Thursday, July 7, 2011

South Korea Can, Can We?

South Korea Can, Can We?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2011

The Korea/EU free trade agreement (FTA) went into force on July 1. Since then, 94% of South Korea's products have enjoyed zero tariff treatment, South Korea has also granted zero tariff treatment for 81% of the EU's products. Meanwhile, reports have emerged from the U.S. Congress that the US may sign a Korea/US FTA before the end of the year.

In the international market, South Korea has always been Taiwan's most direct competitor, especially in high-tech and ICT products, Taiwan and South Korea have long run neck and neck in Europen and US market share. But a few years ago, South Korea succeed in its brand marketing strategy. This, plus the depreciation of the Won and other factors, enabled South Korea to leave Taiwan in the dust. Today, the benefits brought about by FTAs may further weaken Taiwan's competitiveness, Consequently the government and other segments of society have long been concerned about South Korean FTAs.

In the race for FTAs, one must keep an eye on the opponent. One must focus on three things. The first is the number of signatories, the second is the identity of the signatories, and the third is the content of the agreements. If the quantity is limited, if the economic and trade interests are insubstantial, and the degree of liberalization is not great, there is little to fear. But South Korea has successfully signed FTAs with heavyweights such as the United States and the European Union. The number of signatories has rapidly increased. FTAs signed with Singapore, Chile, and ASEAN have already had an impact. An FTA with India went in effect last year. This year South Korea signed an FTA with Peru. Negotiations with Australia are already complete. It is currently holding discussions with Japan, Canada, Mexico and the Chinese mainland.

Consider economic and trade interests. Currently 14.4% of South Korea's trade benefits from FTAs. But FTAs with the United States and Europe are about to go into force. That number is expected to approach 50%. South Korea's ultimate goal is to win preferential trade treatment for at least 80% of its goods. Consider the degree of liberalization vis a vis the content of the FTAs. The FTAs signed by South Korea, the United States, and the EU, are considered indicators of a high degree of liberalization.

The target of South Korea's FTA Policy is not Taiwan or Japan, but the Chinese mainland. It is attempting to resist the magnetic pull of a rising Chinese mainland. In recent years the Chinese mainland has signed numerous FTAs in rapid order. South Korea's train of thought is clear. Europe, the US, Australia and others, are major export markets, Asean, India, Mexico, and the Chinese mainland are partners in the industrial chain. South Korea is the only Asian nation with the same high degree of liberalization as the US and Europe, and has established FTA relationships, South Korean strategic thinking wants Korea to rise phoenix like out of the ashes. Other FTAs are expected to appear at twice the pace. More crucially, South Korea is finishing up FTA negotiations with the Chinese mainland. Once that has been done, South Korea can immediately neutralize the cross-Strait economic cooperation agreement (ECFA) and seize the lead. In other words, South Korea's FTAs may have a limited impact on Taiwan. But its strategy is to connect the dots, and to flesh out the bones. This is something we must reckon with. If we had an FTA monitoring mechanism, a red light would be flashing by now.

South Korea poses a challenge. The Ministry of Economic Affairs recently adopted a domestic market segmentation support mechanism. Internationally, it pushed for an FTA with Taiwan on the EU policy agenda. But the former pertains to downstream industries involved in product development, marketing orientation, even pricing adjustments. They are not timely enough. Will it be a better fit with long term industry needs and development? That remains to be seen. As for the latter, the US, Europe, and even the Chinese mainland may wonder, "Are you (Taiwan) really ready?

We have fewer potential signatories to choose from. Potential signatories are probably less eager to sign with us than they are with South Korea. The biggest factor remains the human factor. The agencies responsible for FTAs, ECFA, and cross-Strait liberalization waffle and procrastinate. Motivated by selfishness, they adopt overly conservative postures, at the expense of industry. They have become a major obstacle. The government is ostensibly committed to liberalization. But electoral considerations have made it hesitant and coy. Put simply, the biggest obstacles to FTAs originate from within.

At this moment, the government needs to gather its wits. It needs to consider its attributes and its needs. It needs to draw up a blueprint for FTAs and liberalization policies, and for short term and long-term goals. In this blueprint, follow-up consultations on ECFA will no longer remain a cross-Strait matter. They will also need to consider the progress of Korea's FTA with the Chinese mainland. They will also have to look beyond Korea. They will have to consider the pace at which the Chinese mainland is signing FTAs. Cross-Strait relations are improving significantly. , The room for cooperation is increasing. But this has not changed cross-Strait industry competition. Therefore, when considering FTAs, we must not look only at the world while ignoring the other side of the Strait.

We face many difficulties. The government has also undergone reorganization. The sole function of the MOEA Office of Trade Negotiations is negotiations. It will be replaced by the Economic and Trade Policy Division. The impact of this change remains to be seen. The ruling administration can try to chant "If South Korea can, so can we!" in response to public concerns. But given current conditions, the words might not come!

韓國能,我們也能嗎?
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.07.08 02:53 am

韓歐盟自由貿易協定(FTA)已於七月一日生效。自該日起,韓國百分之九十四的產品在歐盟享有零關稅待遇,而韓國亦給予百分之八十一的歐盟產品零關稅。同時,美國國會傳出消息,可能在年底前批准早已簽署的韓美FTA。

在國際市場中,韓國向來是台灣最直接的競爭對手。特別是高科技與資通訊產品,台韓過去在歐美主要市場的占有率一直很接近;但這幾年卻因為韓國的品牌行銷策略奏效、韓元貶值等因素,出現彼長我消的趨勢。如今,透過FTA所帶來的優惠利益,可能進一步削弱台灣的競爭力,因此政府及各界對韓國FTA發展一直很關心。

在FTA賽局中,觀察對手動態的重點有三件事;一是數量,二是對象,三是內容。若是數量不多、經貿利益不大,且內容自由化程度不高,自然不足為懼。但韓國在成功與美、歐等重量級國家洽簽FTA後,在數量上出現重力加速度的效應。除過去已經生效的新加坡、智利、東協FTA外,與印度的FTA於去年生效,今年則完成與秘魯的簽署,澳洲部分也即將完成談判。正在進行諮商者,則包括日本、加拿大、墨西哥,以及中國大陸。

在經貿利益上,目前韓國百分之十四點四的貿易量受惠於FTA,但隨著其與美歐的FTA生效,這個涵蓋率可望接近五成。終極目標,韓國計劃至少八成的貿易可享有FTA優惠利益。而在顯現內容品質的自由化程度部分,韓國與美、歐盟的FTA,普遍被認為是深度自由化的代表作。

韓國FTA政策的假想敵不是台灣、日本,而是中國大陸。為突破中國大陸崛起的磁吸效應,以及其近年來在FTA上的發展速度,韓國的推動脈絡很清楚:一方面是歐、美、澳洲等主要出口市場,他方面是東協、印度、墨西哥及大陸等產業鏈分工夥伴。作為亞洲地區唯一與美、歐等高度自由化國家同時建構FTA關係的國家,韓國在「置之死地而後生」的策略思維下,其他FTA預料將以倍增的速度出現。更關鍵的是,一旦韓國與中國大陸完成FTA談判,將頓時抵銷台商透過兩岸經濟合作協議(ECFA)取得的領先優勢。換言之,韓國個別FTA對台灣的影響或許有限,但這種「由線而面」的策略布局,委實已不容輕視;如果我們有FTA的監測機制,此刻正是亮起紅燈之時。

面對韓國的挑戰,經濟部這幾天提出對內採取市場區隔、輔導機制,對外大力推動台歐盟FTA排上歐盟政策議程等作法因應。但對於前者,涉及產業上下游的產品研發、行銷定位,甚至於定價策略的調整,恐怕不會是及時雨,與產業需求及長期發展方向是否契合,也有待觀察。至於後者,則要面對美歐,甚至是中國大陸「Are you ready?(準備好了嗎)」的質疑。

確實,在洽簽對象的選擇及意願上,我們的限制明顯高於韓國,且大半是操之在人的因素。更重要的是,若干部會對FTA及兩岸ECFA自由化的搖擺觀望,卻是出於自私心態而罔顧產業利益的保守立場,儼然已成為重大阻礙;政府的自由化決心,似乎也因選舉考量而顯得猶豫扭捏。簡單地說,目前洽簽FTA的障礙,很大一部分來自內部。

此時此刻,政府有必要靜下心來,認真地按照屬性與需求,畫出FTA及自由化政策的藍圖,以及短中長期的目標。在這個藍圖中,ECFA後續協議的協商節奏,已經不是單純的兩岸問題,還須考慮韓中FTA的進展;也需要在韓國之外,將中國大陸的FTA速度列為評估參數。兩岸關係顯著改善,合作空間不斷擴展,但並未改變兩岸在產業競爭上的局面。因此,在FTA布局思維上,千萬不可只看世界而忘記對岸。

面對種種困難,又逢政府組織再造,專司談判的經貿談判代表辦公室將被經貿政策司所取代,其影響尚無法評估。政府當局或許可用「韓國能,我們也能」的口頭禪回應國人的疑慮;但此情此境,這句話恐怕一時還說不出口吧!

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