Thursday, November 8, 2012

Hu Six Points: Innovations and Regrets

Hu Six Points: Innovations and Regrets
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2012


Summary: Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report. Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?

Full Text below:

Yesterday CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the 18th National Congress on political matters and cross-Strait relations. He gave an oral presentation and submitted a written report.

His oral report reiterated "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." He stressed "the promotion the peaceful reunification per Jiang Zemin's Eight Point Proposal." But the written report, which was not read out loud, used milder more rational language. "I hope the two sides [of the Strait] can work together, explore cross-strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, make reasonable arrangements, discuss the creation of a military confidence building mechanism, and negotiate a cross-Strait peace agreement." Hu wrote, "Although the Mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, the fact that the two sides belong to one China has never changed ... the two sides should continue to oppose Taiwan independence, and continue to affirm the 1992 consensus ... "

The oral presentation and the written report can be compared. The oral report is almost an exact copy of the report to the 17th National Congress. Most of the passages are word for word copies. The standard cited is the old 1995 Jiang Eight Points cross-Strait framework. It issued a coarse declaration. Its theme was "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems." The written report showed greater subtlety. It reiterated the Hu Six Points of 2008. Its themes were "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they remain parts of one China," and "[We must] explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified."

For the moment it is hard to know why Hu Jintao issued two versions of the cross-Strait report, one oral, and one written. Perhaps Hu wanted to distinguish between a "rhetorical edition" and an "operational edition." Perhaps Hu wanted his Hu Six Points to defer to the Jiang Eight Points. Perhaps Hu merely wanted to save time. Perhaps it was akin to the March 26, 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, Hu Jintao spoke of "one China, different interpretations." But afterwards this statement could be found only in the English version of Xinhua News Agency news reports. It was missing from the Chinese version.

Hu Jintao played a key role in changing the cross-Strait strategic scenario. The Hu Six Points is a major innovation. Its impact on cross-Strait relations far exceeds the impact of policies advanced by past CCP leaders. It surpassed the impact of the Jiang Eight Points, never mind the Yeh Nine Articles. Hu Jintao's innovations in cross-strait policy began with "peaceful development" during the 2005 Lien-Hu Summit. It evolved into "one China, different interpretations"during the March 2008 Bush-Hu hotline conversation, into the Hu Six Points on New Years Eve 2008, and into the "two sides' existing provisions (constitutions)" bottom line during the Wu-Hu meeting if March 2012. Hu's statements reveal a unique and consistent thread. They recognize that the "circumstances are special, and the nation has yet to be reunified." In the past, Beijing did not accept the idea that the nation "has yet to be reunified." They equated "yet to be reunified" with "divided." Hu acknowledged that "although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they still belong to one China." Hu urged the two sides to "explore cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified," including military confidence building mechanisms and a cross-Strait peace agreement. To use the language of the previous ARATS chairman Wang Daohan, the Hu Six Points can be considered an "in progress form of one China."

The final point in the Hu Six Points is the ending of hostilities, and the signing of a peace agreement. Since 2008, we have yet to end cross-Strait hostilities. We have yet to sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. There are two reasons why we have not. One. The Ma administration was hesitant. It failed to do everything it could. It was insufficiently supportive of further improvements in cross-Strait relations. Two. The Hu regime advanced the aforementioned rational perspective on cross-Strait relations. But it failed to implement them at a practical level. For example, the Bush-Hu Hotline reference to "one China, different interpretations" was reported only in English. For example, it remained taboo to refer to "the two sides' existing provisions" as "constitutions." For example, Beijing referred to "exploring cross-Strait political relations under these special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." But if refused to name political relations under these special circumstances. These political relations were relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. For example, Beijing said "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still part of one China." But why did it refuse to equate this "in progress form of one China" with the "big roof concept of China?"

The Hu Six Points thought of everything. But it failed to do may of them. In March of this year, during the Wu-Hu meeting, the two sides began discussing the parameters of "current provisions," i.e., the one China constitution. Some members of the DPP even advocated "constitutional consensus." This shows that the two sides can work together and support "one China, different interpretations under a big roof concept of China." If they do, they may be able to establish "political relations under these special circumstances." They may be able to establish a military confidence building mechanism or sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. They may be able to establish an "in progress form of one China." Isn't this what the Hu Six Points were aiming for? So why can't we do it?

Hu Jintao is retiring. His last political report incorporated the merits of the Hu Six Points in the written report, but Hu failed to read them aloud. Will his successor also leave behind empty words and historical regrets?
  
胡六點的發明與遺憾
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.11.09 01:47 am

中共總書記胡錦濤昨日十八大政治報告論及兩岸關係部分,口頭報告與書面報告呈現兩個版本。

口頭報告反覆申論「和平統一,一國兩制」,又強調「推動祖國和平統一進程的八項主張」(江八點);但在未公開宣讀出來的部分書面報告中,則以比較平緩理智的筆觸寫道:「希望(兩岸)雙方共同努力,探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係,作出合情合理的安排;商談建立軍事安全互信機制……協商達成兩岸和平協議。」又道:「大陸和台灣雖然尚未統一,但兩岸同屬一個中國的事實從未改變……兩岸雙方應恪守反對台獨、堅持九二識的共同立場……。」

將口頭報告與書面報告對照可見:口頭報告幾乎完全複製十七大報告的版本,甚至多處原句照抄,所標舉的是儼然「江八點」(一九九五年)以前兩岸政策的陳舊架構,呈現出粗糙的宣示性,而以「和平統一,一國兩制」為軸心;但書面報告則呈現出比較細膩的操作性,主要是在重複演繹「胡六點」(二○○八年),著重在「雖然尚未統一,仍是一個中國」及「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」等思維。

目前難悉,胡錦濤為何要將兩岸報告分做口頭及書面兩種版本,也許是「宣示面」與「操作面」的區隔,也許是表示「胡六點」對「江八點」的謙讓,或許只是為了節省時間;這有如二○○八年三月廿六日,胡錦濤在「布胡熱線」中宣示了「一中各表」,但事後僅見於新華社的英文稿中,中文版則闕如。

胡錦濤是扭轉兩岸大局的關鍵角色,「胡六點」則是重大發明,對兩岸關係的影響及開展,其作用遠逾過去所有中共領導人的政策主張,勝過「江八點」,更別論「葉九條」。胡錦濤對兩岸政策的發明,由二○○五年「連胡會」的「和平發展」,至二○○八年三月「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」,又至二○○八年除夕的「胡六點」,再至二○一二年三月「吳胡會」的「雙方現行規定(憲法)底線論」,其中有一獨特且一貫的脈絡,即是接受「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」(過去北京不接受「尚未統一」的事實,認為尚未統一即是分裂),且認為「兩岸雖然尚未統一」,但仍然可以「同屬一個中國」,並主張研議探討對「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」作出安排,此一安排可以是《(國家尚未統一的)軍事安全互信機制》,也或許是《(國家尚未統一的)兩岸和平協議》。若以前海協會會長汪道涵的語言來說,「胡六點」的思想可以說也是一種:「現在進行式的一個中國」。

胡六點的最後一點是:結束敵對狀態,簽定和平協議。自二○○八年以來,「結束(兩岸)敵對狀態」差堪作到,但「簽定(兩岸)和平協議」則功虧一簣。原因有二:一、馬政府瞻顧猶豫的風格與未盡人意的治理政績,皆不足支持兩岸關係更進一步;二、胡政權徒有前述理智貫通的思想體系,但在操作層面未見大開大闔,例如「布胡熱線」的「一中各表」僅見英文版,又如已經論及「雙方現行規定」卻諱稱「憲法」,再如研議「國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係」卻不直指這種「特殊情況下的政治關係」,即中華民國與中華人民共和國之間的「特殊政治關係」,至於說「雖然尚未統一,仍是一個中國」,卻何以不直說這個「現在進行式的一個中國」,即是「大屋頂中國」?

胡六點都想到了,但都做不到。至今年三月「吳胡會」,雙方的論述已經走到「以現行規定(一中憲法)為準則」的地步,而民進黨內亦有「憲法共識」的主張;在在顯示,兩岸若能共同支撐起「在大屋頂中國下的一中各表」,即可能建構起「特殊情況下的政治關係」,就可能簽定軍事安全互信機制或兩岸和平協議,也就可能出現「現在進行式的一個中國」。胡六點難道不是這樣想的嗎?但何以做不到?

胡錦濤在卸任的最後一次政治報告中,竟將「胡六點」的重大發明留在書面報告上而未宣讀出來,難道繼任者也將使其徒留空言而成歷史遺憾?

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