Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Three Strategies for the Nomination of the KMT Presidential Candidate

Three Strategies for the Nomination of the KMT Presidential Candidate
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 15, 2015


Executive Summary: The KMT has announced how it will nominate its presidential candidate. But whom will the party nominate? That remains a mystery. Based on polls, whomever the KMT runs will trail Tsai Ing-wen. This is one reason for the delay. The 2016 election will be a combined presidential and legislative election. The KMT must go for broke. Otherwise it may even lose its legislative majority. For the blue camp, the situation is dire. It has no room for optimism or foolhardiness.

Full Text Below:

The KMT has announced how it will nominate its presidential candidate. But whom will the party nominate? That remains a mystery. Based on polls, whomever the KMT runs will trail Tsai Ing-wen. This is one reason for the delay. The 2016 election will be a combined presidential and legislative election. The KMT must go for broke. Otherwise it may even lose its legislative majority. For the blue camp, the situation is dire. It has no room for optimism or foolhardiness.

Party morale is low. The only candidate who has openly declared her candidacy is Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Yuan Hung Hsiu-chu. Other potential candidates, including Eric Chu, Wang Jin-pyng, and Wu Den-yih, remain tight-lipped. A sense of crisis is brewing within the party, leading to all manner of trickery and calculation. Ruling party changes are the norm in a democracy. The KMT is currently the ruling party. Yet its defense of the regime and its continued rule are so feeble, comrades are demoralized and supporters are desolate.

Recall the past six presidential elections. KMT or pan blue candidates never lost at the starting line. Now however, the situation is critical and different from the past. To be fair, public support for the blue camp and green camp is roughly equal. In fact, the blue camp may even have an edge. As long as the blue camp nominates the right candidate, listens to the public, and works toward the same goal, an election upset is possible. The real danger is that party insiders may do each other in before the battle even begins. If that happens, all hope of victory is lost.

To win this election, the KMT's best strategy is to regroup pan blue supporters, and lure back former party members. creating an atmosphere of pan blue unity. This is especially true for the legislative elections. In several districts, pan blue cross-party integration is essential. Private sector professionals with clean images should also be added to their ranks. This will attract swing voters who prefer a third force. The blue camp should create a "dream team" that crosses traditional party lines. If it can do so, internally and externally, it can create a synergy that could lead to a whole new political scenario.

Pan blue integration is easier said than done. The how of integration is a problem. Establishing mutual trust between political parties and political groups is not easy. Most importantly, the "Big Blue" KMT must demonstrate magnanimity. Only then can it persuade the "Little Blue" People First Party and New Party to work together. This means that the KMT party leadership must be willing to see the big picture. It means someone must engage in tireless shuttle diplomacy. If politicians care only for their own sectarian interests, pan blue integration will be impossible.

If pan blue integration proves too difficult, the KMT's second best strategy would be to send in its heaviest hitter. Traditionally KMT nominations involve first allowing willing candidates to step forward, then holding party negotiations or a party primary. But if the KMT wants to nominate its heaviest hitter, the nomination process should be bottom-up. The candidate could be Eric Chu, Wang Jin-pyng, even Wu Den-yi, Hung Hsiu-chu, or Hong-Yuan Lee, as long as he or she has the right stuff. The party should conduct an island-wide or hybrid poll, allowing the public to decide who should step up to the plate. Once this process has produced a winner, the candidate should not hesitate. He or she should do battle on behalf of the KMT.

The key to this process is shattering prevailing stereotypes about the nomination process. The heavy hitter must see the party nomination as a call to duty, not just the acquisition of power. After all, the KMT government is already under siege. Anyone who makes other, purely selfish calculations, will only find himself going down with the party. Such people need to think again.

The worst strategy would be for the KMT to cling to its traditional "announce, register, negotiate, hold primary" process for presidential candidate nomination. If the KMT chooses to go down this road, it should skip the negotiation process. If two or more candidates have registered, a party primary should be held. One. This will eliminate negotiations that lead to sore losers. Two. The party primaries will help generate candidate and party political momentum.

The candidate chosen by the party primary process need not be the party's heaviest hitter. But he or she must be willing. He or she must have won public support. He or she must be the candidate with the most legitimacy. In retrospect, KMT presidential candidates have always been vetted by the party. They have either been "designated successors", or the product of negotiations. If a party primary can produce a candidate, it will establish a precedent for intraparty democracy.

If the KMT hopes to win the presidential election, the road ahead will be a long one. Meanwhile, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must fight for her "final mile". Campaigning is never easy. Past KMT defeats were almost always the result of internal divisions and blunders, rather than their opponent's actions. The same error, repeated, amounts to stupidity. Offer up your best candidate. Show that they know how to solve problems. Do this and the blue camp has a chance to make a comeback.

國民黨總統人選的上中下三策

2015-04-15聯合報

     

國民黨公布了總統候選人提名辦法,但黨內由誰出戰二○一六迄今仍無眉目。綜觀目前各項民調,國民黨無論由誰出馬,都與民進黨的蔡英文尚有一段差距,人選遲遲未定正是主要原因之一。由於二○一六是總統與立委併選,若不全力以赴,國民黨可能連國會多數黨的地位都要拱手讓人。對藍營而言,情勢之嚴峻,絲毫沒有樂觀或徼幸的餘地。



在黨內低迷的氣氛中,目前明確表態願意一戰的,只有立法院副院長洪秀柱;其餘可能的人選,如朱立倫、王金平、吳敦義,都表現得諱莫如深。如此一來,更加深了黨內的危機感,包括各種權謀、算計運作不斷。雖說政黨輪替是民主政治的常態,但國民黨身為執政黨,對於保衛政權、延續執政如此消極,不僅讓同志感到失望,也讓支持者無所適從。



回顧過去六次總統直選,國民黨或泛藍候選人的民調從未一開始就輸在起跑點上;可知,這次形勢之危殆異於已往。但平心而論,藍綠基本盤其實相差無幾,甚至泛藍要略勝一籌,只要藍軍提名「對的人」,又能集思廣益採取對的戰略,大家齊心一搏,未必沒有逆轉勝的可能。最怕的是,選戰還沒開打,黨內自己人就先明槍暗箭殺得死去活來;若走到那步田地,就不必再奢想勝算。



要打贏這場選戰,國民黨的「上策」,就是要設法重新整合「泛藍基本盤」,找回離家出走的黨員,營造泛藍大團結氣象。尤其在立委選舉方面,若干地區除了進行泛藍的跨黨整合,甚至可以結合一些形象清新的民間專業人士共同出征;如此,亦有利吸引可能投向第三勢力的中間選民。若能整合出一個跳脫傳統黨派思維的「夢幻組合」,對內對外都可發揮「一加一大於二」的效果,創造出不同局面。



「泛藍整合」說來容易,做來困難;整合機制如何產生是個問題,各政黨、政團間如何取得互信又是個問題。最重要的是,「大藍」國民黨必須展現大器和大義,才能說服「小藍」親民黨和新黨的攜手合作。這點,除了需要黨中央的宏觀思考,也需要有人不辭辛勞居間穿梭。否則,政治人物若各懷鬼胎營一己私利,泛藍整合將無可能。



若泛藍難以整合,國民黨的「中策」至少應該是派出「最強棒」應戰。傳統上,國民黨提名的思維是:可能人選先有「意願」,然後再用「協調」或「初選」方式產生候選人。但若要推出「最強棒」,提名程序應該「由下而上」,朱立倫也好,王金平也罷,甚至吳敦義、洪秀柱或李鴻源,只要是可戰之才,黨內就應採全民調或混合式民調,由人民決定誰代表出征。一旦在此機制勝出,此人選就應義無反顧,代表國民黨決戰。



這個機制的關鍵,首需打破現有提名機制的窠臼,其次是黨內的強棒們必須視代表黨參選為一種「義務」,而不只是權利。畢竟,國民黨已面臨政權保衛戰,若此時還想著其他後路或別的私念,最後只會與黨俱沉。這種人必須慎思!



如果國民黨決定仍以傳統的「表態、登記、協調、初選」程序來產生總統候選人,那麼「下策」就是跳過「協調」程序,只要有兩人以上登記參選,便進行初選。如此,一來可以杜絕協調可能產生的「不服氣」心理,二來也可藉由初選的過程拉抬候選人的和政黨的氣勢。



經由黨內初選程序選出的人選,未必就是「最強棒」;但既有主動代表國民黨參選的意願,又在競爭中獲得民意的支持,應就是黨內最具參選正當性之人。回顧過去,國民黨的總統候選人總是透過「指定接班人」或「協調」產生,此次若能經黨內初選產生,也算開創黨的民主典範。



國民黨要贏得總統大選,路途仍遙;反觀民進黨,蔡英文也仍在為她的「最後一哩」奮鬥。選舉從來不是容易的事,過去國民黨敗選,原因幾乎都出在自己內部分裂、犯錯,而不是對手做對了什麼。同樣的錯誤,若再重蹈,就是愚蠢。提出最好的人選,證明自己最有解決問題的能力,藍軍才有反敗為勝的機會。


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