Number Four Nuclear Power Plant: Fact vs. Fiction

Number Four Nuclear Power Plant: Fact vs. Fiction
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2013

Summary: The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) can neither advance nor retreat. This dilemma was caused by lingering concerns about the project erupting, suddenly and simultaneously. The government is belatedly attempting to address these concerns via a popular referendum. Should the project be continued or halted? The government is seeking to "share responsibility" for the eventual choice and consequences. But before the public can participate in a referendum, the dissemination of information must first be sufficiently transparent. The problems must first be identified and understood. Only then can the trade-offs be weighed. Only then can one seek solutions through a referendum.

Full Text below:

The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) can neither advance nor retreat. This dilemma was caused by lingering concerns about the project erupting, suddenly and simultaneously. The government is belatedly attempting to address these concerns via a popular referendum. Should the project be continued or halted? The government is seeking to "share responsibility" for the eventual choice and consequences. But before the public can participate in a referendum, the dissemination of information must first be sufficiently transparent. The problems must first be identified and understood. Only then can the trade-offs be weighed. Only then can one seek solutions through a referendum.

Plans for the 4NPP were first drawn up in 1980. The conditions for successful completion were quite favorable. The Number One, Two, and Three Nuclear Power Plants were all successes. The general contractor was reputable. Entering the era of the 4NPP ought to have been a simple matter. But the project was repeatedly stopped then restarted. Official construction finally began in 1999, after two decades of time was wasted. Taipower company personnel were already deceased. Reactor design the world over had come to a standstill due to the plant accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

Construction on the 4NPP began 15 years ago, Three aspects of the project, including civil engineering, machinery, and instrumentation and control hardware, are nearing completion. The civil engineering aspect is not a major problem. During the Chen regime, construction was stopped then restarted. Steel reinforcing bars were exposed to the elements for half a year, creating concerns about bonding strength when concrete work was resumed. Eventually remedies were found and the problem overcome. But other aspects of the project, such as the termination of the lease with the general contractor, and the departure of engineering consultants, had a real impact. The large tolerances and rough appearance are cast doubt on the quality control, but were entirely predictable.

The most controversial problems have been with the instrumentation and control systems. Japanese compenies Toshiba and Hitachi were responsible for the reactor and steam turbine. Their experience with nuclear power plant equipment was limited. Nevertheless they met internationally recognized standards. Any problems with them should be minor. But in 2000 the Chen regime stopped construction on the project without any justification. The contractors for the reactor and other components were caught off balance. In an attempt to make sure they got paid, they resorted to all sorts of tactics that may have undermined the quality of the plant's construction.

Today, doubts about the quality of the instrumentation persist. The 4NPP has over 100 component groups. The instrumentation required for eventual power plant operation requires at least 40,000 connection points. The need for complex coordination between subcontractors vastly increases the risk of mistakes. Untangling responsibility for the 4NPP construction mess is now impossible. But the awarding of contracts to subcontractors before the design of the 4NPP was complete, was indeed a major cause of these aftereffects.

Consider the travails of the 4NPP that led to the loss of public trust. The main concerns are listed below. They must be clarified before the referendum is held.

One. Construction began in 2000. Taipower turned the 3NPP over to commercial operators 15 years earlier, in 1985. It completed construction on the 3NPP over 20 years ago. Those who worked on the project scattered long gone. The same is true for the nuclear power generation field the world over. The US company General Electric has not built a nuclear power plant in 20 years. The subcontracts were awarded to "newbie" Japanese companies Toshiba and Hitachi.

Two. To establish an independent nuclear technology, a turnkey operation was instead subcontracted out. As a result, the safety of the plant design became our own responsibility. One mistake was especially egregious. The 4NPP design was similar to Japan's Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant. But instead of using its design as a starting point and taking advantage of past experience, the decision was made to "be creative," and re-design every last interface, and subcontract every last component group. This resulted in today's interface issues and security concerns.

Three. The Chen regime resumed construction of the 4NPP in 1996. But it was clueless about manpower or financial resource allocation. The Chen regime responded to the construction of the 4NPP based on its anti-nuclear attitudes. It withheld both manpower and funds from the project. Under such circumstances, even though the certification papers appear to be in order, the project itself might not be.

Four. The subcontractors were made responsible for their own quality control. They were in effect grading their own test papers. This guaranteed that the quality control would be questionable. In particular, the Atomic Energy Council and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the agencies in charge, had limited manpower. They did what they could, but their ability was limited.

Five. The students graded their own test papers. Changing the rules of the game led to all manner of transgressions. The documentation may have been perfect. But the reality was anything but. This was true in particular for the instrumentation. The passage of time meant that once new designs were now old. Construction stops and restarts, along with hurried specifications, added to the problem.

Six. Basic data was lacking. The 4NPP is susceptible to submarine volcanoes and the Manila Subduction Zone. But it has yet to incorporate such updated information. In particular, new evidence reveals that the 4NPP is located near geological faults and submarine volcanoes. The only data referred to in the plans are more than 20 years old. Another problem concerns the seismic design. Is it adequate? Before the plant begins operation, field data must first undergo analysis. Only the latest data can be considered valid. Only then can one be sure that the seismic design data from years ago is correct. This is of great importance, and something that Taipower has neglected in the past.

The credibility of the ill-fated 4NPP is now extremely low. But nuclear safety is a problem for technical experts. It must not be treated as a political football. No matter what, doubts about the project must be sorted out. Only then can it be the subject of a public referendum.

全面釐清核四疑慮的虛實真偽
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.03.04 03:22 am

核四走到今天進退維谷的情境，是因所有的疑慮同時爆發所致：如今欲以公投方式解決，無論停續，皆是在求「共同承擔」其抉擇後果。然而，民眾參與公投，須有充分且透明的資訊，找出問題、瞭解問題，始能判斷取捨，也才有可能透過公投找到答案。

民國六十九年起始的核四計畫，原本有相當有利的成功條件，包括核一、二、三的成功上路，素質不錯的自主建廠人才，原本應可大步跨入核四年代；但數度計畫終止、回復，停停續續，到民國八十八年正式開工，二十年的時光蹉跎，不但台電的建廠人才漸已凋零，全球核電界的反應爐設計也因三哩島、車諾比事故而呈停頓狀態。

核四建廠起步迄今十五年，三大部門土木、機器、儀控的硬體都接近完工；土木的問題不大，扁政權初期的停工、復工，致使鋼筋紮筋裸露半年而與後續混凝土工程的握裹疑慮本待確認，後經補救，問題已克服。但其他部件諸如大包商解約，工程顧問公司走人，確實影響雖如今已粗具規格及水準的外觀，遭質疑乃是必然。

設備的部分，較被討論的是儀控系統。反應器及汽輪機的日商東芝、日立，雖然跨入核電設備製造資歷有限，但仍有國際認證的一定水準，問題應不大；但在二○○○年扁政府未有任何應對下的宣布停建，讓後續包括反應器等承製組件的包商亂了手腳，為了趕緊拿到工程款，花樣之多難以概述，亦恐影響工程品質。

儀控是至今讓人難以放心之處。核四大約有一百餘個組件，最終整合電廠運作的儀控部門，則至少有四萬個節點需要接到線、對到頭，皆因複雜的轉包分包而致頭緒萬端。如今追究整個核四發包過程的錯亂已無意義，但核四當年未完成全廠設計前分別發包，確實是個至今遺留後遺症的重大原因。

回顧核四廠至今的一路顛簸，失去國人信任，大致尚有以下幾點顧慮，皆須在公投前加以釐清：一、八十九年開工時，台電距七十四年核三第二機組完工商轉已十五年、距核三建廠施工則已二十餘年，相關人才多已散離。全球核電界也然，承包的美國奇異已二十年無核電廠承做實績，轉包給日本的東芝、日立廠，也是新手上路。

二、為了建立自主的核電技術，捨起初的統包改採分包，因而電廠的安全設計也必須改以自主創意；尤其錯誤的是，未以與核四同型且有實際施工經驗的日本柏崎刈羽的設計圖為基礎，卻逕自以自主創意重行設計每一個偶合機制，且各個組件分別發包，造成如今的介面問題及安全上的顧慮。

三、扁政府在民國八十五年回復核四工程，但對核四的人力、財源一直沒有章法。扁政府實質上是以反核的態度因應核四建廠，讓核四工程在「要人沒人、要錢沒錢」的狀況下進行；雖然檢測文件如常，但事實恐不盡然。

四、分包後續的品管是包商自主管理，這是「球員兼裁判」之不當，呈現的考評不確實也是必然存在，尤其原能會、經濟部的督導單位人力有限，雖仍窮盡努力，然也功能受限。

五、因為球員兼裁判，更改競賽規則的犯大忌行為也屢屢出現，以致文書呈現雖完美，但現實卻不足以保證。尤其後續儀控部門，因為時光流逝，新設計變成老設備，加以停工、復工及倉儲未按規格走，問題更多。

六、基本資料不足。核四所在的海底火山、馬尼拉隱沒帶的影響，迄今未具被更新過的基本資料，尤其對核四地質斷層、海底火山的新事證，至今仍只有二十餘年前的建廠資料。另核電廠的耐震設計正確與否，必須以運轉前的震波實地測量數據來檢視，只有最新的測量數據驗證，才知道多年前的建廠耐震應對的設計數據是否正確，這卻是台電以往最不重視的一塊。

核四的命運多舛，致使其公信力極薄弱。然而，核安畢竟是一個專業問題，不能用繪聲繪影的政治手法來面對。但是，無論如何皆必須釐清這些疑慮的真偽虛實，始能作為公民投票的基礎。