Cross-Strait Security Cooperation Should Begin with DialogueChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 31, 2010
Beijing issued another statement yesterday. Its national defense sector explored the possibility of cross-Strait military confidence-building measures. It suggested "proceeding step by step, doing the easy things first," predicated upon the One China Principle. Because the five cities elections are approaching, the Ma administration will probably respond cautiously, hoping to minimize any negative effect on the year-end elections. But in the wake of ECFA and direct links, the two sides will find it difficult to avoid "non-traditional security cooperation." The government may wish to look at the issue of cross-Strait military confidence-building measures from this perspective.
The cross-Strait military confidence-building measures members of the public are most concerned about have to do with "traditional security." They worry about undermined sovereignty, Washington/Taipei arms sales, a reduced ability to defend Taiwan and Penghu, and a lowering of our guard. But merely initiating a dialogue on security cooperation involves none of the above risks. It can be both easy and gradual. Based on three links, it would consist mainly of "non-traditional security measures" such as humanitarian relief, maritime rescue, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, and environmental protection issues. It is referred to as the SCFA, or Cross-Strait Security Cooperation Framework, and is a matter of considerable urgency, since maritime accidents can occur at any moment.
In October 2008, for the first time since three mini-links between Kinmen and Xiamen were established, the two sides held joint martime rescue exercises. The main impetus was the fire which broke out on the mainland vessel Tongan, while it was docking at Kinmen. At the time there was no cross-Strait cooperation mechanism. Panic ensued. Only after Xiamen deployed emergency firefighters was a tragedy averted. In order to prevent any further such eventualities, the two sides finally decided to hold maritime rescue exercises. Unfortunately they ran out of steam, and cross-Strait cooperation has yet to be normalized.
In January 2001, the two sides implemented "mini three links" between Kinmen and Xiamen. Over the next seven years, 2.55 million passengers crossed over. During all that time, not a single major shipwreck occurred. But with increased exchanges, who can say that nothing will go wrong in the future? In particular, now that ECFA has been signed, the volume of traffic between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Mainland is likely to exceed expectations. The slightest carelessness could lead to an accident at any time. If the two sides fail to establish a cross-Strait mechanism for maritime cooperation, the consequences could be unimaginable.
The worst case scenario would be a maritime or air disaster involving one of our ships or planes. Suppose the other side arrives on scene first. It completes rescue operations, safely returns our disaster victims, then engages in wholesale self-promotion, while our side is seen as having done nothing. What will the public on Taiwan think? They might begin asking why they should pay for such a vast yet useless defense establishment. Such an incident would have a greater impact on public morale than guided missiles.
In addition to maritime security, the two sides must face the challenges posed by pirate attacks and terrorism. On June 16, the International Maritime Bureau issued warnings about piracy in the South China Sea. Pirates frequently hijack vessels in the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia. The Strait of Malacca has become a "Second Gulf of Aden." Many waters in the South China Sea are not patrolled. They have become pirate havens. Some coastal countries turn a blind eye to rampant piracy. This encourages even greater lawlessness on the part of the pirates. The situation is now out of control.
To combat piracy, the International Maritime Bureau expects Mainland China to do something similar to what has been done in the Gulf of Aden -- send warships to escort commercial vessels in the South China Sea. There is reason to believe that once Mainland China acts, it will be even more aggressive than in the Gulf of Aden. Such escort operations could encroach on sovereign waters.
Failure to reach a prior understanding and establish a mechanism for maritime humanitarian relief is likely to marginalize us on security issues in the South China Sea. Once a mechanism for cross-Strait cooperation is established, emergency rescue can no longer be one-way. It will require two-way communications, consultation, and decision-making. At most distinctions will be made between first and second responders. But neither side will be completely shut out.
The Ma administration desperately needs to reach an agreement over ECFA. Above all, ECFA will enable us to sign FTAs with other countries. Similarly, the establishment of a cross-Strait maritime security mechanism will enable Taipei to participate in regional security operations. The establishment of cross-Strait "non-traditional security" will help strengthen direct links. It may also reduce concerns in neighboring countries.
How should we proceed? We have three paths before us. First, we have "mini three links" maritime and air traffic safety. The two sides can hold regular cross-Strait search and rescue exercises. Vessels at the local government level can participate in joint operations, transitioning later to paramilitary operations. ROC Coast Guard vessels can participate in joint operations with the other side's public safety vessels and other armed vessels. We can move toward normalization, and promote cross-Strait confidence.
Secondly, we have "three links" maritime and air traffic safety. The two sides can dispatch paramilitary vessels to high seas not in dispute, or the Western Taiwan Strait SAR, to monitor from the sidelines, building cross-strait trust.
Thirdly, we have South China Sea maritime safety. The South China Sea contains economic zones around islands held by the two sides. The two sides can work together to protect marine ecological resources. They can participate in humanitarian relief efforts, anti-piracy efforts, and anti-terrorism efforts. They can maintain the smooth flow of maritime traffic, and reduce the concerns of neighboring countries. The two sides can work together on fisheries policy. Paramilitary vessels can provide backup and escort for fishing vessels. The two sides can set up an information exchange support center. They can resort to a two-pronged approach, moving from cross implementation to parallel implementation.
So-called "non-traditional security" has become an important aspect of international security. It also offers opportunities for cross-Strait security cooperation. Time waits for no man. Cross-Strait maritime rescue exercises can be staged at any time. We urge the government to make advance preparations.
兩岸在「安全協作」上應啟動對話了
2010-07-31
中國時報
北京國防部門日昨就兩岸探討建立軍事互信機制再度發言，呼籲在「一個中國」原則的基礎上，按「先易後難、循序漸進」的方式進行。由於五都選舉逼近，相信馬政府會謹慎回應，避免衝擊年底選情。但隨著ＥＣＦＡ後大三通的全面交往，兩岸在「非傳統安全」領域的協作難以避免，政府不妨從這個角度看待兩岸軍事互信的問題。
目前最讓民眾疑慮的兩岸軍事互信，主要在「傳統安全」領域，擔心主權受損，動搖美台軍售，削弱台澎防衛能力，進而卸我心防。但「安全協作」啟動對話，沒有以上顧慮，既「先易」又「漸進」，主要以三通為基礎，以「非傳統安全」（人道救援、海上應急救難、反恐、反海盜和環境生態保護等）為主要內涵，姑且稱之 SCFA（兩岸安全Security協作框架）。這在時空上不僅有緊迫感，海上意外也隨時可能發生。
二○○八年十月，兩岸首次在金廈小三通航線舉行海上救難協作演練，主要起於該年二月大陸同安輪停靠金門碼頭時發生大火，當時兩岸並無協作機制，一陣慌亂，廈門緊急調派消防力量增援，才免去一場悲劇。為預防起見，雙方終於促成年底的海上救難協作演練，可惜後繼無力，兩岸協作並未常態化。
二○○一年元月兩岸實施金廈小三通，七年內運載旅客達二五五萬多人次，期間未發生大的船難事件，今後隨人員往來的增加，誰能擔保萬無一失？尤其，ＥＣＦＡ通過後，兩岸大三通的人員流量和航線之多，都有可能超過預期規畫，稍有不慎，意外隨時可能發生，兩岸若不及早建立海上協作機制，後果難以想像。
最糟糕情況是，我方船（空）難萬一發生，對岸早先掌握，並搶先一步救援，再把我方受難人員安然送返，大肆宣傳，而我方毫無作為。國內民眾會怎麼想？民意何須支持龐大而無用的國防開支！這種影響對台灣民心士氣打擊，尤勝於飛彈。
除了航運安全問題，兩岸同時面對海盜襲擊和反恐考驗。六月十六日，國際海事局發布南海海盜警報，麻六甲海峽及東南亞海域船隻頻遭海盜劫持，成為「第二個亞丁灣」，且南海的很多海域處於真空地帶，淪為海盜天堂，一些沿海國家對海盜橫行視若無睹，助長海盜的氣燄，情勢有失控之虞。
為打擊海盜，國際海事局有關負責人期待中國能有所作為，如亞丁灣做法，派艦隊到南海護航。有理由相信，中國一旦出手，必將扮演比亞丁灣更為積極的角色，有可能主導某個關鍵並涉及主權海域的護航行動。
在此之前，我方若不能和對岸取得默契，建立海上人道救援機制，日後很可能在南海安全議題上被邊緣化。兩岸一旦建立協作機制，應援救急就不能單向而為，需雙方通聯、協商並決定救援處理方式，頂多有主從之分，另一方不會被完全孤立。
馬政府亟需與對岸達成ＥＣＦＡ，考慮之一是便於與他國簽署ＦＴＡ；同樣的，兩岸達成某種程度的海上安全協作機制，亦可作為台灣參與地區安全協作的一種中介，雙方以「非傳統安全」為內涵，既有助於強固兩岸三通，又可降低周邊國家的疑慮。
怎麼做？眼前就有三條路徑。其一、以「小三通」航線安全為主，兩岸定期舉行海上救難搜救演練，雙方參與船隻由地方政府向準軍事層級過渡，我方派海巡署船隻與對岸公安或武警船隻協力演練，使其常態化，增進兩岸互信。
其二、以「大三通」航線安全為主，雙方選定不具敏感性公海，或先以海西特區往返船隻為主，雙方派準軍事船隻從旁監護，累積兩岸互信。
其三、以「南海」航線安全為主，地點在南海範圍內，兩岸掌握島嶼周邊的經濟海域，進行人道救援、反海盜及反恐，保持海上生命線暢通等演練，兩岸亦可協力維護海洋生態資源。為減少周邊國家疑慮，兩岸協力以漁政船隻為主，準軍事船隻擔任後勤與監護為輔，雙方設立訊息互通暨支援中心，由交叉實施到併行實施，雙管齊下。
「非傳統安全」逐漸成為國際安全領域的重要議題，亦為兩岸的安全協作提供契機。時不我待，兩岸海上救難協作隨時可能上演。在此呼籲政府，應及早因應準備。
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Friday, July 30, 2010
The Meaning behind DPP Factional Struggles
The Meaning behind DPP Factional StrugglesUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2010
Four years ago, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) declared that it was dissolving its factions. But the main attraction during the DPP's recent plenary meeting was factional infighting and quid pro quo deal-making. As long as the DPP's factional infighting persists, the DPP will to remain a party that spins its wheels and goes nowhere. As long as the DPP's factional infighting contaminates its immediate surroundings, Taiwan will remain a society that spin its wheels and goes nowhere.
The recent restructuring of the Central Standing Committee has led to three results. One. The Chen Shui-bian camp has been annihilated. Two. The influence of party elders and hardline Taiwan independence elements has declined. Three. The New Tide faction, the Su Tseng-chang camp, and the Green Friendship Alliance have become the biggest winners. This outcome suggests that Chen Shui-bian no longer has the werewithal to stir up trouble within the party. That said, the DPP has yet to emerge from the shadow of Chen Shui-bian. In other words, the strategic scenario has experienced a minor and temporary shift due to the Five Cities Elections. The party has yet to take a long, hard look at its party line. What the changes in the Central Standing Committee signify remains unclear.
Consider the Chen Shui-bian camp. Members of Chen's Justice Alliance can only run for their lives. During the May party representatives election, the New Tide faction and the Frank Hsieh camp ganged up on the Justice Alliance. As a result Luo Wen-chia and Huang Ching-ling were routed. Yu Cheng-hsien defected to the Chen Chu camp. Chen Chi-mai joined the Frank Hsieh camp. As the situation stands, it makes no difference how much of a fight Chen Shui-bian might put up. His influence over the DPP leadership has evaporated.
Consider the party elders. Trong Chai is the only member of this faction with a seat on the Central Standing Committee, He is already finding it hard to promote his agenda. Annette Lu badly misjudged the situation when she aligned herself with the party elders during a recent crisis. She no longer has any chance of remaining on the Central Standing Committee. Carelessness spelled defeat for the "Old White Rabbit." The Chen Shui-bian faction suffered a humiliating defeat. The problem however, is that Chen Shui-bian, Annette Lu, the party elders, and hardline Taiwan independence elements have basked in the limelight for too many years. They are not about to retire quietly from the battlefield. That much we know beforehand.
The old soldiers have gradually fallen by the wayside, howling in anguish. Ho Chi-wei, an complete unknown, has been elected to the Central Standing Committee. That was the most interesting development during the recent plenary meeting. Ho Chi-wei is thirty-something. Were he not the son of Hsueh Ling, what chance would he have had? As it is, he was a shoo-in for Central Standing Committee memership the moment he announced his candidacy. Factional struggles within the DPP are a cold-blooded affair. But they also involve subtle gamesmanship. Rivals don't confront each other directly. They don't concern themselves with belief systems. They "rise above" political ideology. They care only about power. Ability, integrity, and ideology must kowtow before the power of conglomerates. DPP leaders may spout high-minded green ideology. But they meekly tolerate these plutocrats in their midst. The scene is so tranquil, but the implications are so thought-provoking.
In addition to Ho Chi-wei, Yen Hsiao-ching, a forty-something with the New Tide faction was elected to the Central Standing Committee. By a one vote margin, he edged out an indignant Annette Lu. For the New Tide faction this may have been a windfall. But for the party, it was merely a further debasement of Central Standing Committee membership. The New Tide faction has cultivated fresh talent for years. It has a protocol for orderly generational secession. Four years after the "dissolution of factions," the New Tide faction is alive and kicking. Other factions can only look on enviously. But consider the larger interests of the party. The Chen family was an albatross around its neck. The party has rid itself of that albatross. It stands at a new watershed. What lies on the other side of the ridge? Even the DPP leadership doesn't know.
During the recent plenary meeting the New Tide faction/Su Tseng-chang camp faction scored a major victory. No one was surprised. But lest we forget, the same scenario played out once before in 2006. The Chen family was engaged in runaway corruption. The public was starting to complain. Premier Su Tseng-chang, supported by the New Tide faction, emerged victorious. The theme of that plenary meeting was "an honest face, a bold vision," Ironically, it insisted on covering up for Ah-Bian. Even more ironically, Ah-Bian eventually ordered the dissolution of factions, and ganged up on the New Tide faction. Frank Hsieh and Chen Shui-bian ganged up on an overexposed Su Tseng-chang, and forced him to relinquish his 2008 presidential campaign.
Four years later, the New Tide faction and the Su Tseng-chang camp have recaptured the Central Standing Committee. But who knows whether this formidable strategic alliance will remain following the year-end elections? Will factional disputes during the elections result in backstabbling? Frank Hsieh would rather break his promise than lose his central role on the political stage. The moves he and the other factions make should be closely monitored. Su Tseng-chang asked Chang Hong-lu to relinquish his Central Standing Committee seat, and give it to Chen Ming-wen. Superficially, this was a generous gesture. In fact, it was motivated by selfish calculation. If Su Tseng-chang had not preemptively seized the candidacy for Taipei mayor, how much momentum would he still have today? Meanwhile, Tsai Ing-wen must guard against Frank Hsieh, and not repeat the mistakes Su once made.
The theme of the recent plenary meeting was "a glorious and blessed new generation." Each of the five cities mayoral candidates staged photo ops, with them holding the hands of young children. The atmosphere oozed warmth. But four years ago, when the theme of the plenary meeting was "boldness and vision" its sole accomplishment was the coverup of Chen Shui-bian's corruption and an open power struggle. The DPP put on quite a show. But the public was hardly impressed by what it saw.
民進黨派系鬥爭中掩映的景色
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.30 03:18 am
宣告解散派系四年，民進黨此次全代會的主要戲碼仍是派系角力和換票交易。只要民進黨的派系鬥爭不止，民進黨就注定是一「內耗空轉」的政黨；再經民進黨將內部矛盾向外部投射，台灣也就注定是一「內耗空轉」的社會。
這次中常會改組主要結果有三：一是扁系人馬幾全軍覆沒；二是公媽派及急獨派式微；三是新潮流、蘇系和綠色友誼連線成最大贏家。這個結局，可解讀為陳水扁已失去在黨內興風作浪的力量，但要說民進黨已擺脫了阿扁陰影附身的大形勢，恐怕還嫌太早。亦即，這只是隨五都選戰移轉的小形勢，派系暫時變化隊形，但黨並未就路線問題作出嚴肅檢討，中常會結構變化也就看不出明確意義。
就扁系而言，「正義連線」旗下人馬只能作鳥獸散。五月間的黨部主委改選，即已出現新系和謝系合作圍剿扁系的現象；再經此役，羅文嘉、黃慶林潰敗，余政憲投靠菊營，陳其邁轉與謝系合作。情勢至此，不管阿扁再如何作困獸之鬥，他在黨中央的殘餘已被掏盡。
再看公媽派，僅蔡同榮在中常會維持一席，已難掩力不從心。呂秀蓮在關鍵時刻選擇與公媽派結盟，是嚴重的判斷失誤，結果把自己晉身中常會的機會都敗掉。「老白兔」大意失荊州，狼狽不遜扁系的潰敗。問題是，扁蓮、公媽派和急獨派等享受過多年榮光的大老們，都不會甘心將自己的戰績簿束諸高閣，就此退出江湖，這也是可以預見的發展。
在老將紛紛落馬的哀吼中，名不見經傳的何志偉一舉當選中常委，堪稱此次全代會最耐人尋味的景象。年方卅的何志偉，若非薛凌之子，何德何能，一宣布角逐，便將中常委職位手到擒來？在民進黨冷酷的派系廝殺中，存在著一種柔性遊戲，不假刀槍、不問信仰，只在超乎政治理念的交往中論斤兩；在財團的實力之前，資歷、操守、路線皆須稱臣。從民進黨這一隅「綠色友誼」櫥窗，掩映著黨內資產階層的綺麗風光，如此祥和，又如此耐人尋味。
除何志偉，六年級的顏曉菁靠著新系的眼明手快，以一票奪下中常委，氣走呂秀蓮。對新潮流而言，這是意外收穫；但對黨而言，卻是貶低了中常委的政治分量。新潮流以其平日的深耕，展現整齊的世代梯隊，在「解散派系」四年後依然一尾活龍，這是其他派系所難望項背。但從黨的大局看，甩掉扁家包袱之後，分水嶺的另一頭是什麼風景，恐怕黨中央自己也不十分了然。
「新、蘇」聯軍在全代會大獲全勝，其實並不令人意外。但別忘了，同樣的戲碼，在二○○六年即已上演過一回。當時扁家貪瀆露端倪，社會各界正開始聲討，蘇揆在新潮流的簇擁下燦爛勝出。諷刺的是，那次全代會主軸是「誠實面對、勇敢前瞻」，卻一心為阿扁護航，最後更下令「解散派系」。結果新潮流慘遭圍剿，鋒芒太露的蘇貞昌則遭長扁聯手打壓，把角逐二○○八總統的資格拱手讓人。
四年之後，新潮流和蘇系再度征服中常會，但誰知道這樣壯闊的軍容，在年底選戰結束後是否仍能維持？或者，會不會在選舉中即遭其他派系紛起扯其後腿？謝長廷寧願違背承諾，也不願失去自己站在政治舞台中央的角色，他和其他派系合縱連橫的動向值得觀察。但就像蘇貞昌要求張宏陸將中常委讓位給陳明文，表面豁然大度，其實充滿心機；其實，若非蘇貞昌先下手搶了北市的選戰位置，他今天哪有這樣的氣勢和餘裕？面向小英，同時提防背後的長仔，這是蘇貞昌不能重蹈的覆轍。
這次全代會主軸為「光榮幸福新一代」，五都候選人逐一牽著幼童出場，充分展現溫情氣息。但想到四年前標榜「勇敢前瞻」的全代會最後卻演出大護航和大內鬥，民進黨的表演藝術，也就教人興味索然了。
A Translation
July 30, 2010
Four years ago, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) declared that it was dissolving its factions. But the main attraction during the DPP's recent plenary meeting was factional infighting and quid pro quo deal-making. As long as the DPP's factional infighting persists, the DPP will to remain a party that spins its wheels and goes nowhere. As long as the DPP's factional infighting contaminates its immediate surroundings, Taiwan will remain a society that spin its wheels and goes nowhere.
The recent restructuring of the Central Standing Committee has led to three results. One. The Chen Shui-bian camp has been annihilated. Two. The influence of party elders and hardline Taiwan independence elements has declined. Three. The New Tide faction, the Su Tseng-chang camp, and the Green Friendship Alliance have become the biggest winners. This outcome suggests that Chen Shui-bian no longer has the werewithal to stir up trouble within the party. That said, the DPP has yet to emerge from the shadow of Chen Shui-bian. In other words, the strategic scenario has experienced a minor and temporary shift due to the Five Cities Elections. The party has yet to take a long, hard look at its party line. What the changes in the Central Standing Committee signify remains unclear.
Consider the Chen Shui-bian camp. Members of Chen's Justice Alliance can only run for their lives. During the May party representatives election, the New Tide faction and the Frank Hsieh camp ganged up on the Justice Alliance. As a result Luo Wen-chia and Huang Ching-ling were routed. Yu Cheng-hsien defected to the Chen Chu camp. Chen Chi-mai joined the Frank Hsieh camp. As the situation stands, it makes no difference how much of a fight Chen Shui-bian might put up. His influence over the DPP leadership has evaporated.
Consider the party elders. Trong Chai is the only member of this faction with a seat on the Central Standing Committee, He is already finding it hard to promote his agenda. Annette Lu badly misjudged the situation when she aligned herself with the party elders during a recent crisis. She no longer has any chance of remaining on the Central Standing Committee. Carelessness spelled defeat for the "Old White Rabbit." The Chen Shui-bian faction suffered a humiliating defeat. The problem however, is that Chen Shui-bian, Annette Lu, the party elders, and hardline Taiwan independence elements have basked in the limelight for too many years. They are not about to retire quietly from the battlefield. That much we know beforehand.
The old soldiers have gradually fallen by the wayside, howling in anguish. Ho Chi-wei, an complete unknown, has been elected to the Central Standing Committee. That was the most interesting development during the recent plenary meeting. Ho Chi-wei is thirty-something. Were he not the son of Hsueh Ling, what chance would he have had? As it is, he was a shoo-in for Central Standing Committee memership the moment he announced his candidacy. Factional struggles within the DPP are a cold-blooded affair. But they also involve subtle gamesmanship. Rivals don't confront each other directly. They don't concern themselves with belief systems. They "rise above" political ideology. They care only about power. Ability, integrity, and ideology must kowtow before the power of conglomerates. DPP leaders may spout high-minded green ideology. But they meekly tolerate these plutocrats in their midst. The scene is so tranquil, but the implications are so thought-provoking.
In addition to Ho Chi-wei, Yen Hsiao-ching, a forty-something with the New Tide faction was elected to the Central Standing Committee. By a one vote margin, he edged out an indignant Annette Lu. For the New Tide faction this may have been a windfall. But for the party, it was merely a further debasement of Central Standing Committee membership. The New Tide faction has cultivated fresh talent for years. It has a protocol for orderly generational secession. Four years after the "dissolution of factions," the New Tide faction is alive and kicking. Other factions can only look on enviously. But consider the larger interests of the party. The Chen family was an albatross around its neck. The party has rid itself of that albatross. It stands at a new watershed. What lies on the other side of the ridge? Even the DPP leadership doesn't know.
During the recent plenary meeting the New Tide faction/Su Tseng-chang camp faction scored a major victory. No one was surprised. But lest we forget, the same scenario played out once before in 2006. The Chen family was engaged in runaway corruption. The public was starting to complain. Premier Su Tseng-chang, supported by the New Tide faction, emerged victorious. The theme of that plenary meeting was "an honest face, a bold vision," Ironically, it insisted on covering up for Ah-Bian. Even more ironically, Ah-Bian eventually ordered the dissolution of factions, and ganged up on the New Tide faction. Frank Hsieh and Chen Shui-bian ganged up on an overexposed Su Tseng-chang, and forced him to relinquish his 2008 presidential campaign.
Four years later, the New Tide faction and the Su Tseng-chang camp have recaptured the Central Standing Committee. But who knows whether this formidable strategic alliance will remain following the year-end elections? Will factional disputes during the elections result in backstabbling? Frank Hsieh would rather break his promise than lose his central role on the political stage. The moves he and the other factions make should be closely monitored. Su Tseng-chang asked Chang Hong-lu to relinquish his Central Standing Committee seat, and give it to Chen Ming-wen. Superficially, this was a generous gesture. In fact, it was motivated by selfish calculation. If Su Tseng-chang had not preemptively seized the candidacy for Taipei mayor, how much momentum would he still have today? Meanwhile, Tsai Ing-wen must guard against Frank Hsieh, and not repeat the mistakes Su once made.
The theme of the recent plenary meeting was "a glorious and blessed new generation." Each of the five cities mayoral candidates staged photo ops, with them holding the hands of young children. The atmosphere oozed warmth. But four years ago, when the theme of the plenary meeting was "boldness and vision" its sole accomplishment was the coverup of Chen Shui-bian's corruption and an open power struggle. The DPP put on quite a show. But the public was hardly impressed by what it saw.
民進黨派系鬥爭中掩映的景色
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.30 03:18 am
宣告解散派系四年，民進黨此次全代會的主要戲碼仍是派系角力和換票交易。只要民進黨的派系鬥爭不止，民進黨就注定是一「內耗空轉」的政黨；再經民進黨將內部矛盾向外部投射，台灣也就注定是一「內耗空轉」的社會。
這次中常會改組主要結果有三：一是扁系人馬幾全軍覆沒；二是公媽派及急獨派式微；三是新潮流、蘇系和綠色友誼連線成最大贏家。這個結局，可解讀為陳水扁已失去在黨內興風作浪的力量，但要說民進黨已擺脫了阿扁陰影附身的大形勢，恐怕還嫌太早。亦即，這只是隨五都選戰移轉的小形勢，派系暫時變化隊形，但黨並未就路線問題作出嚴肅檢討，中常會結構變化也就看不出明確意義。
就扁系而言，「正義連線」旗下人馬只能作鳥獸散。五月間的黨部主委改選，即已出現新系和謝系合作圍剿扁系的現象；再經此役，羅文嘉、黃慶林潰敗，余政憲投靠菊營，陳其邁轉與謝系合作。情勢至此，不管阿扁再如何作困獸之鬥，他在黨中央的殘餘已被掏盡。
再看公媽派，僅蔡同榮在中常會維持一席，已難掩力不從心。呂秀蓮在關鍵時刻選擇與公媽派結盟，是嚴重的判斷失誤，結果把自己晉身中常會的機會都敗掉。「老白兔」大意失荊州，狼狽不遜扁系的潰敗。問題是，扁蓮、公媽派和急獨派等享受過多年榮光的大老們，都不會甘心將自己的戰績簿束諸高閣，就此退出江湖，這也是可以預見的發展。
在老將紛紛落馬的哀吼中，名不見經傳的何志偉一舉當選中常委，堪稱此次全代會最耐人尋味的景象。年方卅的何志偉，若非薛凌之子，何德何能，一宣布角逐，便將中常委職位手到擒來？在民進黨冷酷的派系廝殺中，存在著一種柔性遊戲，不假刀槍、不問信仰，只在超乎政治理念的交往中論斤兩；在財團的實力之前，資歷、操守、路線皆須稱臣。從民進黨這一隅「綠色友誼」櫥窗，掩映著黨內資產階層的綺麗風光，如此祥和，又如此耐人尋味。
除何志偉，六年級的顏曉菁靠著新系的眼明手快，以一票奪下中常委，氣走呂秀蓮。對新潮流而言，這是意外收穫；但對黨而言，卻是貶低了中常委的政治分量。新潮流以其平日的深耕，展現整齊的世代梯隊，在「解散派系」四年後依然一尾活龍，這是其他派系所難望項背。但從黨的大局看，甩掉扁家包袱之後，分水嶺的另一頭是什麼風景，恐怕黨中央自己也不十分了然。
「新、蘇」聯軍在全代會大獲全勝，其實並不令人意外。但別忘了，同樣的戲碼，在二○○六年即已上演過一回。當時扁家貪瀆露端倪，社會各界正開始聲討，蘇揆在新潮流的簇擁下燦爛勝出。諷刺的是，那次全代會主軸是「誠實面對、勇敢前瞻」，卻一心為阿扁護航，最後更下令「解散派系」。結果新潮流慘遭圍剿，鋒芒太露的蘇貞昌則遭長扁聯手打壓，把角逐二○○八總統的資格拱手讓人。
四年之後，新潮流和蘇系再度征服中常會，但誰知道這樣壯闊的軍容，在年底選戰結束後是否仍能維持？或者，會不會在選舉中即遭其他派系紛起扯其後腿？謝長廷寧願違背承諾，也不願失去自己站在政治舞台中央的角色，他和其他派系合縱連橫的動向值得觀察。但就像蘇貞昌要求張宏陸將中常委讓位給陳明文，表面豁然大度，其實充滿心機；其實，若非蘇貞昌先下手搶了北市的選戰位置，他今天哪有這樣的氣勢和餘裕？面向小英，同時提防背後的長仔，這是蘇貞昌不能重蹈的覆轍。
這次全代會主軸為「光榮幸福新一代」，五都候選人逐一牽著幼童出場，充分展現溫情氣息。但想到四年前標榜「勇敢前瞻」的全代會最後卻演出大護航和大內鬥，民進黨的表演藝術，也就教人興味索然了。
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Only Judges Such as This Could Deny that Chen Che-nan was Deputy Secretary-General
Only Judges Such as This Could Deny that Chen Che-nan was Deputy Secretary-GeneralUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2010
Former Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan traded political influence for money. He was convicted in the first instance of "fraud involving the abuse of official authority" and sentenced to 12 years in prison. But lo and behold, the judge in the first instance retrial ruled that Chen never abused the authority of his office, and reduced Chen's sentence to a mere seven months. When the news leaked out, there was an immediate public outcry.
The original bill of indictment charged businessman Liang Po-hsiung with making illegal loans, and called for a one year term. It said that Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan knew highly-placed prosecutors and investigators could peddle their influence, and that he had accepted a 6 million dollar check and a 1.1 million dollar "red envelope" from Liang Po-hsiung. That was why Chen was charged with "fraud involving the abuse of official authority," and why prosecutors specified an eight year prison term. A conviction in the first instance with malice aforethought would have increased the sentence to 12 years. A conviction in the second instance on the original charge of corruption would have meant a sentence of nine years. Either would have exceeded the eight years prosecutors were seeking. According to reports, the first instance retrial reduced Chen's sentence to one year and two months, and later to only seven months.
The reason the first instance retrial judge gave for for reducing Chen's sentence to seven months was that the charges had been changed. The "corruption" charge had been reduced to a run of the mill "fraud" charge. The first instance retrial judge said Chen Che-nan deceived Liang Po-hsiung, making him believe he could make Liang's legal problems go away. He said that "over the years Chen Che-nan had cultivated many political and social contacts," and that Chen Che-nan never traded on his status as Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General. This raises an obvious question, namely, "Did Liang Po-hsiung actually say that?" Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan assured Liang Po-hsiung that he could make Liang's legal problems go away -- for an appropriate sum of money. But the first instance retrial judge, with the wave of a magic wand, reduced Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan to "just another civilian who had cultivated political and social contacts." He instantly transformed Chen Che-nan from high-ranking government official into John Q. Citizen.
Herein lies a question. Did Chen Che-nan offer to broker a deal based on his status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General?" Let us review the facts. Fact One. Chen was certifiably Deputy Secretary-General. No question about that. Fact Two. Chen knew he was Deputy Secretary-General. Fact Three. Liang Po-hsiung knew Chen was Deputy Secretary-General. The judge knew Chen was Deputy Secretary-General. Under the circumstances, how can anyone argue that Chen's crime was not committed in his capacity as Deputy Secretary-General? When precisely during the commission of his crime, did Chen lose his status as a high-ranking government official? Note that the first instance retrial judge knew Chen was Deputy Secretary-General. But he argued that Chen did not extort 10 million dollars in "litigation fees" by trading on his status as Deputy Secretary-General.
Does such an argument really hold water? Can Wu Shu-cheng really argue that she committed fraud only on the basis of her status as "the mother of Chen Chih-chung," and not as "the wife of the President" or "the First Lady?" Moreover, if Chen Che-nan merely exploited his "years of cultivating political and social contacts," wasn't his status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" the highest expression of his "lifetime of cultivating political and social contacts?" This "white horse is not a horse" sophistry is utter nonsense, and cannot possibly restore public faith in the justice system.
The first and second instance trials handed down long sentences, precisely because Chen was a high-ranking government offical who engaged in influence peddling. Who knew the first instance retrial judge would sentence him to only seven months? Who knew the judge would insist that Chen's crime was unrelated to his status as a high-ranking government official? If Chen Che-nan had not been Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General, would he really have been worth the sky-high price of 10 million dollars Chen demanded from Liang Po-hsiung? In the end, Liang paid Chen 7.1 million yuan to let him walk. Did Full Court judges Tseng Teh-shui, Tsui Ling-chi, Chen Heng-kuan ever confront Chen Che-nan? Did they ever ask him whether he undertood that he was the Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General during the commission of his crimes?
The key to this case is whether Chen "abused his authority as a government official to engage in fraud and corruption." Suppose for the sake of argument that Chen Che-nan never took advantage of his position to make contact with the presiding judge in Liang's case? The fact remains that Chen used his status to broker a deal for Liang. Is Chen Che-nan's status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" is something judges can switch on and off at will, as if by remote control?
Suppose for the sake of argument that the crime was "merely a routine case of influence peddling." The statutory punishment is still five years. Suppose for the sake of argument Chen Che-nan never relied on his status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" to commit his crimes? This of course is an impossibility. Chen knew he was "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" when he was committing his crime. The only person who refuses to admit this is the first instance retrial judge. He imposed a sentence of only seven months on an "official within the highest ranks of the Presidential Office guilty of influence peddling." How can other defendants who have been handed down heavy sentences possibly accept such a grotesque double standard?
Presidential Office Secretary-General Chen Che-nan traded legal favors for money. President Chen Shui-bian embezzled money. Each of these crimes committed by high-ranking government officials, was an example of knowingly violating the law. Each of these crimes severely injured our justice system. The courts should ensure that these criminals pay for their crimes. We should expect nothing less. Alas, our judges have helped these highly placed government officials escape justice. Even after Chen Shui-bian confessed that the Southern Front Project was a fraud, the judge insisted it was genuine. A life sentence was reduced to two years. Even though Chen Che-nan admitted he was the Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General, the judge insisted that Chen never used his official status to peddle influence. A 12 year sentence was reduced to seven months. This is not the defense of justice in accordance with human rights. This is the undermining of justice by perverting the law.
Judges such as these are either hacks or shysters. What else could they be?
只有這樣的法官不承認陳哲男是副秘書長
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.29 03:22 am
前總統府副秘書長陳哲男做司法黃牛，一審依「公務員利用職務詐財罪」，判刑十二年；但更一審卻認定陳不是利用其公務員職務上衍生的機會詐財，只是一般行騙的司法黃牛而已，故而改依詐欺罪判刑七個月。消息傳出，輿論大譁。
本案原始起訴書指出：商人梁柏薰涉超貸案，被判刑一年；陳哲男藉總統府副秘書長身分，以熟識司法檢調高層可代關說為由，前後收取梁柏薰六百萬元支票及一百一十萬元奠儀；因而以「貪汙治罪條例」將陳起訴，並具體求刑八年。一審認其惡性重大加碼判了十二年。二審則維持原罪名（貪汙），改判九年，亦超越檢察官求刑的八年。詎料，更一審卻改判一年二個月，並減刑為七個月。
更一審改判為七個月的主要理由，是認定的罪名不同；由「貪汙罪」，變成了一般「詐欺罪」。更一審說：陳哲男讓梁柏薰誤信他有解決官司的能力，是因「陳哲男多年政治社會歷練累積的人脈」，並非由於總統府副秘書長的職務（梁柏薰有這麼說嗎？）。經過如此切割，向梁柏薰保證可以擺平司法並索取重金的「總統府副秘書長陳哲男」，竟然頓時就變成了只是「具有政治社會人脈的平民陳哲男」。法官魔棒一揮，不啻將陳哲男由「公務員」變成了「非公務員」。
這裡有一個關鍵性的疑問。陳哲男是否以「總統府副秘書長」身分扮司法黃牛？首先，事實上他本就是如假包換的副秘書長；其次，他自己明知自己是副秘書長；再者，梁柏薰亦明知其為副秘書長，而法官更明知其為副秘書長；既如此，卻緣何偏偏認定陳不是以副秘書長身分犯罪，而竟在犯罪時突然失去了此一身分？請注意：法官不是不知陳是副秘書長，而是不認為他是因具副秘書長身分而藉勢藉端開口勒索一千萬元「官司活動費」。
倘若此說成立，則吳淑珍難道只是以「陳致中之母」的身分詐財？而不是以「總統之妻／第一夫人」的身分貪汙？何況，若謂陳哲男具「多年政治社會歷練累積的人脈」而犯罪，但「總統府副秘書長」難道不是他「歷練與人脈」的最高峰？這種「白馬非馬」的認定，在經驗法則及邏輯法則上簡直是呀呀呸！如何建立公信？
一二審判陳哲男重刑，正因他是頂級公務員而做了司法黃牛；不料，更一審只判他七個月，卻說他只是一般的司法黃牛騙子而已，而與其頂級公務員的職位無關。衡情論理，陳哲男若沒有總統府副秘書長的身分，他有什麼身價能向梁柏薰開口索取一千萬元的黃牛天價，而最後實收了七百一十萬元？合議庭曾德水、崔玲琦、陳恆寬三名法官，有沒有問過陳哲男：犯罪當時知不知道自己是總統府副秘書長？
本案的關鍵在是否「利用公務員職務上衍生的機會詐財貪汙」。而陳哲男即使未利用職務接觸梁案法官，卻明明是利用職務身分藉勢藉端向梁承諾擔任黃牛；然則，陳哲男「總統府副秘書長」的身分，豈是法官手上的電視遙控器，可以轉來轉去？
退一萬步說，即使「只是一般司法黃牛案」，法定刑也是五年以下；陳哲男縱然不是以「總統府副秘書長」身分犯罪（這絕無可能），但至少在犯罪時明知自己具「總統府副秘書長」身分（只有法官不承認）；這樣的「在總統府上班的頂級司法黃牛」只判七個月，讓其他被判重刑的司法黃牛如何甘服？
總統府副秘書長陳哲男做司法黃牛，總統陳水扁貪汙；這些頂級公務員犯罪，無一不是知法犯法，執法犯法，對國家法制及社會正義的創害極為深重。若謂我們的法院依法對於這些罪犯課以他們應當承擔的較重刑責，亦是法理上應然、當然之理；但是，我們的法官反而卻極力為這些頂級公務員開脫罪責。連陳水扁也說南線專案是假的，法官卻說是真的，無期徒刑變成了二十年；連陳哲男也不否認自己是總統府副秘書長，法官卻說他未利用公務員身分藉勢藉端，十二年徒刑變成了七個月。這不是依法伸張人權，而是枉法戕害正義。
這樣的法官，若非法匠，即是法之賊；不是呀呀呸，是什麼？
A Translation
July 29, 2010
Former Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan traded political influence for money. He was convicted in the first instance of "fraud involving the abuse of official authority" and sentenced to 12 years in prison. But lo and behold, the judge in the first instance retrial ruled that Chen never abused the authority of his office, and reduced Chen's sentence to a mere seven months. When the news leaked out, there was an immediate public outcry.
The original bill of indictment charged businessman Liang Po-hsiung with making illegal loans, and called for a one year term. It said that Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan knew highly-placed prosecutors and investigators could peddle their influence, and that he had accepted a 6 million dollar check and a 1.1 million dollar "red envelope" from Liang Po-hsiung. That was why Chen was charged with "fraud involving the abuse of official authority," and why prosecutors specified an eight year prison term. A conviction in the first instance with malice aforethought would have increased the sentence to 12 years. A conviction in the second instance on the original charge of corruption would have meant a sentence of nine years. Either would have exceeded the eight years prosecutors were seeking. According to reports, the first instance retrial reduced Chen's sentence to one year and two months, and later to only seven months.
The reason the first instance retrial judge gave for for reducing Chen's sentence to seven months was that the charges had been changed. The "corruption" charge had been reduced to a run of the mill "fraud" charge. The first instance retrial judge said Chen Che-nan deceived Liang Po-hsiung, making him believe he could make Liang's legal problems go away. He said that "over the years Chen Che-nan had cultivated many political and social contacts," and that Chen Che-nan never traded on his status as Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General. This raises an obvious question, namely, "Did Liang Po-hsiung actually say that?" Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan assured Liang Po-hsiung that he could make Liang's legal problems go away -- for an appropriate sum of money. But the first instance retrial judge, with the wave of a magic wand, reduced Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan to "just another civilian who had cultivated political and social contacts." He instantly transformed Chen Che-nan from high-ranking government official into John Q. Citizen.
Herein lies a question. Did Chen Che-nan offer to broker a deal based on his status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General?" Let us review the facts. Fact One. Chen was certifiably Deputy Secretary-General. No question about that. Fact Two. Chen knew he was Deputy Secretary-General. Fact Three. Liang Po-hsiung knew Chen was Deputy Secretary-General. The judge knew Chen was Deputy Secretary-General. Under the circumstances, how can anyone argue that Chen's crime was not committed in his capacity as Deputy Secretary-General? When precisely during the commission of his crime, did Chen lose his status as a high-ranking government official? Note that the first instance retrial judge knew Chen was Deputy Secretary-General. But he argued that Chen did not extort 10 million dollars in "litigation fees" by trading on his status as Deputy Secretary-General.
Does such an argument really hold water? Can Wu Shu-cheng really argue that she committed fraud only on the basis of her status as "the mother of Chen Chih-chung," and not as "the wife of the President" or "the First Lady?" Moreover, if Chen Che-nan merely exploited his "years of cultivating political and social contacts," wasn't his status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" the highest expression of his "lifetime of cultivating political and social contacts?" This "white horse is not a horse" sophistry is utter nonsense, and cannot possibly restore public faith in the justice system.
The first and second instance trials handed down long sentences, precisely because Chen was a high-ranking government offical who engaged in influence peddling. Who knew the first instance retrial judge would sentence him to only seven months? Who knew the judge would insist that Chen's crime was unrelated to his status as a high-ranking government official? If Chen Che-nan had not been Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General, would he really have been worth the sky-high price of 10 million dollars Chen demanded from Liang Po-hsiung? In the end, Liang paid Chen 7.1 million yuan to let him walk. Did Full Court judges Tseng Teh-shui, Tsui Ling-chi, Chen Heng-kuan ever confront Chen Che-nan? Did they ever ask him whether he undertood that he was the Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General during the commission of his crimes?
The key to this case is whether Chen "abused his authority as a government official to engage in fraud and corruption." Suppose for the sake of argument that Chen Che-nan never took advantage of his position to make contact with the presiding judge in Liang's case? The fact remains that Chen used his status to broker a deal for Liang. Is Chen Che-nan's status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" is something judges can switch on and off at will, as if by remote control?
Suppose for the sake of argument that the crime was "merely a routine case of influence peddling." The statutory punishment is still five years. Suppose for the sake of argument Chen Che-nan never relied on his status as "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" to commit his crimes? This of course is an impossibility. Chen knew he was "Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General" when he was committing his crime. The only person who refuses to admit this is the first instance retrial judge. He imposed a sentence of only seven months on an "official within the highest ranks of the Presidential Office guilty of influence peddling." How can other defendants who have been handed down heavy sentences possibly accept such a grotesque double standard?
Presidential Office Secretary-General Chen Che-nan traded legal favors for money. President Chen Shui-bian embezzled money. Each of these crimes committed by high-ranking government officials, was an example of knowingly violating the law. Each of these crimes severely injured our justice system. The courts should ensure that these criminals pay for their crimes. We should expect nothing less. Alas, our judges have helped these highly placed government officials escape justice. Even after Chen Shui-bian confessed that the Southern Front Project was a fraud, the judge insisted it was genuine. A life sentence was reduced to two years. Even though Chen Che-nan admitted he was the Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General, the judge insisted that Chen never used his official status to peddle influence. A 12 year sentence was reduced to seven months. This is not the defense of justice in accordance with human rights. This is the undermining of justice by perverting the law.
Judges such as these are either hacks or shysters. What else could they be?
只有這樣的法官不承認陳哲男是副秘書長
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.29 03:22 am
前總統府副秘書長陳哲男做司法黃牛，一審依「公務員利用職務詐財罪」，判刑十二年；但更一審卻認定陳不是利用其公務員職務上衍生的機會詐財，只是一般行騙的司法黃牛而已，故而改依詐欺罪判刑七個月。消息傳出，輿論大譁。
本案原始起訴書指出：商人梁柏薰涉超貸案，被判刑一年；陳哲男藉總統府副秘書長身分，以熟識司法檢調高層可代關說為由，前後收取梁柏薰六百萬元支票及一百一十萬元奠儀；因而以「貪汙治罪條例」將陳起訴，並具體求刑八年。一審認其惡性重大加碼判了十二年。二審則維持原罪名（貪汙），改判九年，亦超越檢察官求刑的八年。詎料，更一審卻改判一年二個月，並減刑為七個月。
更一審改判為七個月的主要理由，是認定的罪名不同；由「貪汙罪」，變成了一般「詐欺罪」。更一審說：陳哲男讓梁柏薰誤信他有解決官司的能力，是因「陳哲男多年政治社會歷練累積的人脈」，並非由於總統府副秘書長的職務（梁柏薰有這麼說嗎？）。經過如此切割，向梁柏薰保證可以擺平司法並索取重金的「總統府副秘書長陳哲男」，竟然頓時就變成了只是「具有政治社會人脈的平民陳哲男」。法官魔棒一揮，不啻將陳哲男由「公務員」變成了「非公務員」。
這裡有一個關鍵性的疑問。陳哲男是否以「總統府副秘書長」身分扮司法黃牛？首先，事實上他本就是如假包換的副秘書長；其次，他自己明知自己是副秘書長；再者，梁柏薰亦明知其為副秘書長，而法官更明知其為副秘書長；既如此，卻緣何偏偏認定陳不是以副秘書長身分犯罪，而竟在犯罪時突然失去了此一身分？請注意：法官不是不知陳是副秘書長，而是不認為他是因具副秘書長身分而藉勢藉端開口勒索一千萬元「官司活動費」。
倘若此說成立，則吳淑珍難道只是以「陳致中之母」的身分詐財？而不是以「總統之妻／第一夫人」的身分貪汙？何況，若謂陳哲男具「多年政治社會歷練累積的人脈」而犯罪，但「總統府副秘書長」難道不是他「歷練與人脈」的最高峰？這種「白馬非馬」的認定，在經驗法則及邏輯法則上簡直是呀呀呸！如何建立公信？
一二審判陳哲男重刑，正因他是頂級公務員而做了司法黃牛；不料，更一審只判他七個月，卻說他只是一般的司法黃牛騙子而已，而與其頂級公務員的職位無關。衡情論理，陳哲男若沒有總統府副秘書長的身分，他有什麼身價能向梁柏薰開口索取一千萬元的黃牛天價，而最後實收了七百一十萬元？合議庭曾德水、崔玲琦、陳恆寬三名法官，有沒有問過陳哲男：犯罪當時知不知道自己是總統府副秘書長？
本案的關鍵在是否「利用公務員職務上衍生的機會詐財貪汙」。而陳哲男即使未利用職務接觸梁案法官，卻明明是利用職務身分藉勢藉端向梁承諾擔任黃牛；然則，陳哲男「總統府副秘書長」的身分，豈是法官手上的電視遙控器，可以轉來轉去？
退一萬步說，即使「只是一般司法黃牛案」，法定刑也是五年以下；陳哲男縱然不是以「總統府副秘書長」身分犯罪（這絕無可能），但至少在犯罪時明知自己具「總統府副秘書長」身分（只有法官不承認）；這樣的「在總統府上班的頂級司法黃牛」只判七個月，讓其他被判重刑的司法黃牛如何甘服？
總統府副秘書長陳哲男做司法黃牛，總統陳水扁貪汙；這些頂級公務員犯罪，無一不是知法犯法，執法犯法，對國家法制及社會正義的創害極為深重。若謂我們的法院依法對於這些罪犯課以他們應當承擔的較重刑責，亦是法理上應然、當然之理；但是，我們的法官反而卻極力為這些頂級公務員開脫罪責。連陳水扁也說南線專案是假的，法官卻說是真的，無期徒刑變成了二十年；連陳哲男也不否認自己是總統府副秘書長，法官卻說他未利用公務員身分藉勢藉端，十二年徒刑變成了七個月。這不是依法伸張人權，而是枉法戕害正義。
這樣的法官，若非法匠，即是法之賊；不是呀呀呸，是什麼？
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Preventing Mainland Students from Coming Compels Taiwan Universities to Leave
Preventing Mainland Students from Coming Compels Taiwan Universities to LeaveChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 28, 2010
Recently, several universities on the Mainland began recruiting high-scoring senior high students from Taiwan. This attracted public attention on Taiwan. The data suggests that in the coming years, such recruitment attempts will become an increasingly common. This has raised concern that the best students on Taiwan will be lost. News reports also indicate that the Mainland is attempting to persuade the National Taiwan University and other universities to establish special classes or campuses on the Mainland. Therefore, if the goverrnment prevents Mainland students from studying on Taiwan, the Mainland will induce our best universities to leave Taiwan.
The provision of higher education is a special kind of service industry. Education and other key service industries are under the aegis of different agencies. The Financial Supervisory Commission controls finance. The Ministry of Communications and Transportation controls tourism and telecommunications. The Department of Commerce controls retail shops. Most manufacturing industries find themselves in highly competitive circumstances. For example, suppose South Korea's Samsung panel industry gains an advantage. Taiwan's AUO will be hurt. If Toyota is impacted, global demand for Germany's Volkswagen or South Korea's Hyundai will increase. But not all service industries work this way. If the service sector in Nation A prospers, that does not mean a recession will hit the service sector in Nation B. Internationally speaking, service sector competition is not a zero-sum game. Take universities. An improvement in Beijing University's reputation will not diminish National Taiwan University's reputation. The two sides may both be recruiting students. But that does not imply a conflict of interest. It all depends on how the government approaches the matter.
In general, the Mainland wants exchanges with Taiwan. It has confidence in its economy. Therefore it has opened its arms to students from Taiwan. Taiwan's economy may not be as robust as the Mainland's, but that need not undermine our confidence. Calls for a halt to cross-Strait exchanges are largely ideologically motivated. Eight years of DPP rule has indoctrinated some on Taiwan with an "inordinate fear of Communism" rooted in ideological extremism. Two years ago, during the presidential election, a DPP campaign ad used language that dripped with contempt for people from the Mainland. It actually warned that "Parks will become toilets. Conversation will become expectoration." DPP fundamentalists are contemptuous even of wealthy tourists from the Mainland who came to Taiwan to spread money around. Imagine how they feel about patients who come to Taiwan seeking medical care, or scholars who come to Taiwan to take advantage of its educational resources.
Under a free economy, economic and trade exchanges between the two sides is certain to be quite complex. One cannot obstruct such exchanges simply by imposing one's will. Forcibly preventing people from coming to Taiwan could inadvertently force Taiwan to pay an even higher price. A fellow of the Academia Sinica Institute of Finance and Economics gave a speech on July 5 that cited a case worth the DPP's attention.
As everyone knows, Mainland China has a huge population. The standard of medical services however, is low. Among wealthy Mainlanders however, there is a strong demand for quality medical care. Medical care on Taiwan is among the best in the world. The quality of doctors is excellent. The language and cultural pose no barriers. Wealthy patients from the Mainland are naturally going to seek treatment on Taiwan. Taiwan must make an effort to attract these wealthy patients. If one is afraid that outside patients will "consume" local health care resources, one can establish "special zones." One can provide a limited variety of medical treatments in designated zones. That way health care for outsiders can remain distinct from government provided health care for insiders. But Taiwan independence fundamentalists are obstinately opposed even to such special administrative regions. Academia Sinica members have issued a stern warning. The Taiwan independence fundamentalists' hatred and insularity will almost certainly harm Taiwan.
The government on Taiwan can refuse to allow Mainland patients to seek medical treatment on Taiwan. But this will not diminish the urgent medical needs of wealthy patients from the Mainland. Market incentives will lead to the establishment of many hospitals on Mainland China. These hospitals will recruit many doctors. Over time, as long as wealthy patients on the Mainland are willing to pay, hospitals and doctors on Taiwan will establish operations on the Mainland. In the language of international trade, prohibiting patients from the Mainland from "inputting" to Taiwan, will lead to the "outputting" of hospitals and doctors to the Mainland. The same is true for cross-Strait education. The "inputting" of patients is usually referred to as international medical services. The "outputting" of hospitals on the other hand, is considered direct foreign investment (FDI). Robert Mundell is the Father of the Euro. Forty years ago he warned that trade in goods and services is interchangeable with direct foreign investment. If a government prevents the flow of merchandise, the consequence is often capital flight. This capital flight is clearly more deleterious to the nation from which it flees than the flow of any merchandise.
In short, those who would prohibit trade with the Mainland had better think matters through. The consequence of governmental barriers is frequently capital flight. Capital flight really can "hollow out" Taiwan. Those attempting to prevent trade with the Mainland usually characterize themselves as "Taiwanese patriots." They usually characterize anyone who "hollows out Taiwan" as a "traitor to Taiwan." But this is precisely what they are guilty of. The line between "patriotism" and "treason" is often quite thin. It often depends on a sophisticated understanding of trade theory. The slanderous propaganda in their newspaper ads may have a short term impact. But in the long run how will these self-styled "Taiwanese patriots" escape blame for "hollowing out Taiwan?"
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.28
社論－不讓陸生輸入 當心學校出走
本報訊
中國大陸若干大學近日依台灣高中生學測成績，吸引高分者前往就讀，已引起台灣社會的關注。資訊顯示，明年、後年，這樣的招生模式將日益擴張，引發各界擔心台灣優秀學生向外流失。此外，媒體報導對岸亦在吸引台大等大學赴陸設專班或分校。因此，如果台灣再不容許陸生「輸入」，恐怕台灣的優良大學就會被吸引「輸出」至對岸。
大專教育其實是一種特殊的服務業；除了教育之外，其他重要的服務業散見於金管會（金融業）、交通部（觀光與電信）、經濟部商業司（一般商店）等。一般製造業有比較明顯的競爭態勢；例如，假設韓國三星在面板業取得優勢，則台灣友達等就會受傷；如果日本豐田受到打擊，則全世界汽車需求就會走向德國福斯或韓國現代。但所有的服務業並沒有這種特徵：甲國服務業興盛，並不會使乙國服務業衰頹。簡言之，國與國之間的服務業不是零和賽局。就大學而言，北大聲名變好並不會危及台大的名聲，故兩岸之間爭取學生，並不涉及任何產業利益的此消彼長，其關鍵就只是在於政府政策的「態度」。
大致而言，中國大陸希望與台交流、在經濟上也有信心，故對於台灣學生一向敞開雙臂歡迎。台灣的整體經濟實力可能稍遜於對岸，但也不至於信心受損；而島內阻止兩岸交流的主要聲音，主要是出自強烈的意識形態。在民進黨主政八年之後，台灣民間部分人士「仇匪恨匪」的意識極為高張。兩年前總統大選前夕，民進黨的競選廣告竟赫然出現「公園變廁所、談吐變吐痰」的鄙夷對岸人民字眼。民進黨的基本教義派連對岸來台花鈔票的觀光客都如此鄙視，那麼對於來台看病者是否使用台灣醫療資源、來台就學者是否使用台灣教育資源，當然就更是耿耿於懷了。
但是，在自由經濟的運作之下，兩地之間的經貿往來，其互動十分複雜，不能以簡單的抵制阻絕手段任性處理。有時候，阻絕對岸人員來台，卻反而使台灣付出更慘痛的代價。中研院財經大院士在七月五日該院的一次演講中就提到一則事例，值得提出來給民進黨的朋友們參考。
如所周知，中國大陸人口多、醫療服務水準普遍不佳，而眾多有錢人對醫療的需求也十分強烈。台灣的醫療環境在全世界名列前茅，醫生水準普遍極佳，語言環境又相通，故當然是對岸有錢病人的求診對象。台灣為了吸引這群富有的對岸病患，當然應該極力爭取。外來病患若有侵蝕本地健保資源的顧慮，也可以用「特區」的規畫，限定地區限定醫療種類，以使國外診療與國內健保病患診療有所區隔。但即使限定特區營運，還是有基本教義派者強力反對開放。中研院士已提出嚴正警告：這樣的仇視與鎖國迷思，很可能更會傷害台灣。
若台灣堅決不讓中國大陸病患來看診，由於對岸有錢人強烈的醫療需求並未稍減，故市場誘因會促使許多人在中國市場設立醫院、召募醫生。久而久之，只要對岸富有病人所開出來的條件夠好，則台灣就會有醫院與醫生赴中國大陸開業。用國際貿易的術語來說，不准對岸的病人向台灣「輸入」，就一定會有台灣的醫院與醫生向對岸「輸出」，此情況與兩岸教育事業一模一樣。病人的輸入一般稱之為國際醫療服務，而醫院的輸出則屬直接外人投資（ＦＤＩ）。歐元之父孟岱爾在四十年前就告訴我們，商品服務的貿易與直接外人投資之間是有替代性的。一國若阻止商品貿易的流動，其後果往往是資本的跨國輸出，其對輸出國的傷害，顯然更為嚴重。
總之，那些強力阻止與中共做任何貿易的人可得想清楚：阻擋的後果往往是資本的外流，是實實在在的「掏空」台灣。力阻與對岸貿易的人通常以愛台灣自居，但是掏空台灣資本卻是標準的賣台行徑。這愛台與賣台之間曖昧的一線之隔要如何拿準原則，可要經得起細膩的貿易理論分析才算數。在報紙上刊個汙蔑性的廣告固然有文宣短效，但長期而言又豈能躲過「掏空台灣」的罵名。
A Translation
July 28, 2010
Recently, several universities on the Mainland began recruiting high-scoring senior high students from Taiwan. This attracted public attention on Taiwan. The data suggests that in the coming years, such recruitment attempts will become an increasingly common. This has raised concern that the best students on Taiwan will be lost. News reports also indicate that the Mainland is attempting to persuade the National Taiwan University and other universities to establish special classes or campuses on the Mainland. Therefore, if the goverrnment prevents Mainland students from studying on Taiwan, the Mainland will induce our best universities to leave Taiwan.
The provision of higher education is a special kind of service industry. Education and other key service industries are under the aegis of different agencies. The Financial Supervisory Commission controls finance. The Ministry of Communications and Transportation controls tourism and telecommunications. The Department of Commerce controls retail shops. Most manufacturing industries find themselves in highly competitive circumstances. For example, suppose South Korea's Samsung panel industry gains an advantage. Taiwan's AUO will be hurt. If Toyota is impacted, global demand for Germany's Volkswagen or South Korea's Hyundai will increase. But not all service industries work this way. If the service sector in Nation A prospers, that does not mean a recession will hit the service sector in Nation B. Internationally speaking, service sector competition is not a zero-sum game. Take universities. An improvement in Beijing University's reputation will not diminish National Taiwan University's reputation. The two sides may both be recruiting students. But that does not imply a conflict of interest. It all depends on how the government approaches the matter.
In general, the Mainland wants exchanges with Taiwan. It has confidence in its economy. Therefore it has opened its arms to students from Taiwan. Taiwan's economy may not be as robust as the Mainland's, but that need not undermine our confidence. Calls for a halt to cross-Strait exchanges are largely ideologically motivated. Eight years of DPP rule has indoctrinated some on Taiwan with an "inordinate fear of Communism" rooted in ideological extremism. Two years ago, during the presidential election, a DPP campaign ad used language that dripped with contempt for people from the Mainland. It actually warned that "Parks will become toilets. Conversation will become expectoration." DPP fundamentalists are contemptuous even of wealthy tourists from the Mainland who came to Taiwan to spread money around. Imagine how they feel about patients who come to Taiwan seeking medical care, or scholars who come to Taiwan to take advantage of its educational resources.
Under a free economy, economic and trade exchanges between the two sides is certain to be quite complex. One cannot obstruct such exchanges simply by imposing one's will. Forcibly preventing people from coming to Taiwan could inadvertently force Taiwan to pay an even higher price. A fellow of the Academia Sinica Institute of Finance and Economics gave a speech on July 5 that cited a case worth the DPP's attention.
As everyone knows, Mainland China has a huge population. The standard of medical services however, is low. Among wealthy Mainlanders however, there is a strong demand for quality medical care. Medical care on Taiwan is among the best in the world. The quality of doctors is excellent. The language and cultural pose no barriers. Wealthy patients from the Mainland are naturally going to seek treatment on Taiwan. Taiwan must make an effort to attract these wealthy patients. If one is afraid that outside patients will "consume" local health care resources, one can establish "special zones." One can provide a limited variety of medical treatments in designated zones. That way health care for outsiders can remain distinct from government provided health care for insiders. But Taiwan independence fundamentalists are obstinately opposed even to such special administrative regions. Academia Sinica members have issued a stern warning. The Taiwan independence fundamentalists' hatred and insularity will almost certainly harm Taiwan.
The government on Taiwan can refuse to allow Mainland patients to seek medical treatment on Taiwan. But this will not diminish the urgent medical needs of wealthy patients from the Mainland. Market incentives will lead to the establishment of many hospitals on Mainland China. These hospitals will recruit many doctors. Over time, as long as wealthy patients on the Mainland are willing to pay, hospitals and doctors on Taiwan will establish operations on the Mainland. In the language of international trade, prohibiting patients from the Mainland from "inputting" to Taiwan, will lead to the "outputting" of hospitals and doctors to the Mainland. The same is true for cross-Strait education. The "inputting" of patients is usually referred to as international medical services. The "outputting" of hospitals on the other hand, is considered direct foreign investment (FDI). Robert Mundell is the Father of the Euro. Forty years ago he warned that trade in goods and services is interchangeable with direct foreign investment. If a government prevents the flow of merchandise, the consequence is often capital flight. This capital flight is clearly more deleterious to the nation from which it flees than the flow of any merchandise.
In short, those who would prohibit trade with the Mainland had better think matters through. The consequence of governmental barriers is frequently capital flight. Capital flight really can "hollow out" Taiwan. Those attempting to prevent trade with the Mainland usually characterize themselves as "Taiwanese patriots." They usually characterize anyone who "hollows out Taiwan" as a "traitor to Taiwan." But this is precisely what they are guilty of. The line between "patriotism" and "treason" is often quite thin. It often depends on a sophisticated understanding of trade theory. The slanderous propaganda in their newspaper ads may have a short term impact. But in the long run how will these self-styled "Taiwanese patriots" escape blame for "hollowing out Taiwan?"
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.28
社論－不讓陸生輸入 當心學校出走
本報訊
中國大陸若干大學近日依台灣高中生學測成績，吸引高分者前往就讀，已引起台灣社會的關注。資訊顯示，明年、後年，這樣的招生模式將日益擴張，引發各界擔心台灣優秀學生向外流失。此外，媒體報導對岸亦在吸引台大等大學赴陸設專班或分校。因此，如果台灣再不容許陸生「輸入」，恐怕台灣的優良大學就會被吸引「輸出」至對岸。
大專教育其實是一種特殊的服務業；除了教育之外，其他重要的服務業散見於金管會（金融業）、交通部（觀光與電信）、經濟部商業司（一般商店）等。一般製造業有比較明顯的競爭態勢；例如，假設韓國三星在面板業取得優勢，則台灣友達等就會受傷；如果日本豐田受到打擊，則全世界汽車需求就會走向德國福斯或韓國現代。但所有的服務業並沒有這種特徵：甲國服務業興盛，並不會使乙國服務業衰頹。簡言之，國與國之間的服務業不是零和賽局。就大學而言，北大聲名變好並不會危及台大的名聲，故兩岸之間爭取學生，並不涉及任何產業利益的此消彼長，其關鍵就只是在於政府政策的「態度」。
大致而言，中國大陸希望與台交流、在經濟上也有信心，故對於台灣學生一向敞開雙臂歡迎。台灣的整體經濟實力可能稍遜於對岸，但也不至於信心受損；而島內阻止兩岸交流的主要聲音，主要是出自強烈的意識形態。在民進黨主政八年之後，台灣民間部分人士「仇匪恨匪」的意識極為高張。兩年前總統大選前夕，民進黨的競選廣告竟赫然出現「公園變廁所、談吐變吐痰」的鄙夷對岸人民字眼。民進黨的基本教義派連對岸來台花鈔票的觀光客都如此鄙視，那麼對於來台看病者是否使用台灣醫療資源、來台就學者是否使用台灣教育資源，當然就更是耿耿於懷了。
但是，在自由經濟的運作之下，兩地之間的經貿往來，其互動十分複雜，不能以簡單的抵制阻絕手段任性處理。有時候，阻絕對岸人員來台，卻反而使台灣付出更慘痛的代價。中研院財經大院士在七月五日該院的一次演講中就提到一則事例，值得提出來給民進黨的朋友們參考。
如所周知，中國大陸人口多、醫療服務水準普遍不佳，而眾多有錢人對醫療的需求也十分強烈。台灣的醫療環境在全世界名列前茅，醫生水準普遍極佳，語言環境又相通，故當然是對岸有錢病人的求診對象。台灣為了吸引這群富有的對岸病患，當然應該極力爭取。外來病患若有侵蝕本地健保資源的顧慮，也可以用「特區」的規畫，限定地區限定醫療種類，以使國外診療與國內健保病患診療有所區隔。但即使限定特區營運，還是有基本教義派者強力反對開放。中研院士已提出嚴正警告：這樣的仇視與鎖國迷思，很可能更會傷害台灣。
若台灣堅決不讓中國大陸病患來看診，由於對岸有錢人強烈的醫療需求並未稍減，故市場誘因會促使許多人在中國市場設立醫院、召募醫生。久而久之，只要對岸富有病人所開出來的條件夠好，則台灣就會有醫院與醫生赴中國大陸開業。用國際貿易的術語來說，不准對岸的病人向台灣「輸入」，就一定會有台灣的醫院與醫生向對岸「輸出」，此情況與兩岸教育事業一模一樣。病人的輸入一般稱之為國際醫療服務，而醫院的輸出則屬直接外人投資（ＦＤＩ）。歐元之父孟岱爾在四十年前就告訴我們，商品服務的貿易與直接外人投資之間是有替代性的。一國若阻止商品貿易的流動，其後果往往是資本的跨國輸出，其對輸出國的傷害，顯然更為嚴重。
總之，那些強力阻止與中共做任何貿易的人可得想清楚：阻擋的後果往往是資本的外流，是實實在在的「掏空」台灣。力阻與對岸貿易的人通常以愛台灣自居，但是掏空台灣資本卻是標準的賣台行徑。這愛台與賣台之間曖昧的一線之隔要如何拿準原則，可要經得起細膩的貿易理論分析才算數。在報紙上刊個汙蔑性的廣告固然有文宣短效，但長期而言又豈能躲過「掏空台灣」的罵名。
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
The Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant Controversy -- from the Perspective of the Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant Controversy
The Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant Controversy --from the Perspective of the Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant Controversy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2010
Last week the Ministry of the Interior held its first conference for the protection of dolphins -- the "Cho-shui Creek Tidal Flats Charitable Trust." The atmosphere during the conference was unexpectedly tranquil and reasonable. It was the calm before the storm. The Ministry of the Interior and other agencies adopted a neutral stance, in strict accordance with the law. The agency responsible is willing to prepare the required legal documents in advance, then submit the case for approval. This was the second time in 20 days that controversy over the Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant flared up. Uncertainties over worker safety have diminished production capacity by nearly one half. This has made a balance between development and conservation even more urgent.
Environmentalists say that the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Technology Company's Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant is endangering Chinese White Dolphins. On the same day, company representatives, accompanied by Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-in and Industrial Development Bureau Chief Tu Chi-jun, held a press conference. They make it abundantly clear that if the project was still bogged down by environmental hurdles in November, they would "call it quits." For company representatives to adopt such an attitude is perfectly understandable. But when officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs endorse such a stance and cast doubt on their own neutrality, it is hardly helpful to arriving at a rational solution.
Should the mudflats on the north shore of the Cho-shui Creek in Changhua County's Ta Chen Village be turned into an industrial zone? That is of course a national land use issue. But it also involves Chinese White Dolphins, which are threatened with extinction, and the question, "Whither Taiwan?" This makes it more than just a fight between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Kuo Kuang Petrochemical on one side, with 40,000 supporters of the Environmental Trust Foundation on the other side. This makes it a question about where 23 million people ought to be headed.
Clearly the most important issue for the public is how to balance economic development with environmental protection, i.e., how to ensure sustainable development. Controversies have erupted over Phase Three of the Central Taiwan Science Park Environmental Impact Report, the use of land belonging to the Number 202 Munitions Plant in Nangang as a biotech park, and the invoking of eminent domain in order to acquire agricultural lands in Miaoli Tai Po. In each of these cases, some members of the public have taken exception to the government's policy of sacrificing the environment for the sake of economic productivity. They have lodged protests, demanding that the government address their concerns.
Taiwan has enjoyed sixty years of economic growth, in part at the expense of the environment. We began by cutting down forests and exporting the lumber. Later the Kaohsiung Harbor ship-breaking industry, the acid treatment of heavy metal waste, electroplating, dyeing, cement manufacturing, petrochemical, and other highly polluting, energy-intensive industries have exacted a heavy price on the environment and on peoples' health. The petrochemical and other environmentally harmful industries have contributed to our economic prosperity. For that we must be grateful. But the question 23 million people on Taiwan ought to be asking is, should we continue sacrificing the environment for the sake of economic prosperity today.
Over the past 60 years pro-development forces have called the shots. But they are not an unassailable monolith. They too must change their thinking, in step with the public on Taiwan. That is progress. That is reason. Ship-breaking and the acid treatment of heavy metal waste have been outsourced. Kaohsiung's cement industry has been shutdown. Projects such as the Liwu Creek Power Plant, Zonta Cement Plant, and the Yuli Yushan section of the New Central Cross-Island Highway have been put on hold. This shows that government agencies understand the public's priorities, and is honoring the public's wishes.
Consider the clash between developers who want to proceed with the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant Project and environmentalists who want to protect Chinese White Dolphins. In their fight over how the Cho-shui Creek mudflats ought to be used, they must convince not just the government and shareholders, but 23 million members of the public. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Kuo Kuang Petrochemical argue that the petrochemical industry may be a energy hungry, highly polluting industry, it is nevertheless essential to our economy. There really is no alternative to constructing the plant on Chinese White Dolphin habitat. The Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant Project may not be a low impact, new era technology such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, or information and communications technology. But it will generate 500 billion in profits each year.
Environmentalists whose priority is the protection of the Chinese White Dolphin, must convince the public that the protection of endangered species is the mark of a civilized nation. The mudflats are Chinese White Dolphin habitat essential to their feeding and reproduction. If the land is reclaimed, the Chinese White Dolphins face extinction. The Chinese White Dolphins migrate from the west coast across the "Black Water Ditch" (Taiwan Strait). They travel through the Yun Chang uplift, the Kuanyin depression, and other formations in the Taiwan Strait. Their migratory path is affected by the Kuroshio Current and ocean currents along the Mainland coast. One cannot train them to change paths. One cannot use bait to induce them to live in regions outside the area earmarked for development.
What kind of Taiwan do we want? An environmently friendly Taiwan? Or one that trades its environment for wealth? A public consensus outweighs any consensus reached by a handful of economic experts, capitalists, and industry experts. A public consensus must be respected. This is a society in which the people are the boss.
This case may be seen as the first step in a rational policy debate. Whether the "Environmental Charitable Trust" bill will be passed is still unknown. But the forward-looking ideas in the proposed Environmental Charitable Trust will enable the public to consider the relative importance of Chinese White Dolphins and the petrochemical industry, as it proceeds down the road toward a sustainable future.
從六輕大火看八輕爭議
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.27 01:29 am
在山雨欲來的會議氣氛下，內政部上周首次召開為守護白海豚發起的「濁水溪海埔地公益信託」第一次審查會議，會議過程出乎意外地理性、和諧，內政部等相關單位站穩行政中立及依法辦事立場，信託送件單位也願意先完備法律要件，再逐步推動環境信託成案。這在六輕二十天內第二起大火，工安的不確定重創近半產能的此刻，益增尋求開發與保育新平衡點的迫切。
同一天，遭質疑危害到白海豚族群存續的開發案業主國光石化（八輕），在經濟部長施顏祥、工業局長杜紫軍陪同下召開記者會，表明十一月若環評還不過就「不玩了」的強硬態度。業者這麼說無可厚非，但經濟部官員一旦背書，立遭行政不中立的質疑，且無助於問題的理性解決。
毫無疑問，濁水溪北岸、彰化大城鄉沿岸泥質灘地應否填海造陸開發為工業區，性質是國土利用問題；但牽涉到瀕臨絕滅的中華白海豚，則進階到「我們要怎麼樣的台灣」的思辯訴求。這就絕非經濟部、國光石化聯手對抗環境信託四萬多認股人的問題，而是全台二千三百萬人應共同討論台灣該往何處去的問題。
尋求開發與保育的新平衡點，找出台灣永續發展的路，顯然已是全台民眾當前最重要的課題。從近期接續發生的中科三期環評爭議、南港202兵工廠綠地應否開發為生技園區，以至於仍待善後的苗栗大埔徵收農地事件，性質都是民眾不認同政府犧牲生態永續以換取經濟生產的強硬施政作為，進而以抗爭行動來喚起政府正視問題。
無可否認，這六十年台灣的經濟起飛，確實有許多是犧牲環境換來的。從最早期的砍伐森林外銷，之後高雄港的拆船業、酸洗廢五金、電鍍、染整、水泥、石化等高汙染、高耗能工業，讓台灣的土地與人民都受傷累累，付出了可觀的代價。沒錯，台灣確實靠石化等環境負擔較大的產業累積出夠強的經濟實力，這是要感激的；但這些犧牲環境換取經濟動力的舉措，此刻還要這樣走下去嗎？這是兩千三百萬台灣民眾應當思考的。
回顧這六十年台灣的成長軌跡，開發派雖然是常勝軍，但卻不是碰不得的鐵板一塊，也會隨著民眾對台灣該往何處去的思考，屢屢做出調整，這是進步與理性的展現。例如拆船、酸洗廢五金業一一移出境外，高雄水泥業停工等；一些開發計畫如立霧溪電廠、崇德水泥廠、新中橫公路玉里玉山段等的喊停，都顯示開發單位瞭解民眾對台灣該往何處去有了進階想法後，順應民意做出調整。
回頭檢視國光石化開發案與中華白海豚保育在濁水溪出海口泥灘地國土利用優先性的較勁，任一方要說服的不僅是政府及股東們，更要兩千三百萬民眾支持。經濟部及國光石化要回答民眾的是：石化業雖然高耗能、高汙染，但對現階段台灣經濟仍有其必要；設廠選擇白海豚棲息、覓食的唯一空間為基地，確實無替代方案；國光石化每年五千億產值現階段不是奈米、生技、資通等無害環境的新世紀產業能創造的……。
認為中華白海豚存活優先於發展石化業的一方，則要告訴乃至說服民眾，何以保護瀕危物種存續是國家文明的關鍵指標；工業區預定地的泥質灘地對白海豚棲息、覓食、繁殖的重要，一經填海造陸，可能讓白海豚面臨絕滅；白海豚在西海岸洄游有黑水溝、雲彰隆起、觀音凹陷等海峽地貌因素，以及黑潮支流、大陸沿岸流等海流因素，不是訓練轉彎或放誘餌導引到工業區基地以外海域就能存活。
我們要一個什麼樣的台灣？友善的環境，還是典當環境換財富？人民的共識，比重絕對超過少數經濟官員、產業專家及資本家的想法，應受到絕對的尊重，這是個人民作主的社會，人民才是頭家。
本案發展至今算是跨出理性討論的第一步，「環境公益信託」是否成案猶未可知，但提出「環境信託」前瞻性想法，讓國人在白海豚存亡以及石化產業對台灣影響的衝突面深刻思考，找出台灣永續之路，無疑是極有意義的。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 27, 2010
Last week the Ministry of the Interior held its first conference for the protection of dolphins -- the "Cho-shui Creek Tidal Flats Charitable Trust." The atmosphere during the conference was unexpectedly tranquil and reasonable. It was the calm before the storm. The Ministry of the Interior and other agencies adopted a neutral stance, in strict accordance with the law. The agency responsible is willing to prepare the required legal documents in advance, then submit the case for approval. This was the second time in 20 days that controversy over the Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant flared up. Uncertainties over worker safety have diminished production capacity by nearly one half. This has made a balance between development and conservation even more urgent.
Environmentalists say that the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Technology Company's Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant is endangering Chinese White Dolphins. On the same day, company representatives, accompanied by Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-in and Industrial Development Bureau Chief Tu Chi-jun, held a press conference. They make it abundantly clear that if the project was still bogged down by environmental hurdles in November, they would "call it quits." For company representatives to adopt such an attitude is perfectly understandable. But when officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs endorse such a stance and cast doubt on their own neutrality, it is hardly helpful to arriving at a rational solution.
Should the mudflats on the north shore of the Cho-shui Creek in Changhua County's Ta Chen Village be turned into an industrial zone? That is of course a national land use issue. But it also involves Chinese White Dolphins, which are threatened with extinction, and the question, "Whither Taiwan?" This makes it more than just a fight between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Kuo Kuang Petrochemical on one side, with 40,000 supporters of the Environmental Trust Foundation on the other side. This makes it a question about where 23 million people ought to be headed.
Clearly the most important issue for the public is how to balance economic development with environmental protection, i.e., how to ensure sustainable development. Controversies have erupted over Phase Three of the Central Taiwan Science Park Environmental Impact Report, the use of land belonging to the Number 202 Munitions Plant in Nangang as a biotech park, and the invoking of eminent domain in order to acquire agricultural lands in Miaoli Tai Po. In each of these cases, some members of the public have taken exception to the government's policy of sacrificing the environment for the sake of economic productivity. They have lodged protests, demanding that the government address their concerns.
Taiwan has enjoyed sixty years of economic growth, in part at the expense of the environment. We began by cutting down forests and exporting the lumber. Later the Kaohsiung Harbor ship-breaking industry, the acid treatment of heavy metal waste, electroplating, dyeing, cement manufacturing, petrochemical, and other highly polluting, energy-intensive industries have exacted a heavy price on the environment and on peoples' health. The petrochemical and other environmentally harmful industries have contributed to our economic prosperity. For that we must be grateful. But the question 23 million people on Taiwan ought to be asking is, should we continue sacrificing the environment for the sake of economic prosperity today.
Over the past 60 years pro-development forces have called the shots. But they are not an unassailable monolith. They too must change their thinking, in step with the public on Taiwan. That is progress. That is reason. Ship-breaking and the acid treatment of heavy metal waste have been outsourced. Kaohsiung's cement industry has been shutdown. Projects such as the Liwu Creek Power Plant, Zonta Cement Plant, and the Yuli Yushan section of the New Central Cross-Island Highway have been put on hold. This shows that government agencies understand the public's priorities, and is honoring the public's wishes.
Consider the clash between developers who want to proceed with the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant Project and environmentalists who want to protect Chinese White Dolphins. In their fight over how the Cho-shui Creek mudflats ought to be used, they must convince not just the government and shareholders, but 23 million members of the public. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Kuo Kuang Petrochemical argue that the petrochemical industry may be a energy hungry, highly polluting industry, it is nevertheless essential to our economy. There really is no alternative to constructing the plant on Chinese White Dolphin habitat. The Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant Project may not be a low impact, new era technology such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, or information and communications technology. But it will generate 500 billion in profits each year.
Environmentalists whose priority is the protection of the Chinese White Dolphin, must convince the public that the protection of endangered species is the mark of a civilized nation. The mudflats are Chinese White Dolphin habitat essential to their feeding and reproduction. If the land is reclaimed, the Chinese White Dolphins face extinction. The Chinese White Dolphins migrate from the west coast across the "Black Water Ditch" (Taiwan Strait). They travel through the Yun Chang uplift, the Kuanyin depression, and other formations in the Taiwan Strait. Their migratory path is affected by the Kuroshio Current and ocean currents along the Mainland coast. One cannot train them to change paths. One cannot use bait to induce them to live in regions outside the area earmarked for development.
What kind of Taiwan do we want? An environmently friendly Taiwan? Or one that trades its environment for wealth? A public consensus outweighs any consensus reached by a handful of economic experts, capitalists, and industry experts. A public consensus must be respected. This is a society in which the people are the boss.
This case may be seen as the first step in a rational policy debate. Whether the "Environmental Charitable Trust" bill will be passed is still unknown. But the forward-looking ideas in the proposed Environmental Charitable Trust will enable the public to consider the relative importance of Chinese White Dolphins and the petrochemical industry, as it proceeds down the road toward a sustainable future.
從六輕大火看八輕爭議
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.27 01:29 am
在山雨欲來的會議氣氛下，內政部上周首次召開為守護白海豚發起的「濁水溪海埔地公益信託」第一次審查會議，會議過程出乎意外地理性、和諧，內政部等相關單位站穩行政中立及依法辦事立場，信託送件單位也願意先完備法律要件，再逐步推動環境信託成案。這在六輕二十天內第二起大火，工安的不確定重創近半產能的此刻，益增尋求開發與保育新平衡點的迫切。
同一天，遭質疑危害到白海豚族群存續的開發案業主國光石化（八輕），在經濟部長施顏祥、工業局長杜紫軍陪同下召開記者會，表明十一月若環評還不過就「不玩了」的強硬態度。業者這麼說無可厚非，但經濟部官員一旦背書，立遭行政不中立的質疑，且無助於問題的理性解決。
毫無疑問，濁水溪北岸、彰化大城鄉沿岸泥質灘地應否填海造陸開發為工業區，性質是國土利用問題；但牽涉到瀕臨絕滅的中華白海豚，則進階到「我們要怎麼樣的台灣」的思辯訴求。這就絕非經濟部、國光石化聯手對抗環境信託四萬多認股人的問題，而是全台二千三百萬人應共同討論台灣該往何處去的問題。
尋求開發與保育的新平衡點，找出台灣永續發展的路，顯然已是全台民眾當前最重要的課題。從近期接續發生的中科三期環評爭議、南港202兵工廠綠地應否開發為生技園區，以至於仍待善後的苗栗大埔徵收農地事件，性質都是民眾不認同政府犧牲生態永續以換取經濟生產的強硬施政作為，進而以抗爭行動來喚起政府正視問題。
無可否認，這六十年台灣的經濟起飛，確實有許多是犧牲環境換來的。從最早期的砍伐森林外銷，之後高雄港的拆船業、酸洗廢五金、電鍍、染整、水泥、石化等高汙染、高耗能工業，讓台灣的土地與人民都受傷累累，付出了可觀的代價。沒錯，台灣確實靠石化等環境負擔較大的產業累積出夠強的經濟實力，這是要感激的；但這些犧牲環境換取經濟動力的舉措，此刻還要這樣走下去嗎？這是兩千三百萬台灣民眾應當思考的。
回顧這六十年台灣的成長軌跡，開發派雖然是常勝軍，但卻不是碰不得的鐵板一塊，也會隨著民眾對台灣該往何處去的思考，屢屢做出調整，這是進步與理性的展現。例如拆船、酸洗廢五金業一一移出境外，高雄水泥業停工等；一些開發計畫如立霧溪電廠、崇德水泥廠、新中橫公路玉里玉山段等的喊停，都顯示開發單位瞭解民眾對台灣該往何處去有了進階想法後，順應民意做出調整。
回頭檢視國光石化開發案與中華白海豚保育在濁水溪出海口泥灘地國土利用優先性的較勁，任一方要說服的不僅是政府及股東們，更要兩千三百萬民眾支持。經濟部及國光石化要回答民眾的是：石化業雖然高耗能、高汙染，但對現階段台灣經濟仍有其必要；設廠選擇白海豚棲息、覓食的唯一空間為基地，確實無替代方案；國光石化每年五千億產值現階段不是奈米、生技、資通等無害環境的新世紀產業能創造的……。
認為中華白海豚存活優先於發展石化業的一方，則要告訴乃至說服民眾，何以保護瀕危物種存續是國家文明的關鍵指標；工業區預定地的泥質灘地對白海豚棲息、覓食、繁殖的重要，一經填海造陸，可能讓白海豚面臨絕滅；白海豚在西海岸洄游有黑水溝、雲彰隆起、觀音凹陷等海峽地貌因素，以及黑潮支流、大陸沿岸流等海流因素，不是訓練轉彎或放誘餌導引到工業區基地以外海域就能存活。
我們要一個什麼樣的台灣？友善的環境，還是典當環境換財富？人民的共識，比重絕對超過少數經濟官員、產業專家及資本家的想法，應受到絕對的尊重，這是個人民作主的社會，人民才是頭家。
本案發展至今算是跨出理性討論的第一步，「環境公益信託」是否成案猶未可知，但提出「環境信託」前瞻性想法，讓國人在白海豚存亡以及石化產業對台灣影響的衝突面深刻思考，找出台灣永續之路，無疑是極有意義的。
Saturday, July 24, 2010
What Ever Happened to the DPP's "Political Platform for the Coming Decade?"
What Ever Happened to the DPP's "Political Platform for the Coming Decade?"China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2010
Following the Three in One Elections, the Democratic Progressive Party achieved a string of electoral victories. It has gathered momentum in the Five Cities Elections, and the KMT is feeling the heat. However, a recent reorganization of the party's power structure has caused the DPP to revert to form. The party is now caught in a power struggle. It has lost sight of the issues, and unable to offer any coherent policy proposals.
The workings of the DPP have been remarkably consistent with sociologist Robert Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy." To wit, the DPP's euphemistic "democratic centralism." The DPP's Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee elections have long been held hostage to factional power struggles. Even Annette Lu recently became another "white bunny who strayed into the jungle." She unsuccessfully tried to seize power within the Central Standing Committee. Her bid was much too naive. The DPP nomination process has long been decided by party factions or party bosses. No one has ever seized power on the basis of personal charisma.
The current "new faces, old forces" power struggle has gone too far. Chen Sheng-hong is the head of a local DPP political machine. He and his wife, DPP legislator Hsue Ling want their son to be made a member of the Central Standing Committee, so that he can run for city councilman. Chen Sheng-hong had himself transferred to the Central Standing Committee, and made Chairman of the Central Evaluation Committee. The DPP is the largest opposition party on the island. Yet it allows itself to be manipulated by a single family. The Party Chairman and Party Princes have yet to utter a single word in protest. They have demeaned themselves by kowtowing to the demands of power.
The New Tide Faction, the largest faction in the DPP, is not much better. In order to counter Annette Lu and seize three seats on the Standing Committee, it endorsed Yen Hsiao-ching, an inexperienced Kaohsiung County Councilman for Central Standing Committee member. The Central Standing Committee should not be a gerentocracy. But the new generation is politically unqualified. They were nominated to the Central Standing Committee purely to protect the interests of their respective factions. Such a Central Standing Committee will inevitably degenerate into a "smoke-filled room" for the divvying up of factional spoils, not a forum for the discussion of important policies.
Politics has always been about the distribution of power. But the conduct of the DPP is cause for concern. It is the reason why the DPP cannot find a new direction. Party elections are all about "power for the sake of power." They represent what the party is really about. The party may not be able to explain its policies. But its objective is plain for all to see -- to seize power, and nothing else.
The DPP, whose current objective is to regain power, pales before the DPP prior to gaining power. Before the DPP gained power, it understood that its cross-Strait policy was its Achilles Heel. During debates over the party's Mainland policy, party insiders and outsiders worked closely to arrive at a consensus. Dissenters wtihin the DPP expressed their opposition openly. For one, this was consistent with intra-party democracy. For another, public debate involving diverse views offered the greatest possibility of arriving at workable policy. In 1999 it allowed the DPP to propose its comparatively moderate "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," and to ameliorate voter anxiety.
In 2008 the DPP was routed. One reason was Chen family corruption. But another reason was hardline Taiwan independence cross-Strait policies that moved far away from the political center. Tsai Ing-wen has been DPP chairman for two years. Yet the DPP has deliberately refused to offer a clear cross-Strait policy. The party leadership is afraid that cross-Strait policy debate may anger Deep Greens and cause a split within the party. But refusing to discuss such issues is tantamount to allowing Deep Green hate speech to monopolize the debate. Given such an atmosphere, any cross-Strait negotiations or agreements will inevitably be characterized as "Selling out Taiwan!" ECFA will inevitably be characterized as "the establishment of a One China Market," as "the first step towards reunification," and "the disenfranchisement of the disadvantaged."
Tsai Ing-wen repeated appealed to DPP legislators to engage in rational discussion of ECFA. But Deep Greens dictated policy. Therefore bloody clashes were entirely predictable. What's worse, the DPP has yet to offer a reasonable cross-Strait policy. Its opposition to ECFA is rife with internal contradictions. If ECFA is really all bad and no good, Tsai Ing-wen should have threatened a referendum to repeal ECFA long ago. The DPP should have been eager to add a sunset clause to ECFA. But some DPP leaders are afraid Beijing might attempt to influence the election by terminating ECFA.
The DPP's internal contradictions are not limited to cross-Strait policy. The DPP has accused the Ma administration of giving tax cuts to the rich. But DPP legislators took the lead by proposing a 17.5% tax cut for big business, forcing the KMT to raise the ante. The Five Cities Elections are upon us. DPP elders are asking Lin Yi-hsiung to rejoin the party, and work for its future. But Lin Yi-hsiung demands a halt to the construction of the Number Four Nuclear Plan, or a referendum to that effect. Has the DPP leadership taken this into account? The DPP has never offered a coherent energy efficiency and carbon reduction policy. Yet this is clearly an important issue that every political party in the 21st century must think through.
Any political party that wishes to return to power, must offer a set of policies appropriate for a new era. The British Conservative Party had the courage to propose unpopular measures such as streamlining the government. Nevertheless it won the support of voters come election time. For the sake of peace, Tsai Ing-wen proposed a "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." It demonstrated her desire for a responsible policy. But the DPP is courageous only during internal power struggles. It is pusillanimous during debates over important policy. That is why it is hard to be optimistic about the fate of the Political Platform for the Coming Decade.
民進黨10年政綱哪裡去了?
2010-07-24
中國時報
三合一選舉之後，民進黨連選連勝；五都選舉，氣勢更直逼國民黨。不過，日前的一場黨內權力結構改組，卻將民進黨打回原形。更嚴重的是，舉黨不但汲汲營營於權力競逐，事實上也失去討論問題的能力，更別說要能整合出一套執政後可行的政策論述。
民進黨運作一向頗為符合社會學家羅伯米契爾所說的「寡頭鐵律」，也就是該黨美其名的「民主集中制」。因此，民進黨歷來的中常委、中執委選舉，都是依派系邏輯運作。呂秀蓮這次「老白兔誤闖叢林」，在中常委爭奪戰中失利，確實有點天真過頭；畢竟，民進黨黨職選舉向來要看派系老大或黨內山頭臉色的，沒有人可以靠個人魅力出線。
只是這次「新臉孔、舊勢力」的權力角逐戰，確實玩過頭。民進黨大票倉陳勝宏、立委薛淩夫婦支持要參選市議員的兒子出任中常委，陳勝宏自己更轉任要監督中常會的中評會主委。堂堂最大在野黨，竟讓一家人這樣玩，黨主席、天王們都不敢置一詞，權力妥協鑿痕斑斑。
民進黨最大派系新潮流也不遑多讓，為了防堵呂秀蓮，並搶攻三席中常委，他們同樣推出資歷不深的高雄縣議員顏曉菁擔任中常委；中常會也許不該弄到老人政治當家，但是這些沒有太多政治資歷的新生代，擺明就是代理人，到中央幫派系護盤，看守利益。這樣的中常會，必然淪為純粹派系分贓的場所，不可能討論重大政策。
政治本來就是攸關權力分配。但，當前民進黨的作為之所以令人憂慮，在於民進黨無能擘畫新方向。因此黨內選舉的「為權力而權力」，其實就是整黨具體而微的寫照。政策如果說不清楚，民進黨的目標，就是赤裸裸的贏取權力而已。
志在奪回政權的民進黨，甚至還比不上未執政時。執政前的民進黨，至少還知道兩岸政策是選舉罩門；黨內正式舉辦中國政策辯論會，黨內外人士共襄盛舉，民進黨不同主張者大鳴大放。一來，這是黨內民主，第二、經過各界菁英言辭討論，最可能從論辯中找出可行的主張，民進黨也才可能在一九九九年時提出立場較溫和的《台灣前途決議文》，化解選民疑慮。
民進黨二○○八年大敗，除了扁家貪瀆外，極獨的兩岸政策偏離中間路線也是主因。可是，蔡英文擔任主席二年來，民進黨卻刻意不討論兩岸政策方向。黨高層憂心，對兩岸政策的討論，可能會激怒深綠、再挑起民進黨分裂危機；但是，迴避討論的後果是，民進黨形同任由深綠的仇中言論把持。在這樣的氛圍下，任何兩岸談判、協議都是「賣台」，兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ不但是建立一中市場，更是統一的第一步，弱勢民眾也將無立錐之地。
即使蔡英文三令五申，要求黨籍立委在國會殿堂理性討論ＥＣＦＡ；但是在深綠主導政策基調下，流血抗爭完全是可以預期的結果。更嚴重的是，民進黨未提出一套合理兩岸論述，反ＥＣＦＡ反得矛盾百出；既然ＥＣＦＡ百害而無一利，蔡英文更是早就揚言執政後要公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ，民進黨應該樂見兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協議中的終止條款才是。但，近來民進黨中卻有人擔憂，未來大陸會以威脅終止ＥＣＦＡ來操作、影響選情。
民進黨政策自相矛盾之處，還不只兩岸政策而已。民進黨批評馬政府減稅政策圖利富人，但民進黨團卻率先在國會提案將營所稅降到百分之十七點五，逼使國民黨再加碼；五都選舉到了，民進黨大老又呼喚林義雄再入黨，一起為團結的民進黨打拚，只是，民進黨對林義雄相當在意的「停建核四」或「核四公投」主張想清楚了嗎?事實上，民進黨從未提出完整的能源或節能減碳政策，而這是二十一世紀每個執政黨都必須想清楚的重要課題。
任何政黨要重返執政，都必然要針對新局提出一套政策方向，如英國保守黨就勇於在大選時提出不討好的精簡財政措施，一樣得到選民支持；持平而言，蔡英文之前提出「十年政綱」，就是有心提出一套負責任的政策方向，但當民進黨內勇於爭奪權力、卻怯於討論政策時，十年政綱的最後下場，令人無法樂觀！
A Translation
July 24, 2010
Following the Three in One Elections, the Democratic Progressive Party achieved a string of electoral victories. It has gathered momentum in the Five Cities Elections, and the KMT is feeling the heat. However, a recent reorganization of the party's power structure has caused the DPP to revert to form. The party is now caught in a power struggle. It has lost sight of the issues, and unable to offer any coherent policy proposals.
The workings of the DPP have been remarkably consistent with sociologist Robert Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy." To wit, the DPP's euphemistic "democratic centralism." The DPP's Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee elections have long been held hostage to factional power struggles. Even Annette Lu recently became another "white bunny who strayed into the jungle." She unsuccessfully tried to seize power within the Central Standing Committee. Her bid was much too naive. The DPP nomination process has long been decided by party factions or party bosses. No one has ever seized power on the basis of personal charisma.
The current "new faces, old forces" power struggle has gone too far. Chen Sheng-hong is the head of a local DPP political machine. He and his wife, DPP legislator Hsue Ling want their son to be made a member of the Central Standing Committee, so that he can run for city councilman. Chen Sheng-hong had himself transferred to the Central Standing Committee, and made Chairman of the Central Evaluation Committee. The DPP is the largest opposition party on the island. Yet it allows itself to be manipulated by a single family. The Party Chairman and Party Princes have yet to utter a single word in protest. They have demeaned themselves by kowtowing to the demands of power.
The New Tide Faction, the largest faction in the DPP, is not much better. In order to counter Annette Lu and seize three seats on the Standing Committee, it endorsed Yen Hsiao-ching, an inexperienced Kaohsiung County Councilman for Central Standing Committee member. The Central Standing Committee should not be a gerentocracy. But the new generation is politically unqualified. They were nominated to the Central Standing Committee purely to protect the interests of their respective factions. Such a Central Standing Committee will inevitably degenerate into a "smoke-filled room" for the divvying up of factional spoils, not a forum for the discussion of important policies.
Politics has always been about the distribution of power. But the conduct of the DPP is cause for concern. It is the reason why the DPP cannot find a new direction. Party elections are all about "power for the sake of power." They represent what the party is really about. The party may not be able to explain its policies. But its objective is plain for all to see -- to seize power, and nothing else.
The DPP, whose current objective is to regain power, pales before the DPP prior to gaining power. Before the DPP gained power, it understood that its cross-Strait policy was its Achilles Heel. During debates over the party's Mainland policy, party insiders and outsiders worked closely to arrive at a consensus. Dissenters wtihin the DPP expressed their opposition openly. For one, this was consistent with intra-party democracy. For another, public debate involving diverse views offered the greatest possibility of arriving at workable policy. In 1999 it allowed the DPP to propose its comparatively moderate "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," and to ameliorate voter anxiety.
In 2008 the DPP was routed. One reason was Chen family corruption. But another reason was hardline Taiwan independence cross-Strait policies that moved far away from the political center. Tsai Ing-wen has been DPP chairman for two years. Yet the DPP has deliberately refused to offer a clear cross-Strait policy. The party leadership is afraid that cross-Strait policy debate may anger Deep Greens and cause a split within the party. But refusing to discuss such issues is tantamount to allowing Deep Green hate speech to monopolize the debate. Given such an atmosphere, any cross-Strait negotiations or agreements will inevitably be characterized as "Selling out Taiwan!" ECFA will inevitably be characterized as "the establishment of a One China Market," as "the first step towards reunification," and "the disenfranchisement of the disadvantaged."
Tsai Ing-wen repeated appealed to DPP legislators to engage in rational discussion of ECFA. But Deep Greens dictated policy. Therefore bloody clashes were entirely predictable. What's worse, the DPP has yet to offer a reasonable cross-Strait policy. Its opposition to ECFA is rife with internal contradictions. If ECFA is really all bad and no good, Tsai Ing-wen should have threatened a referendum to repeal ECFA long ago. The DPP should have been eager to add a sunset clause to ECFA. But some DPP leaders are afraid Beijing might attempt to influence the election by terminating ECFA.
The DPP's internal contradictions are not limited to cross-Strait policy. The DPP has accused the Ma administration of giving tax cuts to the rich. But DPP legislators took the lead by proposing a 17.5% tax cut for big business, forcing the KMT to raise the ante. The Five Cities Elections are upon us. DPP elders are asking Lin Yi-hsiung to rejoin the party, and work for its future. But Lin Yi-hsiung demands a halt to the construction of the Number Four Nuclear Plan, or a referendum to that effect. Has the DPP leadership taken this into account? The DPP has never offered a coherent energy efficiency and carbon reduction policy. Yet this is clearly an important issue that every political party in the 21st century must think through.
Any political party that wishes to return to power, must offer a set of policies appropriate for a new era. The British Conservative Party had the courage to propose unpopular measures such as streamlining the government. Nevertheless it won the support of voters come election time. For the sake of peace, Tsai Ing-wen proposed a "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." It demonstrated her desire for a responsible policy. But the DPP is courageous only during internal power struggles. It is pusillanimous during debates over important policy. That is why it is hard to be optimistic about the fate of the Political Platform for the Coming Decade.
民進黨10年政綱哪裡去了?
2010-07-24
中國時報
三合一選舉之後，民進黨連選連勝；五都選舉，氣勢更直逼國民黨。不過，日前的一場黨內權力結構改組，卻將民進黨打回原形。更嚴重的是，舉黨不但汲汲營營於權力競逐，事實上也失去討論問題的能力，更別說要能整合出一套執政後可行的政策論述。
民進黨運作一向頗為符合社會學家羅伯米契爾所說的「寡頭鐵律」，也就是該黨美其名的「民主集中制」。因此，民進黨歷來的中常委、中執委選舉，都是依派系邏輯運作。呂秀蓮這次「老白兔誤闖叢林」，在中常委爭奪戰中失利，確實有點天真過頭；畢竟，民進黨黨職選舉向來要看派系老大或黨內山頭臉色的，沒有人可以靠個人魅力出線。
只是這次「新臉孔、舊勢力」的權力角逐戰，確實玩過頭。民進黨大票倉陳勝宏、立委薛淩夫婦支持要參選市議員的兒子出任中常委，陳勝宏自己更轉任要監督中常會的中評會主委。堂堂最大在野黨，竟讓一家人這樣玩，黨主席、天王們都不敢置一詞，權力妥協鑿痕斑斑。
民進黨最大派系新潮流也不遑多讓，為了防堵呂秀蓮，並搶攻三席中常委，他們同樣推出資歷不深的高雄縣議員顏曉菁擔任中常委；中常會也許不該弄到老人政治當家，但是這些沒有太多政治資歷的新生代，擺明就是代理人，到中央幫派系護盤，看守利益。這樣的中常會，必然淪為純粹派系分贓的場所，不可能討論重大政策。
政治本來就是攸關權力分配。但，當前民進黨的作為之所以令人憂慮，在於民進黨無能擘畫新方向。因此黨內選舉的「為權力而權力」，其實就是整黨具體而微的寫照。政策如果說不清楚，民進黨的目標，就是赤裸裸的贏取權力而已。
志在奪回政權的民進黨，甚至還比不上未執政時。執政前的民進黨，至少還知道兩岸政策是選舉罩門；黨內正式舉辦中國政策辯論會，黨內外人士共襄盛舉，民進黨不同主張者大鳴大放。一來，這是黨內民主，第二、經過各界菁英言辭討論，最可能從論辯中找出可行的主張，民進黨也才可能在一九九九年時提出立場較溫和的《台灣前途決議文》，化解選民疑慮。
民進黨二○○八年大敗，除了扁家貪瀆外，極獨的兩岸政策偏離中間路線也是主因。可是，蔡英文擔任主席二年來，民進黨卻刻意不討論兩岸政策方向。黨高層憂心，對兩岸政策的討論，可能會激怒深綠、再挑起民進黨分裂危機；但是，迴避討論的後果是，民進黨形同任由深綠的仇中言論把持。在這樣的氛圍下，任何兩岸談判、協議都是「賣台」，兩岸簽ＥＣＦＡ不但是建立一中市場，更是統一的第一步，弱勢民眾也將無立錐之地。
即使蔡英文三令五申，要求黨籍立委在國會殿堂理性討論ＥＣＦＡ；但是在深綠主導政策基調下，流血抗爭完全是可以預期的結果。更嚴重的是，民進黨未提出一套合理兩岸論述，反ＥＣＦＡ反得矛盾百出；既然ＥＣＦＡ百害而無一利，蔡英文更是早就揚言執政後要公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ，民進黨應該樂見兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協議中的終止條款才是。但，近來民進黨中卻有人擔憂，未來大陸會以威脅終止ＥＣＦＡ來操作、影響選情。
民進黨政策自相矛盾之處，還不只兩岸政策而已。民進黨批評馬政府減稅政策圖利富人，但民進黨團卻率先在國會提案將營所稅降到百分之十七點五，逼使國民黨再加碼；五都選舉到了，民進黨大老又呼喚林義雄再入黨，一起為團結的民進黨打拚，只是，民進黨對林義雄相當在意的「停建核四」或「核四公投」主張想清楚了嗎?事實上，民進黨從未提出完整的能源或節能減碳政策，而這是二十一世紀每個執政黨都必須想清楚的重要課題。
任何政黨要重返執政，都必然要針對新局提出一套政策方向，如英國保守黨就勇於在大選時提出不討好的精簡財政措施，一樣得到選民支持；持平而言，蔡英文之前提出「十年政綱」，就是有心提出一套負責任的政策方向，但當民進黨內勇於爭奪權力、卻怯於討論政策時，十年政綱的最後下場，令人無法樂觀！
Friday, July 23, 2010
Forced to Flee: Hon Hai or Dolphins?
Forced to Flee: Hon Hai or Dolphins?United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2010
Hon Hai Group Chairman Terry Gou has recently been subjected to relentless of criticism. Guo asked, "Is there really no place for me on Taiwan? Will I really be driven out?" Meanwhile, an environmental impact report has paralyzed the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Company. One reason is that its facilities may obstruct the migratory route for white dolphins. Environmentalists oppose driving the white dolphins out.
But just who is being driven out of Taiwan? Is it Hon Hai? Or is it white dolphins? Does a majority on Taiwan really favor these two extremes? Can we not find a balance between realism and idealism? Whether the issue is labor rights or ecological and environmental claims, can we not eschew anti-business demagoguery and political sloganeering?
Some capitalists are indeed despicable. The Wall Street fat cats responsible for the financial tsunami swallowed up the life savings of countless ordinary folk the world over. But other entrepreneurs are decent people who create employment opportunities and promote social progress. Often a nation's economic pulse and competitiveness depends on just such a handful of key industrialists.
The Republic of China remains in dire political and economic straits. If we wish to become a "free trade island," and establish an "Asian Pacific Platform," we must attract businesses and raise capital. We must "build nests to entice the phoenix." We must attract Taiwan capital, Mainland capital, and foreign capital. We must "join the world." But even more importantly, we must "keep our roots on Taiwan." Therefore, maintaining a certain amount of manufacturing capacity on the island is essential. Because only manufacturing industries can retain unique technical advantages. Only the manufacturing sector can increase employment opportunities.
But soliciting businesses to set up factories, especially within the manufacturing industry, inevitably leads to conflict over labor rights, rivalries between regions, and concerns over environmental protection. When Taiwan was still known as "Formosa," the entire island was a natural deer park. Now the only place one can see a deer is on a nature preserve. As long as human beings continue to inhabit the earth, this competition between development and conservation will not end. That is why we face a dilemma over white dolphins today.
The social cost of attracting business and capital must be proportionate. But the Republic of China's central policy is to attract global investment. If every major investment is subjected to such an unrealistic selection process, how much room will remain for economic development? When some people wanted to establish a biotech park, a prominent author characterized the site as "Taiwan's lungs." When some people wanted to construct a petrochemical plant, ecologists said "Don't drive out the dolphins!" When some people wanted to construct an enclosure around a Technology Park, 24 farming families vowed to "til their fields to their last breath." How one views such controversies of course, depends on one's perspective. Both sides claim to be on the side of the angels. Take the Tai Po land incident for example. Ninety-eight percent of the farmers favored selling the land. But a mere two percent who opposed selling the land dictated the outcome. We are reluctant to comment on the merits of each sides' arguments. But we cannot help wondering, should our economic policy really be dicated by this "98:2" standard?
Now let us return to Terry Gou. Guo built factories on both sides of the Strait. At the very least, he fully complied with the law. Working conditions exceeded both legal requirements and standards set by other manufacturers. The main cause for the plant controversy was political and social factors unique to the Chinese Mainland. Arguably Gou could have done better. After all, he eventually offered raises. But to label him "Taiwan's Shame" is unjust. It is unseemly for university professors to engage in such name-calling. Mainland factories belonging to Japanese companies have also experienced labor strikes. Should the management of these companies be indiscriminately labeled "Japan's Shame?" Terry Gou is an entrepreneur struggling to survive within a labor chain controlled by the West. The income from his OEM work represents merely 2% of the upstream income. Both sides of the Strait ought to be ashamed about this 2% OEM number. But who if anyone deserves to be denounced as "Taiwan's Shame?" Just who are the university professors who slapped this label on Terry Guo?
The public fears entrepreneurs even as it invests its hopes on them. The choice between Hon Hai and white dolphins underscores the relationship between corporate responsibility and public expectations. Certain entrepreneurs are publicly reviled, including those who colluded with the Chen Shui-bian regime during its "Second Round of Fiscal Reforms." Such crony capitalists deserve to be reviled. But legitimate businesses that promote economic development and benefit the community deserve public support and encouragement.
How can Taiwan's economy be brought back to life? In the end it all boils down to persuading businesses to invest, thereby transforming Taiwan into an island of free trade. Assuming this view is correct, assuming this is the way out for Taiwan, we must be fair to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs confront global challenges. We can urge them to be sociallly responsible regarind labor rights and environmental protection. But we cannot expect them to live with "98:2" standards. We must not demonize them as "Taiwan's Shame."
Does anyone remember how DuPont and Bayer were driven off Taiwan? Then Chen Shui-bian era presidential economic adviser Vincent Siew pronounced it the "death knell" for foreign investment on Taiwan. Now, over a decade later, we are again "soliciting business." But will naysayers amounting to 2% of the public drown out the yeasayers who constitute the other 98%?
Lukang did not want DuPont. So DuPont went to the Mainland. Ilan did not want the Number Six Naptha Cracking Plant. So the Number Six Naphtha Cracking Plant went to Yunlin. These are all choices we make. Hon Hai and white dolphins represent two sets of values. For four centuries we have been choosing between the two. In the centuries to come, we too will have to make similar choices.
逼誰出走，鴻海還是白海豚？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.23 02:39 am
深陷批評的鴻海集團董事長郭台銘問：「台灣是不是沒有我留下來的餘地？難道要逼我們出走？」在此同時，國光石化的環評也陷入僵局，原因之一是影響了白海豚的廊道，生態人士反對逼白海豚出走。
台灣要逼誰出走？要逼走鴻海，或白海豚？難道多數台灣人都贊同有此無彼的極端選擇？我們難道不能在現實與理想之間找到平衡？不論是勞工權益、生態或環保的主張，能否不被操作成反商仇富的社會偏見或政治口號？
資本家有可怕可惡者，如美國華爾街那批肥貓，掀起金融海嘯，吞噬了全球多少庶民的畢生血汗積蓄。但企業家也有可愛可敬者，創造就業機會，帶動社會發展，甚至整個國家的經貿命脈與競爭力往往是靠幾個重要廠家維繫於不墜。
台灣的國際政經情勢極度嚴峻。我們要走向「經貿自由島」、建設為「亞太平台」；主要就是要招商募資，築巢引鳳，吸引台資、陸資、外資在台匯聚。然而，台灣雖要「走向世界」，但更重要的卻是「根留台灣」。因此，維持一定規模及品質的製造業尤其重要，因為有製造業才能保留獨特的技術優勢，且有製造業才有較多的就業機會。
然而，招商設廠，尤其是製造業，難免會與勞工權益、區域社會情境及生態環境發生衝突或選擇的問題。以台灣而言，在「福爾摩沙」時代，可謂全島都是天然鹿苑，現在卻只在養殖場才看得到鹿；事實上，只要人類繼續在地球上存在，這類發展與保育的競合過程就不會停止，所以今天我們也才會面對白海豚的問題。
招商投資，當然絕不可付出不成比例的社會代價。但是，在台灣正以全球招商為國家中興政策之際，如果件件重大投資都要面對有此無彼的極端選擇的話，台灣還有多少發展的空間？要設生技園區，作家說那是台灣的肺；要設石化廠，生態人士說，別趕跑白海豚；要圈地設科技園區，廿四家農戶說要「死守農業」。這些爭議，見仁見智，公說公有理、婆說婆有理；如大埔圈地事件，即使百分之九十八的農人贊成賣地，但情勢已由百分之二反對售地者主控。我們不願也無權評論兩方的是非曲直，只是想問：台灣的經濟政策是否將以這種「九十八比二法則」為準據？
回頭說到郭台銘，他在兩岸設廠，至少完全符合法律規定，且勞動條件亦有優於法律規定及其他廠家之處。關於他在對岸廠區發生的種種爭議，恐怕大陸政治及社會的特殊因素才是主因；若謂郭台銘可以做得更好，應可期待（畢竟他加薪了），但若說他是「台灣之恥」，這卻不像是教授們會寫得出來的判決書。君不見大陸的日商工廠也有工潮，難道亦可用「日本之恥」概括？其實，郭台銘也是在西方主控的產業分工鏈中掙扎生存的企業家，他的代工所得僅佔上下游所得的二％而已；兩岸應以這種「二％代工」為恥，但若要數可以稱作「台灣之恥」的人物，不知那些教授們是以什麼排序挑上了郭台銘？
社會與企業家的關係，可謂是「既期待／又怕受傷害」。鴻海與白海豚這類的選擇，凸顯出企業責任與社會期待的競合關係。有些企業家深受社會嫌惡，如扁政府在二次金改中與財團的勾結，使人深惡痛絕；但是，對於那些正當經營、帶動發展、造福社會的企業家，社會亦應當給他們應有的施展空間，並給予支持與掌聲。
台灣如何起死回生，說到底，就是四個字：招商投資。若要再加一句話，就是：招商投資，將台灣建設為經貿自由島。倘若這樣的看法是對的，倘若這是台灣的活路；那麼，我們至少應給面對全球挑戰的企業家們一個平衡合理的評價，可以督促他們在勞動人權及環保生態上克盡社會責任，但不宜用「九十八比二法則」否定他們，也不要亂扣「台灣之恥」的帽子。
還記得趕走杜邦及拜耳的事嗎？扁政府時代的總統經濟顧問蕭萬長當時稱，那是外商來台投資的「喪鐘」。現在十餘年後「招商」的嬰兒又要臨盆，難道二％的噓聲會蓋過九十八％的掌聲？
鹿港不要杜邦，杜邦跑到中國；宜蘭不要六輕，六輕跑到雲林。這些都是選擇。鴻海和白海豚其實代表兩種社會價值，台灣四百年來皆在兩者之間的選擇之中走過來，未來，我們一定要更懂得選擇之道。
A Translation
July 23, 2010
Hon Hai Group Chairman Terry Gou has recently been subjected to relentless of criticism. Guo asked, "Is there really no place for me on Taiwan? Will I really be driven out?" Meanwhile, an environmental impact report has paralyzed the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Company. One reason is that its facilities may obstruct the migratory route for white dolphins. Environmentalists oppose driving the white dolphins out.
But just who is being driven out of Taiwan? Is it Hon Hai? Or is it white dolphins? Does a majority on Taiwan really favor these two extremes? Can we not find a balance between realism and idealism? Whether the issue is labor rights or ecological and environmental claims, can we not eschew anti-business demagoguery and political sloganeering?
Some capitalists are indeed despicable. The Wall Street fat cats responsible for the financial tsunami swallowed up the life savings of countless ordinary folk the world over. But other entrepreneurs are decent people who create employment opportunities and promote social progress. Often a nation's economic pulse and competitiveness depends on just such a handful of key industrialists.
The Republic of China remains in dire political and economic straits. If we wish to become a "free trade island," and establish an "Asian Pacific Platform," we must attract businesses and raise capital. We must "build nests to entice the phoenix." We must attract Taiwan capital, Mainland capital, and foreign capital. We must "join the world." But even more importantly, we must "keep our roots on Taiwan." Therefore, maintaining a certain amount of manufacturing capacity on the island is essential. Because only manufacturing industries can retain unique technical advantages. Only the manufacturing sector can increase employment opportunities.
But soliciting businesses to set up factories, especially within the manufacturing industry, inevitably leads to conflict over labor rights, rivalries between regions, and concerns over environmental protection. When Taiwan was still known as "Formosa," the entire island was a natural deer park. Now the only place one can see a deer is on a nature preserve. As long as human beings continue to inhabit the earth, this competition between development and conservation will not end. That is why we face a dilemma over white dolphins today.
The social cost of attracting business and capital must be proportionate. But the Republic of China's central policy is to attract global investment. If every major investment is subjected to such an unrealistic selection process, how much room will remain for economic development? When some people wanted to establish a biotech park, a prominent author characterized the site as "Taiwan's lungs." When some people wanted to construct a petrochemical plant, ecologists said "Don't drive out the dolphins!" When some people wanted to construct an enclosure around a Technology Park, 24 farming families vowed to "til their fields to their last breath." How one views such controversies of course, depends on one's perspective. Both sides claim to be on the side of the angels. Take the Tai Po land incident for example. Ninety-eight percent of the farmers favored selling the land. But a mere two percent who opposed selling the land dictated the outcome. We are reluctant to comment on the merits of each sides' arguments. But we cannot help wondering, should our economic policy really be dicated by this "98:2" standard?
Now let us return to Terry Gou. Guo built factories on both sides of the Strait. At the very least, he fully complied with the law. Working conditions exceeded both legal requirements and standards set by other manufacturers. The main cause for the plant controversy was political and social factors unique to the Chinese Mainland. Arguably Gou could have done better. After all, he eventually offered raises. But to label him "Taiwan's Shame" is unjust. It is unseemly for university professors to engage in such name-calling. Mainland factories belonging to Japanese companies have also experienced labor strikes. Should the management of these companies be indiscriminately labeled "Japan's Shame?" Terry Gou is an entrepreneur struggling to survive within a labor chain controlled by the West. The income from his OEM work represents merely 2% of the upstream income. Both sides of the Strait ought to be ashamed about this 2% OEM number. But who if anyone deserves to be denounced as "Taiwan's Shame?" Just who are the university professors who slapped this label on Terry Guo?
The public fears entrepreneurs even as it invests its hopes on them. The choice between Hon Hai and white dolphins underscores the relationship between corporate responsibility and public expectations. Certain entrepreneurs are publicly reviled, including those who colluded with the Chen Shui-bian regime during its "Second Round of Fiscal Reforms." Such crony capitalists deserve to be reviled. But legitimate businesses that promote economic development and benefit the community deserve public support and encouragement.
How can Taiwan's economy be brought back to life? In the end it all boils down to persuading businesses to invest, thereby transforming Taiwan into an island of free trade. Assuming this view is correct, assuming this is the way out for Taiwan, we must be fair to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs confront global challenges. We can urge them to be sociallly responsible regarind labor rights and environmental protection. But we cannot expect them to live with "98:2" standards. We must not demonize them as "Taiwan's Shame."
Does anyone remember how DuPont and Bayer were driven off Taiwan? Then Chen Shui-bian era presidential economic adviser Vincent Siew pronounced it the "death knell" for foreign investment on Taiwan. Now, over a decade later, we are again "soliciting business." But will naysayers amounting to 2% of the public drown out the yeasayers who constitute the other 98%?
Lukang did not want DuPont. So DuPont went to the Mainland. Ilan did not want the Number Six Naptha Cracking Plant. So the Number Six Naphtha Cracking Plant went to Yunlin. These are all choices we make. Hon Hai and white dolphins represent two sets of values. For four centuries we have been choosing between the two. In the centuries to come, we too will have to make similar choices.
逼誰出走，鴻海還是白海豚？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.23 02:39 am
深陷批評的鴻海集團董事長郭台銘問：「台灣是不是沒有我留下來的餘地？難道要逼我們出走？」在此同時，國光石化的環評也陷入僵局，原因之一是影響了白海豚的廊道，生態人士反對逼白海豚出走。
台灣要逼誰出走？要逼走鴻海，或白海豚？難道多數台灣人都贊同有此無彼的極端選擇？我們難道不能在現實與理想之間找到平衡？不論是勞工權益、生態或環保的主張，能否不被操作成反商仇富的社會偏見或政治口號？
資本家有可怕可惡者，如美國華爾街那批肥貓，掀起金融海嘯，吞噬了全球多少庶民的畢生血汗積蓄。但企業家也有可愛可敬者，創造就業機會，帶動社會發展，甚至整個國家的經貿命脈與競爭力往往是靠幾個重要廠家維繫於不墜。
台灣的國際政經情勢極度嚴峻。我們要走向「經貿自由島」、建設為「亞太平台」；主要就是要招商募資，築巢引鳳，吸引台資、陸資、外資在台匯聚。然而，台灣雖要「走向世界」，但更重要的卻是「根留台灣」。因此，維持一定規模及品質的製造業尤其重要，因為有製造業才能保留獨特的技術優勢，且有製造業才有較多的就業機會。
然而，招商設廠，尤其是製造業，難免會與勞工權益、區域社會情境及生態環境發生衝突或選擇的問題。以台灣而言，在「福爾摩沙」時代，可謂全島都是天然鹿苑，現在卻只在養殖場才看得到鹿；事實上，只要人類繼續在地球上存在，這類發展與保育的競合過程就不會停止，所以今天我們也才會面對白海豚的問題。
招商投資，當然絕不可付出不成比例的社會代價。但是，在台灣正以全球招商為國家中興政策之際，如果件件重大投資都要面對有此無彼的極端選擇的話，台灣還有多少發展的空間？要設生技園區，作家說那是台灣的肺；要設石化廠，生態人士說，別趕跑白海豚；要圈地設科技園區，廿四家農戶說要「死守農業」。這些爭議，見仁見智，公說公有理、婆說婆有理；如大埔圈地事件，即使百分之九十八的農人贊成賣地，但情勢已由百分之二反對售地者主控。我們不願也無權評論兩方的是非曲直，只是想問：台灣的經濟政策是否將以這種「九十八比二法則」為準據？
回頭說到郭台銘，他在兩岸設廠，至少完全符合法律規定，且勞動條件亦有優於法律規定及其他廠家之處。關於他在對岸廠區發生的種種爭議，恐怕大陸政治及社會的特殊因素才是主因；若謂郭台銘可以做得更好，應可期待（畢竟他加薪了），但若說他是「台灣之恥」，這卻不像是教授們會寫得出來的判決書。君不見大陸的日商工廠也有工潮，難道亦可用「日本之恥」概括？其實，郭台銘也是在西方主控的產業分工鏈中掙扎生存的企業家，他的代工所得僅佔上下游所得的二％而已；兩岸應以這種「二％代工」為恥，但若要數可以稱作「台灣之恥」的人物，不知那些教授們是以什麼排序挑上了郭台銘？
社會與企業家的關係，可謂是「既期待／又怕受傷害」。鴻海與白海豚這類的選擇，凸顯出企業責任與社會期待的競合關係。有些企業家深受社會嫌惡，如扁政府在二次金改中與財團的勾結，使人深惡痛絕；但是，對於那些正當經營、帶動發展、造福社會的企業家，社會亦應當給他們應有的施展空間，並給予支持與掌聲。
台灣如何起死回生，說到底，就是四個字：招商投資。若要再加一句話，就是：招商投資，將台灣建設為經貿自由島。倘若這樣的看法是對的，倘若這是台灣的活路；那麼，我們至少應給面對全球挑戰的企業家們一個平衡合理的評價，可以督促他們在勞動人權及環保生態上克盡社會責任，但不宜用「九十八比二法則」否定他們，也不要亂扣「台灣之恥」的帽子。
還記得趕走杜邦及拜耳的事嗎？扁政府時代的總統經濟顧問蕭萬長當時稱，那是外商來台投資的「喪鐘」。現在十餘年後「招商」的嬰兒又要臨盆，難道二％的噓聲會蓋過九十八％的掌聲？
鹿港不要杜邦，杜邦跑到中國；宜蘭不要六輕，六輕跑到雲林。這些都是選擇。鴻海和白海豚其實代表兩種社會價值，台灣四百年來皆在兩者之間的選擇之中走過來，未來，我們一定要更懂得選擇之道。
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Judicial Yuan Appointment Must Transcend Partisan Politics
Judicial Yuan Appointment Must Transcend Partisan PoliticsChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2010
Summary: Judicial Yuan President Lai Ying-chao was resolute about tendering his resignation. He was determined to assume responsiblity for systematic corruption among High Court judges. President Ma has accepted Lai's resignation. He has asked Judicial Yuan Vice President Hsieh Chai-fu, who tendered his resignation at the same time, to remain until a successor can be found. The Special Investigation Unit is investigating High Court judges. This has shattered the credibility of our justice system. But President Lai's unwavering resignation was a rare demonstration of political responsibility. He earned the public's respect, and set an example for his peers.
Full Text below:
Judicial Yuan President Lai Ying-chao was resolute about tendering his resignation. He was determined to assume responsiblity for systematic corruption among High Court judges. President Ma has accepted Lai's resignation. He has asked Judicial Yuan Vice President Hsieh Chai-fu, who tendered his resignation at the same time, to remain until a successor can be found. The Special Investigation Unit is investigating High Court judges. This has shattered the credibility of our justice system. But President Lai's unwavering resignation was a rare demonstration of political responsibility. He earned the public's respect, and set an example for his peers.
Does anyone remember how former Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming refused to step down despite public skepticism about his integrity? With his swift resignation, President Lai demonstrated far more character. That was obvious. His resignation was so unequivocal even the president was taken by surprise. Lai resigned only as Judicial Yuan President, not as a High Court judge. This would have enabled the president to keep Lai on as a High Court judge. Lai did not realize this would significantly limit the president's options regarding personnel appointments. Therefore special importance was put on him simultaneously resigning as High Court judge. Simultaneously resigning his posistion as High Court judge would allow the president to recruit from circles other than current judges. Lai was both thoughtful and honorable. President Lai's willingness to assume responsibility ended any hemorraging within the justice system. It raised public hopes for judicial reform. has opened up new horizons. It allowed the administration to carefully consider the next wave of judicial appointments and its policy direction. The administration should consult a wide range of people before making its final decision.
The Special Investigation Unit's handling of cases has inspired the public to consider the establishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption, or ICAC. Similar calls have been heard everywhere. But the design of the Special Investigation Unit and its recent moves mean it is essentially the same as an Independent Commission Against Corruption. If one insists on having the name as well as the game, one could simply rename the Special Investigation Unit the "Independent Commission Against Corruption." The first chief of the Special Investigation Unit was improperly selected. Chen Tsung-ming has resigned. We should not throw the baby out with the bath water. We should not assume that establishing a separate Independent Commission Against Corruption is the only way. The key is systemic reform of the justice system. We must eliminate its defects while retaining its virtues. We must establish an effective exit mechanism for judges. We must eliminate diseased tissue while preserving the healthy. We must avoid untoward eventualities. After all, improving the quality and efficiency of the trial process is not the responsiblity of the Special Investigation Unit or an Independent Commission Against Corruption. Judicial integrity is merely a minimum requirement for the justice system. The only way to improve the trial process is to improve both the trial system and judicial appointees.
Former Judicial Yuan President Ong initiated judicial reform, but his campaign was only a partial success. Now President Lai has resigned. Judicial reform can no longer be delayed. Everyone agrees that judicial reform is not a panacea. It cannot effect an overnight transformation. Therefore one must appoint a Judicial Yuan President with a sense of mission. One must allow enough time for knowledgeable professionals to review the Big Picture and eliminate all obstacles. One must not maintain the status quo and continue muddling along as before.
What kind of abilities should the next Judicial Yuan president have? He must have a deep understanding of the law. He must have an impeccable professional reputation. He must have considerable administrative ability. He must be able to transform the justice system into a high quality, professional service provider. With judicial independence as a precondition, he must find a way to increase the quality and efficiency of the justice system. The ability to manage the "economics of law" will be indispensable. Public expectations are running high. Unflinching determination will be essential in leading the trial system out of its crisis of public confidence. Allow us to speak frankly. Taiwan has many talented individuals. But few candidates meet the aforementioned requirements. The president will have to choose carefully.
We would like to take this opportunity to remind the ruling and opposition parties that judicial reform should transcend partisan political struggles. It must not be rooted in selfish calculation. The "Justice Act" has remained stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years, unable to see the light of day. The result has been the decline of judicial discipline. The mechanism for evaluating and eliminating unfit judges remains ineffective, nothing more than the result of political struggle. How can one not be distraught? Judicial Yuan appointments impact judicial reform. They determine whether judicial reform will be able to make a fresh start. The ruling and opposition parties must not view this issue purely from partisan perspectives. They must not turn judicial appointments into partisan political struggles. Too much political calculation is not healthy to the reform of the trial process. The ruling and opposition parties must allow the nation to recruit the talent it needs.
The President of the Judicial Yuan is chosen from among High Court judges. He or she will preside over constitutional interpretations and play a key part in the next wave of judicial reforms. President Lai's departure has left the president with a personnel appointment decision that could make or break the Republic of China's democracy and its rule of law. When the president makes his appointment, he should throw open the doors of his mind. He should ask himself what the real requirements are for judicial reform. He must find good people to assume this heavy responsibility. The future of the rule of law in the Republic of China depends on it.
中國時報
2010.07.22
社論－遴選司法院長應超越政黨鬥爭
本報訊
由於司法院賴英照院長堅決請辭，以示對於高院法官集體收賄疑案負責，馬總統業已接受其辭呈，並請同時請辭的謝在全副院長代行職務，以待後任。特偵組偵辦高院法官一案，固然重創司法信用，但是賴院長的果斷辭職，卻是多年以來難得一見顯示何謂政治責任的空谷足音，令人尊敬，也足為典範。
還記得前檢察總長陳聰明曾經如何面對外界的質疑而不肯辭職嗎？賴院長的下台身影顯然優雅的多。誰都看得出來，他的辭職甚至讓總統也出乎意料，這才有慰留不成而只允辭去院長不允辭去大法官的折衷。殊不知賴院長辭職只辭院長實質上限縮了總統的人事選擇空間，還因此特別強調隨時準備讓出大法官的位置，以容總統可以不必囿於只從現任大法官中求才，可謂設想周到而且光明磊落。賴院長勇於負責，不僅為司法負傷起了止血的功用，也為接下來國人高度期待的司法改革，打開了一個全新的空間，值得期待，也讓主政者可就下一波的司法人事乃至政策走向，審慎思考，廣徵意見，再為決定。
特偵組的辦案行動，讓社會聯想到廉政公署的議題，相關呼聲一時之間似乎甚囂塵上。稍微思考一下，就可知道特偵組的設計以及這次施展鐵腕，原就是廉政公署的替身，如果必須名正言順，將特偵組更名為廉政公署，也不妨事。特偵組首任總長擇人不當，陳聰明黯然去職，不該因人廢制，以為另設廉政公署才是出路。問題的關鍵，是在如何調整司法體質，汰劣存菁，建立有效的法官退場機制，去腐生肌，避免不應有的事態發生。畢竟審判品質與效率的提昇，不是靠特偵組或廉政公署來建立的；司法清廉只是最起碼的要求，從制度與人事入手提昇審判品質與效率，才是根本之圖。
翁院長時代的司法改革，行過半途而未竟全功，現在賴院長又告去職，司法改革真的不能再蹉跎了。誰都同意，司法改革沒有靈丹妙藥，無法期待一夕之間脫胎換骨；唯其如此，才必須要任命一位具有高度使命感的司法院長，有充足的時間縱深與專業智慧，能為全局之思考，排除萬難，絕不能繼續趑趄不前，安於現狀而得過且過了。
一個必須熟加考慮的問題是，下任的司法院長應該具備什麼特殊才能？他除了深厚的法學知識，崇隆的專業聲望之外，可能特別需要足夠的行政能力，將司法體系當作一個提供優質專業服務的部門，在符合審判獨立要求的前提條件下，找到制度上及實踐上強化品質與效率的方法，以成功輸出正義。也因此，法律經濟的管理學問，或許不可或缺。當然，回應當前社會的殷切盼望，任事的魄力，尤其是領導審判體系走出公信力困境的意志與決心，同樣是必要的條件。容我們坦率以告，台灣人才濟濟，但是符合以上多種要求的人選，並非俯拾即是，實在需要總統潛心的選才。
我們也要藉此機會提醒朝野政黨，司法改革應該是一個超越政黨鬥爭的領域，也容不下本位的盤算與私心。《法官法》在立法院中橫遭擱置經年，不見天日，弄到司法風紀敗壞，卻在法官評鑑及淘汰機制上仍然一無用武之地，就是過度政治角力的結果，能不令人扼腕？司法院長的人選，關係到司法改革能否再度邁步出發，無論朝野政黨，都不該只從政黨本位著眼，忙不迭地將司法人事捲入政治鬥爭的漩渦；過多的政治算計，並不適合審判部門的體質，朝野都該讓出足夠的空間，以便遴選者從容為國舉才。
司法院長是由大法官兼任，主持釋憲大業與下一波司法改革大計的關鍵人物。賴院長留下了一個關係台灣民主法治成敗的職位，總統的人事抉擇，應該本諸大開大闔的胸襟，調查司法改革的真正需要，善得其人而委之以重任；台灣的法治前途，實所賴之。
A Translation
July 22, 2010
Summary: Judicial Yuan President Lai Ying-chao was resolute about tendering his resignation. He was determined to assume responsiblity for systematic corruption among High Court judges. President Ma has accepted Lai's resignation. He has asked Judicial Yuan Vice President Hsieh Chai-fu, who tendered his resignation at the same time, to remain until a successor can be found. The Special Investigation Unit is investigating High Court judges. This has shattered the credibility of our justice system. But President Lai's unwavering resignation was a rare demonstration of political responsibility. He earned the public's respect, and set an example for his peers.
Full Text below:
Judicial Yuan President Lai Ying-chao was resolute about tendering his resignation. He was determined to assume responsiblity for systematic corruption among High Court judges. President Ma has accepted Lai's resignation. He has asked Judicial Yuan Vice President Hsieh Chai-fu, who tendered his resignation at the same time, to remain until a successor can be found. The Special Investigation Unit is investigating High Court judges. This has shattered the credibility of our justice system. But President Lai's unwavering resignation was a rare demonstration of political responsibility. He earned the public's respect, and set an example for his peers.
Does anyone remember how former Prosecutor General Chen Tsung-ming refused to step down despite public skepticism about his integrity? With his swift resignation, President Lai demonstrated far more character. That was obvious. His resignation was so unequivocal even the president was taken by surprise. Lai resigned only as Judicial Yuan President, not as a High Court judge. This would have enabled the president to keep Lai on as a High Court judge. Lai did not realize this would significantly limit the president's options regarding personnel appointments. Therefore special importance was put on him simultaneously resigning as High Court judge. Simultaneously resigning his posistion as High Court judge would allow the president to recruit from circles other than current judges. Lai was both thoughtful and honorable. President Lai's willingness to assume responsibility ended any hemorraging within the justice system. It raised public hopes for judicial reform. has opened up new horizons. It allowed the administration to carefully consider the next wave of judicial appointments and its policy direction. The administration should consult a wide range of people before making its final decision.
The Special Investigation Unit's handling of cases has inspired the public to consider the establishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption, or ICAC. Similar calls have been heard everywhere. But the design of the Special Investigation Unit and its recent moves mean it is essentially the same as an Independent Commission Against Corruption. If one insists on having the name as well as the game, one could simply rename the Special Investigation Unit the "Independent Commission Against Corruption." The first chief of the Special Investigation Unit was improperly selected. Chen Tsung-ming has resigned. We should not throw the baby out with the bath water. We should not assume that establishing a separate Independent Commission Against Corruption is the only way. The key is systemic reform of the justice system. We must eliminate its defects while retaining its virtues. We must establish an effective exit mechanism for judges. We must eliminate diseased tissue while preserving the healthy. We must avoid untoward eventualities. After all, improving the quality and efficiency of the trial process is not the responsiblity of the Special Investigation Unit or an Independent Commission Against Corruption. Judicial integrity is merely a minimum requirement for the justice system. The only way to improve the trial process is to improve both the trial system and judicial appointees.
Former Judicial Yuan President Ong initiated judicial reform, but his campaign was only a partial success. Now President Lai has resigned. Judicial reform can no longer be delayed. Everyone agrees that judicial reform is not a panacea. It cannot effect an overnight transformation. Therefore one must appoint a Judicial Yuan President with a sense of mission. One must allow enough time for knowledgeable professionals to review the Big Picture and eliminate all obstacles. One must not maintain the status quo and continue muddling along as before.
What kind of abilities should the next Judicial Yuan president have? He must have a deep understanding of the law. He must have an impeccable professional reputation. He must have considerable administrative ability. He must be able to transform the justice system into a high quality, professional service provider. With judicial independence as a precondition, he must find a way to increase the quality and efficiency of the justice system. The ability to manage the "economics of law" will be indispensable. Public expectations are running high. Unflinching determination will be essential in leading the trial system out of its crisis of public confidence. Allow us to speak frankly. Taiwan has many talented individuals. But few candidates meet the aforementioned requirements. The president will have to choose carefully.
We would like to take this opportunity to remind the ruling and opposition parties that judicial reform should transcend partisan political struggles. It must not be rooted in selfish calculation. The "Justice Act" has remained stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years, unable to see the light of day. The result has been the decline of judicial discipline. The mechanism for evaluating and eliminating unfit judges remains ineffective, nothing more than the result of political struggle. How can one not be distraught? Judicial Yuan appointments impact judicial reform. They determine whether judicial reform will be able to make a fresh start. The ruling and opposition parties must not view this issue purely from partisan perspectives. They must not turn judicial appointments into partisan political struggles. Too much political calculation is not healthy to the reform of the trial process. The ruling and opposition parties must allow the nation to recruit the talent it needs.
The President of the Judicial Yuan is chosen from among High Court judges. He or she will preside over constitutional interpretations and play a key part in the next wave of judicial reforms. President Lai's departure has left the president with a personnel appointment decision that could make or break the Republic of China's democracy and its rule of law. When the president makes his appointment, he should throw open the doors of his mind. He should ask himself what the real requirements are for judicial reform. He must find good people to assume this heavy responsibility. The future of the rule of law in the Republic of China depends on it.
中國時報
2010.07.22
社論－遴選司法院長應超越政黨鬥爭
本報訊
由於司法院賴英照院長堅決請辭，以示對於高院法官集體收賄疑案負責，馬總統業已接受其辭呈，並請同時請辭的謝在全副院長代行職務，以待後任。特偵組偵辦高院法官一案，固然重創司法信用，但是賴院長的果斷辭職，卻是多年以來難得一見顯示何謂政治責任的空谷足音，令人尊敬，也足為典範。
還記得前檢察總長陳聰明曾經如何面對外界的質疑而不肯辭職嗎？賴院長的下台身影顯然優雅的多。誰都看得出來，他的辭職甚至讓總統也出乎意料，這才有慰留不成而只允辭去院長不允辭去大法官的折衷。殊不知賴院長辭職只辭院長實質上限縮了總統的人事選擇空間，還因此特別強調隨時準備讓出大法官的位置，以容總統可以不必囿於只從現任大法官中求才，可謂設想周到而且光明磊落。賴院長勇於負責，不僅為司法負傷起了止血的功用，也為接下來國人高度期待的司法改革，打開了一個全新的空間，值得期待，也讓主政者可就下一波的司法人事乃至政策走向，審慎思考，廣徵意見，再為決定。
特偵組的辦案行動，讓社會聯想到廉政公署的議題，相關呼聲一時之間似乎甚囂塵上。稍微思考一下，就可知道特偵組的設計以及這次施展鐵腕，原就是廉政公署的替身，如果必須名正言順，將特偵組更名為廉政公署，也不妨事。特偵組首任總長擇人不當，陳聰明黯然去職，不該因人廢制，以為另設廉政公署才是出路。問題的關鍵，是在如何調整司法體質，汰劣存菁，建立有效的法官退場機制，去腐生肌，避免不應有的事態發生。畢竟審判品質與效率的提昇，不是靠特偵組或廉政公署來建立的；司法清廉只是最起碼的要求，從制度與人事入手提昇審判品質與效率，才是根本之圖。
翁院長時代的司法改革，行過半途而未竟全功，現在賴院長又告去職，司法改革真的不能再蹉跎了。誰都同意，司法改革沒有靈丹妙藥，無法期待一夕之間脫胎換骨；唯其如此，才必須要任命一位具有高度使命感的司法院長，有充足的時間縱深與專業智慧，能為全局之思考，排除萬難，絕不能繼續趑趄不前，安於現狀而得過且過了。
一個必須熟加考慮的問題是，下任的司法院長應該具備什麼特殊才能？他除了深厚的法學知識，崇隆的專業聲望之外，可能特別需要足夠的行政能力，將司法體系當作一個提供優質專業服務的部門，在符合審判獨立要求的前提條件下，找到制度上及實踐上強化品質與效率的方法，以成功輸出正義。也因此，法律經濟的管理學問，或許不可或缺。當然，回應當前社會的殷切盼望，任事的魄力，尤其是領導審判體系走出公信力困境的意志與決心，同樣是必要的條件。容我們坦率以告，台灣人才濟濟，但是符合以上多種要求的人選，並非俯拾即是，實在需要總統潛心的選才。
我們也要藉此機會提醒朝野政黨，司法改革應該是一個超越政黨鬥爭的領域，也容不下本位的盤算與私心。《法官法》在立法院中橫遭擱置經年，不見天日，弄到司法風紀敗壞，卻在法官評鑑及淘汰機制上仍然一無用武之地，就是過度政治角力的結果，能不令人扼腕？司法院長的人選，關係到司法改革能否再度邁步出發，無論朝野政黨，都不該只從政黨本位著眼，忙不迭地將司法人事捲入政治鬥爭的漩渦；過多的政治算計，並不適合審判部門的體質，朝野都該讓出足夠的空間，以便遴選者從容為國舉才。
司法院長是由大法官兼任，主持釋憲大業與下一波司法改革大計的關鍵人物。賴院長留下了一個關係台灣民主法治成敗的職位，總統的人事抉擇，應該本諸大開大闔的胸襟，調查司法改革的真正需要，善得其人而委之以重任；台灣的法治前途，實所賴之。
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Lacking: Not an ICAC, but Public Trust
Lacking: Not an ICAC, but Public TrustUnited Daily News editorial Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 21, 2010
Several High Court judges are suspected of accepting bribes. President Ma has chosen this occasion to announce the establishment of an "Independent Commission Against Corruption."
Whether the Republic of China should establish an Independent Commission Against Corruption has long been a controversial issue. Opponents say that an Independent Commission Against Corruption would be redundant. Its functions would overlap with those of the existing Bureau of Investigation. This would make it difficult to ensure its independent character. Moreover, the members of any Independent Commission Against Corruption would probably be drawn from existing institutions. If the public doesn't trust our current institutions, why should they trust new insititutions consisting of members drawn from existing institutions?
Therefore reducing corruption and increasing clean government is not a matter of establishing new institutions. It is a matter of gaining the public trust. The Bureau of Investigation Special Investigation Unit does not lack the ability to fight crime. What the Bureau of Investigation lacks is the ability to resist political pressure. Critics have long accused it of "selective prosecution." The Bureau of Investigation even tipped off former president Chen Shui-bian. It leaked important information about Chen's corruption and money-laundering case to the suspect himself. How can the public possibly believe that the Bureau of Investigation is determined to fight corruption? The Special Investigation Unit consists of elite members of the prosecutorial system. Its authority is considerable. But the Prosecutor General partied with important witnesses in a case under active prosecution. How can the public believe prosecutors will not pull their punches? Despite a plethora of concerns, the public finds the idea of a separate ICAC appealing.
If one wishes to discuss the establishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption, one can hardly avoid mentioning Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption, or ICAC. Why has Hong Kong's ICAC won the public trust? Hong Kong's ICAC has a unique operating mechanism. For example, the ICAC is not subject to the control of Hong Kong's Department of Justice (DOJ). Hong Kong's DOJ is roughly the equivalent of our [District Prosecutors Office?]. Instead, Hong Kong's DOJ and ICAC check and balance each other. The two institutions were previously under the supervision of the Colonial Governor. Now they are under the supervision of a Monitoring Committee appointed by Hong Kong's Chief Executive. Monitoring Committee members are drawn from the private sector. They are authorized to monitor individual cases. The Monitoring Committee has the right to demand a ruling from the Chief Executive on cases that the ICAC or DOJ refuse to prosecute.
Can Hong Kong's ICAC be successfully replicated on Taiwan? The Monitoring Committee probably cannot. Hong Kong's ICAC is able to maintain its independence due to its Monitoring Committee and other design features. But if this system were transplanted in our society, it simply would not work. Suppose we established a Monitoring Committee to monitor individual cases being prosecuted by an ICAC or the Bureau of Investigation. This would not ensure the independence of the ICAC. Instead, the Monitoring Committee itself would become the focus of a political struggle. Furthermore, the status of the ICAC is unrelated to how well it does its job. Consider our own Special Investigation Unit. Its head is appointed by the president. The Legislative Yuan approves the appointment of the Prosecutor General. Their status could not be any higher. Their institutional independence could not be more assured. Hong Kong's ICAC has established an excellent reputation. Our own Bureau of Investigation Special Investigation Unit, on the other hand, is not trusted by the public. Clearly the reason has nothing to do with the system as such.
Hong Kong's ICAC has won the public trust, and established an excellent reputation. In addition to wielding great power, its members have a sense of purpose and responsibility. That is the most important factor of all. But suppose that motivated by cronyism, its members tipped off suspects, the way our Bureau of Investigation has? Suppose that lacking self-restraint, its members exceeded their authority, the way our Prosecutor General has? The ICAC would hardly be effective as it is today.
Laws do not enforce themselves. Even the best system requires individuals of excellence to make it work. If is members have no consciences, everythig will come to naught. This is true for any prosecutorial authority or ICAC. This is true for the courts as well. Corrupt judges with "independent authority in trying cases" pervert the law, They are extremely difficult to monitor and sanction. If they can try cases "independently," they can engage in corruption "independently." In the end, the only thing one can rely on is the judge's conscience.
Therefore to establish an ICAC, one must first design an operating mechanism. One must concentrate on how its members are selected, and comply with professional norms. The ruling administration has announced the establishment of a new institution on the heels of the High Court judge corruption case. Perhaps its motive is political propaganda. But new institutions without a new spirit can only squander economic resources and increase institutional redundancy. President Ma's order deserves further consideration. But until his proposal has been given sufficient consideration, it would be better to go slow.
One may or may not choose to establish new institutions. But either way, the existing Bureau of Investigation and Special Investigation Unit must do better. They must improve their reputations. They must justify their existence. Perhaps the ruling administration no longer believes in the Bureau of Investigation and Special Investigation Unit. If so, why should the public believe in the ruling administration? Why should it believe that any ICAC it establishes will be better and more trustworthy, that it will reduce corruption and increase offical integrity?
不是沒有廉政署 而是沒有公信力
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.21 01:40 am
高等法院爆發法官集體貪汙案，馬總統選擇此一時機宣示成立「廉政署」。
是否成立「廉政署」，一直爭議不斷。反對意見認為，廉政署與既有的調查局疊床架屋，且機關獨立性不易確保；再者，廉政署成員恐仍須由既有相關機構中調用，這些老機構若不受民眾信任，取其成員組成新機構，又如何期待能夠獲得民眾信任？
所以，肅貪倡廉，其根本不在機關的增置，而在能否獲得民眾的信任。調查局、特偵組不是沒有查案能力；但是，調查局長期以來難以擺脫政治力的控制，「選擇性辦案」的批評不斷，甚至調查局長都向總統通風報信，洩露總統貪汙洗錢案的重要資訊，民眾又如何能夠相信調查局的肅貪決心和成效？再如，特偵組集合檢察系統菁英，實力堪稱上選，但檢察總長卻和案件重要證人飲宴往來，又如何讓民眾相信辦案不會放水？正因如此，雖然有疊床架屋的顧慮，但另設廉政署的主張始終有一定的社會期待。
談廉政機構，一定要談香港的「廉政公署」。香港廉政公署因何獲得民眾信任？香港「廉政公署」有其成立背景和特殊的運作機制，例如，廉政公署不受律政司（相當於檢察署）的控制，反而是與律政司相互制衡的機構；在此二機構之上，是由過去港督、現在特首任命的「監督委員會」來監控。監督委員會成員來自民間，有權針對個案進行監督；廉政公署或律政司堅持不追訴的案件，委員會有權要求由特首裁決。
台灣能否複製香港的「廉政公署」，恐怕僅以「監督委員會」一項即不可能原樣移植。香港廉政公署因有「監督委員會」等設計，而能維持其獨立地位。但此制若放到我們的社會，就完全行不通；若我們也組成「監督委員會」來監控廉政署或調查局所辦個案，恐怕非但無益廉政署的獨立地位，反而「監督委員會」自己也成了政爭焦點。再者，廉政署的隸屬階位其實亦未必與績效有關，如我們的特偵組，其首長是總統提名、立法院同意任命的檢察總長，層級已不可能再高，機關獨立性也不可能再有更好的設計；然而，港版「廉政公署」卻能建立很高的聲譽，我們的調查局、特偵組則不受信任。原因顯然不在制度。
港版「廉政公署」獲得民眾信任，建立很高的聲譽，除了制度上賦予大權，其機構成員的使命感和責任心，應當是最重要的原因。倘若其成員和我們的通風報信的調查局長一樣徇私舞弊，或是和不知自我節制的檢察總長一樣逾越分寸，廉政公署也就不可能有任何成效了。
徒法不足以自行，再好的制度，也要優良的成員來運作；倘若機構成員不能自覺，一切均將落空。檢調機關或者廉政署如此，法院亦復如是。「獨立辦案」的法官貪汙枉法，是非常難以監督及制裁的；他能「獨立」審判，也能「獨立」貪腐，最終只能仰賴法官的節操。
因此，這次成立廉政署之議，除了運作機制的設計之外，應當置重點於將來其成員如何選派，以及如何嚴格要求遵守專業規範。政府當局在高院法官集體貪汙案爆發之際，宣示新機構的成立，或有政治宣傳的用意；但若空有新機構而無新精神，只會浪費國家資源，再養一批冗員。我們認為，馬總統的命令，或許應當視為一個有待深入研議的課題；研議如未成熟，新機構恐是寧緩勿急。
再者，不論是否成立新機構，現有的調查局和特偵組，必須拿出更多成績，贏得更高的聲譽，以事實證明自己的存在價值。如果當局對調查局和特偵組已不寄期望，試問，國人憑什麼相信一定能夠產生更優秀、更可信任的人員，來組成廉政署，從而作出肅貪績效？
A Translation
July 21, 2010
Several High Court judges are suspected of accepting bribes. President Ma has chosen this occasion to announce the establishment of an "Independent Commission Against Corruption."
Whether the Republic of China should establish an Independent Commission Against Corruption has long been a controversial issue. Opponents say that an Independent Commission Against Corruption would be redundant. Its functions would overlap with those of the existing Bureau of Investigation. This would make it difficult to ensure its independent character. Moreover, the members of any Independent Commission Against Corruption would probably be drawn from existing institutions. If the public doesn't trust our current institutions, why should they trust new insititutions consisting of members drawn from existing institutions?
Therefore reducing corruption and increasing clean government is not a matter of establishing new institutions. It is a matter of gaining the public trust. The Bureau of Investigation Special Investigation Unit does not lack the ability to fight crime. What the Bureau of Investigation lacks is the ability to resist political pressure. Critics have long accused it of "selective prosecution." The Bureau of Investigation even tipped off former president Chen Shui-bian. It leaked important information about Chen's corruption and money-laundering case to the suspect himself. How can the public possibly believe that the Bureau of Investigation is determined to fight corruption? The Special Investigation Unit consists of elite members of the prosecutorial system. Its authority is considerable. But the Prosecutor General partied with important witnesses in a case under active prosecution. How can the public believe prosecutors will not pull their punches? Despite a plethora of concerns, the public finds the idea of a separate ICAC appealing.
If one wishes to discuss the establishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption, one can hardly avoid mentioning Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption, or ICAC. Why has Hong Kong's ICAC won the public trust? Hong Kong's ICAC has a unique operating mechanism. For example, the ICAC is not subject to the control of Hong Kong's Department of Justice (DOJ). Hong Kong's DOJ is roughly the equivalent of our [District Prosecutors Office?]. Instead, Hong Kong's DOJ and ICAC check and balance each other. The two institutions were previously under the supervision of the Colonial Governor. Now they are under the supervision of a Monitoring Committee appointed by Hong Kong's Chief Executive. Monitoring Committee members are drawn from the private sector. They are authorized to monitor individual cases. The Monitoring Committee has the right to demand a ruling from the Chief Executive on cases that the ICAC or DOJ refuse to prosecute.
Can Hong Kong's ICAC be successfully replicated on Taiwan? The Monitoring Committee probably cannot. Hong Kong's ICAC is able to maintain its independence due to its Monitoring Committee and other design features. But if this system were transplanted in our society, it simply would not work. Suppose we established a Monitoring Committee to monitor individual cases being prosecuted by an ICAC or the Bureau of Investigation. This would not ensure the independence of the ICAC. Instead, the Monitoring Committee itself would become the focus of a political struggle. Furthermore, the status of the ICAC is unrelated to how well it does its job. Consider our own Special Investigation Unit. Its head is appointed by the president. The Legislative Yuan approves the appointment of the Prosecutor General. Their status could not be any higher. Their institutional independence could not be more assured. Hong Kong's ICAC has established an excellent reputation. Our own Bureau of Investigation Special Investigation Unit, on the other hand, is not trusted by the public. Clearly the reason has nothing to do with the system as such.
Hong Kong's ICAC has won the public trust, and established an excellent reputation. In addition to wielding great power, its members have a sense of purpose and responsibility. That is the most important factor of all. But suppose that motivated by cronyism, its members tipped off suspects, the way our Bureau of Investigation has? Suppose that lacking self-restraint, its members exceeded their authority, the way our Prosecutor General has? The ICAC would hardly be effective as it is today.
Laws do not enforce themselves. Even the best system requires individuals of excellence to make it work. If is members have no consciences, everythig will come to naught. This is true for any prosecutorial authority or ICAC. This is true for the courts as well. Corrupt judges with "independent authority in trying cases" pervert the law, They are extremely difficult to monitor and sanction. If they can try cases "independently," they can engage in corruption "independently." In the end, the only thing one can rely on is the judge's conscience.
Therefore to establish an ICAC, one must first design an operating mechanism. One must concentrate on how its members are selected, and comply with professional norms. The ruling administration has announced the establishment of a new institution on the heels of the High Court judge corruption case. Perhaps its motive is political propaganda. But new institutions without a new spirit can only squander economic resources and increase institutional redundancy. President Ma's order deserves further consideration. But until his proposal has been given sufficient consideration, it would be better to go slow.
One may or may not choose to establish new institutions. But either way, the existing Bureau of Investigation and Special Investigation Unit must do better. They must improve their reputations. They must justify their existence. Perhaps the ruling administration no longer believes in the Bureau of Investigation and Special Investigation Unit. If so, why should the public believe in the ruling administration? Why should it believe that any ICAC it establishes will be better and more trustworthy, that it will reduce corruption and increase offical integrity?
不是沒有廉政署 而是沒有公信力
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.21 01:40 am
高等法院爆發法官集體貪汙案，馬總統選擇此一時機宣示成立「廉政署」。
是否成立「廉政署」，一直爭議不斷。反對意見認為，廉政署與既有的調查局疊床架屋，且機關獨立性不易確保；再者，廉政署成員恐仍須由既有相關機構中調用，這些老機構若不受民眾信任，取其成員組成新機構，又如何期待能夠獲得民眾信任？
所以，肅貪倡廉，其根本不在機關的增置，而在能否獲得民眾的信任。調查局、特偵組不是沒有查案能力；但是，調查局長期以來難以擺脫政治力的控制，「選擇性辦案」的批評不斷，甚至調查局長都向總統通風報信，洩露總統貪汙洗錢案的重要資訊，民眾又如何能夠相信調查局的肅貪決心和成效？再如，特偵組集合檢察系統菁英，實力堪稱上選，但檢察總長卻和案件重要證人飲宴往來，又如何讓民眾相信辦案不會放水？正因如此，雖然有疊床架屋的顧慮，但另設廉政署的主張始終有一定的社會期待。
談廉政機構，一定要談香港的「廉政公署」。香港廉政公署因何獲得民眾信任？香港「廉政公署」有其成立背景和特殊的運作機制，例如，廉政公署不受律政司（相當於檢察署）的控制，反而是與律政司相互制衡的機構；在此二機構之上，是由過去港督、現在特首任命的「監督委員會」來監控。監督委員會成員來自民間，有權針對個案進行監督；廉政公署或律政司堅持不追訴的案件，委員會有權要求由特首裁決。
台灣能否複製香港的「廉政公署」，恐怕僅以「監督委員會」一項即不可能原樣移植。香港廉政公署因有「監督委員會」等設計，而能維持其獨立地位。但此制若放到我們的社會，就完全行不通；若我們也組成「監督委員會」來監控廉政署或調查局所辦個案，恐怕非但無益廉政署的獨立地位，反而「監督委員會」自己也成了政爭焦點。再者，廉政署的隸屬階位其實亦未必與績效有關，如我們的特偵組，其首長是總統提名、立法院同意任命的檢察總長，層級已不可能再高，機關獨立性也不可能再有更好的設計；然而，港版「廉政公署」卻能建立很高的聲譽，我們的調查局、特偵組則不受信任。原因顯然不在制度。
港版「廉政公署」獲得民眾信任，建立很高的聲譽，除了制度上賦予大權，其機構成員的使命感和責任心，應當是最重要的原因。倘若其成員和我們的通風報信的調查局長一樣徇私舞弊，或是和不知自我節制的檢察總長一樣逾越分寸，廉政公署也就不可能有任何成效了。
徒法不足以自行，再好的制度，也要優良的成員來運作；倘若機構成員不能自覺，一切均將落空。檢調機關或者廉政署如此，法院亦復如是。「獨立辦案」的法官貪汙枉法，是非常難以監督及制裁的；他能「獨立」審判，也能「獨立」貪腐，最終只能仰賴法官的節操。
因此，這次成立廉政署之議，除了運作機制的設計之外，應當置重點於將來其成員如何選派，以及如何嚴格要求遵守專業規範。政府當局在高院法官集體貪汙案爆發之際，宣示新機構的成立，或有政治宣傳的用意；但若空有新機構而無新精神，只會浪費國家資源，再養一批冗員。我們認為，馬總統的命令，或許應當視為一個有待深入研議的課題；研議如未成熟，新機構恐是寧緩勿急。
再者，不論是否成立新機構，現有的調查局和特偵組，必須拿出更多成績，贏得更高的聲譽，以事實證明自己的存在價值。如果當局對調查局和特偵組已不寄期望，試問，國人憑什麼相信一定能夠產生更優秀、更可信任的人員，來組成廉政署，從而作出肅貪績效？
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Political Appointees Must Set An Example by Stepping Down
Political Appointees Must Set An Example by Stepping DownChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 20, 2010
Judicial Yuan President Lai Ying-chao submitted his resignation several days ago, because three High Court judges were suspected of accepting bribes. Lai submitted his resignation because he must assume responsibility for the lapse in judicial discipline.
Some people say Lai should not resign. They say that the High Court judges may have taken bribes, but what does that have to do with the Judicial Yuan president himself? Some see the issue through partisan eyes. They accuse President Ma of forcing out the sole remaining yuan president appointed by a DPP administration. Some say Lai should stick to his guns, and see judicial reform through to the end. We cannot agree with these justifications. Officials today willing to resign their positions out of a sense of responsibility are as rare as hen's teeth. Judicial reform requires capable leadership. But a sense of honor is as important as ability. The political atmosphere is as important as judicial integrity. As we take stock of officialdom on Taiwan, we feel his resignation deserves commendation.
The integrity of political appointees has undergone a swift decline. Too many unspeakable scandals have erupted. Take Chen Tsung-ming for example. He too is part of the justice system. He had the effrontery to dine with Huang Fang-yen, a possible accomplice in the Chen Shui-bian corruption and money-laundering case. He refused to take a stand on the Discretionary Fund issue. Talking heads blasted him, but he refused to resign. He justified himself by repeating that "I must stay on to finish the job." Only when the Control Yuan threatened to impeach him, did Chen Tsung-ming feel obligated to resign. The rumors and controversies surrounding Chen Tsung-ming relate to him personally. The current judicial crisis involves only High Court judges, not Lai Ying-chao specifically. Compare the two justice system officials. The difference between the two should immediately become apparent.
Forty years ago, during the Chiang Ching-kuo era, a Suao Harbor fishing boat sank, drowning dozens of students. Then Minister of Education Chiang Yan-shi assumed responsibility and resigned. When a building on the Yuan Feng Senior High School campus collapsed and crushed several students, Huang Kuen-hui, then Bureau of Education chief also resigned. When aircraft belonging to the state-run China Airlines crashed, the Minister of Transportation was forced to resign. Insiders often joke that Lien Chan was lucky. When others served as Minister of Transportation, they were forced to step down in response to air disasters. But Lien Chan experienced smooth sailing all the way, For three long years, not one air disaster occurred. Air disasters are of course affected in part by airline safety procedures. But luck may play an important part as well. When political appointees are held responsible even for random events such as these, then of course Lai Ying-chao must be held responsible for judicial discipline. Of course Chen Tsung-ming must be held responsible for his personal misconduct. It is only right.
It is universally accepted that political appointees should assume responsibility for their policy failures. But just how does one define "policy failure?" If one is unable to implement a policy, or if a policy that has been implemented leads to disaster, officials can always blame bad weather, overseas economic factors, financial shocks, even sunspots. Allow us to use a metaphor to explain what we mean by responsibility. Think of a national government as a private company. A nation's political leader is the company manager. A nation's citizens are the company's shareholders. A whole range factors will determine the success or failure of the company, including a considerable element of luck. But regardless, the company's business manager must assume responsibility for the company's performance. Whether he turns out to be a hero or a zero will ultimately depend upon the success or failure of the company's operations. He cannot blame anyone else. A company manager must assume final responsibility. The same is true of a national government's political appointees.
During Chen Shui-bian's eight years in power, political appointees came and went regularly. Whether they remained in office or were given the boot depended entirely on President Chen's changing moods. Neither ability nor integrity mattered. Political appointees would pray desperately that nothing went wrong on their watch. They were paralyzed, afraid to do anything that might rock the boat. Two years ago, with the change in ruling parties, everyone assumed that the bureaucratic mindset that prevailed under the previous regime were a thing of the past. But during the past two years, cabinet members in more than one municipal administration have left observers dumbfounded. Apparently what the Ma administration wants from officials more than anything else is obedience. It care nothing about an official's judgment or ability. When problems surfaced, high-ranking officials with the Presidential Office and Executive Yuan find it hard to blame cabinet members, because cabinet members refused to do anything but carry out orders from their superiors. Given such an atmosphere, it is utterly unrealistic to expect political appointees to demonstrate backbone and behave responsibly.
Yuan President Lai Ying-chao assumed responsibility and resigned. Did he do so to bring the Republic of China's dysfunctional officialdom out of its slump? Whatever his motives, he set a positive example. Will judicial discipline be restored as a result of the current scandal? It is hard to say. But Lai's bold move deserves praise.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.20
社論－政務官請辭下台是負責的典範
本報訊
司法院長賴英照日前因三位高院法官之涉嫌受賄而請辭獲准。賴院長之所以請辭，當然是要為司法官風紀之不彰而負政治責任。
對賴的請辭動作，社會有些許的不贊成之聲；有人認為高等法院法官涉貪與司法院長無涉、有人從黨同伐異的角度，認為是馬總統逼走了民進黨執政期間獲聘的僅存院長、有人認為賴英照應該堅守崗位，切實做好司法風氣的整頓。我們對於以上這三種反對賴先生辭官的說法，都礙難同意。相反的，在當今台灣官場，能夠以辭官表達責任立場的，確是鳳毛麟角。司法改革確實需要能幹的首長帶隊，但是政府首長的羞恥心與能力同等重要，政壇的整體風氣與法官的清廉風紀也不分軒輊，但是觀諸台灣官場生態，我們認為辭官是最值得肯定的行動。
曾幾何時，台灣的政務官風骨已經是江河日下，有太多不可聞問的事例。就拿同屬司法界的檢察總長陳聰明來說吧，這位總長毫不避諱地與扁案關係人黃芳彥餐敘，不對首長特別費的分歧局勢表態，被媒體名嘴按三餐罵，但說不辭職就不辭職，永遠是以「留下來把事情做好」為藉口，一直要到陳聰明受到監察院彈劾，才不得不辭職。陳聰明的傳言與風波都是與自己有關，但此次的司法風波卻只是高院法官，而不是賴英照自己的問題。兩相比較，兩位司法人物之風骨高下立判。
在四十年前蔣經國時代，蘇澳漁船沉沒淹死了數十位學生，當時的教育部長蔣彥士就負責請辭。豐原高中建築倒塌壓死了若干學生，教育局長黃昆輝也請辭。此外，只要國營航空公司摔了架飛機，交通部長就得請辭下台。坊間經常開玩笑說連戰「好命」，別人做交通部長常因飛安事故下台，但連戰卻為官一帆風順，三年交長全無事故。摔飛機背後有飛安管理，但也有更多的運氣。連這麼樣隨機的事情政務官都得負起廣義的政治責任，那麼賴英照為司法風紀負責，陳聰明為自己的行事風格負責，當然是天經地義的舉措。
政務官要為政策成敗負責，這是大家都接受的觀念。但是這「成敗」二字要如何詮釋，就有相當的詮釋空間。在政策推動失敗甚或出現災難時，官員總是可以把原因推給天候風雨、國外經濟、金融衝擊、甚至太陽黑子等。但是我們用一個比喻，就能了解其中的責任分際。國家就像是一家公司，國家政務官就像是公司經理人，而人民則是公司的股東。影響公司成敗興衰的因素很多，背後也有不少的運氣成分，但公司經理人是營業績效的概括承受者，只能以最終成敗論英雄，不能再怪罪其他。公司經理人要負起最後責任，而國家政務官要負政策責任，也是同樣的道理。
在陳水扁執政八年期間，政務官五日京兆，都得看大老闆的喜怒定去留，能力與操守都變得不重要。斯時也，政務官只求不出亂子，完全不敢有積極作為。前年政黨輪替之後，原本大家以為能讓官場文化耳目一新，但兩年下來，若干「市府團隊」閣員的表現，也讓外界瞠目結舌。馬政府對於官員的要求，似乎是「服從」重於一切，不在乎官員的判斷與能力。一旦出了問題，府院高層也就不便對閣員多所責備，因為他們都只是府院意志的貫徹者。在這樣的氣氛之下，要期待政務官有勇於負責的風骨，恐怕是奢望了。
賴英照院長負責辭職，無論如何是為台灣萎靡不振的官場生態，立下了一個典範。司法風紀能不能因此次弊案而脫胎換骨，現在還很難說，但賴院長的明快表態，無論如何是要給予肯定的。
A Translation
July 20, 2010
Judicial Yuan President Lai Ying-chao submitted his resignation several days ago, because three High Court judges were suspected of accepting bribes. Lai submitted his resignation because he must assume responsibility for the lapse in judicial discipline.
Some people say Lai should not resign. They say that the High Court judges may have taken bribes, but what does that have to do with the Judicial Yuan president himself? Some see the issue through partisan eyes. They accuse President Ma of forcing out the sole remaining yuan president appointed by a DPP administration. Some say Lai should stick to his guns, and see judicial reform through to the end. We cannot agree with these justifications. Officials today willing to resign their positions out of a sense of responsibility are as rare as hen's teeth. Judicial reform requires capable leadership. But a sense of honor is as important as ability. The political atmosphere is as important as judicial integrity. As we take stock of officialdom on Taiwan, we feel his resignation deserves commendation.
The integrity of political appointees has undergone a swift decline. Too many unspeakable scandals have erupted. Take Chen Tsung-ming for example. He too is part of the justice system. He had the effrontery to dine with Huang Fang-yen, a possible accomplice in the Chen Shui-bian corruption and money-laundering case. He refused to take a stand on the Discretionary Fund issue. Talking heads blasted him, but he refused to resign. He justified himself by repeating that "I must stay on to finish the job." Only when the Control Yuan threatened to impeach him, did Chen Tsung-ming feel obligated to resign. The rumors and controversies surrounding Chen Tsung-ming relate to him personally. The current judicial crisis involves only High Court judges, not Lai Ying-chao specifically. Compare the two justice system officials. The difference between the two should immediately become apparent.
Forty years ago, during the Chiang Ching-kuo era, a Suao Harbor fishing boat sank, drowning dozens of students. Then Minister of Education Chiang Yan-shi assumed responsibility and resigned. When a building on the Yuan Feng Senior High School campus collapsed and crushed several students, Huang Kuen-hui, then Bureau of Education chief also resigned. When aircraft belonging to the state-run China Airlines crashed, the Minister of Transportation was forced to resign. Insiders often joke that Lien Chan was lucky. When others served as Minister of Transportation, they were forced to step down in response to air disasters. But Lien Chan experienced smooth sailing all the way, For three long years, not one air disaster occurred. Air disasters are of course affected in part by airline safety procedures. But luck may play an important part as well. When political appointees are held responsible even for random events such as these, then of course Lai Ying-chao must be held responsible for judicial discipline. Of course Chen Tsung-ming must be held responsible for his personal misconduct. It is only right.
It is universally accepted that political appointees should assume responsibility for their policy failures. But just how does one define "policy failure?" If one is unable to implement a policy, or if a policy that has been implemented leads to disaster, officials can always blame bad weather, overseas economic factors, financial shocks, even sunspots. Allow us to use a metaphor to explain what we mean by responsibility. Think of a national government as a private company. A nation's political leader is the company manager. A nation's citizens are the company's shareholders. A whole range factors will determine the success or failure of the company, including a considerable element of luck. But regardless, the company's business manager must assume responsibility for the company's performance. Whether he turns out to be a hero or a zero will ultimately depend upon the success or failure of the company's operations. He cannot blame anyone else. A company manager must assume final responsibility. The same is true of a national government's political appointees.
During Chen Shui-bian's eight years in power, political appointees came and went regularly. Whether they remained in office or were given the boot depended entirely on President Chen's changing moods. Neither ability nor integrity mattered. Political appointees would pray desperately that nothing went wrong on their watch. They were paralyzed, afraid to do anything that might rock the boat. Two years ago, with the change in ruling parties, everyone assumed that the bureaucratic mindset that prevailed under the previous regime were a thing of the past. But during the past two years, cabinet members in more than one municipal administration have left observers dumbfounded. Apparently what the Ma administration wants from officials more than anything else is obedience. It care nothing about an official's judgment or ability. When problems surfaced, high-ranking officials with the Presidential Office and Executive Yuan find it hard to blame cabinet members, because cabinet members refused to do anything but carry out orders from their superiors. Given such an atmosphere, it is utterly unrealistic to expect political appointees to demonstrate backbone and behave responsibly.
Yuan President Lai Ying-chao assumed responsibility and resigned. Did he do so to bring the Republic of China's dysfunctional officialdom out of its slump? Whatever his motives, he set a positive example. Will judicial discipline be restored as a result of the current scandal? It is hard to say. But Lai's bold move deserves praise.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.20
社論－政務官請辭下台是負責的典範
本報訊
司法院長賴英照日前因三位高院法官之涉嫌受賄而請辭獲准。賴院長之所以請辭，當然是要為司法官風紀之不彰而負政治責任。
對賴的請辭動作，社會有些許的不贊成之聲；有人認為高等法院法官涉貪與司法院長無涉、有人從黨同伐異的角度，認為是馬總統逼走了民進黨執政期間獲聘的僅存院長、有人認為賴英照應該堅守崗位，切實做好司法風氣的整頓。我們對於以上這三種反對賴先生辭官的說法，都礙難同意。相反的，在當今台灣官場，能夠以辭官表達責任立場的，確是鳳毛麟角。司法改革確實需要能幹的首長帶隊，但是政府首長的羞恥心與能力同等重要，政壇的整體風氣與法官的清廉風紀也不分軒輊，但是觀諸台灣官場生態，我們認為辭官是最值得肯定的行動。
曾幾何時，台灣的政務官風骨已經是江河日下，有太多不可聞問的事例。就拿同屬司法界的檢察總長陳聰明來說吧，這位總長毫不避諱地與扁案關係人黃芳彥餐敘，不對首長特別費的分歧局勢表態，被媒體名嘴按三餐罵，但說不辭職就不辭職，永遠是以「留下來把事情做好」為藉口，一直要到陳聰明受到監察院彈劾，才不得不辭職。陳聰明的傳言與風波都是與自己有關，但此次的司法風波卻只是高院法官，而不是賴英照自己的問題。兩相比較，兩位司法人物之風骨高下立判。
在四十年前蔣經國時代，蘇澳漁船沉沒淹死了數十位學生，當時的教育部長蔣彥士就負責請辭。豐原高中建築倒塌壓死了若干學生，教育局長黃昆輝也請辭。此外，只要國營航空公司摔了架飛機，交通部長就得請辭下台。坊間經常開玩笑說連戰「好命」，別人做交通部長常因飛安事故下台，但連戰卻為官一帆風順，三年交長全無事故。摔飛機背後有飛安管理，但也有更多的運氣。連這麼樣隨機的事情政務官都得負起廣義的政治責任，那麼賴英照為司法風紀負責，陳聰明為自己的行事風格負責，當然是天經地義的舉措。
政務官要為政策成敗負責，這是大家都接受的觀念。但是這「成敗」二字要如何詮釋，就有相當的詮釋空間。在政策推動失敗甚或出現災難時，官員總是可以把原因推給天候風雨、國外經濟、金融衝擊、甚至太陽黑子等。但是我們用一個比喻，就能了解其中的責任分際。國家就像是一家公司，國家政務官就像是公司經理人，而人民則是公司的股東。影響公司成敗興衰的因素很多，背後也有不少的運氣成分，但公司經理人是營業績效的概括承受者，只能以最終成敗論英雄，不能再怪罪其他。公司經理人要負起最後責任，而國家政務官要負政策責任，也是同樣的道理。
在陳水扁執政八年期間，政務官五日京兆，都得看大老闆的喜怒定去留，能力與操守都變得不重要。斯時也，政務官只求不出亂子，完全不敢有積極作為。前年政黨輪替之後，原本大家以為能讓官場文化耳目一新，但兩年下來，若干「市府團隊」閣員的表現，也讓外界瞠目結舌。馬政府對於官員的要求，似乎是「服從」重於一切，不在乎官員的判斷與能力。一旦出了問題，府院高層也就不便對閣員多所責備，因為他們都只是府院意志的貫徹者。在這樣的氣氛之下，要期待政務官有勇於負責的風骨，恐怕是奢望了。
賴英照院長負責辭職，無論如何是為台灣萎靡不振的官場生態，立下了一個典範。司法風紀能不能因此次弊案而脫胎換骨，現在還很難說，但賴院長的明快表態，無論如何是要給予肯定的。
Monday, July 19, 2010
Discussing Democratic Evolution with the DPP
Discussing Democratic Evolution with the DPPUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 19, 2010
Incidents of physical assaults committed by the DPP within the Legislative Yuan are nothing new. The latest assault gave the DPP yet another convenient excuse to walk out of the emergency session. The DPP's tricks are clearly getting old. Let us take a moment to review the history of democracy on Taiwan. The era of reform was characterized by shrill slogans and violent acts. But martial law was lifted over 20 years ago. Yet the DPP remains attached to physical conflict. It assaults fellow legislators and sheds their blood at the slightest pretext. We travel the road to democracy, but somehow the farther we travel, the bleaker the landscape becomes.
Twenty years ago, DPP legislators assaulted their colleagues. They threw chairs and tore out microphones. They resorted to any and all means imaginable. They ended the so-called "10,000 year legislature." They promoted political reform and ended single-party rule. Their methods were radical, but received considerable public support. Their aim then was to make politics on Taiwan more mature and democratic. But the Legislative Yuan has been democratically elected for the past twenty years. One-party rule is long dead, as dead as the "10,000 year legislature." Two ruling party changes have taken place at the central government level. So why is the DPP still addicted to confrontation? Why does it persist in assaulting fellow legislators? Why does it persist in forcibly occupying the podium? Why does it persist in referring to majority rule as "majoritarian violence?" Does the DPP truly not realize that it is going nowhere?
Consider the spirit of representative government. The proportion of seats within the legislature are the result of popular elections. Legislators are authorized by voters to exercise law-making powers within the legislature, in accordance with parliamentary procedure. The power to legislate is the essence of representative politics. The current legislature has a Pan Blue majority and a Pan Green minority. This may not meet with the approval of the DPP, but it was a collective political decision on the part of the Republic of China electorate. Every political party must defer to such expressions of the public will. This is the basis of democracy.
The DPP has never won a majority within the legislature. The reason why is simple. It maintains an overwrought, extremist stance on national identity, and a narrow, bigoted view of "ethnic identity," or more accurately, "community group affiliation." As a result, it has never gained the trust of a democratic majority. Add to this the fiasco of the DPP's eight years in power, during which it proved utterly incapable of governing the nation or formulating a strategy for economic development. Its time in office only increased people's misgivings. The DPP stubbornly refuses to engage in soul-searching. Instead, it blindly lashes out in anger. Such behavior only leaves the public more disgusted, and only makes it harder for the DPP to make a comeback.
The process by which legislators are elected has undergone a long string of reforms. The reforms may involve the single district, two-vote system. They may involve the halving of the number of seats in the legislature. But the DPP took part in their passage and even proposed many of the reforms. The process by which legislators are elected to office is above reproach. Yet the DPP obstinately refuses to admit that a democratic majority considers its platform unacceptable. It endlessly resorts to stonewalling. It even incites and organizes street demonstrations. Such behavior is not merely high-handed and undemocratic. It shows that the DPP is unwilling to abide by the basic rules of democracy. Is the DPP truly unaware of these realities?
Elections are an essential component of democracy. A rational legislative process is an important component of democratic politics. The problem with the DPP is that it remains preoccupied with symbolic political gestures. It glosses over or avoids substantive policy matters. Over time, this deprives the government of checks and balances. It renders the legislative process crude and imbalanced. The DPP has long been derelict in its duty as an opposition party. Its irrational opposition to ECFA is merely the most recent example. Such opposition epitomizes the Green Camp's obstructionist attitude for the past twenty years.
In recent years, the Republic of China's democracy has stalled. A major factor is the DPP's refusal to let go of the past and move toward the future. During the early stages of the Republic of China's democratic evolution, the DPP made an undeniable contribution. But the Republic of China's politics has matured. Unfortunately the DPP refuses to mature along with it. An opposition party that can only assault fellow legislators is an opposition party that can only debase and marginalize itself. An opposition party that can only engage in mindless obstructionism, is an opposition party that has forfeited any right to lead the nation. How can the DPP possibly contribute to the growth of the Republic of China's democracy?
Look back at the DPP's path for the past twenty years. Look at what it has lost. It lost the enthusiasm and ideals of the "dang wai" era. It lost sight of the goals it set for itself. Twenty years is a long time. The DPP leadership has changed completely. Society on Taiwan has undergone generational change as well. The DPP would have the public believe that the assaults committed against fellow legislators are part of a "sacred struggle for democracy." Who, pray tell, buys into that?
The Republic of China's democracy must evolve. Both ruling and opposition parties must promote that evolution. We would like to remind the DPP of three things. One. The DPP must return to its proper role as a loyal opposition party. Two. The DPP must adopt opposition tactics consistent with the principle of proportionality. Three. The DPP must adopt a constructive approach to policy matters. Only by doing so can the DPP rediscover its purpose as an opposition party. Only by doing so can the DPP regain the public trust. A political party can refuse to grow up. But the public on Taiwan can hardly be expected to do the same.
和民進黨商榷民主「進化論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.19 02:32 am
立法院再打一架其實不是新鮮事，在野黨藉口退出臨時會，顯然也已招式用老。回顧台灣民主歷程，從改革年代走來，一路口號響亮、行動猛烈；但解嚴廿年過去，民進黨竟仍留戀肢體衝突的格局，國會動不動就演出暴力流血場面。這趟民主旅程，越走風景似乎越蕭瑟。
試想，廿年多前民進黨在立法院打架、丟椅子、扯麥克風，什麼抗爭手段沒用過？但當年是為了終結萬年國會、為了促進政治改革、為了打破一黨獨大，這些手段固然激烈，卻也能獲得民眾相當程度的支持，目的是希望台灣政治走向更成熟、更民主的境地。如今，立法院歷經廿多年的民主選舉，一黨獨大早已打破，萬年國會早已作古，政權也已兩次輪替；民進黨卻仍耽溺於對峙、霸台的衝突戰術，還在指責對手是「多數暴力」，民進黨沒發覺自己一直在原地踏步嗎？
先談「代議政治」的精神。國會席次是經由各地民眾投票而產生，立委根據選民的託付，在國會行使議事、立法之權，這就是代議政治的本質。目前的國會結構呈現藍大綠小，或許不符合民進黨的利益，但這正是台灣民眾集體的政治選擇，這樣的民意，任何政黨都應該加以尊重。這是民主政治最基本的遊戲規則。
民進黨無法在國會取得多數席次，主要原因是其國家認同有偏激傾向，族群主張亦流於狹隘，因而無法取得多數人民的信任。此外，民進黨在執政的八年，無法有效證明自己的國家治理能力，無法拿出積極的經濟策略來引導台灣的發展；這也讓不少民眾心存疑慮。民進黨不思在這些本質問題上自我反省、改進，卻一味訴諸肢體衝突，恐怕只會讓民眾愈發反感，使自己愈難以翻身。
再說，立委的產生方式歷經多次改革，無論是單一選區兩票制，或者席次減半，都是民進黨倡議並參與討論的結果。國會的產生程序既已無可置疑，民進黨卻拒絕承認自己不獲多數選民認同的事實，不斷在國會硬拗杯葛，甚至不時動員上街示威；這種表現，恐怕已不只是缺乏民主素養，而是根本無意承認民主政治了，民進黨自己難道沒有覺察到嗎？
選舉是民主的必要手段，國會理性議事則是政治實踐的重要場域。民進黨的問題，在過度沉迷於象徵性的政治杯葛，對實質性的政策討論卻蜻蜓點水，甚至刻意迴避切入；長此以往，不僅將使政府決策處於缺乏制衡的狀態，也將導致立法的粗糙和失衡。從這點看，民進黨作為在野黨，不僅是失職，也是不負責任的。反ＥＣＦＡ，只是最新的事例之一，卻集中反映了綠營廿年缺乏進步的硬拗心態。
事實上，台灣民主發展近年處於遲滯狀態，與民進黨一直留戀過往、不願往前走，有很大的關係。不可否認，在台灣民主萌芽階段，民進黨有過不可抹滅的貢獻；然而，當台灣政治到了「轉大人」的階段，民進黨卻拒絕長大。一個以打架、杯葛為能事的在野黨，其實是一種自我矮化與自我邊緣化；它失去了為國家指引方向的力量，台灣民主政治更如何提升？
回顧這廿多年走過的軌跡，民進黨失去的，何止是當初黨外前輩呼籲改革的熱情和理想，甚至也失去了自己的追求目標。廿年的時間不算短，民進黨檯面人物已經換了一批臉孔，台灣社會也已是一個世代更替，誰還會認同立院粗暴對抗是民主的神聖象徵？
台灣民主需要進化，朝野政黨皆然。我們要提醒民進黨三件事：一是回到忠誠反對黨的位置，二是採取合乎比例原則的抗爭制衡，三是運用積極的思維來思考並論述台灣的問題。如此，才能找到一個在野黨存在的價值，並重新獲取民眾的認同。一個政黨可以拒絕長大，但台灣主流社會不會選擇跟隨那樣的政黨。
A Translation
July 19, 2010
Incidents of physical assaults committed by the DPP within the Legislative Yuan are nothing new. The latest assault gave the DPP yet another convenient excuse to walk out of the emergency session. The DPP's tricks are clearly getting old. Let us take a moment to review the history of democracy on Taiwan. The era of reform was characterized by shrill slogans and violent acts. But martial law was lifted over 20 years ago. Yet the DPP remains attached to physical conflict. It assaults fellow legislators and sheds their blood at the slightest pretext. We travel the road to democracy, but somehow the farther we travel, the bleaker the landscape becomes.
Twenty years ago, DPP legislators assaulted their colleagues. They threw chairs and tore out microphones. They resorted to any and all means imaginable. They ended the so-called "10,000 year legislature." They promoted political reform and ended single-party rule. Their methods were radical, but received considerable public support. Their aim then was to make politics on Taiwan more mature and democratic. But the Legislative Yuan has been democratically elected for the past twenty years. One-party rule is long dead, as dead as the "10,000 year legislature." Two ruling party changes have taken place at the central government level. So why is the DPP still addicted to confrontation? Why does it persist in assaulting fellow legislators? Why does it persist in forcibly occupying the podium? Why does it persist in referring to majority rule as "majoritarian violence?" Does the DPP truly not realize that it is going nowhere?
Consider the spirit of representative government. The proportion of seats within the legislature are the result of popular elections. Legislators are authorized by voters to exercise law-making powers within the legislature, in accordance with parliamentary procedure. The power to legislate is the essence of representative politics. The current legislature has a Pan Blue majority and a Pan Green minority. This may not meet with the approval of the DPP, but it was a collective political decision on the part of the Republic of China electorate. Every political party must defer to such expressions of the public will. This is the basis of democracy.
The DPP has never won a majority within the legislature. The reason why is simple. It maintains an overwrought, extremist stance on national identity, and a narrow, bigoted view of "ethnic identity," or more accurately, "community group affiliation." As a result, it has never gained the trust of a democratic majority. Add to this the fiasco of the DPP's eight years in power, during which it proved utterly incapable of governing the nation or formulating a strategy for economic development. Its time in office only increased people's misgivings. The DPP stubbornly refuses to engage in soul-searching. Instead, it blindly lashes out in anger. Such behavior only leaves the public more disgusted, and only makes it harder for the DPP to make a comeback.
The process by which legislators are elected has undergone a long string of reforms. The reforms may involve the single district, two-vote system. They may involve the halving of the number of seats in the legislature. But the DPP took part in their passage and even proposed many of the reforms. The process by which legislators are elected to office is above reproach. Yet the DPP obstinately refuses to admit that a democratic majority considers its platform unacceptable. It endlessly resorts to stonewalling. It even incites and organizes street demonstrations. Such behavior is not merely high-handed and undemocratic. It shows that the DPP is unwilling to abide by the basic rules of democracy. Is the DPP truly unaware of these realities?
Elections are an essential component of democracy. A rational legislative process is an important component of democratic politics. The problem with the DPP is that it remains preoccupied with symbolic political gestures. It glosses over or avoids substantive policy matters. Over time, this deprives the government of checks and balances. It renders the legislative process crude and imbalanced. The DPP has long been derelict in its duty as an opposition party. Its irrational opposition to ECFA is merely the most recent example. Such opposition epitomizes the Green Camp's obstructionist attitude for the past twenty years.
In recent years, the Republic of China's democracy has stalled. A major factor is the DPP's refusal to let go of the past and move toward the future. During the early stages of the Republic of China's democratic evolution, the DPP made an undeniable contribution. But the Republic of China's politics has matured. Unfortunately the DPP refuses to mature along with it. An opposition party that can only assault fellow legislators is an opposition party that can only debase and marginalize itself. An opposition party that can only engage in mindless obstructionism, is an opposition party that has forfeited any right to lead the nation. How can the DPP possibly contribute to the growth of the Republic of China's democracy?
Look back at the DPP's path for the past twenty years. Look at what it has lost. It lost the enthusiasm and ideals of the "dang wai" era. It lost sight of the goals it set for itself. Twenty years is a long time. The DPP leadership has changed completely. Society on Taiwan has undergone generational change as well. The DPP would have the public believe that the assaults committed against fellow legislators are part of a "sacred struggle for democracy." Who, pray tell, buys into that?
The Republic of China's democracy must evolve. Both ruling and opposition parties must promote that evolution. We would like to remind the DPP of three things. One. The DPP must return to its proper role as a loyal opposition party. Two. The DPP must adopt opposition tactics consistent with the principle of proportionality. Three. The DPP must adopt a constructive approach to policy matters. Only by doing so can the DPP rediscover its purpose as an opposition party. Only by doing so can the DPP regain the public trust. A political party can refuse to grow up. But the public on Taiwan can hardly be expected to do the same.
和民進黨商榷民主「進化論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.19 02:32 am
立法院再打一架其實不是新鮮事，在野黨藉口退出臨時會，顯然也已招式用老。回顧台灣民主歷程，從改革年代走來，一路口號響亮、行動猛烈；但解嚴廿年過去，民進黨竟仍留戀肢體衝突的格局，國會動不動就演出暴力流血場面。這趟民主旅程，越走風景似乎越蕭瑟。
試想，廿年多前民進黨在立法院打架、丟椅子、扯麥克風，什麼抗爭手段沒用過？但當年是為了終結萬年國會、為了促進政治改革、為了打破一黨獨大，這些手段固然激烈，卻也能獲得民眾相當程度的支持，目的是希望台灣政治走向更成熟、更民主的境地。如今，立法院歷經廿多年的民主選舉，一黨獨大早已打破，萬年國會早已作古，政權也已兩次輪替；民進黨卻仍耽溺於對峙、霸台的衝突戰術，還在指責對手是「多數暴力」，民進黨沒發覺自己一直在原地踏步嗎？
先談「代議政治」的精神。國會席次是經由各地民眾投票而產生，立委根據選民的託付，在國會行使議事、立法之權，這就是代議政治的本質。目前的國會結構呈現藍大綠小，或許不符合民進黨的利益，但這正是台灣民眾集體的政治選擇，這樣的民意，任何政黨都應該加以尊重。這是民主政治最基本的遊戲規則。
民進黨無法在國會取得多數席次，主要原因是其國家認同有偏激傾向，族群主張亦流於狹隘，因而無法取得多數人民的信任。此外，民進黨在執政的八年，無法有效證明自己的國家治理能力，無法拿出積極的經濟策略來引導台灣的發展；這也讓不少民眾心存疑慮。民進黨不思在這些本質問題上自我反省、改進，卻一味訴諸肢體衝突，恐怕只會讓民眾愈發反感，使自己愈難以翻身。
再說，立委的產生方式歷經多次改革，無論是單一選區兩票制，或者席次減半，都是民進黨倡議並參與討論的結果。國會的產生程序既已無可置疑，民進黨卻拒絕承認自己不獲多數選民認同的事實，不斷在國會硬拗杯葛，甚至不時動員上街示威；這種表現，恐怕已不只是缺乏民主素養，而是根本無意承認民主政治了，民進黨自己難道沒有覺察到嗎？
選舉是民主的必要手段，國會理性議事則是政治實踐的重要場域。民進黨的問題，在過度沉迷於象徵性的政治杯葛，對實質性的政策討論卻蜻蜓點水，甚至刻意迴避切入；長此以往，不僅將使政府決策處於缺乏制衡的狀態，也將導致立法的粗糙和失衡。從這點看，民進黨作為在野黨，不僅是失職，也是不負責任的。反ＥＣＦＡ，只是最新的事例之一，卻集中反映了綠營廿年缺乏進步的硬拗心態。
事實上，台灣民主發展近年處於遲滯狀態，與民進黨一直留戀過往、不願往前走，有很大的關係。不可否認，在台灣民主萌芽階段，民進黨有過不可抹滅的貢獻；然而，當台灣政治到了「轉大人」的階段，民進黨卻拒絕長大。一個以打架、杯葛為能事的在野黨，其實是一種自我矮化與自我邊緣化；它失去了為國家指引方向的力量，台灣民主政治更如何提升？
回顧這廿多年走過的軌跡，民進黨失去的，何止是當初黨外前輩呼籲改革的熱情和理想，甚至也失去了自己的追求目標。廿年的時間不算短，民進黨檯面人物已經換了一批臉孔，台灣社會也已是一個世代更替，誰還會認同立院粗暴對抗是民主的神聖象徵？
台灣民主需要進化，朝野政黨皆然。我們要提醒民進黨三件事：一是回到忠誠反對黨的位置，二是採取合乎比例原則的抗爭制衡，三是運用積極的思維來思考並論述台灣的問題。如此，才能找到一個在野黨存在的價值，並重新獲取民眾的認同。一個政黨可以拒絕長大，但台灣主流社會不會選擇跟隨那樣的政黨。
Friday, July 16, 2010
David Shear Diametrically Opposed to Tsai Ing-wen on ECFA
David Shear Diametrically Opposed to Tsai Ing-wen on ECFAUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 17, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen warns that the cross-Strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) upsets the strategic balance in Southeast Asia. She warns that Southeast Asia will become a "Sinocentric Southeast Asia" that will weaken and marginalize the United States' presence in Southeast Asia.
Her remarks may convey the ring of a "strategic international perspective." But they were clearly intended for Washington's ears. They imply that once Taipei and Beijing sign ECFA, Mainland China will become the "center of gravity" for Southeast Asia, and that the United States will lose influence. The subtext is that in order to prevent the United States from being marginalized in Southeast Asia, Taipei should not sign ECFA. The subtext is that if Washington wishes to maintain the current "strategic balance in Southeast Asia," it must not support ECFA.
Unfortunately for Tsai Ing-wen, Washington has offered precisely the opposite response. According to State Department Acting Deputy spokesman Gordon Duguid, ECFA is a "positive development" that the U.S. government "encourages." This was followed by similar remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Asian-Pacific Affairs David Shear. During a keynote speech Shear said that ECFA will benefit Taiwan and the world, and that the United States was delighted to see the two sides sign such an agreement. This remark may well be the most favorable evaluation of cross-Strait interactions that Washington has offered in 60 years. It was a rare moment in history.
David Shear's comments were actually quite circumspect. He reiterated that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, and is opposed to any party unilaterally changing the status quo. He added that cross-Strait economic exchanges and cultural relations were the healthiest they have been in decades. He said ECFA would accelerate this "positive development" and make Taiwan more attractive to foreign investors. He added that Washington was willing to strengthen Taipei/Washington economic cooperation by means of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). He said that for the past 60 years, Taiwan has developed politically, socially, and economically. He said this proved that Taiwan can be simultaneously Chinese, modern, and democratic. He said the whole world "can learn from the Taiwan experience" how to promote modernization. He said ECFA showed Taipei's desire to become "an important and valuable member of the international community." He said "The United States is strongly encouraged by this development." The Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations forty years ago. Since then, when has Washington ever praised Taipei so generously? During the 60 years since 1949, when has Washington ever reaffirmed Taipei's cross-Strait policy so enthusiastically?
The DPP should reflect on Washington's assessment of ECFA. Why is its assessment diametrically opposed to Tsai Ing-wen's? Tsai Ing-wen warns ECFA is harmful to the "strategic balance in Southeast Asia." She insists that the rise of [Mainland] China will lead to the United States' marginalization. But David Shear's remarks show no hint of such concerns. Just the opposite. Shear affirmed ECFA, saying it was helping to make cross-Strait relations the healthiest they have been in 60 years. He said it showed Taipei's desire to become an important and valuable member of the international community. He said Washington was deeply encouraged. David Shear was clearly evaluating ECFA from an elevated international and global perspective. But his international and global perspective was entirely different from Tsai Ing-wen's.
Tsai Ing-wen has a strategic perspective -- of sorts. Her strategic perspective is the outdated perspective of the 20th century Cold War. David Shear's comments represent a very different strategic perspective, a post-Cold War 21st century perspective.
For example: Tsai Ing-wen warns that ECFA will facilitate the rise of [Mainland] China in Southeast Asia. But in David Shear's eyes, Beijing has already erected an ASEAN plus N framework. Therefore Taipei has no choice but to sign ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen warns that Taipei must take measures to block the rise of [Mainland] China. But David Shear apparently believes that Taipei should strive to improve the environment for foreign investment. Tsai Ing-wen assumes that Taiwan must be "anti-Chinese," even "non-Chinese." But David Shear believes Taiwan can be simultaneously Chinese, modern, and democratic.
We have repeatedly urged both the ruling and opposition parties to take note of Washington's assessment of cross-Strait interactions. Washington has said nothing negative about the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy for the past two years. Now David Shear, addressing ECFA on behalf of the US government, has praised it to the skies. Needless to say this is a clear indication of Washington's strategic perspective.
Skeptics may conclude that this is Washington's way of jettisoning Taiwan. But a fairer evaluation would be that this reflects Washington's transition from military confrontation to political/economic coopetition. Washington remains committed to Taipei. But the nature of that commitment has changed. Taipei must learn to read the signs.
Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian over-estimated Washington's military commitment to Taipei. They clung to fantasies about Washington's desire to use Taiwan independence as an anti-communist pawn. Tsai Ing-wen has apparently compounded that error. David Shear has pointed out her errors, one by one.
The United States will not be marginalized. But Taiwan is being marginalized. This may well be a concern for David Shear. But he offers a completely different perspective, and a completely different set of countermeasures than Tsai Ing-wen.
施大偉的見解與蔡英文完全相反
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.16 03:38 am
蔡英文評論兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）說：ＥＣＦＡ牽涉到東南亞戰略平衡問題，將使東南亞成為「以中國為中心的東南亞」，並會使美國在東南亞弱化及邊緣化。
這話聽起來，頗具「國際觀」，且儼然是說給美國聽的。意思是說：台灣與大陸簽成了ＥＣＦＡ，中國在東南亞將成為「中心」，美國將失勢。其潛台詞是：為了不使美國在東南亞「邊緣化」，台灣不應簽ＥＣＦＡ；為了「東南亞戰略平衡」，美國不應支持ＥＣＦＡ。
但是，美國政府卻給了與蔡英文完全相反的答案。繼國務院代理副發言人杜桂德表示，兩岸此項「正面發展」令美國政府「深受鼓舞」之後；亞太助理國務卿施大偉又發表專題演說指出：ＥＣＦＡ對台灣及全世界都有好處，美國樂見兩岸簽署。這可能是六十年來，美國對兩岸互動提過的最高評價，史罕出其右者。
施大偉的評論相當周延。他重申，美國不支持台獨，反對任何一方片面改變現狀。又說，兩岸交流的現況經濟與文化關係「較過去數十年來任何時刻都還要健康」，ＥＣＦＡ則加速了這種「正面發展」。還說，ＥＣＦＡ使台灣對外商更具吸引力。又說，美國願藉由「貿易暨投資架構協定」（ＴＩＦＡ）來加強台美經濟合作。他更說：「六十年來，台灣在政治、社會、經濟各方面的發展，證明了台灣不但可以同時是中國、是現代，而且也完全民主。」他說，全世界推動現代化，「可以學習台灣經驗」；ＥＣＦＡ顯示台灣意欲成為「國際社會重要、有價值的一員」，「美國對此深感鼓舞，我們樂見此種發展」。台灣退出聯合國四十年以來，誰曾聽過美方如此稱讚過台灣？一九四九年以降六十年以來，美方何嘗如此肯定過台灣的兩岸政策？
民進黨應當思考的是，美國政府對ＥＣＦＡ的評價，何以與蔡英文的主張完全相反？蔡英文認為，ＥＣＦＡ對「東南亞戰略平衡」有害，將使中國崛起，美國邊緣化；但在施大偉的評論中完全嗅不到這種氣味，反而肯定ＥＣＦＡ使兩岸關係「較過去數十年來任何時刻都還要健康」，且顯示台灣意欲成為「國際社會重要、有價值的一員」，美國「深感鼓舞」。施大偉顯然也將ＥＣＦＡ提高至「國際／世界」的高度作出評論，卻展現了與蔡英文完全不同的「國際觀」或「世界觀」。
蔡英文有「戰略觀點」，但那是退潮落伍的「二十世紀冷戰時代」的觀點；施大偉的評論當然也顯示了一種「戰略觀點」，卻是「廿一世紀後冷戰」的觀點。
例如：蔡英文認為，ＥＣＦＡ將使中國在東南亞崛起；但在施大偉眼中的事實卻可能是，中國已然架構了東協加Ｎ，才使ＥＣＦＡ不能不簽。蔡英文認為，台灣必須採取抵制中國崛起的手段；但施大偉似乎認為，台灣應當努力改善外商投資環境。蔡英文兀自認為，台灣唯一的角色就是「反中國」；但施大偉的見解卻是：「台灣可以同時是中國，是現代，而且也完全民主。」
我們屢次提醒朝野各方，注意美國政府對近兩年來兩岸互動的評價。有目共見的鮮明事實是：兩年來，美國對馬政府的兩岸政策沒有出現過半句負面評價；而現在施大偉代表美國政府評價ＥＣＦＡ的修辭，更幾已到了「讚譽備至」的程度。毫無疑問，這當然展示了美國的「戰略觀點」。
持懷疑眼光者或許將會認為，這是美國「甩掉」台灣的步驟；但比較公允的評論應是，美國的「兩岸戰略」已從「軍事對抗」轉軌至「政經競合」。美國對台灣仍有「承諾」，但「承諾」的性質已經改變；台灣必須正確解讀。
李登輝、陳水扁皆高估了美國對台的軍事承諾，且對美國對台獨或「反共馬前卒」的運用有逾度的幻想；現在，蔡英文好像錯得更加離譜，其嚴重謬誤經施大偉已一一指出。
美國不會邊緣化，但台灣正在邊緣化。這或許亦是施大偉的憂慮，但他提出了與蔡英文完全不同的觀點與對策。
A Translation
July 17, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen warns that the cross-Strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) upsets the strategic balance in Southeast Asia. She warns that Southeast Asia will become a "Sinocentric Southeast Asia" that will weaken and marginalize the United States' presence in Southeast Asia.
Her remarks may convey the ring of a "strategic international perspective." But they were clearly intended for Washington's ears. They imply that once Taipei and Beijing sign ECFA, Mainland China will become the "center of gravity" for Southeast Asia, and that the United States will lose influence. The subtext is that in order to prevent the United States from being marginalized in Southeast Asia, Taipei should not sign ECFA. The subtext is that if Washington wishes to maintain the current "strategic balance in Southeast Asia," it must not support ECFA.
Unfortunately for Tsai Ing-wen, Washington has offered precisely the opposite response. According to State Department Acting Deputy spokesman Gordon Duguid, ECFA is a "positive development" that the U.S. government "encourages." This was followed by similar remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Asian-Pacific Affairs David Shear. During a keynote speech Shear said that ECFA will benefit Taiwan and the world, and that the United States was delighted to see the two sides sign such an agreement. This remark may well be the most favorable evaluation of cross-Strait interactions that Washington has offered in 60 years. It was a rare moment in history.
David Shear's comments were actually quite circumspect. He reiterated that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, and is opposed to any party unilaterally changing the status quo. He added that cross-Strait economic exchanges and cultural relations were the healthiest they have been in decades. He said ECFA would accelerate this "positive development" and make Taiwan more attractive to foreign investors. He added that Washington was willing to strengthen Taipei/Washington economic cooperation by means of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). He said that for the past 60 years, Taiwan has developed politically, socially, and economically. He said this proved that Taiwan can be simultaneously Chinese, modern, and democratic. He said the whole world "can learn from the Taiwan experience" how to promote modernization. He said ECFA showed Taipei's desire to become "an important and valuable member of the international community." He said "The United States is strongly encouraged by this development." The Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations forty years ago. Since then, when has Washington ever praised Taipei so generously? During the 60 years since 1949, when has Washington ever reaffirmed Taipei's cross-Strait policy so enthusiastically?
The DPP should reflect on Washington's assessment of ECFA. Why is its assessment diametrically opposed to Tsai Ing-wen's? Tsai Ing-wen warns ECFA is harmful to the "strategic balance in Southeast Asia." She insists that the rise of [Mainland] China will lead to the United States' marginalization. But David Shear's remarks show no hint of such concerns. Just the opposite. Shear affirmed ECFA, saying it was helping to make cross-Strait relations the healthiest they have been in 60 years. He said it showed Taipei's desire to become an important and valuable member of the international community. He said Washington was deeply encouraged. David Shear was clearly evaluating ECFA from an elevated international and global perspective. But his international and global perspective was entirely different from Tsai Ing-wen's.
Tsai Ing-wen has a strategic perspective -- of sorts. Her strategic perspective is the outdated perspective of the 20th century Cold War. David Shear's comments represent a very different strategic perspective, a post-Cold War 21st century perspective.
For example: Tsai Ing-wen warns that ECFA will facilitate the rise of [Mainland] China in Southeast Asia. But in David Shear's eyes, Beijing has already erected an ASEAN plus N framework. Therefore Taipei has no choice but to sign ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen warns that Taipei must take measures to block the rise of [Mainland] China. But David Shear apparently believes that Taipei should strive to improve the environment for foreign investment. Tsai Ing-wen assumes that Taiwan must be "anti-Chinese," even "non-Chinese." But David Shear believes Taiwan can be simultaneously Chinese, modern, and democratic.
We have repeatedly urged both the ruling and opposition parties to take note of Washington's assessment of cross-Strait interactions. Washington has said nothing negative about the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy for the past two years. Now David Shear, addressing ECFA on behalf of the US government, has praised it to the skies. Needless to say this is a clear indication of Washington's strategic perspective.
Skeptics may conclude that this is Washington's way of jettisoning Taiwan. But a fairer evaluation would be that this reflects Washington's transition from military confrontation to political/economic coopetition. Washington remains committed to Taipei. But the nature of that commitment has changed. Taipei must learn to read the signs.
Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian over-estimated Washington's military commitment to Taipei. They clung to fantasies about Washington's desire to use Taiwan independence as an anti-communist pawn. Tsai Ing-wen has apparently compounded that error. David Shear has pointed out her errors, one by one.
The United States will not be marginalized. But Taiwan is being marginalized. This may well be a concern for David Shear. But he offers a completely different perspective, and a completely different set of countermeasures than Tsai Ing-wen.
施大偉的見解與蔡英文完全相反
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.16 03:38 am
蔡英文評論兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）說：ＥＣＦＡ牽涉到東南亞戰略平衡問題，將使東南亞成為「以中國為中心的東南亞」，並會使美國在東南亞弱化及邊緣化。
這話聽起來，頗具「國際觀」，且儼然是說給美國聽的。意思是說：台灣與大陸簽成了ＥＣＦＡ，中國在東南亞將成為「中心」，美國將失勢。其潛台詞是：為了不使美國在東南亞「邊緣化」，台灣不應簽ＥＣＦＡ；為了「東南亞戰略平衡」，美國不應支持ＥＣＦＡ。
但是，美國政府卻給了與蔡英文完全相反的答案。繼國務院代理副發言人杜桂德表示，兩岸此項「正面發展」令美國政府「深受鼓舞」之後；亞太助理國務卿施大偉又發表專題演說指出：ＥＣＦＡ對台灣及全世界都有好處，美國樂見兩岸簽署。這可能是六十年來，美國對兩岸互動提過的最高評價，史罕出其右者。
施大偉的評論相當周延。他重申，美國不支持台獨，反對任何一方片面改變現狀。又說，兩岸交流的現況經濟與文化關係「較過去數十年來任何時刻都還要健康」，ＥＣＦＡ則加速了這種「正面發展」。還說，ＥＣＦＡ使台灣對外商更具吸引力。又說，美國願藉由「貿易暨投資架構協定」（ＴＩＦＡ）來加強台美經濟合作。他更說：「六十年來，台灣在政治、社會、經濟各方面的發展，證明了台灣不但可以同時是中國、是現代，而且也完全民主。」他說，全世界推動現代化，「可以學習台灣經驗」；ＥＣＦＡ顯示台灣意欲成為「國際社會重要、有價值的一員」，「美國對此深感鼓舞，我們樂見此種發展」。台灣退出聯合國四十年以來，誰曾聽過美方如此稱讚過台灣？一九四九年以降六十年以來，美方何嘗如此肯定過台灣的兩岸政策？
民進黨應當思考的是，美國政府對ＥＣＦＡ的評價，何以與蔡英文的主張完全相反？蔡英文認為，ＥＣＦＡ對「東南亞戰略平衡」有害，將使中國崛起，美國邊緣化；但在施大偉的評論中完全嗅不到這種氣味，反而肯定ＥＣＦＡ使兩岸關係「較過去數十年來任何時刻都還要健康」，且顯示台灣意欲成為「國際社會重要、有價值的一員」，美國「深感鼓舞」。施大偉顯然也將ＥＣＦＡ提高至「國際／世界」的高度作出評論，卻展現了與蔡英文完全不同的「國際觀」或「世界觀」。
蔡英文有「戰略觀點」，但那是退潮落伍的「二十世紀冷戰時代」的觀點；施大偉的評論當然也顯示了一種「戰略觀點」，卻是「廿一世紀後冷戰」的觀點。
例如：蔡英文認為，ＥＣＦＡ將使中國在東南亞崛起；但在施大偉眼中的事實卻可能是，中國已然架構了東協加Ｎ，才使ＥＣＦＡ不能不簽。蔡英文認為，台灣必須採取抵制中國崛起的手段；但施大偉似乎認為，台灣應當努力改善外商投資環境。蔡英文兀自認為，台灣唯一的角色就是「反中國」；但施大偉的見解卻是：「台灣可以同時是中國，是現代，而且也完全民主。」
我們屢次提醒朝野各方，注意美國政府對近兩年來兩岸互動的評價。有目共見的鮮明事實是：兩年來，美國對馬政府的兩岸政策沒有出現過半句負面評價；而現在施大偉代表美國政府評價ＥＣＦＡ的修辭，更幾已到了「讚譽備至」的程度。毫無疑問，這當然展示了美國的「戰略觀點」。
持懷疑眼光者或許將會認為，這是美國「甩掉」台灣的步驟；但比較公允的評論應是，美國的「兩岸戰略」已從「軍事對抗」轉軌至「政經競合」。美國對台灣仍有「承諾」，但「承諾」的性質已經改變；台灣必須正確解讀。
李登輝、陳水扁皆高估了美國對台的軍事承諾，且對美國對台獨或「反共馬前卒」的運用有逾度的幻想；現在，蔡英文好像錯得更加離譜，其嚴重謬誤經施大偉已一一指出。
美國不會邊緣化，但台灣正在邊緣化。這或許亦是施大偉的憂慮，但他提出了與蔡英文完全不同的觀點與對策。
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