Monday, August 26, 2013

Taipei-Washington Arms Sales: Disarmament Will Not Win Over the Public on Taiwan

Taipei-Washington Arms Sales: Disarmament Will Not Win Over the Public on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 24, 2013


Summary: Beijing is promoting the "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Cross-Strait relations are gradually entering deep water. The ultimate solution for cross-Strait relations cannot be to force Taipei to disarm. One can force people to relinquish their guns, but not their hearts. Do so, and the Taiwan Strait tragedy will make "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" impossible. Therefore instead of urging Washington to halt arms sales to Taipei, why not win people over by means of democracy and civilization?

Full text below:

When Mainland Chinese Defence Minister Chang Wanquan visited the US, he made a proposal to U.S. Defense Secretary Charles Hagel. If Washington would halt arms sales to Taipei, Beijing would consider changing its military deployment. Chang Wanquan proposed also setting up a "special task force" to facilitate communications and resolve obstacles.

According to Beijing, Hagel said the establishment of a working group was a good idea. But Pentagon officials deny that he made any such statement.

So-called "changing its military deployment" refers mainly to missiles pointed at Taiwan. In fact "withdrawing missiles in exchange for halting arms sales" is not a new idea. Jiang Zemin made just such a proposal to President Bush, but Bush did not respond. In June this year, Xi Jinping mentioned this to Obama, but Obama also failed to respond. This however, was the first time Beijing ever proposed setting up a "special task force" to address the matter of arms sales. That caught everyones' attention.

Let us summarize the situation. One. Chang Wanquan confirmed that the Mainland has in fact deployed missiles against Taiwan. At times Beijing has claimed its missiles were not aimed at Taiwan, that they were purely defensive deployments. Other times Beijing has claimed that they were not directed at the public on Taiwan, but at Taiwan independence. Two. Chang Wanquan said Beijing is willing to change its military deployment provided it receives concessions from Washington. This contradicts what Beijing said about military sovereignty and independence in the past. Three. Talk of establishing a "special task force" with Washington could be interpreted as Beijing acquiescing to Washington's intervention in the cross-Strait military situation.

Therefore, if Washington and Beijing actually establish a "special task force," Beijing could use it to pressure Washington into halting arms sales to Taipei. But Washington could use it to demand "co-management" of the cross-Strait military situation. Therefore, if the two sides actually do establish a "special task force," it could be more than merely a "Yes you will halt arms sales" vs. "No I won't" debating forum. It could become a platform for bilateral discussions on the big picture. When that happens, the direction the "Task Force" takes may be difficult to predict. Washington says it is unaware of the "special task force" proposal. Its behavior suggests that any such "special task force" would not be able to discuss sovereignty issues.

Actually, Beijing's perception of Washington's arms sales to Taipei as a major issue is misguided, at least from the perspective of cross-Strait relations. One. The Taipei Washinton arms sales relationship is non-aggressive. If one advocates the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the absence of conflict, it does not even having any defensive role. Taipei Washington arms sales are mainly political symbolism. They show that cross-Strait issues involve issues of human civilization and world peace. They necessarily involve the United States and the rest of the world. Two. Beijing continues to demand that Washington halt arms sales to Taipei. It is now is proposing a "special task force." This shows that Beijing understands the value of linking cross-Strait relations to international values as well as to American values and interests. Such links are rooted in democracy and civilization. They cannot be readily divorced from each other.

The way out for Taipei and Beijing is not military conflict. The obstacle in the way of reconciliation between Taipei and Beijing is not Washington's arms sales to Taipei. Taipei and Beijing must work together towards the universal values of democracy and civilization. They must establish good relations that are in the interest of both sides. If they can do this, one day even symbolic arms sales can be discontinued.

The 1981 "Yeh Nine Articles" and the 1983 "Deng Six Points" stated that even after reunification "Taiwan can still have its own military." Deng added a condition, "As long as it does not constitute a threat to the Mainland." As we can see, thirty years ago, Beijing already knew what a military meant for Taipei. It involves both Taipei's self-confidence and cross-Strait trust. But if Taipei can still have its own military after reunification, why can't it purchase arms before reunification? How can that build Taipei's self-confidence and cross-Strait trust? Washington is selling arms to Taipei in today's cross-Strait atmosphere. Under the current diplomatic truce Taipei has retained 23 allies. For the two sides, this has become an important symbol of good will. Beijing has yet to offer a better cross-Strait policy framework. Until it does, it is unnecessary to change this beneficial status quo.

The key to cross-Strait issues is surely not arms sales. Even many on Taiwan oppose arms purchases and advocate replacing the military with an SDF. We must find a peaceful solution that does not require resort to war. That solution must be consistent with the universal values of democracy and civilization. That is not something that military deployment can fulfill. Nor is it something that Washington's arms sales to Taipei can fulfill. Therefore changing military deployment in order to halt arms sales to Taipei is irrelevant. It is the wrong prescription for the ailment.

Beijing is promoting the "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Cross-Strait relations are gradually entering deep water. The ultimate solution for cross-Strait relations cannot be to force Taipei to disarm. One can force people to relinquish their guns, but not their hearts. Do so, and the Taiwan Strait tragedy will make "China Dream" and "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" impossible. Therefore instead of urging Washington to halt arms sales to Taipei, why not win people over by means of democracy and civilization?

台美軍售問題:繳械不能說服台灣人心
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.08.24 02:57 am

中國大陸國防部長常萬全訪美,向美國國防部長海格提議稱,美國倘停止對台軍售,北京可以考慮調整軍事部署。常萬全同時建議,雙方成立「專責工作小組」進行溝通,以化解障礙。

據中方轉述海格的回應說,「成立工作小組是好建議」;但美國五角大廈官員否認此說。

所謂「調整軍事部署」,主要是指撤廢指向台灣的飛彈部署而言。其實,「撤彈換停止軍售」不是一個新主意,江澤民曾當面對小布希提出此議,但布希未作回應;今年六月,習近平又當面向歐巴馬提出,歐巴馬亦無回應。不過,這是北京首次提出雙方就軍售問題成立「專責工作小組」,引起各方注意。

此一情勢可作的初步解讀是:一、常萬全的說法再度證實,大陸的相關(主要是飛彈)軍事部署確有針對台灣者。過去北京的解釋,有時稱不是針對台灣,而是全方位的國防部署;有時則稱不是針對台灣人民,而是針對台獨。二、常萬全的說法亦指出,北京願以調整軍事部署作為與美國之交換條件;此說已與北京過去所稱主權及軍事獨立自主之說出現矛盾。三、美中成立「專責工作小組」之說,在實質上也可能被視為北京承認美國有資格介入兩岸軍事情勢的表態。

因此,美中雙方若真的成立相關「專責工作小組」,在北京言,或許欲藉為促成美國停止對台軍售的壓力機制,但美國亦可能藉為美中「共同管理」兩岸軍事情勢的平台。所以,倘若雙方真的成立「專責工作小組」,恐怕不能以為只是互嗆「你停軍售」「我不停」的口角場域,反而也可能成為雙方議論兩岸整體情勢的角力平台。屆時,「專責工作小組」的運作方向將循著誰的想像進行,恐怕難說。何況,美國方面既否認知悉「專責工作小組」的提議,反而表示其主權行為不能落為談判題目。

其實,北京將美國停止軍售視為重大課題,就兩岸關係言,似乎選錯了題目。一、台美軍售關係,不具攻擊性;至若兩岸既然皆主張和平發展,不生戰爭,甚至也就無防禦性可言。既如此,台美軍售其實主要是一種政治象徵,顯示兩岸問題畢竟是一個牽涉人類文明與世界和平的問題,不能想像與美國或世界無關,如此而已。二、北京不斷與美國爭議停止對台軍售,如今又提議共設「專責工作小組」,在在顯示北京亦知兩岸關係確與國際的價值與利益連結,也與美國的價值與利益連結,而此種連結深植於民主及文明之中,不易勉強使之剝離。

因此可知,兩岸的出路,不在軍事解決;兩岸的障礙,亦不在美國對台軍售。兩岸若能共同努力在民主及文明的普世價值與利益下營造兩岸良好關係,軍售即可能終究有一天連象徵意義也不必強留了。

早在一九八一年的《葉九條》與一九八三年的《鄧六點》,皆稱統一後「台灣可以有自己的軍隊」(鄧小平加了一句,「只是不能構成對大陸的威脅」);可見,三十年前北京即知「軍隊」對台灣的意義,這牽涉到台灣的自信與兩岸的互信。但倘若「統一後」台灣可有軍隊,卻在「統一前」甚至不容對台軍售;則台灣的自信與兩岸的互信如何建立?其實,美國對台軍售在今日兩岸氛圍中,猶如台灣在外交休兵保住了二十三個邦交國,皆已成為兩岸善意與同理心的重要象徵,北京在未能提出更能表達善意及同理心的兩岸政策架構之前,其實不必改變此一有益亦有效的現狀。

因為,兩岸問題演化至今關鍵確實不在區區軍售,甚至在台灣也有反對軍購及主張將軍隊改為自衛隊者;而在於必須找到一個絕對不是訴諸戰爭的和平解決方案,且這個方案必須滿足民主與文明的普世價值與利益,那也就不可能靠「軍事部署」達成,亦不可能靠「美台軍售」達成。那麼,以「調整軍事部署交換停止美對台軍售」的提議,會不會顯得文不對題或藥不對症?

北京正在倡議「中國夢」及「中華民族的偉大復興」,而兩岸關係也逐漸進入深水區;兩岸關係的終極解決,不可能靠強逼台灣「繳械」而達成,因為槍砲可強繳,但人心不能強求。否則,台海若生悲劇,那將使「中國夢」與「中華民族的偉大復興」也變質變調。所以,與其催迫美國停止對台軍售,何如以民主及文明說服人心?

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