Premier Chiang: Assume Responsibility to Advance Policy

Premier Chiang: Assume Responsibility to Advance Policy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 1, 2013

Summary: The cabinet reshuffle has impacted seven officials. It qualifies as a medium scale reshuffle. The focus has been on the Defense Minister and FSC Chairman. The reshuffling has been heated, but the response lukewarm. The reason is not hard to see. First, the reshuffle was largely a passive reaction, not an act of initiative. Secondly, problematic cabinet leaders may have been replaced. But expectations aside, the crux of the problem -- long-standing defects and wide-ranging difficulties, make reforms daunting. They have yet to be tested.

Full text below:

The cabinet reshuffle has impacted seven officials. It qualifies as a medium scale reshuffle. The focus has been on the Defense Minister and FSC Chairman. The reshuffling has been heated, but the response lukewarm. The reason is not hard to see. First, the reshuffle was largely a passive reaction, not an act of initiative. Secondly, problematic cabinet leaders may have been replaced. But expectations aside, the crux of the problem -- long-standing defects and wide-ranging difficulties, make reforms daunting. They have yet to be tested.

The personnel changes have stopped the bleeding, soothed discontent, and limited the damage. Therefore there is little incentive to make a larger breakthrough or assume greater responsibility. As a result, the entire cabinet is merely reacting to developments and pandering to public sentiment. It is trapped within a mental prison of its own making. The government's ruling principle is to avoid provoking public discontent. It is no longer to discern whether grievances are large or small, warranted or unwarranted. It is even less able to distinguish between government responsibility and government authority, and the burdens leaders must bear. The government has an even bigger blind spot. When true discontent spills over, the government often fails to perceive the problem. It fails to address the problem. It procrastinates until the problem explodes in its face, and gets totally out of control.

This is currently the Ma Chiang regime's biggest blind spot. Many of the government's policies and achievements are positive and far-reaching. They include the improvement of cross-Strait relations, ECFA, and TISA. But the government has failed to highlight them and win recognition for them. It has failed to promote them, communicate them, and the public on them. The governments has found it difficult to trumpet its cabinet leaders' initiative and accomplishments. Its accomplishments have been underplayed. Its failures have been overplayed. The entire cabinet is lifeless. Its approval ratings are low.

But let us be fair. Compare this to authoritarian era imperiousness. Their orders had to be carried out, or else. In today's democratic society, even populist cabinet chiefs find the going harder and harder. No wonder people joke about how "officials can barely get by." Cabinet recruitment is increasingly difficult. This anomaly is a vicious circle. The entire government, specifically President Ma, is overly cautious and indecisive. He has steadily diminished the authority of the head of state. The wind blows, and the grass bends. His appointment of the premier and cabinet ministers have shown excess deference to populist sentiment. He panders to public opinion. Avoiding mistakes outweighs making breakthroughs.

Another anomaly is the willful conduct of "independent authorities." They have transgressed executive leadership team norms. They have raised public concern over quid pro quo media deals. Parties to trades must make declarations, undergo review, and conduct business in accordance with the law. The NCC must approve or reject them in accordance with the law. Yet the NCC stonewalled, motivated by political considerations or indifference to illegal conduct. The interests of law-abiding citizens were harmed. The President and the Executive Yuan ignored these shenanigans. The administration was essentially a runaway train. Another example was FSC anti-corruption measures, intended to ensure the separation of media and money. In principle local shareholders were favored over Mainland capital. In practice select businesses and consortia were favored over all others. Internet firms were concerned about third-party payments. The financial industry was concerned about Free Trade Zone Pilot Programs and favorable liberalization policies. These were repeatedly obstructed. The prime culprit was a trusted President Ma lieutenant. How can this not lead to public resentment and an official backlash? This was a major blow to President Ma's leadership and prestige, and to the cabinet's morale.

The Taiwan Region of the Republic of China has held democratic presidential elections for the past 17 years. After Lee Teng-hui was elected, Premier Vincent Siew served for four years. This was considered a long premiership. Under Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, the average term for premiers was between one year two months, and one year four months. It differs little from Japan, with its rampant turmoil. As we can see, "short-lived cabinets" have become the norm. Breaking this pattern will not be easy. But the power of the legislature is growing. The Legislative Yuan must demonstrate greater finesse when dealing with party politics and party to government operations. Only then can cabinet policy be more robust. This is definitely worth the effort.

Over the past two sessions, the legislature has tackled many problems. They include U.S. beef imports, gasoline price hikes and electricity rate hikes, and the capital gains tax. The administration and the ruling party have not always been on the same page. Never mind the Party Chairman. The Party Secretary-General appears to have no role. Nor do the policy committees and working committees. When the three broadcasting industry laws were amended, the policy committees, the legislative caucuses, and the party whip each went their own way. They parroted the DPP version of the bill, passing it with whirlwind speed. When deliberating major bills, they sought credit for reform, but were simultaneously fearful of the political backlash. Ma's position was often ambiguous and unclear. The presidential office, the executive, and the party were forced to play guessing games. As a result, chaos reigned as they each went their own way. Cabinet policy has been totally disrupted. The Ma government has been blasted for incompetence.

Chiang Yi-hua has been blamed for a long list of problems. They include the Hung Chung-chiu case, The Ta Pu demolition and relocation case, TISA, rabies, and the Referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. He has been blamed, justly or unjustly. His approval numbers are low. But he is knowledgeable about political science. He has convictions. He has a solld performance record in the cabinet. Many still have high hopes for him. They hope his cabinet members will do well. They wonder why as soon as he was made premier, things went wrong. The most important thing is that President Ma allows cabinet ministers to do their jobs. The entire cabinet must feel a sense of responsibility. They must change passivity into activity. They must ensure party-administration coordination. They must reform the government. Only then can they rise above today's "soy vat culture," in which officials seek to avoid blame instead of reaching goals.
   
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2013.08.01
社論－評析內閣改組 系列3 期勉江內閣─首長有擔當 政策能主動
本報訊

    　此次內閣改組人數達七位之多，屬中度規模，焦點主要在於國防部長與金管會主委；而任何人都看得出來，雖然改組新聞熱度不低，但是各界反應卻普遍冷淡。原因倒也不難想見，其一，這次改組是被動因應大於主動布局；其二，發生問題的部會首長雖然換人做看看，但期待之外，真正的癥結、積弊與挑戰，困難重重，改革艱鉅，猶待檢驗。

    　正因為人事的更替布局，完全只在於止血、弭怨，設下停損點，所以心態上就很難有太大的突破與擔當；也因此整個內閣始終只能追著形勢發展與民眾好惡跑，陷入一種畏首畏尾，過關為上、自我設限的困境。導致政府的施政以不引發「民怨」為最高原則，卻往往分不清民怨的性質、大小、是非，更不論政府的責任與權力何在，首長的擔當何為！而更大的盲點則是，當真正的民怨在醞釀時，政府又常常未能洞見，輕忽以對、因循苟且，直至全面引爆，不可收拾！

    　這也是馬江體制當前最大的盲點，儘管政府的體質與不少政策的本質與績效（如兩岸關係的改善、ECFA與服貿協議的簽訂）極其正面深遠，但施政的重點卻無法有效凸顯，贏得認同；推動、溝通與說服力也抓不住民意的節奏，首長的擔當與作為又難以主動展現。如此優點頻遭壓抑，缺點老被誇大，整個內閣當然死氣沉沉，民調疲軟，怎個悶字了得！

    　平心而論，比起過去威權時代所謂「當官的」威風凜凜、令出必行，如今民主社會，甚至是民粹當道的內閣首長，的確是越來越難做了，這也難怪在台灣有所謂「官不聊生」之嘆，以致內閣求才越來越是困難。但這種亂象或怪象，其實也是一種惡性循環，因為從整個政府的最高領導人馬總統，因為謹小慎微、不夠恢弘果斷的政治性格，自己已經把元首的權位不斷做小；風行草偃之下，他與閣揆任用的內閣各部會首長，當然也就常會親民寬容過了頭，看今上眼色辦事，競相討好民意、不要出錯重於開創突破。

    　還有一種怪象則是所謂「獨立機關」的特立獨行，且超乎行政團隊的領導規範。以之前引發社會關注的幾宗媒體交易案為例，交易當事者依法進行申報、查核與交易，NCC自然也該依法進行審查准駁；但NCC卻可因政治考量而違法不作為，硬拖到底，任令守法民眾權益受損，總統與行政院也完全置之不理，形同默認政府團隊脫軌失控！又如金管會在防弊上之媒金分離、參股陸銀，厚此薄彼，獨惠特定企業財團；在興利上對網路業者關心的第三方支付、金融業者關切的自由經濟示範區等有利開放政策，一再阻撓，而其主事者又被視為馬總統的愛將，如此豈能不激起真正的民怨與官場的反彈，對馬總統領導威信與內閣整體觀感紀律，更是一大傷害！

    　台灣從民選總統後的十七年，除了李登輝選後四年用了一任四年的行政院長蕭萬長，尚稱長命之外，從陳水扁到馬英九，歷任行政院長任期平均不過一年兩個月到一年四個月，比諸日本政局之動盪，所差無幾，可見「短命內閣」在政治生態上已漸成常態。要突破此一魔咒，牽涉複雜，但國會聲勢增長、立法院內從政黨政治到黨政運作，應該更為細緻，才能使內閣施政更為穩健，絕對是必須深下工夫的課題。

    　過去兩個會期來，從開放美牛進口、油電雙漲到開徵證所稅等重大政策，執政黨黨政步調總是無法齊一，黨主席就甭提了，既看不到黨祕書長的角色，也看不見政策會和各工作會的功能；甚至一場廣電三法的修法，從政策會到國會大小黨團黨鞭，各行其是，竟然演出呼應民進黨版的飆速修法鬧劇。其間各重大法案，既想收改革之名，又怕反彈力道太大，更因馬態度曖昧不明，出現府院黨國會分別揣摩上意，各自暴走的亂象，不僅完全打亂內閣施政節奏，也間接坐實馬政府無能的罵名。

    　江宜樺現在遭到洪仲丘案、大埔拆遷案、服貿協議案、狂犬病、核四公投案等等不管有理無理的衝擊或牽連，雖然民調數據不佳，但以他的政治學專業、理念個性以及過去在內閣中的表現，仍有不少人對他寄予厚望，也惋惜他閣員幹得出色，為何一當閣揆便不濟。最要緊的是，馬總統要真正放手讓閣員施為，整個內閣必須具有責任的認同與擔當，化被動為主動，重建黨政協調平台，重整施政的節奏，才能跳脫如今官場不求有功、但求無過的醬缸文化！