Su Tseng-change Does Not and Cannot Lead

Su Tseng-change Does Not and Cannot Lead
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
December 19, 2013

Summary: Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office twice blasted the Su Tseng-chang led Democratic Progressive Party. Once over the "constitutional governance consensus" issue, and once over the ADIZ issue. Beijing will of course not discontinue exchanges with the DPP. But under Su Tseng-chang's leadership, political dialogue between the two parties will remain difficult. The Chinese mainland conducts exchanges with the DPP. But it also refuses to hold talks. It continues to divide the DPP from within. As a result, the DPP has lost its voice on cross-Strait issues. Is this really what DPP insiders want to see?

Full text below:

The DPP Taipei Mayoral primaries underwent a major direction change. Ko Wen-je, who vigorously supports the "Opposition Alliance," has expressed willingness to join the DPP. He has not made a firm commitment yet. But his preference is now known. Ko Wen-je is a major player. He is now halfway into the DPP cage. The prospects for the Opposition Alliance suddenly look bleak. It is unlikely to be much of a threat to the KMT in the future.

The dispute over Ko Wen-je joining the party provides a clear example of Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership. For months, Su Tseng-chang refused to take a stand on the Opposition Alliance strategy, and what rights and obligations Ko Wen-je would have upon becoming a party member. He allowed pro-Su elements to attack Ko Wen-je, even as he remained ambiguous about the Taipei mayoral candidate issue. He turned the process into a farce. Voters became increasingly weary. Grassroots DPP supporters grew ever more anxious. The main reason was that Su Tseng-chang was a reluctant leader. He was unwilling to take on the burden of waging a campaign in Taipei City. His strategy remained unclear. The DPP candidate has yet to be named. It will probably be Ko Wen-je. But his chances for victory are gradually diminishing.

Su Tseng-chang was reluctant to run for Taipei Mayor even before his nomination. As a result, the DPP missed an opportunity to expand is support base. This of course also undermined DPP reform. But Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership involves an even bigger problem. The DPP's biggest weakness has to do with cross-Strait policy.

Since its defeat in 2012, the public on Taiwan knows full well that the DPP must change its cross-Strait policy.  It must win the trust of the public on Taiwan, of Beijing, and of Washington. Otherwise the chance of victory in 2016 will remain slim. This is why the China Affairs Committee has become the focus of attention within the party. Despite repeated urging, Su Tseng-chang rejected Frank Hsieh as committee chairman. Hsieh's cross-Strait policy thinking is flexible and pragmatic. The purpose of the committee is to clarify DPP party policy toward the Chinese mainland. Su Tseng-chang decided to "lead" this important platform himself. But by "lead" Su Tseng-tsang really meant "drag his feet." The Huashan Conference engaged in nothing more than armchair strategizing. It refused to open the doors to debate. It bore no resemblance to the China Policy Debate sponsored by Hsu Hsin-liang many years ago.

The Huashan Conference went on for some time. The DPP apparently concluded that a "constitutional governance consensus" would form the basis for exchanges with the Chinese mainland. This was the result of a compromise between Hsieh supporters and the New Tide faction. As it turned out, it was the result of Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership. It made Su Tseng-chang's failure of leadership on cross-Strait policy abundantly clear.

On the surface, the "constitutional governance consensus" differs from Frank Hsieh's "constitutional consensus" by only one word. In fact, the difference is enormous. The "constitutional consensus" refers to the two sides' "two constitutions." The ROC Constitution governs Taiwan. The PRC Constitution governs the Mainland. The two sides are equal. They are not subordinate to each other. But according to their constitutions they have a special relationship with each other. The constitutional consensus is not quite the same as the "one China Constitution." It is less clear about the two sides' sovereignty and connection to each other. But at least it moves in the direction of the "constitutional one China" concept. It also keeps its distance from the Taiwan independence party platform, and one nation on each side.

Now consider the meaning of "constitutional governance consensus." According to the DPP, it means the party must actively promote constitutionalism, implement national sovereignty, enhance awareness of the nation's constitution, and use Taiwan's constitutional consensus as the basis for cross-strait dialogue.

The "constitutional governance consensus" make no attempt whatsoever to deal with the 1992 consensus and one China framework that Beijing is most concerned about. It clings to the Taiwan independence path. Its "national sovereignty" and "constitutional consciousness" refers to a newly authored constitution and a newly founded Nation of Taiwan. The DPP's political rhetoric is merely old wine in new bottles. Obviously this is completely unacceptable to Beijing. Any sort of dialogue is unlikely.

Su Tseng-chang cannot lead when it comes to cross-Strait policy reform. He cannot lead on major political issues that involve in cross-Strait relations. The most obvious is the East China Sea ADIZ issue. No sooner had controversy erupted, than Su Tseng-chang denounced the Ma government for failing to attack, while simultaneously advocating an "alliance of democracies." He attempted to return to joint US-Japan Cold War containment of the Chinese mainland. Su Tseng-chang deliberately evaded the issues regarding "constitutional consensus." He ignored Beijing's line in the sand. On the East China Sea ADIZ and Diaoyutai Islands issues, he challenged the Mainland authorities on territorial sovereignty and national dignity, again ignoring Beijing's line in the sand.

These moves did Su Tseng-chang no good whatsoever. During his meeting with Raymond Burghardt he blasted the Ma administration for weakness on the ADIZ issue. But the AIT publicly affirmed the Ma government's response as "constructive." It said Taipei and Washington enjoyed a good working relationship. Basically it issued Su Tseng-tsang a resounding slap in the face. As one can imagine, if Su Tseng-chang continues demonstrating a failure of leadership on cross-Strait and international issues, the Democratic Progressive Party is unlikely to recapture the presidency. And even if it did recapture the presidency, it would continue to be regarded as a troublemaker, and bring even greater disaster to Taiwan.

Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office twice blasted the Su Tseng-chang led Democratic Progressive Party. Once over the "constitutional governance consensus" issue, and once over the ADIZ issue. Beijing will of course not discontinue exchanges with the DPP. But under Su Tseng-chang's leadership, political dialogue between the two parties will remain difficult. The Chinese mainland conducts exchanges with the DPP. But it also refuses to hold talks. It continues to divide the DPP from within. As a result, the DPP has lost its voice on cross-Strait issues. Is this really what DPP insiders want to see?
   
社論－蘇貞昌不領導 不能領導 不會領導
    2013-12-19 01:32
    中國時報
    【本報訊】

    　吵吵鬧鬧的民進黨台北市長初選，有了大轉彎，力倡「在野大聯盟」的柯文哲表露加入民進黨的意願，雖然話沒有說死，但方向大致確定，柯文哲這頭獅子，上半身被關入了民進黨的鐵籠子，「在野大聯盟」頓時黯淡無光，未來對國民黨還有多大威脅性，實在並不樂觀。

    　柯文哲入黨爭議，是蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學的一大案例。幾個月來，蘇貞昌一方面在柯文哲所提「在野大聯盟」戰略和「入黨後的權利義務」等問題上不清楚表態，同時放任親蘇派系攻擊柯文哲，一方面對於台北市長人選的問題又曖曖昧昧，搞得整齣提名大戲是歹戲拖棚，選民日見厭煩，民進黨基層萬分焦慮。核心原因就是蘇貞昌「不願領導」，不願扛起台北市選戰的重責，戰略不清，人選未定，如今雖是框住了柯文哲，但勝選的可能性也一點一滴的在流失之中。

    　蘇貞昌在台北市長提名問題上的「不願領導」，是錯失了民進黨擴大社會基盤的良機，當然也影響到民進黨的轉型，但蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學更大的問題、對民進黨更致命的傷害還是在兩岸政策上。

    　2012敗選以來，全社會都知道民進黨不在兩岸政策上改弦更張，並獲得台灣社會、北京方面以及美國的信賴，2016年大選的勝選機率還是無法樂觀。於是中國事務委員會的議題首先成為黨內焦點，在千呼萬喚之後，蘇貞昌排除在兩岸論述調整的準備上較為完整、思考靈活務實的謝長廷，決定自己主導該委員會，但蘇貞昌所謂的「主導」，就是讓這個宣稱是「整合黨內中國政策的重要平台」先是運作長期陷入停擺，而後的「華山會議」則竟是「坐而論劍」，沒有大開大闔的氣勢，也沒有大鳴大放的爭論，和許信良當年主導下的中國政策大辯論，其距離不可以道里計。

    　華山會議開了半天，據說結論上民進黨將以「憲政共識」作為與中國大陸交流的基礎，這是謝系與新潮流系較勁之後的妥協結果，原來，這還是蘇貞昌「不領導」哲學下的產物，而且充分顯示了蘇貞昌在兩岸政策轉型上的「不能領導」。

    　表面上，「憲政共識」與謝長廷力主的「憲法共識」只有一字之差，但是差別卻極其之大。「憲法共識」講的是兩岸「兩個憲法」，中華民國憲法治理台灣，中華人民共和國憲法治理大陸，兩岸對等，互不隸屬，但依憲法有特殊關係。憲法共識雖然不完全等同於「憲法一中」，在兩岸主權的連接與兩岸共屬一中的問題上比較模糊，但是至少是朝向「憲法一中」概念發展的論述方向，也看的出嘗試遠離台獨黨綱、一邊一國的善意。

    　至於「憲政共識」的內涵，就民進黨的解釋來看，講的是該黨「應積極推動憲政，落實國民主權的精神，提升國民的憲政意識，並以台灣的憲政共識做為兩岸對話基礎」。

    　坦白說，既完全沒有嘗試處理大陸最關心的九二共識、一中框架問題，更隱含著繼續堅持台獨路線的意涵，所謂的國民主權、憲政意識，在民進黨的政治語彙裡，還是接近於新憲法、新國家等舊論述舊思維的「新瓶舊酒」，自然完全為大陸方面所不能容忍，連對話的空間都難以存在。

    　蘇貞昌在兩岸政策調整上「不能領導」，更在許多涉及兩岸關係的重大政治議題上「不會領導」，最明顯的就是東海防空識別區的問題。在爭議爆發之後，蘇貞昌一面對馬政府進行不實攻擊，一面則是重提所謂「民主同盟」，企圖回到冷戰時代聯合美日圍堵中國的局面。如果說，蘇貞昌在「憲政共識」問題上是刻意迴避、無視大陸的紅線，那麼，在東海防空識別區和釣魚台問題上則完全是選擇在領土主權和民族尊嚴問題上挑戰大陸當局，跨越了大陸的紅線。

    　然而，蘇貞昌的作為完全沒有撈到任何好處，在他會見薄瑞光並痛批馬政府在防空識別區問題上軟弱之後，美國在台協會公開發表聲明，肯定馬政府在此議題上的回應具「建設性」，並表示台美之間擁有良好合作關係，結結實實打了蘇貞昌一個響亮的耳光。可以想見，蘇貞昌如果繼續在兩岸和國際問題上如此地「不會領導」，民進黨要嘛是執政無望，要嘛是執政後繼續被視為麻煩製造者，給台灣帶來更大的災難。

    　大陸國台辦在「憲政共識」和防空識別區議題上兩度嚴批蘇貞昌領導下的民進黨，大陸當局當然不會就此放棄和民進黨人士進行交流，但在蘇的領導之下，兩黨的政治對話之門已經難以打開。如此，大陸方面一手交流，一手拒談的結果，就是民進黨內繼續拉扯、裂變，就是民進黨越來越在兩岸問題上喪失話語權，這是民進黨內有識之士所樂見的嗎？