Thursday, December 12, 2013

How Should Taipei Position Itself in East Asia?

How Should Taipei Position Itself in East Asia?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 13, 2013


Summary: The Washington-Beijing major balance of power has become imbalanced. The Tokyo-Seoul minor balance of power is also changing. As an East Asian government, Taipei cannot sit idly by. It must reassess the situation and respond. It matters not what message King Pu-tsung brought back from Washington. Taipei faces increasing pressure from both Beijing and Washington. Can Taipei establish a new East Asian security strategy? Can it find a new posture amidst unbalanced power relations in East Asia? These are the government's most urgent national security concerns.

Full text below:

King Pu-tsung, the Republic of China's Representative to the US, has quietly returned home. He is rumored to have conveyed Washington's concern about Taipei's stand on Beijing's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). He allegedly arranged for EPA Director Gina McCarthy to visit Taipei. Not surprisingly, the premature leaking of this highly symbolic visit displeased Washington and led to its cancellation.

East Asia is undergoing complex changes. Beijing's East China Sea ADIZ has affected the balance of power between Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei. Washington seeks Taipei's cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs leakk was unforgivable. Taipei constantly harps on its now old "East China Sea Peace Initiative." But its highest priority should be to decide exactly where it stands on the issue.

Seoul recently announced a further expansion of its own ADIZ, which now includes the southern tip of Jeju Island, Marlowe Island, and Red Island. It overlaps islands within Beijing's ADIZ. This is seen as the first countermove by an East Asian nation. South Korea is attempting to fine tune the strategic picture. In the past, Seoul avoided taking sides among Washington, Tokyo, and Moscow. It attempted to split the difference and maintain the delicate balance between Beijing and Washington. It attempted to maximize its own national interests. The current initiative from Seoul can be seen as an attempt at balanced East Asian diplomacy. It may have a domino effect for neighboring countries, and force them to take sides. This warrants concern.

In 2009, Washington announced that it was "returning to Asia." In East Asia, there is one major balance of power and three minor balances of power. All are linked, and all affect each other. The major balance of power is the "constructive strategic partnership" between the United States and Mainland China. It is Washington's attempt to "contain" Beijing while simultaneously engaging in coopetition. The three minor balances of power take place within the framework of Washington-Beijing coopetition. These are moves made by Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei within the Washington-Beijing framework. For example, the Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a "comprehensively strategic, mutually beneficial" toward Beijing. Park Geun-hye of Korea has adopted a strategic partnership with Beijing. The Ma administration in Taipei has adopted a balanced diplomacy policy that befriends Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo.

The major balance of power and three minor balances of power depends on three factors. One. The major balance of power depends on the maintenance of internal power. It depends on the ebb and flow of Beijing and Washington's military strength in East Asia. It depends on whether Beijing challenges Washington's core interests in East Asia, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. It depends on whether Beijing attempts to transform its brown water navy into a blue water navy. These will determine whether cooperation or competition will prevail between Washington and Beijing. Two. The minor balance of power depends on the tug of war between the weaker powers. Tokyo and Seoul are Washington's military allies. But the two have long clashed over the sovereignty of the Dokdo Islands, This has enabled Washington and Beijing to intervene. Three. The major balance of powers and the minor balances of power involve dynamic equilibrium and the internalization of conflicts. Beijing and Tokyo have clashed over the Diaoyutai Islands. But Washington still considers this a territorial dispute between China and Japan, one that will not change the status quo in East Asia.

But consider the major balance of power and the three minor balances of power. These were once in equilibrium. But Beijing's ADIZ changed the balance of power. Confrontation followed. One. Beijing's ADIZ enabled aircraft to take off and land from the Liaoning aircraft carrier in the East China Sea. It also enabled Beijing to break through the Western Pacific island chain, through the Miyako Strait. This changed the ebb and flow of Washington-Beijing military power in East Asia. Two. Beijing included islands claimed by Seoul within its ADIZ This pulled Seoul into the East China Sea dispute. This gave Tokyo and Seoul common cause to oppose Beijing. Washington may seize the opportunity to bridge the gap with Tokyo and Seoul. Three. The East China Sea ADIZ has expanded the Sino-Japanese dispute over sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands. It has turned it into an East China Sea regional conflict. It has externalized the conflict, and will gradually change the status quo in East Asia.

Consider the three minor balances of power. In September last year, the Noda Cabinet's Diaoyutai "nationalization" destroyed any "comprehensively strategic, mutually beneficial" relationship between Beijing and Tokyo. Bilateral conflict is intensifying. Tokyo has reverted to its unconditionally pro-Washington policy. It has begun actively courting Washington and Tokyo's East Asian neighbors, to counter Beijing. Seoul has expanded its East China Sea ADIZ. Beijing's ADIZ and Seoul's ADIZ now overlap. It has shattered Park Geun-hye aggressive attempt to strike a balance between Beijing and Washington. Cracks have appeared in the Beijing-Seoul "strategic partnership."

The Washington-Beijing major balance of power has become imbalanced. The Tokyo-Seoul minor balance of power is also changing. As an East Asian government, Taipei cannot sit idly by. It must reassess the situation and respond. It matters not what message King Pu-tsung brought back from Washington. Taipei faces increasing pressure from both Beijing and Washington. Can Taipei establish a new East Asian security strategy? Can it find a new posture amidst unbalanced power relations in East Asia? These are the government's most urgent national security concerns.

台灣如何在東亞權力大平衡尋求新定位
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.12.13 04:29 am

我駐美代表金溥聰悄悄返國,據稱是傳達美方對我國在東海防空識別區立場之關切,並安排美國環保署長吉娜麥卡錫訪台。詎料,此一極具象徵意義的部長訪問,竟因消息提前曝光引起美方不滿,而告取消。

東亞情勢正處於微妙的變動中,中國大陸東海防空識別區的劃設,牽動了美、中、日、韓和我國在此區域的權力平衡。在此之際,美方亟欲爭取我方的合作,而我外交部門卻發生如此不可原諒的疏漏,令人扼腕。更重要的是,我方面對此一形勢,除了不斷重彈「東海和平倡議」的老調,究竟應如何找到自己新的定位,是當務之急。

日前韓國政府宣布進一步擴大其防空識別區,範圍涵括了濟州島南端的馬羅島及紅島,同時也劃入與中共防空識別區重疊的離於島。此舉,被視為東亞國家開出反制的第一槍,也是韓國對區域形勢「小平衡」採取了微調。過去,韓國政府在美中日俄環伺中不輕易選邊,而以左右逢源戰術,在美中之間維持微妙的平衡關係,以爭取國家利益的最大化。這次韓國政府的舉措,不僅可視為東亞平衡外交的傾頹,也可能引發周邊國家選邊站的骨牌效應,值得注意。

自二○○九年美國宣布重返亞洲之後,東亞基本存在著一個「大平衡」與三個「小平衡」,彼此相互連動,也相互制衡。所謂「大平衡」,是指美中之間的「建設性戰略合作夥伴關係」,美國對中國大陸採取既圍堵、又合作的競爭性夥伴關係。而三個「小平衡」,是指在美中競合的框架下,日本、韓國及台灣在美中之間各自所採取的平衡政策;例如,日本民主黨時期所採取的中日「全面性戰略互惠關係」政策,韓國朴槿惠的「建立中韓戰略夥伴關係」,以及台灣馬政府上台後所採取的「親美、和中、友日」的平衡外交政策。

在這「一大三小」的權力平衡架構下,靠著三項因素維繫彼此間的均衡關係。第一,「大平衡」內部權力的維持,繫乎美中在東亞地區軍事實力的消長,只要中國大陸不挑戰美國在東亞的核心利益──南海與東海,不從近海朝向遠洋軍事大國推進,美中之間的合作關係自然大於競爭。第二,「小平衡」內部均衡的維持,繫乎各國之間的相互角力。日韓都是美國的軍事同盟國,但是兩國長期以來卻因為歷史問題及獨島爭議而不睦,這有利於美中兩大國的政治力介入。第三,「大平衡」與「小平衡」之間動態均衡的維持,是繫乎衝突的內化;中日關係雖因釣魚台而齟齬,但對美國而言,這仍是中日兩國間的領土爭議,不致改變東亞權力現狀。

然而,這個「大平衡」與三個「小平衡」間原有的均衡關係,卻因中共劃定防識區而出現變化,從權力平衡逐漸朝相互對抗發展。首先,中共劃定東海防識區,主要是便於遼寧號航空母艦在東海的飛機起降,同時透過前進宮古海峽突破西太平洋第一島鏈;這改變了美中在東亞地區的勢力消長。其次,中共將中韓間爭議的離於島也劃入防識區範圍,不啻將韓國捲入東海爭議;這使日韓找到共同抗中的連接點,而美國則可趁機彌補美日韓三邊軍事關係的缺口。最後,東海防識區的劃定,將中日釣魚台主權爭議擴大為東海區域衝突,衝突的外部化將逐漸改變東亞的權力現狀。

事實上,在三個「小平衡」中,中日「全面性戰略互惠關係」,在去年九月野田內閣將釣魚台國有化後,即已告瓦解;在雙邊衝突激化下,日本又重新回到過去對美一面倒的政策,開始積極拉攏美國及東亞鄰國,以對抗中國大陸。而韓國這次擴大東海防識區的舉動,讓中韓兩國的防識區出現了重疊,這也打破朴槿惠上台後積極推動的對中和對美的平衡外交,中韓「戰略夥伴關係」似已出現裂痕。

當美中「大平衡」已逐漸失衡,而日韓「小平衡」也開始出現變化,身為東亞利害關係國的我國當然不可能置身事外,亦不可能不對情勢作出新的評估及因應。不論金溥聰返國帶回什麼樣的訊息,我國面臨來自中共和美國兩邊的壓力也會與日俱增;如何建構新的東亞安全戰略,在失衡的東亞權力關係中找到自己的新定位,當是政府國安高層的當務之急。

No comments: