Diaoyutai Status Quo Shattered: Taipei Must Speak Up

Diaoyutai Status Quo Shattered: Taipei Must Speak Up
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 2, 2012

Summary: The status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands has changed. Taipei's strategy is to maintain peace with Beijing, while remaining friendly with Washington and Tokyo. It is to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. This will be a top priority for the Ma administration during Ma's second term.
   
Full Text below:
   
The dispute between Mainland China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands has reached an apparent impasse. Forces maintaining the status quo and forces effecting change are tugging at each other.

Initially Japan wanted to maintain the status quo. It exercised de facto control over the Diaoyutai Islands. Therefore it established three bottom lines. These include the maintenance of a 12 nautical mile limit, long term occupation of territory within the 12 nautical mile limit, and organized large-scale landings on the islands. Mainland China has long wanted to change this status quo, one in which Japan alone exercised control over the Diaoyutai Islands. To do this, Mainland China dispatched fishery boats, ocean surveillance ships, and naval fleets into the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. It constantly tried to break through Japan's defenses, to test Japan's resolve.

Japan's defenses do not consist of its own military forces. Instead it is based on the US-Japan alliance. When Japan loses support from the United States, its defenses are weakened. The pendulum will then swing toward Mainland China. With Mainland China constantly challenging the status quo, the situation has been reversed.

Recently Mainland China ocean surveillance ships sailed within 12 nautical miles of Diaoyutai Island waters. It began expelling Japanese Coast Guard vessels. Mainland China has changed the status quo. The next step is to establish its own de facto control over the Diaoyutai Islands, and maintain a new status quo. Of course the Mainland is also using the dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands to break through the first line of defense established by the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific island chain.

Mainland China has changed the status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands. Will this lead to a further escalation of conflict between Mainland China and Japan? The future of relations between Mainland China and Japan will be determined by both catalysts and constraints. One catalyst is the United States' return to Asia as a strong backer for Japan. Another catalyst is Mainland China's determination to break through the first island chain in the Western Pacific. One constraint is the high degree of economic interdependence between Mainland China and Japan, and Mainland China's strategy of "engaged struggle." Consider the status quo. The U.S. government cancelled its plans for joint island landing exercises between the United States and Japan. The United States apparently did not want to become caught up in a dispute between Mainland China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland China has already changed the status quo regarding Diaoyutai. It has already achieved its military goal by breaking through the Western Pacific island chain.

Now consider the constraints. Mainland China is Japan's largest trading partner. Japan is Mainland China's third largest trading partner. Japan is Mainland China's largest source of investments and technology. Economic interdependence between Mainland China and Japan is both deep and wide. Anti-Japanese sentiment on Mainland China has cost Japanese companies heavily. The Japanese government has begun looking for alternative markets. Japanese companies have begun large-scale divestments and halted technology sharing. This is not conducive to the economic development of the Chinese mainland. Secondly, Mainland China and Japan may have engaged in economic warfare, trade warfare, and actual military warfare. But Mainland China continues to maintain high-level diplomatic contacts with Japan. Mainland China hopes the Japanese government will change its policy of nationalizing Diaoyutai. It does not want to expand the military conflict between Mainland China and Japan.

Clearly the constraints outweigh the catalysts. The conflict over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands will eventually cool down. The two sides need to find a way to step down at the appropriate time.

Beijing has changed the status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands. This has impacted Taipei in two wasys. Beijing has exercised its political influence in the Diaoyutai Islands. It will now intervene in fishing rights talks between Taipei and Tokyo. Beijing opposes any Taipei-Tokyo fishing rights negotiations that might bear on the sovereignty of the two parties. Secondly, Mainland Chinese military forces have entered waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands. The Diaoyutai Islands are less than 20 nautical miles from the main island of Taiwan. This will have a significant impact on the ROC's coastal defenses and air defenses.

Tensions between the Mainland and Japan are gradually cooling. Taipei must be wary of changes in the Japanese government's position regarding Taipei-Tokyo fishing rights talks. Tensions between Mainland China and Japan are gradually easing. Tokyo will not continue making concessions to Taipei during fishing rights negotiations. Therefore, we recommend that Taipei hold fishing rights talks with Tokyo before high level talks are held between Beijing and Tokyo. Taipei will then have more chips to play with during fishing rights negotiations with Tokyo. .

Secondly, we must beware of the ROC's marginalization on the international stage. Tensions between Mainland China and Japan are gradually easing. Beijing and Tokyo have excluded Taipei from the bargaining table. Therefore Taipei must take precautions. It must follow-up on the "East China Sea Peace Initiative ." It must make public the "East China Sea Code of Conduct" or "East China Sea Declaration on Conduct." It must bolster the ROC's position on the Diaoyutai issue.

The status quo in the Diaoyutai Islands has changed. Taipei's strategy is to maintain peace with Beijing, while remaining friendly with Washington and Tokyo. It is to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. This will be a top priority for the Ma administration during Ma's second term.

當釣魚台現狀被打破 我須掌握話語權
    2012-11-02
    中國時報

　最近中日釣魚台主權爭議似乎陷入了對峙的僵局，形成一種「維持現狀」與「改變現狀」兩大力量的相互拉鋸戰。

　首先是日本政府積極想要維持其實質控制釣魚台的現狀，因此，日本為釣魚台主權爭議設下了「常態性的進入十二浬、長時間的停留在十二浬以及有組織性的大規模登島」等三道底線；而中國大陸則是頻頻想要改變由日本單獨控制釣魚台的現狀，為此，中國大陸陸續派出漁政船、海監船及海軍艦隊進入了釣魚台海域，不斷地在突破日本的防線，更不停地在測試日本的底線。

　日本的防線不在本身的軍事力量，而是建構在美日同盟的基礎上，而當日本在逐漸失去美國的有力支持之後，它的防線只能不停地往後移，鐘擺也不斷地向中國大陸傾斜；而就在中國大陸不斷地衝撞「現狀」下，現在的情況似乎已經是主客易位了。

　前日中國大陸海監船已經在釣魚台十二浬的海域內，開始執行驅離日本海上保安廳船隻的任務，這便是中國大陸在改變現狀之後，進一步開始想要製造、維持是由其實質控制釣魚台的「現狀」；當然大陸本身的軍事力量也藉由釣魚台主權爭議，一舉突破由美日所共同布下的西太平洋第一島鏈防線。

　而在中國大陸改變了釣魚台的現狀之後，未來中日兩國的衝突是否會進一步升高呢？影響今後中日關係走向的因素有催化因素與制約因素兩大類型。催化因素是美國重返亞洲成為日本強而有力的後盾，其次是中國想要突破西太平洋第一島鏈的決心；而制約因素則是中日兩國緊密的經濟互賴關係，以及中國大陸「鬥而不破」的大戰略。以當前的情勢來看，在美國政府決定取消美日奪島演習計畫之後，美國似乎不希望被捲入中日的釣魚台主權爭議當中；而中國大陸在改變釣魚台現狀之後，早就已經達成突破西太平洋島鏈的軍事目的。

　反觀在制約因素方面，中國大陸是日本的最大貿易國家，而日本也是中國大陸的第三大貿易國，日本是中國大陸最主要的投資國及技術來源國，中日兩國之間的經濟互賴不但深而且廣，中國大陸的反日情緒讓日本企業蒙受極大的損失，日本政府已經開始在尋找替代的市場，而日本企業的大規模撤資與停止技術輸入，同樣不利於中國大陸的經濟發展；其次中國大陸雖然對日本進行一連串的經濟戰、貿易戰及軍事戰，但是中國大陸卻還是維繫著與日本之間的高層外交對話管道，因此，中國大陸只是希望日本政府能夠改變釣魚台的國有化政策，而並非要擴大中日之間的軍事衝突。

　由此可見，在制約因素大於催化因素之下，中日釣魚台主權爭議終將會逐漸降溫，現在就看雙方如何在適當的時間找到彼此的下台階。

　而當中國大陸改變了釣魚台現狀，將會對我國產生兩項衝擊。首先是中國大陸對釣魚台議題產生政治影響力之後，中國大陸將會開始介入我國與日本之間的漁權談判，例如中國大陸政府之前便明白反對台日漁權談判談到涉及雙方主權的議題；其次，中國大陸軍事力量進入了釣魚台海域之後，由於釣魚台離我國本島只有不到一百二十浬，這將對我國的海防與空防造成相當大的衝擊與影響。

　另外當中日兩國緊張關係逐漸降溫之後，我國必須慎防日本政府對於台日漁業會談態度的轉向，也就是說，當中日兩國關係漸趨於緩和之後，日本政府將不會繼續在漁業談判問題對台灣讓利，因此，建議台灣政府若要和日本進行漁業會談，最好的時機應該要選擇在中日高層會談之前，這樣台灣將會有更多的籌碼與日本政府就漁業會談議題進行協商。

　其次是慎防台灣的國際話語權被邊緣化，若中日關係逐漸趨於緩和，中日兩國同意以外交談判的手段來解決釣魚台主權爭議，我國將會被排除在中日的談判桌之外，因此，我國政府應該要未雨綢繆，在近期內盡快推動「東海和平倡議」的後續行動，例如對外發表「東海行為準則」或是「東海行為宣言」，以持續強化我國在釣魚台議題的話語權。

　當釣魚台現狀被改變之後，我國如何在和中、親美、友日的大戰略下，尋求台灣利益的最大化，將會是馬政府第二任期的當務之急。