Monday, November 29, 2010

Defeat Amidst Victory, Victory Amidst Defeat

Defeat Amidst Victory, Victory Amidst Defeat
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 29, 2010

Executive Summary: Regarding the five cities elections, the most incisive observation has been that the KMT experienced "defeat amidst victory", and the DPP "victory amidst defeat." Victory contains the seeds of defeat. Defeat contains the seeds of victory. The KMT has experienced "defeat amidst victory." It should seek victory amidst defeat. The DPP has experienced "victory amidst defeat." It should seek to avoid defeat amidst victory.

Full Text below:

Regarding the five cities elections, the most incisive observation has been that the KMT experienced "defeat amidst victory", and the DPP "victory amidst defeat."

The KMT held onto to three cities in the north. But during its victorious 2008 presidential campaign it received 1.1 million votes more than the DPP. This time it received 400,000 fewer votes than the DPP. Altogether, it received 1.5 million fewer votes than before. In two cities in the south, it suffered landslide defeats. Hence, the characterization, "defeat amidst victory." By contrast, Although the DPP was unable to beat the odds in the north, it received 1.5 million more votes than in 2008. It also made major gains in the number of city council seats held. The two cities in the south remain Green Camp bastions. Hence, the characterization, "victory amidst defeat."

But the night the ballots were tallied, history had already been rewritten. The criteria for victory in the five cities elections, may not be the criteria for victory in the 2012 presidential election. By then, how the candidates are measured against one other may have changed. The issues may have changed. The level on which the campaigns are conducted may have changed. Therefore the criteria for victory may also have changed. When Ma Ying-jeou runs for reelection, will the KMT have lost so many votes since the five cities election, that it will also lose the presidential election? Conversely, will Tsai Ing-wen, assuming she is the DPP candidate, have gained so many votes since the five cities elections that she wins the presidential election? The answer should be clear. Nothing is impossible. But nothing is guaranteed.

The five cities elections are, after all, different from the presidential election. During the recent five cities elections, the DPP avoided all discussion of national identity and cross-Strait issues. But during the presidential election it cannot avoid these two issues. The DPP opposes the "1992 consensus." But during the presidential election, it must reiterate whether it opposes the "1992 consensus." During the five cities elections, the DPP can say that "ECFA is a central government issue." But during the presidential election, the DPP must respond. Does it intend to honor ECFA? If so, how? If it opposes the "1992 consensus, how can it possibly honor ECFA? In the five cities elections, the DPP put its "Platform for the Coming Decade" on hold. But can it refuse to reintroduce it during the presidential election?

The DPP's current "victory" was won mainly on the basis of well-executed campaign tactics, and Tsai Ing-wen's apparently moderate public image. But these were the thinnest of political masks. The DPP has yet to alter either its fundamental ideology or its innate character. Su Tseng-chang held an evening rally to thank supporters in his unsuccessful bid for Taipei Mayor. Hundreds of young people stayed on after the rally concluded. Were they there to listen to the musicians, or to Su Tseng-chang? Clearly the DPP must get back to basics.

The increase in DPP votes can be attributed to the "Deep Green biological mother" plus "swing voters wet nurse" phenomenon mentioned in one of our recent editorials. On the one hand, the DPP's deft campaign tactics attracted a number of swing voters who hope desperately that the DPP will undergo a complete metamorphosis. On the other hand, Chen Chih-chung's "one nation on each side connection" consolidated support from Deep Green Taiwan independence extremists, who remain deeply embedded within the genetic makeup of the DPP. These divergent sources of support and conflicting expectations mean that when the DPP makes appeals to national identity and cross-Strait policy, it is caught on the horns of a dilemma. These internal contradictions will put the party to the test during the 2012 presidential election, at which time it will no longer be able to duck the issues. Therefore, one has to ask whether the victory scored during the five cities elections will be repeated during the presidential election?

The DPP may achieve victory in the 2012 presidential election through sophisticated campaign tactics. But if it continues relying on both its "biological mother" and its "swing voter wet nurse" to win elections, how can it govern while it holds these internal contradictions? Chen Shui-bian's eight year regime was a nightmare. The DPP "won the election, but lost its values." It was a "technical victory, but a substantive defeat." It showed the public that the DPP "knew only how to win elections, but not how to govern the nation." This has always been the case. Suppose the DPP replicates its five cities "victory amidst defeat" during its 2012 presidential campaign? At most it will experience the same fate as Chen Shui-bian. In the end it will merely experience "defeat amidst victory."

Now let's look at the KMT. The Ma administration's most important contribution over the past two and a half years, has been the establishment of a clear framework for national identity and cross-Strait policy. This framework has a close relationship to the survival of Taiwan's economy. It includes the "1992 consensus," "one China, different interpretations," "no reunification, no independence, no use of force," a diplomatic truce, direct flights, allowing Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan, ECFA, and enabling ROC citizens to visit over 100 countries without the need for visas. This framework may be imperfect. It may involve well-recognized risks. But the ROC has no alternative. By contrast, Taiwan Independence is utterly infeasible. It is a concept fast being relegated to the history books. So why are so many people still addicted to Taiwan independence ideology?

The Ma administration should apply itself to the following policies. On the one hand it must explain to the public on Taiwan how such a framework defends their interests and upholds their dignity. It must persuade people through deeds. On the other hand it must increase public support for our national identity as ROC citizens, and increase public discussion of cross-Strait issues. If it allows the DPP to monopolize the role of "champion of Taiwan" and to obtain a patent on "loving Taiwan," it will never be able to allay Deep Green concerns about "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." The KMT lost many hearts and minds in the south. The Ma administration's policies may be correct. But it may lose the presidential election nevertheless. As mentioned earlier, Chen Shui-bian "won the election, but lose the DPP's values." Ma Ying-jeou could "retain the KMT's values, but lose the election."

Victory contains the seeds of defeat. Defeat contains the seeds of victory. The KMT has experienced "defeat amidst victory." It should seek victory amidst defeat. The DPP has experienced "victory amidst defeat." It should seek to avoid defeat amidst victory.

勝中有敗.敗中有勝
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.11.29


關於五都選舉,也許最獲人心的一句評論是:國民黨勝中有敗,民進黨敗中有勝。

國民黨穩住了北三都,但總得票數自二○○八年總統大選在此區大勝一一○萬票,變成倒輸四十萬票,來回流失了一五○萬票,且在南二都崩盤慘敗。這自是「勝中有敗」。相對而言,民進黨雖未能使北三都翻盤,但總得票數相較於二○○八年增長了一五○萬票,又在市議會席次有長足增進,南二都更是從綠營的鐵板一塊變成一堵銅牆鐵壁。這自是「敗中有勝」。

然而,就在開票當夜,歷史已經翻頁。五都選舉的勝敗標準,未必能繼續成為一年四個月後二○一二總統大選的勝敗標準。屆時,候選人的對照效應變了,選舉議題變了,選舉層次變了;因而,或許勝敗的標準也會改變。也就是說,到時候,國民黨(馬英九競選連任)會不會延續五都選舉輸掉總得票數而輸掉總統大選?或民進黨(蔡英文是候選人)會不會延續五都選舉贏得總得票數而贏得總統大選?任人皆知的答案是:不無可能,但也未必如此。

因為,五都選舉畢竟與總統大選不同。比如說,民進黨在此次選舉中,將國家定位及兩岸議題完全遮蔽掩蓋,避而不談;但面對總統大選,卻無可能迴避這兩大議題。例如:民進黨現今反對「九二共識」,但到總統大選,卻必須再說一次究竟反不反對「九二共識」?在五都選舉中,民進黨可以說「ECFA是中央議題」;但在總統大選中,民進黨卻必須回答,是否延續ECFA及如何延續(反對「九二共識」能延續ECFA嗎)?在五都選舉中,民進黨可將「十年政綱」擱置,但難道能到總統大選還不端出來?

民進黨此次的「勝」,主要是勝在選舉技術演出的精妙,及由蔡英文主導的在氣質形象上的感染力。但是,這畢竟只是如一張面具搬地膚淺,未能根本改善民進黨的主體論述與內在本質。只要看蘇貞昌落選謝票晚會最後留下的數百青年群眾,已分不清他們是因樂團的感應而來或是為蘇貞昌而來,即知民進黨還是要回頭練一練紮實的基本功。

民進黨選票增加,或許印證了日前社論所說「深綠親娘」加「中間選民奶媽」的共育現象。一方面民進黨精妙的選舉操作所吸引來的游離選民,對民進黨深寄轉型蛻變的期望;另一方面,例如陳致中「一邊一國連線」深綠極獨的強固勢力,仍然深植在民進黨的神髓血脈之中。這種「分裂的支持」與「分裂的期許」,使得民進黨在道德號召、國家定位及兩岸政策上,皆陷於左支右絀的兩難之境。而此類矛盾錯亂,在二○一二總統大選中,皆將面臨考驗,無可閃躲。那麼,此次五都選舉民進黨在總得票數上的勝利,難道也能在總統大選中重現?

進一步說,民進黨亦不無可能在二○一二總統大選因選舉技術的精妙操作而致勝。但是,倘若仍然是憑藉「親娘/奶媽」的共育而贏得選舉,則如何以此種矛盾錯亂的體質執政?陳水扁八年主政「贏了選舉/輸了路線」的噩夢,正是「技術勝利/本質失敗」及「只會選舉/不會治國」的慘痛寫照。倘係如此,民進黨即使延續五都選舉的「敗中有勝」,而贏得了二○一二總統大選,那也將只是複製了陳水扁的宿命,而仍將走到「勝中有敗」的下場。

回頭看國民黨。馬政府兩年半來最重大的表現,是在國家定位及兩岸政策上建築了明確的架構;而此一架構又與台灣的經濟生路密切相關。從「九二共識/一中各表」、「不統/不獨/不武」、外交休兵,到直航、陸客來台、ECFA,百國免簽證……;這個架構雖絕非十全十美,且其中更隱伏了任人皆知的風險,卻仍是台灣別無他途的選擇。相較而言,台獨可謂已是全無可能實現的歷史名詞,但為何仍有那麼多人沉溺於台獨的情愫之中?

馬政府應當致力的是:一方面努力體現此一架構給台灣人民帶來的利益與尊嚴,用實際政績說服人民;另一方面亦當深化關於國家認同與兩岸關係的討論,否則,如果仍讓民進黨壟斷「台灣代言人」及「愛台灣」的政治專利,又不能扭轉深綠「親中賣台」的疑慮,而出現了像南二都這般天塌地陷般的民心流失;則即使馬政府的政策是正確的,卻也不無可能輸掉大選。如前所述,陳水扁是「贏了選舉/輸了路線」,馬英九則不無可能「贏了路線/輸了選舉」。

勝敗相倚,吉凶相伏。國民黨勝中有敗,應謀敗中求勝之道;民進黨敗中有勝,則應避勝中猶敗之險。

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