Ma Su Debate: On Stage and Off Stage Wrangling

Ma Su Debate: On Stage and Off Stage Wrangling
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 2, 2013

Summary: On the 15th of this month, President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang will hold a public debate on "TISA," or the "Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement." Compare the format to the format of the 2010 Two Yings ECFA Debate. TISA is a follow-up agreement to ECFA. It was signed in June of this year and now awaits approval by the legislature. Debating the issue now is unlikely to change the ruling and opposition parties' entrenched positions. But it is turning the debate into onstage and offstage wrangling.

Full text below:

On the 15th of this month, President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang will hold a public debate on "TISA," or the "Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement." Compare the format to the format of the 2010 Two Yings ECFA Debate. TISA is a follow-up agreement to ECFA. It was signed in June of this year and now awaits approval by the legislature. Debating the issue now is unlikely to change the ruling and opposition parties' entrenched positions. But it is turning the debate into onstage and offstage wrangling.

Consider its substance. TISA can be viewed from several angles.

One. Consider the nation's larger interests. TISA is a key component of ECFA's grand strategy "Today the Chinese mainland, tomorrow the world." It will help Taipei and its trading partners sign FTAs.  It will help Taipei become part of TPP, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement, and RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and other regional integration agreements. The DPP understands its relevance. That is why it eventually endorsed ECFA during the 2012 presidential election.

Two. Consider cross-Strait economic and trade interests. TISA is unequivocally a unilateral Mainland concession to Taiwan. The operative word is "unequivocal." The Mainland has granted Taiwan nearly the same treatment as WTO members. Also, in accordance with FTA principles, it has made Taiwan 80 commitments that go well beyond WTO mandates. By contrast, Taiwan has given the Mainland only half the concessions normally granted WTO members. Taiwan has made the Mainland commitment on only 64 items. More than a third of these were capital investment projects previously approved. These were explicitly termed "stopgaps" in the agreement. Another third fell below WTO standards. A final one-third exceeded WTO standards. But these were granted almost exclusively to Overseas Chinese in recent years. By international standards, TISA was enormously favorable to Taiwan. But the Ma administration dared not underscore this achievement. It was fearful the opposition DPP would cast doubt on the Mainland's motives. As a result, TISA has perversely been spun as detrimental to Taiwan. This is deeply ironic .

Three. Consider the issue of management. Service sector market opening is primarily about investments. In accordance with international practices, nations allow investments to be made on the basis of national security , market order, and other considerations. Foreign investment and the attendant transfer of personnel is permitted. TISA opening commitments are a sensitive issue for the Mainland. Even a handful of national security concerns may be subject to individual examination. The scale of investment and personnel access is controlled. As long as the government manages the opening, it remains quite safe. There is no call for concern.

TISA has turned into a major controversy. In fact, it is the demagoguing of a phony issue. Why is it a phony issue? Four reasons. Reason One. If TISA had been signed between Taipei and any other government, the agreement would have been uncontroversial. Reason Two. Beijing sees TISA as an unprecedented concession, and an economic transfusion for Taiwan. If the Democratic Progressive Party were in power, Beijing would probably halt or reduce its investments in Taiwan. The DPP is the party that ought to worry about how to persuade Beijing to change its mind. Reason Three. TISA has raised concerns about Mainland industries affecting land prices. Some media and and special interest groups have exaggerated the impact, but the truth has gradually emerged. Opponents then resortd to questioning the government's committment to market opening and how long the control mechanisms would last. Reason Four. Beijing has maximized its concessions to Taipei. It is almost impossible for the Green Camp to reopen negotiations. Doing so would do Taiwan more harm than good.

Ma and Su agreed to debate TISA. Alas, the debate is more about political considerations than about facts or truth. President Ma faces endless criticism of his administration. Public protests follow one after another. He faces endless ruling vs. opposition controversy and public protests. Agreeing to a ruling vs. opposition debate may help relieve such public pressure. Besides, the Ma administration's cross-strait policy is its shining achievement. The debate may improve communications with the public. It may give it a leg up in the legislature.

The DPP was not originally opposed to TISA. Chairman Su Tseng-chang is obviously using the debate to revive the opposition party's lost status. The DPP hoped its opposition to TISA would pay off big time. It adopted an extremely very tough stance in the legislature. Anti-TISA groups began agitating. They argued that the Ma Su debate was no substitute for "citizen participation." Su Tseng-chang feels pressured to win this debate, or else. If he loses, he will not merely lose points politically. He may even become the target of anti-TISA forces.

Therefore each side has its own political calculus. The Ma Su debate is unlikely to be a focused, rational debate that reveals the truth. It may well degenerate into a manipulative and antagonistic war of words, in which the sole intent is to win whatever the cost. The side that loses may dig in its heels, intensifying the confrontational atmosphere, and undermining the passage of TISA in the legislature.

We urge Ma and Su to set aside the matter of winning or losing, and their personal interests. Instead, they should investigate the facts and to solve the problems that emerge in the wake of TISA. That way maybe both Ma and Su can be winners.

馬蘇辯論：場內和場外的角力
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.09.02 03:50 am

馬英九總統和民進黨主席蘇貞昌本月十五日將就「兩岸服務貿易協議」公開辯論，規格比照二○一○年四月雙英ＥＣＦＡ辯論。服貿協議是ＥＣＦＡ後續協議之一，今年六月已完成簽署並進入立法院審理程序，現在進行辯論顯難改變朝野既定立場，反而成為辯論場內和場外的角力。

從實質面來看，兩岸服貿協議可以從幾個層次加以分析：

第一，在國家總體利益層次，服貿協議是執行ＥＣＦＡ「從中國大陸走向世界」大戰略的環節，有助台灣加速和貿易對手洽簽ＦＴＡ及參加ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋戰略夥伴協定）及ＲＣＥＰ（區域全面經濟夥伴關係）等區域整合。民進黨當然了解其關聯性，也是二○一二年總統大選為ＥＣＦＡ背書的重要原因之一。

第二，在兩岸經貿利益層次，服貿協議可以說是大陸對台灣的「絕對」讓利。這裡用「絕對」兩個字，是指大陸給予台灣近乎完整的世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）成員待遇，並依ＦＴＡ原則，另給予台灣八十項超越ＷＴＯ的開放承諾。但相對上，台灣給予大陸約僅其他ＷＴＯ成員待遇之半數，僅承諾開放六十四個項目；且其中超過三分之一是已開放陸資投資項目，寫入協議顯為「充數」。另近三分之一項目，則低於ＷＴＯ標準；還有近三分之一，雖高於ＷＴＯ標準項目，近年也幾乎完全開放僑外人投資。從國際談判角度看，服貿協議可說對台灣大大有利，但馬政府不敢突出此等成果，顯是擔憂在野黨會質疑大陸讓利動機；弄到現在，卻反被質疑服貿協議不利台灣，實在諷刺。

第三，在管理層次，服務市場開放主要是投資形式，依國際慣例，各國基於安全、市場秩序等理由，對外來投資及衍生的人員移動進行必要管理，乃理所當然。服貿協議對大陸開放承諾，皆非敏感項目；即使涉及到極少數國安顧慮，也可透過個案審查把關。對於投資規模及人員進出，也有足夠管控機制，只要政府落實管理，可以說是相當安全的開放，沒有擔憂的必要。

現兩岸服貿協議演變成社會重大爭議，其實是一個被操弄出來的「假議題」。稱之為「假議題」，原因有四：其一，如果服貿協議是台灣和其他國家間簽署的協議，各種爭議必定大幅降低；其二，北京視服貿協議是前所未有的讓利，也是為台灣經濟輸血；若換成是民進黨執政，北京很可能停止或減少對台投資，民進黨反而要憂慮如何說服北京改變心意；其三，服貿協議引發各行各業擔憂陸企大軍壓境，肇因於部分媒體及有心人士過度渲染、誇大其衝擊，在真實資訊漸次揭露後，反對者又轉而質疑政府未承諾開放的項目及各種管控機制還能維持多久；其四，在北京以最大限度對台讓利的情況下，綠營要求重開談判幾無可能，對台灣更是弊多利少。

馬蘇同意就兩岸服貿協議進行辯論，背後的政治考量顯多於對事實與真理的論辯。對馬總統而言，面對政府施政爭議不斷，社會抗爭事件此起彼落，同意朝野辯論，可適度紓解社會壓力。而且，兩岸政策是最有力的政績，服貿協議在立法院有非過不可的壓力，如果能透過辯論產生社會溝通的效果，對立院闖關自有臨門一腳的助力。

另一方面，民進黨最初並非反服貿協議主角，蘇貞昌主席顯然是想藉辯論重振近來日益失落的在野黨角色及發言地位。但民進黨受到反服貿團體的高度期待，在立法院採取極強硬立場；反服貿團體則放話：馬蘇辯論不能取代「公民參與」。因此，蘇貞昌在這場辯論有非贏不可的壓力，如果落居下風，不僅政治上大為失分，而且可能淪為反服貿勢力抨擊對象。

所以，在各有所圖下，馬蘇辯論很難是一場真理愈辯愈明，聚焦、理性的辯論，甚至可能淪為操弄對立、意圖技術上壓倒對方的唇槍舌劍。落居下風的一方，為扳回一城，在辯論場外立場會更強硬，從而可能激化對立氛圍，反不利服貿協議在立法院順利審查通過。

有鑑於此，我們仍要呼籲馬蘇皆放下辯論輸贏與個人利害，多為探討事實及解決服貿協議後續問題盡一分心力，如此，或許反而能成就馬蘇的雙贏。