East China Sea ADIZ: Did Beijing Overplay Its Hand, or Exploit an Opportunity?

East China Sea ADIZ: Did Beijing Overplay Its Hand, or Exploit an Opportunity?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 4, 2013

Summary: Beijing should critically evaluate its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Character determines policy. Deng Xiaoping advocated keeping a low profile. This arose out of his restrained character. Keeping a low profile is difficult for high flyers. Read the Analects of Confucius. Governing a nation is no different than cultivating one's own character. Confucius said, "The ancients were reluctant to boast,  because failure meant embarrassment."

Full text below:

Beijing declared an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. Did it overplay its hand? Or did it exploit an opportunity? We will have to wait and see.

On the morning of the 23rd of last month, Beijing's MInistry of Defense announced the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Aircraft entering and leaving are required to submit flight plans and to identify themselves. Beijing announced that "If aircraft fail to identify themselves or obey commands, [Mainland] China's armed forces will take emergency defensive measures." Rumors emerged that the Mainland Chinese Embassy in Japan was carrying out alien registration. Rumors also emerged that the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" had left port.

Washington immediately denounced the move as an  unnecessary provocation. It declared that it would not recognize it, would not provide notification, and would not respond. It then dispatched two B-52 bombers into the ADIZ for two hours. In response, it adopted a "three noes policy." Beijing did not demand that the B-52s identify themselves. Nor did it issue any orders. It merely said that it engaged in "timely identification" and exercised "effective control." Over the past few days, US and Japanese military aircraft have come and gone in the ADIZ. They have all adopted a "three noes policy." Beijing has responded saying merely that it engaged in "timely identification."

Beijing's swift change in posture was either a case of tough on the outside, weak on the inside, or a return to reason. On the one hand, it reiterated that the Air Defense Identification Zone was not airspace. Still less was it a no-fly zone. It was merely a "warning zone." Aircraft entering and exiting the ADIZ are not about to be shot down. According to this reading, Mainland China's armed forces are not obligated to use force. On the other hand, it explained that the Liaoning set sail and passed through the Taiwan Strait along Taiwan's west coast. It did not sail past the east coast of Taiwan, the waters of the Diaoyutai Islands, and the "first island chain." Its purpose was to refute the slanderous "China threat theory."

Beijing's changes in posture had people wondering. If it is so flexible, why the original theatrics? Actually Beijing normalized sea and air patrols around the Diaoyutai Islands last September. Doing so ensured that the status of the Diaoyutai Islands would remain "disputed." One might say it was a successful strategy. But the sudden announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone was perhaps excessive. Overnight Beijing was forced back on the defensive. One cannot help wondering. Did Beijing overplay its hand?

Beijing announced its ADIZ just when the situation in the East China Sea was most tense. What was its intention? Was it to establish a warning system to minimize misunderstandings? That would have been a positive development. But Beijing used incendiary language, imposed alien registration, and that its aircraft carrier had left port. It turned the event into a show of force. This gave Washington an opportunity to lash back, leaving Beijing in an embarrassing situation.

Or one might say that what Washington opposed was Beijing's attitude, and not Beijing's Air Defense Identification Zone. Six days after the incident, the U.S. State Department announced that civilian US aircraft should identify themselves when entering and exiting the East China Sea region, and that they should provide Beijing with identification. The State Department also said this did not constitute acceptance of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. The State Department probably meant that U.S. military aircraft in the region may still adhere to the "three noes policy." In fact, this is standard practice for Air Defense Identification Zones the world over. Civilian aircraft must identify themselves. But military aircraft that do not enter the airspace of other nations need not provide identification. If Washington distinguishes between military and civilian aircraft in the East China Sea ADIZ, then it has essentially reached an agreement with Beijing on its East China Sea ADIZ.

The situation is unpredictable, and could deteriorate. Washington's decision to distinguish between military and civilian aircraft in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is probably a wise move. The Japanese declared an Air Defense Identification Zone during the Cold War, in 1969. In 2002, it pushed the zone to within 130 nautical miles of Mainland China's coast. This established a warning system to minimize misjudgments. The situation in the East China Sea is dangerous. The international community should be pleased that Mainland China too has established a warning system to minimize misunderstandings in the East China Sea. The Japanese and Mainland Chinese ADIZs have considerable overlap. This underscores the need to strike a balance between the two sides' interests. Washington and other nations may object to Beijing's attitude when it established its ADIZ. But they have no call to forbid Beijing from establishing an ADIZ. Instead, they should encourage Beijing to adopt the correct terminology and attitudes when establishing an ADIZ.

Washington has apparently given Tokyo a slap in the face. Can Washington approve Tokyo's establishment of an ADIZ, but reject Beijing's establishment of an ADIZ? Washington knows that would not fly. Suppose Washington distinguishes between military and civilian aircraft? If Japan persists in going its own way, it will be reduced to "the sound of one hand clapping." Suppose the situation shifts toward this direction. Suppose Beijing's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone incident fades from memory. If its patrol zone and ADIZ are abruptly advanced toward the "first island chain," one might characterize Mainland China's move as opportunistic.

Beijing should critically evaluate its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Character determines policy. Deng Xiaoping advocated keeping a low profile. This arose out of his restrained character. Keeping a low profile is difficult for high flyers. Read the Analects of Confucius. Governing a nation is no different than cultivating one's own character. Confucius said, "The ancients were reluctant to boast,  because failure meant embarrassment."

東海劃界：畫蛇添足或得寸進尺
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.04 03:42 am

北京宣示「東海防空識別區」，究竟是畫蛇添足的敗筆？還是得寸進尺的高招？有待後續發展的檢驗。

上月二十三日晨，中國大陸國防部剛上班就公布東海防空識別區，要求往來航空器提交飛行計畫且回答識別詢問。並宣稱：「對不配合識別或拒不服從指令的航空器，中國武裝力量將採取防禦性緊急處置措施。」接著，傳出中國駐日使館進行僑民登記；又宣布航母「遼寧號」出航。

在第一時間，美國即指此為「不必要的煽動舉動」；並宣示「不承認／不通報／不回應」。接著，就派出兩架Ｂ五十二轟炸機進入識別區飛了二小時，對北京所訂「規則」採前述「三不政策」；而北京未對Ｂ五十二進行「識別詢問」，也並無任何「指令」，只稱已做到「及時識別」、「有效監控」。數日來，美日韓軍機進出識別區已如家常便飯，皆採「三不政策」，北京均以「及時識別」回應。

北京姿態的急轉直下，即非色厲內荏，至少是從魯莽回復了理智。例如：一方面再三解釋，「防空識別區不是領空，更不是禁航區」，而只是「預警地帶」，不可能對進入識別區的航空器擊落；以此解釋「中國武裝力量」何以沒有強制動作。另一方面又解釋，遼寧號出航，通過台灣西岸的台灣海峽，而未穿越台灣東岸的釣魚台海域及第一島鏈地帶，是要打破外界「中國威脅論」的誣衊。

北京姿態的前後變化，令人覺得，既然能屈能伸，當初何必大張旗鼓？其實，去年九月以來，北京在釣島海空域的「例行巡邏常態化」，已使釣島「爭議的現狀」得以維持，可謂是成功的戰略；然而，防空識別區一舉，卻似是過猶不及，一夕之間反而落為守勢，不禁令人質疑，這是不是畫蛇添足之舉？

其實，在東海情勢日緊之時，北京宣布識別區，若意在「設置預警／減低誤判」，未嘗沒有正面意義；但北京卻以充滿火藥味的文字及僑民登記、航空母艦出航等動作，將整個事件操作成一個耀武揚威的肌肉展示。這正好給美國抓住了反擊題材，導致了北京難堪的局面。

或許可說，美國反對的是北京的「態度」，而未必是北京設置「防空識別區」這個動作。事發六天後，美國務院宣布「美國民用飛機在進入東海識別區時，應向北京提供識別資訊」。不過，國務院也同時表示，「這並不代表接受中國東海防空識別區的各項要求」，這應是指美國軍機在識別區內仍可能採「三不政策」。其實，這也是舉世「防空識別區」的通例；民航機遵行識別動作，軍機若不繼續進入對方國之領空即不提供識別。倘若美國在東海識別區採此「軍民分流」的政策，則可視為北京的東海識別區對美國已經局部成立。

在情勢出現不測及更加惡化之前，美國改採「軍民分流」的防空識別區通則，應是明智之舉。因為，日本在一九六九年冷戰時期已宣示其防空識別區，二○○二年更將之推進至距中國海岸一三○公里處，這是為了「設置預警／減低誤判」；則在東海風雲險惡之際，國際社會其實也應當樂見中國亦相對宣布「設置預警／減低誤判」的東海識別區；而日本與中國防空識別區的大部分重疊，更顯示相對權益應當求取平衡的必要性。於是，美國及國際社會縱有正當理由來反對北京設置識別區的「態度」，卻沒有理由禁阻北京設置識別區之作為，反而應當協助北京以正確的語言及態度來面對識別區。

日本好像被美國甩了一巴掌。但若只准日本設識別區，卻不容中國設識別區，美國亦知這不可能成為公論。而只要美國改採「軍民分流」，日本如仍一意孤行，即是孤掌難鳴。倘若局勢朝此方向發展，則北京「東海防空識別區」的尷尬期即可望逐漸度過，並藉此將其巡弋及預警空域大幅推向第一島鏈，也許即可在未來東海情勢的戰略地位上有了得寸進尺的獲益。

然而，無論如何，北京在此次東海防空識別區上的操作手法，應是可「批評與自我批評」的。性格決定政策；鄧小平以來的「韜光養晦」，出自動心忍性的性格，這是性格飛揚者所不能及。若讀論語，即知治國與修身無異，子曰：「古者言之不出，恥躬之不逮也。」