How Will Su Tseng-chang Attack the Ball that Frank Hsieh Set for Him?

How Will Su Tseng-chang Attack the Ball that Frank Hsieh Set for Him?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2012

Summary: Frank Hsieh is a volleyball player who has set the ball for Su Tseng-chang. Now Su Tseng-chang must decide how he will attack it. Su and Hsieh have long-standing grievances. But Su and Hsieh have an opportunity to join hands and rewrite history. But the opportunity is fleeting. They can hardly be "in no hurry." Will the two help each other, or will they hurt each other. Will both end up as losers? This will all be decided in a fleeting moment.

Full Text below:

Frank Hsieh has returned from his visit to the Mainland. He has met with Su Tseng-chang and shared his findings. Following the meeting, Frank Hsieh said, "In the end, the future of cross-Strait policy must be decided by Chairman Su." Su Tseng-chang said, "We are in no hurry to establish a China Affairs Committee." Frank Hsieh is a volleyball player who has set the ball for Su Tseng-chang. Now Su Tseng-chang must decide how he will attack it.

Let us return to 1999 and 2000. Chen Shui-bian was a rising star. His support was enormous. He had become the DPP's ideal candidate for president. Under Party Chairman Lin Yi-hsiung, the DPP adopted the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." This camouflaged the party's "Taiwan independence party platform" and paved the way for Chen Shui-bian's election victory. The key figure in this political undertaking was Lin Yi-hsiung. He had two main virtues. One. He had a reputation for personal integrity and he had a high degree of name recogniton. Two. More importantly, he himself was not running for president.

Today the 2016 presidential election looms. The DPP must reform itself. DPP reform is even more urgent than it was in 2000. And yet "In the end, the future of cross-Strait policy must be decided by Chairman Su." But Chairman Su is also a 2016 presidential hopeful. This is a horse of a different color than 2000. Su Tseng-chang has assumed the role of Lin Yi-hsiung.

When Su Tseng-chang ran for party chairman, he touched off a major controversy. If the party chairman intends to run for president, he is bound to adversely impact the party's efforts at transformation. But this is precisely the situation we have before us. Su Tseng-chang is running for president. He must weigh the support he will receive from Taiwan independence hardliners against the support he will receive from party reformers. He will be forced to continually second guess himself. He will be incapable of throwing open the doors and embarking wholeheartedly on party reform. Conversely, if someone not running for president assumes responsibility for party reform, he can act boldly and decisively. He need only consider the future of the party. He need only set the ball for the party's presidential candidate. He need not worry about seeking support from opposing factions. This was the role Lin Yi-hsiung played back then. But this is not the role Su Tseng-chang is playing today.

Has Su Tseng-chang decided to abandon the work of party reform? From what we can see, Frank Hsieh is the only person providing Su with political leverage. This leverage, if passed up, may never come again. The DPP is talking about party reform. Assuming it is serious, it must meet four conditions. One. It must act from the top down. For example, the party leadership should launch a great debate. Two. If the party wishes to reform itself, it must get serious. It must forsake Chen Shui-bian era "rectification of names" campaigns. It must eschew word games such as "peace with differences," "peace while seeking common ground," or "transcendence." Three. It must enact dramatic and major reforms. Absent such a dramatic move, it probably will not succeed. Four. It must make someone with considerable resources and name recognition the star of the show, to serve as a pillar. Otherwise the show will not be able to go on.

From what we can see, Frank Hsieh meets three of the required conditions. He has undergone a sufficiently radical change. His change was radical enough that he could speak of a "one China constitution." His "bartender's trip" was sufficiently dramatic. With this move he knocked on Zhongnanhai's door. He sang the right tune. He carried a heavy load. All Frank Hsieh needs today is the support of Chairman Su. If Su Tseng-chang appoints Frank Hsieh Chairman of the China Affairs Committee, Hsieh will be strategically positioned. Top-down reform can then begin.

Su Tseng-chang must realize that as party chairman, leading DPP reform is his "destiny." Frank Hsieh is standing before him, precisely because he is the best leverage Su can get. There is nobody else. If Su Tseng-chang forsakes Frank Hsieh, he will not find a better champion of reform. He will be perceived as fleeing from responsibility. If this happens, there will repercussions. One. DPP reform will be delayed. The blame will fall on Su Tseng-chang. That is inescapable. Two. Party insiders and the general public will see Su Tseng-chang as a stumbling block, standing in the way of party reform. This will be disadvantageous to his bid for president. It will not prevent Tsai Ing-wen from joining forces with Frank Hsieh, and billing themselves as champions of party reform. Two years later they might even seize control of the DPP party leadership.

In other words, If Su Tseng-chang fails to attack the ball set up for him by Frank Hsieh, the damage will be incalculable, both for the party and for himself. Yet Su Tseng-chang insists that the current situation is "not urgent." In fact his main concern is that if the situation is not handled properly, it could hurt his 2016 election prospects. Can Frank Hsieh make allowances for Su Tseng-chang's dilemma? He appears to have made a genuine effort. Frank Hsieh should let Su Tseng-chang know that it is safe to make him Chairman of the DPP China Affairs Committee and entrust him with party reform. Hsieh should declare that he will not run for either president or vice president in the 2016 general election, and that he will not side with any of the DPP presidential hopefuls. Hsieh should declare that reform is for the future of the DPP and Taiwan, and must not become a part of intraparty power struggles. Such declarations would rebuild the relationships between Frank Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen. If Frank Hsieh wants to become the champion of party reform, he must assume a transcendent position. Perhaps Su Tseng-chang is waiting for such assurances from Frank Hsieh? Otherwise, if party reform becomes a part of intraparty power struggles, the party will debase itself. Words will not be adequate to describe the consequences.

Su Tseng-chang remains the key. But Su has a huge blind spot. He seems to think he must keep a lid on the pot. He seems to think that as long as no one shows his cards, he can avoid offending either party reformers or Taiwan independence hardliners. But the truth is the lid can no longer be kept on the pot. The more the DPP refuses to lift the lid, the more difficult it will be to resolve conflicts between these opposing forces. If the DPP waits to long to lift the lid, the bottom of the pot may have already burned through. When that happens, the blame will fall on Su Tseng-chang. Therefore Su's best strategy is to simply let go. He should turn over reform to party insiders who will subject the issues to democratic debate. He should submit the issues to the judgment of the public. He may wish to assume the role of a midwife. Whether the child is a boy or a girl will be determined through democratic debate within the party. The result may even be decided through a democratic vote within the party. Su Tseng-chang may be able to seize the high ground. He may be able to defuse the most controversial reform since the founding of the party. Will this be a crisis or an opportunity for Su Tseng-chang? That will depend on his political vision.

Anyone who has ever boiled water knows that once it comes to a boil, the lid must be removed. It must be allowed to boil from three to five minutes. This will enable to the chloroform to evaporate, leaving one with a pot of pure water. Su Tseng-chang's responsibility is to open the lid and let the chloroform boil away.

Su and Hsieh have long-standing grievances. But Su and Hsieh have an opportunity to join hands and rewrite history. But the opportunity is fleeting. They can hardly be "in no hurry." Will the two help each other, or will they hurt each other. Will both end up as losers? This will all be decided in a fleeting moment.

貞昌如何接謝長廷這一球
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.10.18

謝長廷訪陸歸來，面見蘇貞昌，分享心得。會畢，謝長廷說，「未來的兩岸政策，還是必須由蘇主席決定。」蘇貞昌則說：「設置中國事務委員會的事，不急。」謝長廷把球揮進蘇貞昌這一邊，現在要看蘇貞昌如何接球。

暫且回到一九九九年至二○○○年之交。陳水扁以明日之星的姿態，聲勢蒸騰，已成代表民進黨角逐總統寶座的不二人選；在黨主席林義雄的主導下，民進黨通過了《台灣前途決議文》，遮蓋了《台獨黨綱》，為陳水扁競選總統之路作好鋪墊。此一重大政治工程的關鍵人物是林義雄，他具備兩大條件：一、德望兼備；二、最重要的是，他自己不選總統。

如今，面對二○一六總統大選，民進黨之必須轉型，迫切性尤甚於二○○○年。然而，「未來的兩岸政策，還是必須由蘇主席決定」，但蘇主席也正是二○一六年總統大位的有意問鼎者；這卻是與二○○○年大異其趣之處，蘇貞昌自己站上了當年林義雄的位置。

蘇貞昌競選黨主席之時，引發的主要爭論即是，黨主席若亦有意競逐總統，勢必不利轉型工程；這卻正是當前已經驗證的情勢。為了自己要角逐總統，蘇貞昌必須在「獨派」與「轉型派」之間計算自己的支持度，因此左顧右盼，不能大開大闔地推動轉型工程。反之，倘若由一位不參選總統者擔任主導轉型的操作手，即有可能大刀闊斧；因為，他只須考慮如何為黨打開出路，作球給參選總統者，不必顧慮自己在派系之間的支持度；這就是當年的林義雄，卻不是今日的蘇貞昌。

然而，除非蘇貞昌已決定要逃避及放棄轉型工程，眼前所見，謝長廷幾乎是他唯一的，且錯過即不可能再有的政治槓桿。因為，民進黨今日要談轉型工程，至少必須體現四個原理：一、要居高臨下，由上而下，例如，由黨中央發動大辯論。二、要大轉彎，立即從陳水扁時代的「正名制憲」徹底轉出來，不能再玩「和而不同／和而求同」或「超越」那類空洞的文字遊戲。三、要有一些戲劇性，這樣的大轉彎，若無戲劇化的大動作，恐怕辦不到。四、要有一個具備相當資望者，作為領銜主演的台柱，否則撐不住場面。

眼前所見，謝長廷至少是符合了其中三項原理的人選：他的轉彎夠大，大到「憲法一中」；他的「調酒之旅」夠戲劇性，一舉敲開了中南海的大門；他的唱作俱佳，足堪挑起大樑。如今謝長廷唯一缺的是蘇主席的支持，倘若蘇貞昌任命謝長廷為中國事務委員會主任委員，謝就取得了「由上而下」的勢位，轉型工程即可啟動。

蘇貞昌應知，在此際出任黨主席，帶領民進黨轉型其實是他的「天職」；而此時站在他面前的謝長廷，正是不作第二人想的最佳槓桿。如果蘇貞昌放棄了謝長廷，一方面必不可能找到更佳的轉型操作手，另一方面尤會被視為逃避「天職」。倘係如此，後續的效應可能是：一、民進黨轉型遲誤的責任，必指向蘇貞昌，無可逃逭。二、蘇貞昌在黨內及民間將被視為轉型的擋路石，恐對其參選總統不利；何況，將也阻擋不住蔡英文若與謝長廷合流，佔據轉型號召，直至兩年後奪下黨中央。

也就是說，蘇貞昌若不接謝長廷這一球，於黨於己皆可能將有不易收拾的後果。然而，蘇貞昌將當前情勢看成「不急」，其實主要是顧慮若處理不當，會影響他在二○一六的選情。如何寬釋蘇貞昌的心結，謝長廷似可盡些心力。或許，謝長廷可向蘇貞昌示意，若出掌中國事務委員會主委，操持轉型工程，自己將不參加二○一六年總統、副總統的競逐，也不在民進黨各組候選人中選邊站，以示轉型工程是為了民進黨及台灣的前途計，不可涉入黨內權力的競逐。這樣的宣示，不僅是為了重建謝長廷與蘇貞昌及蔡英文之間的關係，也是謝長廷若欲成為轉型總工程師所必須持守的超然立場；也許，蘇貞昌如今正在等謝長廷的這句話。如若不然，竟將轉型捲入黨內政爭，即是自甘下流，不足論矣。

然而，關鍵仍在蘇貞昌。蘇現在有一個大盲點，他似乎認為，必須把沸騰的鍋蓋壓住；只要不攤牌，他就不會開罪「轉型派」，也不會得罪「獨派」。但是，眼前所見，這只鍋蓋根本已經壓不住了；愈不掀鍋，雙方的矛盾分裂就愈難化解，待等到已來不及掀鍋蓋時，鍋底可能已經燒穿，到時候責任還是要算到蘇貞昌的頭上。所以，蘇現在的最佳策略應是放空自己，將轉型議題交由黨內進行徹底的民主辯論，並訴諸全國民意；他不妨以產婆的角色自命，生男生女，則由黨內民主辯論，甚至由黨內的民主投票決定。如此，蘇貞昌始有可能搶佔制高點，並為化解此次建黨以來最嚴峻的轉型爭議盡其「天職」。這是蘇貞昌的危機或轉機，決定於他的政治視野。

煮開水者皆知，沸騰後必須掀開壺蓋，然後再聽其無蓋沸騰三、五分鐘，使內含三氯甲烷揮發，即可得一壺淨水。蘇貞昌此時的責任，就是打開壺蓋，煮去三氯甲烷。

蘇謝之間久有心結。但眼前已然出現了蘇謝可能攜手改寫歷史的契機，卻是稍縱即逝，不能「不急」；究竟二人將是相得益彰或兩敗俱傷，似均繫乎一念之間。