Wednesday, July 18, 2012

The 25th Anniversary of the Lifting of Martial Law: Constitutional Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations

The 25th Anniversary of the Lifting of Martial Law:
Constitutional Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2012


Summary: On July 15, 1987, the Chiang Ching-kuo administration officially lifted 38 years and 56 days of martial law. Chiang Ching-kuo had an uncanny sense of history. He knew cross-Strait relations were inextricably intertwined with the Taiwan Region's constitutional democracy. For 25 years, Taiwan has remained on this road paved by Chiang Ching-kuo. When it comes to cross-Strait relations, even Beijing must walk this road

Full Text below:

Today is the 25th anniversary of the lifting of martial law. Let us relive this storm-tossed quarter century.

On July 15, 1987, the Chiang Ching-kuo administration officially lifted 38 years and 56 days of martial law. It declared constitutional democracy. It lifted the ban on political parties and the publication of new newspapers. It allowed cross-Strait exchanges. It allowed people to visit relatives in the Mainland Region of the nation. Chiang Ching-kuo had an uncanny sense of history. He knew cross-Strait relations were inextricably intertwined with the Taiwan Region's constitutional democracy. On the one hand, the public demanded cross-Strait exchanges. On the other hand, it demanded separation between the two sides. For 25 years, Taiwan has remained on this road paved by Chiang Ching-kuo. When it comes to cross-Strait relations, even Beijing must walk this road.

Taiwan's greatest challenge is cross-Strait relations. During martial law, cross-Strait relations were dealt with using martial law methods. Upon the lifting of martial law, cross-Strait relations were dealt with using constitutional and democratic methods. The methods may be different, but cross-Strait relations remain Taiwan's greatest challenge.

History is full of ironies. Chiang Ching-kuo's cross-Strait path could be implemented only because Lee Teng-hui sabotaged the KMT from within, leading to its defeat in 2000. It was replaced by Chen Shui-bian's DPP government, which clung to power for the next eight years. Had Lee Teng-hui not engineered the Kuomintang's defeat, Lien Chan would not have visited the Mainland in 2005 as KMT Chairman. He would not have had the opportunity to open the doors to cross-Strait exchanges. Had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian not demagogued Taiwan independence, Beijing would never have reconsidered its stance on cross-Strait policy. It would never have gone from saber rattling to peaceful development. This tortuous history was in part a consequence of the Lee and Chen dynasties' Taiwan independence demagoguery. This demagoguery provoked a public backlash which expressed itself at the ballot box. Beijing also learned a lesson from its mistaken strategies for dealing with Lee and Chen. It learned the Taiwan public's bottom line.

The lesson to be learned from this is that constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably intertwined. If cross-Strait relations meet with public approval, they are considered rational cross-Strait relations. Conversely, rational cross-Strait relations require the support of constitutional democracy. Taiwan's rulers and the authorities in Beijing cannot deviate from this principle. These are the cross-Strait rules of the game established by Chiang Ching-kuo 25 years ago.

As mentioned above, Chiang Ching-kuo's lifting of martial law involved two strands. One strand was the promotion of constitutional democracy. The other strand was the opening of cross-Strait exchanges. These two are intertwined like the strands of a rope. For 25 years democratic constitutionalism has been evolving. Lee Teng-hui is a clear example. He enacted the "National Unification Guidelines." He said "I have said 300 times that I am opposed to Taiwan independence." Later he denounced the KMT government as a "foreign regime." He argued that the Mainland Region and the Taiwan Region were "two states." He claimed that "The Republic of China perished long ago." More recently he reversed himself again. He said "Shouting Taiwan independence is pointless." He even said "I never advocated Taiwan independence." These are Lee Teng-hui's flip-flops on the ROC Constitution. They are a microcosm of 25 years of constitutional crises.

Now look at cross-Strait relations. For 25 years, Lee Teng-hui trumpeted his "Coming Collapse of [Mainland] China Theory." For 25 years, his prophecy failed to materialize. Just the opposite. The world now talks about the "Rise of a Great Nation." Lee Teng-hui's "be patient, avoid haste" policy turned out to be unsustainable. Under the Chen Shui-bian regime, the Mainland market accounted for 40% of Taiwan's exports. ECFA has become Taiwan's most successful economic and trade agreement. Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan increased annual pineapple cake production from 1 billion to 25 billion units.

As we can see, constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably intertwined. Those who argue that "The Republic of China is a foreign regime" will advocate the "Coming Collapse of [Mainland] China Theory." They will advocate "be patient, and avoid haste." They will advocate the "rectification of names." Those who champion and defend the Republic of China on the other hand, will advocate "three links." They will advocate ECFA. They will advocate a peace agreement. They will advocate "one China, different interpretations." They will advocate "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force." This is why the Republic of China's constitutional democracy is rooted in cross-Strait relations. This is why cross-Strait relations constrains the Republic of China's democracy and constitutional government. Constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably intertwined. This has remained true since martial law was lifted 25 years ago.

For 25 years, constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations have undergone one crisis after another. But even major derailments contributed to inextricably intertwined relations. For example, had Lee Teng-hui not sabotaged the Kuomintang, and caused it to lose power, Lien Chan would never have visited the Mainland. Had Chen Shui-bian not thoroughly discredited Taiwan independence, the public would never have appreciated the hollowness of its demands for the "rectification of names." Had Beijing's actions during the 1996 missile crisis not backfired, Beijing's cross-Strait policy would not have evolved into today's "peaceful development." The past 25 years have taught the Blue, Green, and Red camps that constitutional democracy and cross-Strait relations are inextricably interwoven.

Over the past 25 years, some people on both sides of the Strait have attempted to deviate from the rules of the game established by Chiang Ching-kuo. But those who tried, failed. In the future, perhaps someone on one side or the other will make another such attempt. But they too will have a difficult time overcoming Chiang Ching-kuo's rules of the game.

解嚴廿五周年:民主憲政與兩岸關係的交纏
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.07.15 03:22 am

今天是解嚴二十五周年,可對這四分之一世紀的雷電風雨作一回顧。

一九八七年七月十五日,蔣經國政府公告解除實施了三十八年又五十六天的戒嚴令,宣布進入民主憲政(解除黨禁、報禁),並開啟兩岸交流(開放赴陸探親);蔣經國的歷史感是準確的,此一架構使得兩岸關係與台灣的民主憲政出現麻花式的交纏,一方面因民意而維持兩岸交流,另一方面也因民意而建立兩岸區隔。二十五年來,台灣一直走在蔣經國鋪設的這條道路上,北京在兩岸關係上也不能跳出此一道路。

台灣最重要的生命課題就是兩岸關係。在戒嚴時代,是以戒嚴統治來處理兩岸關係;在解嚴之後,則是改以民主憲政來處理兩岸關係。方法雖異,但兩岸關係作為台灣最重要生命課題的地位並未動搖改變。

然而,歷史也充滿諷刺,促成蔣經國路線之所以能在兩岸間初告確立,其關鍵事件其實是二○○○年李登輝輸掉了國民黨政權,改由民進黨的陳水扁政府主政八年。如果不是李登輝輸掉國民黨的政權,連戰就不可能在二○○○五年以國民黨主席身分訪問大陸,開啟了兩岸的機會之窗;又如果不是李登輝及陳水扁的台獨操作,北京亦不可能對兩岸政策痛切省思,從「文攻武嚇」轉為「和平發展」。這一段曲折的歷史是:一方面,李扁兩朝的台獨操作,經台灣民眾以民主程序給予否定;另一方面,北京亦從與李扁對應的失敗中,領悟了台灣民意的底蘊。

其中的啟示是:在台灣,民主憲政與兩岸關係是交纏的麻花,若是符合民意的兩岸關係,就是合理的兩岸關係;而合理的兩岸關係,又必須獲得民主憲政的支撐。台灣的執政者與北京當局皆不易背離此一法則,這是蔣經國在二十五年前預設的兩岸遊戲規則。

如前所述,蔣經國解嚴,有兩條主線。一是推進民主憲政,一是開放兩岸互動;這正是麻花的兩股。二十五年來,就民主憲政的演化言,李登輝就是一個顯例:他從頒行「國家統一綱領」、「說了三百次的反台獨」,到「外來政權」、「兩國論」、「中華民國已經滅亡」,最近又變成「喊台獨沒有用」,甚至說「我沒有主張台獨」……。這是李登輝的「憲法履歷」,也是台灣二十五年憲政風潮的濃縮版。

再看兩岸關係,二十五年來,李登輝預言的「中國崩潰論」並未實現,反而「大國崛起」成了舉世的話題;李登輝的「戒急用忍」也難以為繼,扁政府將大陸市場推到占台灣外銷總額的四十%,而如今ECFA又成為台灣最成功的經貿談判,大陸來台觀光客更使原本年產值十幾億的鳳梨酥飆到二五○億。

由此可見,民主憲政與兩岸關係是一個麻花。主張「中華民國是外來政權」者,就會主張「中國崩潰論」,就會主張「戒急用忍」,就會主張「正名制憲」;但選擇維持及護衛「中華民國」者,就會主張「三通」,主張ECFA,主張「和平協議」,主張「一中各表」,主張「不統、不獨、不武」。正因如此,台灣的民主憲政是以兩岸關係為主要的課題,而兩岸關係這個課題也制約了台灣的民主憲政;此一民主憲政與兩岸關係的麻花架構,遂成為解嚴二十五年的歷史主軸。

二十五年來,在民主憲政及兩岸關係屢屢出現驚濤駭浪;但即使是一些重大的脫軌事件,也對這個麻花關係的推進作出了貢獻。例如:若不是李登輝輸掉國民黨政權,連戰不可能訪陸;若不是陳水扁把台獨搞砸搞臭,國人不知「正名制憲」的虛無;若不是一九九六年的「飛彈危機」計不得售,北京的兩岸政策不會走到今日的「和平發展」。二十五年間,兩岸藍綠紅三黨的領導階層,應皆領悟到台灣「民主憲政與兩岸關係」的麻花效應。

二十五年來,兩岸都有人嘗試背離這一套蔣經國設定的遊戲規則,但皆告失敗。未來,也許兩岸仍有人會作此嘗試,但恐怕還是不易跳出蔣經國的宏觀擘劃。
          

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