Establish a Cross-Strait Arbitration Center

Establish a Cross-Strait Arbitration Center
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2010

The sixth Chiang-Chen summit will soon convene. One of the issues that has been attracting the most attention is whether concrete progress can be made on the cross-Strait investment protection agreement. The ultimate goal of course is the signing of an Investment protection agreement. Before one begins promoting investments, one must first reach an agreement concerning concrete mechanisms for investment protection. Such mechanisms are a prerequisite for investor confidence.

Based on the experience of Taiwan-based businessmen who have invested on the Mainland, the first priority is a bilateral investment protection agreement. This will help when one attempts to promote government mandated compensation. The economic strength of the public sector on the Mainland still far exceeds that of the private sector. When Taiwan-based businessmen invest on the Mainland, the most commonly encountered obstacle is official intervention in the private economy. This intervention is not necessarily under the official aegis of the government. But local governments or public authorities often resort to various means to deprive Taiwan-based businessmen of their rights, nullifying licenses that have already been approved, and depriving them of land, factories, or proxy rights they have already acquired, Under nations governed by the rule of law, these are referred to as "quasi-levies." They are another form of levy. Financial compensation should be provided via a public or quasi-public levy.

Taiwan-based businessmen have run into problems with levies or quasi-levies. Mainland capital entering Taiwan will surely encounter the same problems in the future. This is a problem for both sides, and a source of friction between investors and the government. When one of the parties involved is the government, the use of local dispute settlement procedures is apt to raise doubts about whether the administration of justice is even-handed. The use of arbitration procedures not involving the exercise of sovereignty would be more appropriate. Such issues should be dealt with in accordance with international standards. One method would be to resolve them through arbitration by the World Bank International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The International Convention has established arbitration mechanisms. But years ago cross-Strait disputes over participation in international organizations and sovereignty led to Taipei's exclusion from the convention. If consultations begin on the cross-Strait investment protection agreement, it will be tantamount to substantive negotiations on the two sides' political and diplomatic status. Would this be consistent with putting trade matters first and setting aside disputes over sovereignty? It would not, and would render such an approach impracticable.

Premier Wu Den-yih recently told reporters that the cross-Strait investment protection agreement should be classified as "international arbitration" in order to protect investments by Taiwan-based businessmen. But he admits that the term is a sensitive one for the other side. So-called "international arbitration" can be referred to the World Bank's international investment dispute settlement mechanism. It can also be referred to private arbitration institutions. The difference is that the former would be based on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes signed by national governments. The latter would be based on a bilateral agreement, and rely on private arbitration within the affected nation or nations. Our side has proposed arbitration by the Paris based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). A cross-Strait investment protection agreement consistent with the international arbitration mechanism established by the International Convention is unlikely. An agreement to submit disputes to arbitration by foreign non-governmental organizations is also sure to provoke a politically sensitive reaction. As Premier Wu said, that too can be expected.

A natural question arises. Foreign nations such as France are not the only ones that have private arbitration entities capable of handling foreign disputes. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait have their own highly experienced arbitration entities. Taiwan-based businessmen have resorted to remote and expensive private foreign arbitration institutions. Why not rely on close by cross-Strait investment arbitration institutions for the arbitration of disputes? Consider the concerns of Taiwan-based businessmen. One of their concerns is the Mainland's Arbitration Commission. The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission is one of the world's leading international investment arbitration entities. But it differs from purely private arbitration entities on Taiwan and in other countries. The Mainland's Arbitration Commission has quasi-official status. Suppose Taiwan-based businessmen become embroiled in disputes with local governments over quasi-levies. They cannot help being concerned about a lack of impartiality and favoritism toward local governments. This is something the two sides must consider when discussing options for a cross-Strait investment protection arbitration mechanism.

Other arbitration mechanisms for cross-Strait investment protection agreements are possible. One need not adopt the arbitration mechanism of the World Bank Convention for Investment Disputes. One can merely follow their example. The two sides can resort to existing arbitration institutions. With assistance from competent authorities on the two sides, the two sides can establish a center specifically for the arbitration of investment disputes between investors and local governments. This new arbitration center would have its own set of arbitration rules. It would have a sufficient number of qualified arbitrators. They would include internationally respected arbitrators whom both sides could accept as impartial and neutral.

The most important purpose of an investment protection agreement is the adequate protection of investors who require arbitration. The intention must be to avoid issues of political sovereignty. When discussing options for arbitration mechanisms, negotiators must see the big picture. They must focus on solving practical problems. They must avoid becoming mired in controversies in which one can no longer see the forest for the trees.

兩岸何不設立聯合仲裁中心
2010-12-07 中國時報

兩岸第六次江陳會即將啟動，這其中最受矚目的議題，應該就是兩岸投資保障協議能否夠取得具體進展了。投資保障協議的簽署，終極目的當然是促進。但是，在進入促進投資的議題之前，必須先從投資保障的具體機制達成協議談起，以之做為建立投資信心，進而促進投資措施的前提。

根據台商過去在對岸投資的經驗，首要透過兩岸投資保障協議做為屏障者，當推政府徵收補償的問題。由於對岸仍是處於公有經濟實力遠在私有經濟之上的狀態，台商在對岸的投資活動，最常遇到的障礙就是公權力以各種形式或方式介入私經濟經營領域，即使不使用公共徵收的名義，當地政府或公權力部門，經常以各種方式，讓台商實質喪失原已獲得許可而擁有的土地、廠房、企業股權或是經營權；在法治國度中，這類的行為稱之為「準徵收」，也是徵收的一種，應該由實施徵收或準徵收的公部門提供經濟補償。

過去台商在對岸遇到徵收或準徵收的問題，將來陸資入台，也會產生一樣的風險顧慮。這是雙邊的問題，又是投資者與政府之間發生的糾紛或爭議，由於涉及的一造是政府，運用當地的訴訟程序解決爭端，極易產生是否胳膊向裡彎的司法信心問題，訴諸不涉及主權行使的仲裁程序，其實更為適宜。國際間標準的處理模式之一，就是透過世界銀行的國際投資爭端解決中心的仲裁機制加以解決。然而此項根據國際公約建立的仲裁機制，若干年前由於國際參與所涉及的兩岸主權爭議，使得台灣已非該項公約的締約國，兩岸投資保障協議若是就此選項進行協商，將與直接從事實質政治外交性質的談判無異，是否符合經貿先行、擱置政治主權爭議的架構協議基調，不無疑義，恐怕也不切實際。

吳敦義院長日前在媒體面前說，兩岸投保協議，應該納入「國際仲裁」以保障台商投資，但也坦承對岸對此用語十分敏感。此中所謂「國際仲裁」，可以指涉世界銀行的國際投資爭端解決機制，也可以指涉民間的國際仲裁機構，所不同的是，前者是根據各國已經簽訂的投資爭端公約而設置的公約仲裁機制，後者則是要由投保協議的雙方同意採用各國的民間仲裁機構，我方提出的一個選擇是位於巴黎的國際商會（ＩＣＣ）仲裁。兩岸在投資保障協議中商訂使用國際公約設定的公約仲裁機制，固屬不可期待；雙方協議將爭端交付外國的民間仲裁機構，產生一定的政治敏感反應，確如吳楑所言，也在意料之中。

一個很自然的疑問是，有能力處理涉外事務仲裁的民間仲裁機構，不只外國（如法國）有，兩岸也各自具備富有經驗也富有能力的仲裁機構，與其讓台商千里迢迢使用價格昂貴的外國民間仲裁機構，為何不就近利用兩岸各自的仲裁機構辦理相關的投資爭端仲裁？站在台商的立場，值得提出的關切是，對岸的仲裁委員會，即使是在世界上辦理跨國投資仲裁案件量首屈一指的中國國際經濟貿易仲裁委員會，也與其他國家乃至台灣的仲裁機關，性質上是純民間的仲裁機關，不盡相同。對岸的仲裁委員會，都具有某種準官方機構的性質，對於台商與當地政府發生投資爭端（例如準徵收）進行仲裁，台商仍然不免發生偏袒當地政府而有公正性不足的顧慮。這一點確實是兩岸在洽商投資保障協議，討論仲裁機制選項時所應思考的問題。

另一種可能的方向則是，在兩岸投資保障協議之中，針對仲裁機制的選擇，另闢蹊徑，不去採用世銀投資爭端公約的仲裁機制，但是仿效其思路，由兩岸自行透過既有的仲裁機關，在兩岸主管機關的協助下，聯合設立專門解決兩岸投資者與當地政府間投資爭端的仲裁中心。這個新的仲裁中心，可以有一套自備的仲裁規則，一張人數充足的合格仲裁人員名單（其中可以包括國際知名的仲裁人在內），以及兩岸皆可接受為公正中立的配套仲裁機制。

投資保障協議最重要的目的就是充分保障投資者，訴諸仲裁，原就是要擱置或避開政治主權的障礙。討論仲裁機制的選項，談判者務必應從大處著眼，儘量以解決實際問題為關注焦點，也儘可能避免任何陷入捨本逐末的爭議中。