Saturday, July 10, 2010

Two States Theory Repudiates the 1992 Consensus and ECFA

Two States Theory Repudiates the 1992 Consensus and ECFAUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2010

The cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) has been signed. The DPP now faces a new political scenario. On the one hand, cross-Strait relations have progressed beyond the point of no return. Taiwan independence has become increasingly unlikely. On the other hand, it is too late for the DPP to call off its campaign to kill ECFA, and disassociate itself from Taiwan independence. In short, the DPP finds itself swimming against the tide, in diametric opposition to the larger currents of history.

The DPP's defeat in the 2008 presidential election led to Tsai Ing-wen's election as DPP chairman. The public and elements within the DPP, once entertained the illusion that the DPP would take advantage of this opportunity to reinvent itself, and get the Taiwan independence monkey off its back. But ECFA showed that the DPP is incapable of divorcing itself from the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen may be the person who finally dashes all hope that the DPP might remake itself. This is the effect ECFA has had on party politics on Taiwan. ECFA's importance should not be underestimated.

For the past two years, Tsai Ing-wen was the person the public hoped would transform the DPP. But as a result of ECFA, Tsai has backslid. She has adopted a scorched earth policy, and a hardline Taiwan independence posture. Any hope that the DPP might transform itself has been completely shattered. Actually, we should not be surprised. In fact, Tsai Ing-wen was the instigator of the "two states theory" during the Lee Teng-hui era, and the person responsible for the repudiation the 1992 Consensus during the Chen Shui-bian era. She was the main reason the cross-Strait policies of both the Lee and Chen regimes ran smack into a brick wall. But because Tsai Ing-wen was merely a staffer at the time, many believed that once she became party chairman she would change. She would help the DPP undergo a transformation. Tsai Ing-wen once said "The DPP is an opposition party with experience in governing." Some concluded that meant she could see the bigger picture, and would not revert to self-destructive policies of the Taiwan independence movement. ECFA however, has inspired the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen to revert to form. Tsai has totally blanked out the disastrous consequences her "two states theory" and her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus had on cross-Strait relations. If anything, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen have intensified their opposition to ECFA.

During the Lee and Chen era, not one day passed without Taiwan independence political maneuveurs leading to confrontation. For example, in 2000, Lee Teng-hui stumped for the Lien-Siew ticket. In order to appeal to supporters of "softcore Taiwan independence," he introduced his "two states theory." A few days later however, he publicly stated that "the two states theory would not be incorporated into the Constitution." In 2004, Chen Shui-bian launched his "anti-missile referendum," which later morphed into a half-baked "missile purchase referendum." In 2006, Chen Shui-bian launched his "end reunification" drive. As a result, Washington demoted his status during transit, and Ah-Bian enacted his "Journey to Nowhere" farce. In 2008, Ah-Bian launched his "referendum to join the UN," only to be publicly condemned by George W. Bush, and labeled a "Taiwan independence element" by the US State Department. Eventually the DPP lost power. The DPP's Taiwan independence tactics exhibit a common pattern. First, they experience a power crisis. Then they escalate their Taiwan independence rhetoric, digging themselves in deeper and deeper, to where they can no longer to turn back, can no longer brake, and wind up driving headlong into a wall.

The DPP's current tactics have followed the same pattern. At first they are unsure about how they should express opposition to ECFA. Tsai Ying-wen loses the debate over ECFA. Now she faces a power crisis. So she escalates her anti-ECFA rhetoric. She refers to the Republic of China as a "government in exile." She characterizes ECFA as a "duet between the KMT and the CCP," and a "class struggle between the rich and poor." She demonizes ECFA. But ECFA is signed, and when its contents are announced, the DPP's demonization campaign backfires. By now however, it is too late to turn back, it is too late to apply the brakes. Therefore they insist that ECFA is "not a treaty," they demand a "line item review," and begin scorched earth resistance tactics. They simultaneously launch a referendum campaign, sinking deeper and deeper in their own quagmire. They find themselves riding a tiger, and unable to get off. They find themselves swimming against the tide, unable to repudiate their anti-ECFA stance in order to win the five cities elections. They may not even be able to reverse their anti-ECFA stance for the 2012 presidential election. They may even find themselves forced to invoke Article XVI and proclaim that ECFA is invalid. The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen are now stuck to their own anti-ECFA tar baby. Under the circumstances, how can the DPP possibility undergo transformation?

Tsai Ing-wen takes a back seat to no one in the DPP when it comes to cross-Strait policy. After all, during her two terms in the Lee and Chen regimes, she racked up considerable hands-on experience in cross-Strait policy. Some people concluded that the tragic consequences of her two states theory" and repudiation of the 1992 Consensus gave Tsai Ing-wen all the more reason to transform the DPP. After all, she clearly knew Taiwan independence was a dead end. Her hands-on experience was painful and unforgettable. When Tsai Ing-wen was first elected party chairman, some of her words and deeds seemed to suggest a desire to transform the party. Who knew the ECFA controversy, followed by a power struggle within the DPP over the party's future, would persuade in Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the DPP's Taiwan independence, scorched earth path?

Within a single lifetime, Tsai Ying-wen led Taiwan to ruin three times. This may end up being Tsai Ing-wen's epitaph. Her "two states theory" spelled the end of the Lee Teng-hui regime. Her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus spelled the end of the Chen Shui-bian regime. Tsai Ing-wen is now holding high the anti-ECFA banner. She may enable the DPP to win the five cities elections. She may even enable the DPP to win the 2012 presidential election. But she cannot prevent Taiwan from running head on into a brick wall. Moreover, the consequences will be far more serious than the consequences of her "two-states theory" and her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus.

Tsai Ying-wen has erred, once, twice, thrice. Why is she unable to learn from her mistakes?

兩國論‧否認九二共識‧反ECFA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.10

兩岸經濟協議(ECFA)簽訂後,民進黨面對新的政治局勢:一方面,兩岸關係已經超越了返折點,台獨已愈不可能;另一方面,民進黨追殺ECFA的政治操作,卻已煞不住車,無法從獨派路線上自我超脫。一句話說明:民進黨已與大局大勢南轅北轍,背道而馳。

二○○八年民進黨的慘敗,與蔡英文當選民進黨主席,曾經在社會上及民進黨內普遍引發一種幻想,認為那是民進黨跳脫台獨路線、轉型蛻變的契機。但是,經由ECFA的考驗,證明了民進黨已無可能從台獨路線跳脫,而蔡英文可能成為民進黨轉型領航者的想像亦告正式幻滅。這是ECFA對台灣政黨政治的重大影響,不容輕估。

無人可以否認,蔡英文是過去兩年民進黨可能轉型蛻變的寄託;如今卻證實她也因ECFA而走回焦土鬥爭的獨派路線,則民進黨轉型蛻變的想像亦告完全破滅。其實,蔡英文在李登輝時代倡議「兩國論」,在陳水扁時代堅持「否認九二共識」,皆是造成李扁二任兩岸政策推車撞壁的主要原因;但當時蔡英文只是幕僚身分,許多人覺得她在成為黨主席後,應當有所調整,引領民進黨轉型蛻變。蔡英文原本說:「民進黨是一個有執政經驗的反對黨。」這句話被解讀成,能識大體,不會回到玉石俱焚的台獨鬥爭。但是,ECFA卻使民進黨及蔡英文回復原形,她儼然完全忘記「兩國論」及「否認九二共識」對兩岸關係造成的慘重創傷;民進黨及蔡英文此時操作ECFA的手法,實已變本加厲。

在李扁二任,台獨操作沒有一次不是推車撞壁。例如:二 ○○○年,李登輝為「連蕭配」輔選,想拉攏「輕獨」選民,推出「兩國論」,後來在幾天之內就公開表示「兩國論不入憲」;二○○四年,陳水扁發動「反飛彈公投」,結果卻成了虎頭蛇尾的「買飛彈公投」;二○○六年,陳水扁發動「終統」,結果美國降低過境禮遇,扁演出「迷航」的鬧劇;二○○八年,扁又發動「入聯公投」,被小布希公開譴責,國務院則逕指其為「台獨分子」,最後民進黨輸掉了政權。這些台獨操作皆呈現一種共同程序:發生權力危機→升高台獨操作→愈陷愈深,不能回頭,煞不住車→推車撞壁。

現在,民進黨對ECFA的操作又進入同一程序:一開始,對如何對抗ECFA,有些猶豫→蔡英文辯論落敗,出現權力危機→升高反ECFA操作→指中華民國是流亡政府→指ECFA是「國共唱和/貧富鬥爭」,將之妖魔化→ECFA簽成,公布內容,民進黨的「妖魔化」操作失敗→不能回頭,煞不住車→主張「不是條約」,堅持「逐條審查」,焦土抗爭→另一路又發動公投,愈陷愈深→騎虎難下,逆向操作,五都反ECFA煞不住車,未來二○一二大選反ECFA也下不了車,甚至可能被迫主張動用第十六條宣布廢約→民進黨及蔡英文被自己的「反ECFA」路線綑綁住→民進黨豈再有轉型蛻變的可能性?

蔡英文對於兩岸政策的鑽研,在民進黨中不作第二人想,畢竟她在李扁二任兩岸政策上皆真正具有第一線的「執政經驗」。有些人曾認為,「兩國論」的失敗,與「否認九二共識」的悲劇後果,皆是蔡英文較有可能引領民進黨轉型蛻變的理由;畢竟,明明已知此路不通,這種「執政經驗」自是創鉅痛深且刻骨銘心。蔡英文任黨主席之初,有些言行也顯得不無轉型蛻變的用心;詎料,一場ECFA爭議,伴隨著民進黨內的權力與路線鬥爭,蔡英文又將民進黨帶向愈陷愈深的台獨焦土路線上。

以一身而竟將台灣連續三次帶上絕路,這或許將成為蔡英文的人生碑記。兩國論,結束了李登輝政權;否認九二共識,結束了陳水扁政權;現在蔡英文又高舉反ECFA的大旗,或許她能因而使民進黨贏得五都選舉,及二○一二總統大選,但她恐怕終究避免不了再將台灣推車撞壁的下場。而且,屆時的後果,必較兩國論及否認九二共識更嚴重萬倍。

一而再,再而三,寧有此理?

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