Sunday, May 31, 2015

Tsai Ing-wen Cannot Evade Reality

Tsai Ing-wen Cannot Evade Reality
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2015


Executive Summary: The US and the Mainland are undergoing a clash of strategic interests in the South China Sea. This however will not affect overall Sino-US relations.  Tsai Ing-wen will not be able to take advantage of friction between the the United States and the Mainland. She must adopt a new definition of the cross-Strait status quo. She must respond also to concerns expressed by Lin Chong-pin.

Full Text Below:

When Tsai Ing-wen was Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council, Lin Chong-pin was her special deputy. On the eve of Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the US, Lin told Want Daily reporters that if her former boss became president, but refused to change her cross-Strait policy, she would face an "avalanche of severed diplomatic relations." Lin Chong-pin was in quiet retirement. He was not deliberately poor-mouthing his former boss. He was merely reminding Tsai Ing-wen that maintaining the status quo may win one applause. But one cannot just talk the talk. One must also walk the walk. Otherwise the situation is likely to spiral out of control. Lin Chong-pin's warning was not alarmism. But Tsai Ing-wen is not about to listen. She is convinced that if she becomes president, external circumstances will change to accommodate her.

The DPP may not be willing to listen to Lin Chong-pin's warning. But the public on Taiwan is aware of the problem. If Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy remains fuzzy, if she persists in covertly fanning the flames of Taiwan independence, Lin Chong-pin's avalanche may not be confined to severed diplomatic relations. Washington may go so far as to state explicitly, before the election, that it rejects her argument.

Consider the diplomatic repercussions. People may take current conveniences and benefits for granted. They may have forgotten just how hard-won these conveniences and benefits were. The ROC has few diplomatic ties. It must rely on diplomatic allies to gain international community attention and to defend its rights and dignity. But with Mainland China's rise, these nations are moving closer to Beijing. ROC diplomatic allies continue to defect.

During the DPP's eight years in power, it adopted "checkbook diplomacy". It used massive bribes to retain diplomatic allies. Yet the number of diplomatic allies shrank from 29 nations to 23 nations. These allies were lured away by the Mainland. The tide was stemmed and the bleeding stopped only when President Ma Ying-jeou took office. One nation, Gambia, was lost during Ma's seven years in office. The number of allies shrank from 23 nations to 22. But Gambia unilaterally severed diplomatic relations with us. The Mainland did not lure Gambia away.

When the ROC left the United Nations, many nations severed diplomatic relations. Why could Ma Ying-jeou stop the bleeding? The difference was that the DPP adopted the path of confrontation. It used large sums of money to battle the Mainland. Eight years of checkbook diplomacy and scorched earth diplomacy later, the ROC lured away three of the Mainland's diplomatic allies. The Mainland by contrast, lured away nine of Taiwan's diplomatic allies. The result was a major loss of diplomatic ties and national wealth. The transfer of funds was opaque. The result was the Papua New Guinea diplomatic brokerage scandal. Worse, controversy erupted over our corruption of other nations' governments. We alienated Australia and other geopolitically sensitive nations. This was a miserable lose/lose scenario.

By contrast, the KMT and the CCP reached an implicit diplomatic truce. They ended checkbook diplomacy, a policy that was both fiscally exorbitant and harmful to the national image. They eventually established a stable cross-Strait diplomatic truce, stabilized diplomatic allies, reduced their financial burdens, and preserved the image of the Chinese nation. The result was a win for both sides. The strategy was successful for one reason. The Kuomintang recognized that the main obstacle to Taiwan's participation in international activities was the Mainland. It chose to improve relations with the CCP, establish trust, and soften Mainland opposition. This opened the door to Taiwan's participation in the activities of the international community. The Democratic Progressive Party, by contrast, upon seeing the boulder blocking its way. , chose to butt heads with the boulder. The boulder did not break. But its own head did.

The effectiveness of the KMT strategy extended to other areas of diplomacy. When the DPP was in power, it desperately sought to gain entry to the World Health Assembly (WHA) and the ICAO. Eight years of struggle later, both doors remained tightly shut. As soon as Ma Ying-jeou took office however, we gained immediate entry. The Taiwan-Japan investment agreement, the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, the Taiwan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (ASTEP), and the Taiwan-New Zealand Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) all followed. When the DPP was in power, these were all considered "Mission Impossible". But as soon as the Kuomintang took office, they were all achieved in short order. The most emotionally moving was visa-free treatment for ROC citizens visiting other countries and regions. Eight years of DPP rule yielded nothing, added nothing. By contrast, once the KMT returned to power in 2008, the number of nations ROC citizens could visit increased from 54 nations to 142 nations. This included nations and regions such as the USA, Europe and others that people most hope to visit.

Cross-Strait peace makes international links possible. Clearly the KMT approach is effective. Tsai Ing-wen poo-poos Ma Ying-jeou's achievements. But when all is said and done, who achieved these foreign policy results? Tsai Ing-wen is currently running around in circles, offering absolutely nothing of substance. She brims over with hostility toward the Mainland. Never mind preserving Ma's diplomatic achievements. Can Tsai Ing-wen prevent an avalanche from inundating Ma Ying-jeou's foundation for diplomacy? Even that is in doubt.

Lin Chong-pin's warning of avalanches was confined to diplomatic ties. He did not touch upon the more worrisome economic avalanche. That is something sure to follow any deterioration in cross-Strait relations. That security avalanche is the most worrisome of all.

Tsai Ing-wen says she advocates maintaining the status quo. She says her cross-Strait policy is the same as that of the United States. But her declarations are riddled with deceit. Tsai Ing-wen visited Washington in September 2011. She gave a speech on "Challenges and Strategies for National Security over the Coming Decade" at the American Enterprise Institute. She defined the cross-Strait status quo in the following manner. She said "Taiwan is already an independent nation. The people of Taiwan are frustrated with discrimination by the international community. But it wants political separation from [Mainland] China." She said "The  ultimate goal is to ensure the rights of the people of Taiwan to make decisions regarding the future of Taiwan. Any change in the status quo must be made through democratic means. The Taiwan people must decide." Three days later the UK Financial Times expressed doubts about Tsai Ing-wen's ability to maintain stability in the Strait. This led to Tsai Ing-wen's defeat during the final mile of her election campaign.

The US and the Mainland are undergoing a clash of strategic interests in the South China Sea. This however will not affect overall Sino-US relations.  Tsai Ing-wen will not be able to take advantage of friction between the the United States and the Mainland. She must adopt a new definition of the cross-Strait status quo. She must respond also to concerns expressed by Lin Chong-pin.

蔡英文不能逃避的真相
20150601 中國時報

蔡英文訪美前夕,她擔任陸委會主委期間的特任副主委林中斌接受《旺報》專訪時對前長官發出警訊,認為她執政後如不調整兩岸政策說法,可能得面對「雪崩式斷交」。退居山林的林中斌並非故意唱衰前長官,而是提醒蔡英文,維持現狀固然討喜,但不能只是宣示,還必須有方法,否則情勢發展很可能失控。林中斌的警訊並非辟言,但蔡英文不會把警告聽進去,因為她深信勝券在握,外在環境會跟著改變。

不管民進黨聽不聽得進去林中斌的警告,台灣人民都不可以不知道,如果蔡英文對兩岸政策持續保持明裡模糊、暗裡煽火的態度,林中斌的「雪崩警告」,從外交面言,可能不只發生在斷交潮上,這場雪崩,更不只發生在「外交場域」;甚至,美國也可能在選前就明確表態,不接受她的說法。

我們先從外交面來評估可能的衝擊。人們對於既存的便利與好處,常會以理所當然的態度看待,忘了這些便利與好處得來是多麼不易。以邦交國來說,台灣國際處境困難,必須依靠邦交國代為發聲來爭取國際社會注意,並捍衛國家的權利與尊嚴,但隨著中國大陸崛起,各國向大陸靠攏,中華民國邦交國持續流失。

民進黨執政8年,即便採取「支票簿外交」,以大量金援留住邦交國,邦交國數仍從29國減為23國,這些流失的邦交國,全被大陸挖走。斷交潮直到馬英九總統上任才止血,7年間雖然丟了一個甘比亞,邦交國數從23國減為22國,但甘比亞是片面與我斷交,並非大陸挖走。

為什麼馬英九可以讓台灣從退出聯合國後即開始的斷交潮止血?和民進黨不同的是,民進黨採取的是對抗路徑,以巨額金錢為代價和大陸進行拉鋸式外交戰,8年銀彈烽火挖來了3個邦交國,卻被大陸挖走了9個。結果是邦交國大減、財政重度失血,在不透明金援手段掩蓋下,不但被外交掮客利用釀成巴紐建交醜聞案,更引起許多敗壞他國政風的爭議,因此讓澳洲等地緣利害關係國不滿。可謂處在多輸、慘輸局面。

國民黨則與中共達成外交休兵默契,終止勞民傷財又害形象的支票簿外交政策。終能穩定形成兩岸外交休兵、穩住邦交國、減輕財政負擔、保全國家形象的多贏局面。策略的成功處無它,國民黨承認中共是擋住台灣參與國際空間最大的石頭,選擇改善和中共的關係、建立雙方互信,柔化了這顆石頭,也就敲開了台灣參與國際社會的大門。民進黨則相反,看到巨石擋路,選擇用頭猛烈地撞擊巨石,不但沒把巨石撞開,還讓自己頭破血流。

這個策略的成效還延及其他外交層面。民進黨執政想方設法要參與的世界衛生大會(WHA與國際民航組織(ICAO),8年努力仍然大門緊密,馬英九上任就取得了門票;台日投資協議、台日漁業協議、台星經濟夥伴協定(ASTEP)、台紐經濟合作協定(ECA),民進黨執政時都被視為不可能的任務,均由國民黨達陣;而其中「最有感的」就是給台灣免簽的國家與地區,民進黨執政8年交出了鴨蛋,增加數為0,而2008年國民黨重新執政後,則從54國增加142國,還包括美國、歐洲等國人最常前往的國家與地區。

「兩岸和、國際通」的方法顯然有效。蔡英文對馬英九的政績不屑一顧,但到底要拿出什麼樣具體的外交政策牛肉?以蔡英文目前空心繞圈、甚至對大陸充滿敵意的兩岸態度,不要說超越馬英九的外交成績,要保住馬英九打下的外交基礎不「雪崩」,都成奢求。

而林中斌的「雪崩」警告,還僅及於邦交國層面,未觸及兩岸關係惡化後更讓人擔心的「經濟雪崩」,甚至「安全雪崩」,這才是最讓人憂心的地方。

蔡英文曾經說,她主張兩岸維持現狀與美國的政策相同,她這句話實有欺瞞之嫌。20119月蔡英文訪問華府時,在美國企業研究所發表「未來十年台灣的國家安全挑戰與戰略」演講時,曾經定義兩岸現狀:「台灣已是一個獨立的國家,雖然台灣人民因為國際社會的歧視感到挫折,但普遍仍渴望和中國維持政治上的分離。」「最終目標則是,希望能確保台灣人民享有決定台灣前途的權利,任何對現狀的改變,都必須透過民主方式由台灣人民來決定。」她的演講剛結束才3天,英國《金融時報》就對蔡英文能否維護台海穩定表達懷疑,最終造成蔡英文在選戰最後一哩路摔跤。

美中在南海發生戰略利益衝突,但不會影響美中關係大局,蔡英文不可能從美中摩擦火中取栗,她不但必須就兩岸現狀提出新定義,還必須回答林中斌的疑慮。

Thursday, May 28, 2015

Tsai Ing-wen Could Be More Dangerous Than Chen Shui-bian

Tsai Ing-wen Could Be More Dangerous Than Chen Shui-bian
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 29, 2015


Executive Summary: Former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will be a "female version of Ma Ying-jeou" for eight years. Some people think Tsai Ing-wen is "Ma Ying-jeou + Chen Shui-bian". Is Tsai Ing-wen a female version of Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian? The answer may depend on whom you ask. But questions such as this allow us to scrutinize Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy.

Full Text Below:

Former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will be a "female version of Ma Ying-jeou" for eight years. Some people think Tsai Ing-wen is "Ma Ying-jeou + Chen Shui-bian". Is Tsai Ing-wen a female version of Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian? The answer may depend on whom you ask. But questions such as this allow us to scrutinize Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy.

What is Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy? Mathematics has a relative coordinate system we can use to determine where Tsai Ing-wen stands compared to a control group. The best control group is Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian. Simply examine Ma, Tsai, and Chen's cross-Strait positions. Ma Ying-jeou talks the talk and walks the walk. Tsai Ing-wen neither talks the talk nor walks the walk. Chen Shui-bian talks one talk, but walks another walk. Chen Shui-bian says one thing, but does another.

Of the three, Ma Ying-jeou has been the most consistent. He has adhered to the 1992 consensus and "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force" from beginning to end. Ma Ying-jeou's position has been the least elastic, the most transparent, most stable, and most predictable. Cross-Strait and foreign relations involve high-level, three way Washington/Beijing/Taipei political interactions. The complexity can be imagined. Good faith is everything. Loss of credibility means loss of trust. It means difficulty in reaching a consensus and difficulty in establishing a constructive relationship. Ma Ying-jeou's position has been the least elastic and the most predictable. It has also resulted in the most cross-Strait and diplomatic achievements.

Chen Shui-bian was the polar opposite. When he took office in 2000, he solemnly proclaimed, "I will not declare independence. I will not change the name of the nation. I will not make the two states theory part of the constitution. I will not promote a referendum on reunification vs. independence that changes the status quo. I will not repeal the National Unification Guidelines and the "five noes" of the National Unification Council. But two years later, Chen did a complete about face and trumpeted "Taiwan and China, one nation on each side".  His rhetoric kept changing. His position was the most elastic, the least stable, and the least predictable. Washington and Taipei found it difficult to trust each other. So did Taipei and Beijing. Collisions became the norm. Eventually Washington and Bejing were forced to establish channels to manage the Taiwan situation, humiliating the nation.

So what about Tsai Ing-wen? In terms of flexibility and predictability, she falls somewhere between Ma and Chen. In terms of transparency, she ranks dead last. The greatest difference between her, Ma, and Chen, is her ability to ask others questions without providing any answers of her own. Tsai Ing-wen uses lots of question marks, very few periods, and ever fewer exclamation marks. She is good at questioning others, but poor at suggesting solutions of her own, particularly on cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen's "maintain the status quo" is abstract and ambiguous. Ma Ying-jeou has questioned both the "what" and the "how" of her policy. Julian Kuo, in "Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Challenges", notes the key to Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait posture. Regarding "what", Kuo cited polls. According to "Confronting Taiwan's Two Major Public Opinion Trends", over 85% of the public advocates "maintaining the status quo". Over 60% consider themselves "Taiwanese only". Both KMT and DPP candidates must of course face reality. That is why Tsai advocates maintaining the status quo.

This is the key to Tsai Ing-wen's "maintain the status quo". She hides her own preferences, then acts like a mirror, reflecting the reality of public opinion. She blasts Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. But when asked about her own cross-Strait policy proposals, she invokes a "Taiwan consensus". No one can object to it. But no one can understand it either. When she advocates "maintaining the status quo" most people approve. But this is mere talk. A recent Legislative Watch Foundation poll showed that 68.3% approved of Tsai's proposal to maintain the cross-Strait status quo. Only 18.4% did not. But this is deceitful. It is not that the public approves of Tsai's proposals. It is that the public approves of maintaining the status quo, no matter who advocates it.

Refusal to specify "what" inevitably makes it difficult to specify "how". Julian Kuo responded to Tsai's "how to maintain the status quo". He said 'So far Tsai Ing-wen has never offered any detailed "new cross-Strait formula" to replace the 1992 consensus.' Therefore Tsai Ing-wen is neither a female version of Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian. Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian's cross-Strait policies are highly personal in nature. One was clear and consistent in his advocacy. The other was clear but inconsistent in his advocacy.

Tsai Ing-wen has changed her position on "how". She went from denouncing ECFA as "sugar-coated poison" to "unconditional acceptance". Tsai Ing-wen can claim that her cross-Strait policy stance "has not changed" only because she has never made her stance clear to begin with.

Tsai Ing-wen refuses to clarify her cross-Strait policy stance. As an election strategy, this may make it difficult for opponents to land any hard blows on her. It may minimize her exposure to criticism. But her refusal to state her policy stance puts Taiwan in a quandary. It sets the two sides at odds with each other. Optimistically speaking, Tsai Ing-wen might not turn out like Chen Shui-bian. She might not destroy cross-strait trust. Pessimistically speaking, her totally opaque cross-Strait policy stance could be the biggest obstacle in the way of cross-Strait and Washington/Taipei trust.

Will Tsai Ing-wen really continue Ma Ying-jeou's constructive "talk the talk and walk the walk" cross-Strait policy? One cannot avoid skepticism. Let us hope she does not repeat Chen Shui-bian fickle betrayal of promises and scorched earth diplomacy. That much Tsai Ing-wen owes Taiwan. That is why voters must demand that Tsai Ing-wen make clear her cross-Strait policy.

蔡英文可能比陳水扁更危險
2015-5-29 中國時報

民進黨前主席施明德表示,如果選蔡英文,就是給「女版馬英九」8年時間,也有人認為,蔡英文是「馬英九+陳水扁」。蔡英文究竟是不是女版馬英九或陳水扁?答案或許見仁見智,但這些提問,倒是解析蔡英文兩岸政策的切入點。

如何定義蔡英文兩岸政策位置?數學上有一種「相對座標」的位置定位法可以參考,亦即找出與蔡英文比較的對應點,透過這個對應點,也就是對照組,來定義蔡英文的位置。最好的對照組就是馬英九與陳水扁。如果要簡單歸納馬、蔡、扁3人的兩岸態度。馬英九是「說到做到」;蔡英文是「不說不做」;陳水扁是「說一套做一套」。

3個人當中,一路堅持「九二共識」、「不統不獨不武」的馬英九,彈性最小,透明度、穩定度與可預測性最高。在兩岸與外交事務中,由於涉及美中台三邊高層政治互動,複雜程度可想而知,「無信不立」,「誠信」就成為一切的起點,失去信用就失去信任,就很難達致共識、建立建設性的關係。馬英九彈性小、可預測性高,也會帶來較大兩岸與外交成績。

陳水扁是極端的另一面,他在2000年上任時鄭重宣示:「不會宣布獨立,不會更改國號,不會推動兩國論入憲,不會推動改變現狀的統獨公投,也沒有廢除《國統綱領》與國統會的問題」的「四不一沒有」,2年後就變成「台灣中國,一邊一國」,以今我否定昨我,說法與做法不斷改變,彈性最大,穩定度與可預測性最低。因此,在他任內美台與兩岸難以建立信任,烽火衝撞成為常態,最後淪為「美中共管」台灣的局面,全民受辱。

蔡英文呢?彈性與可預測性可能居於馬扁之間,透明度確定是三者之末。她和馬扁最不同的地方在於她「善問而不答」,蔡式語法充滿問號,鮮有句號,更難找到驚嘆號。長於質疑他人,卻短於提出主張,在兩岸政策上尤其如此。

對這種抽象模糊性,馬英九從「內涵」與「方法」二層次,質疑蔡英文的「維持現狀」說。但郭正亮在〈蔡英文的兩岸論述挑戰〉一文中的點出了蔡式兩岸論述重點。在內涵論上,郭引用民調指出,「面對台灣兩大民意趨勢:『兩岸現狀指數』超過85%,『只是台灣人』比例超過60%,不管是國民黨或民進黨候選人,當然都要面對選舉現實。」因此蔡英文主張維持現狀。

這正是蔡英文在維持現狀的「內涵論」上的最大「特色」,她隱藏自己的特色,把自己當成一面鏡子,只現實投射民意現實。所以,對馬英九的兩岸政策她有諸多批判,但當被問及她的兩岸主張時,她強調「台灣共識」,這句話沒有人會反對,但也沒有人聽得懂;她講的「維持現狀」,多數人會贊成,但有說和沒說也沒差別。就像最近國會觀察基金會公布的民調,有68.3%民眾贊成蔡英文兩岸維持現狀主張,僅18.4%民眾不贊成。這與其說是民眾贊成蔡英文的主張,不如說是民眾贊成兩岸維持現狀,誰主張都一樣。

這種無特色的「內涵論」,必然導致「方法論」的難產。就如郭正亮對蔡英文「如何維持現狀」提出的看法:「直到今天,蔡英文還沒針對這個取代『九二共識』的『兩岸新公式』,拋出任何試探性的解答。」所以,蔡英文既不是女版馬英九,也不是女版陳水扁。馬英九和陳水扁的兩岸政策,都有很強烈的個人色彩,一個是一以貫之的主張明確,一個是主張明確但立場不斷跳動。

蔡英文除了技術性的立場調整,如對ECFA從「糖衣毒藥」調整為「概括承受」外,嚴格來說,蔡英文的兩岸立場並不跳動,但她的不跳動,不是因為她真的不跳動,而是因為她的主張不明確,人們無法準確定位她的立場,也就無法測量她有沒有移動。

我們必須提醒,在兩岸政策上「不說不做」的蔡英文,也許在選舉策略上,有如讓對手難於著力的武當棉拳,可以取得「打擊面縮小」、「打擊力減弱」的效果。但在治國上,「不說不做」卻會陷台灣於不利處境、置兩岸於對立風險。從樂觀論,蔡英文或許不會像陳水扁,讓兩岸互信全毀,但從悲觀言,她的兩岸主張透明度不足,將是兩岸與美台間建立互信的最大障礙。

要期待蔡英文延續馬英九在兩岸「說到做到」風格下的建設性成果,並不容易。但至少不要回到陳水扁「說變就變」的毀諾循環、烽火之路,這應是台灣社會對蔡英文最低程度的期待。因此,選民有權利要求蔡英文說清楚兩岸政策。

Seize One Belt, One Road Opportunities

Seize One Belt, One Road Opportunities
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 28, 2015


Executive Summary: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will be established by the end of the year. The Mainland's One Belt, One Road is taking a giant leap forward. Taiwan longs to profit from the Mainland's One Belt, One Road business opportunities. We must respond to the new cross-Strait situation. We must seize the opportunity. Taiwan enjoys a number of industrial advantages. We must propose a viable cross-Strait co-production strategy. Otherwise, with the rise of the Mainland red supply chain, Taiwan risks marginalization.

Full Text Below:

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will be established by the end of the year. The Mainland's One Belt, One Road is taking a giant leap forward. Taiwan longs to profit from the Mainland's One Belt, One Road business opportunities. We must respond to the new cross-Strait situation. We must seize the opportunity. Taiwan enjoys a number of industrial advantages. We must propose a viable cross-Strait co-production strategy. Otherwise, with the rise of the Mainland red supply chain, Taiwan risks marginalization.

The Mainland's One Belt, One Road vision establishes interoperability between the Asian, European, and African continents, and their adjacent oceans. It will use railroad and highway infrastructure projects to link the nations' development strategies, explore the potential of regional markets, promote investment and consumption, and create demand and employment. Put plainly, its purpose is to increase regional cooperation.

The One Belt, One Road runs all the way through Asia, Europe and Africa. The One Road, the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century, is active in the East Asia economic circle, and is highly relevant to Taiwan's geopolitical situation. Meanwhile, the One Belt, the Silk Road economic zone, or developed European economic zone, is Taiwan's major foreign trade market.

Consider the data. The One Belt, One Road encompasses 4.4 billion people and $21 trillion USD. It accounts for nearly 30% of the global economy, an estimated investment of $1.6 trillion USD, and trade approaching $2.5 trillion USD. Any of these numbers loom large in world economic development.

Think tanks on Taiwan are worried. Taiwan must participate in the construction of the One Road, One Belt. It must work with the Mainland to further regional cooperation between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Taiwan has already been plunged into economic crisis. It is on the verge of marginalization and exclusion, especially since the One Belt, One Road will promote Mainland China's global production chain.

In recent years, the Mainland has nutured an independent industry and the rise of the red supply chain. Taiwan's model of re-exporting components to the Mainland for further processing has come under pressure. Recent ROC Customs export data and Ministry of Economic Affairs export orders data show exports to the Mainland falling. This April in particular, showed the largest decline in exports to the Mainland in nearly six years.

The Mainland's One Belt, One Road strategy must not further marginalize or exclude Taiwan. The One Belt, One Road accounts for nearly 30 percent of the global economy. It is the largest regional integration plan of the 21st century. Taiwan must not remain passive or sit on the sidelines. If it does, Taiwan's economic lifeline will be seriously threatened. It may never recover.

This scenario is a nightmare that could well come to pass. One. Cross-Strait relations have entered a critical stage. If the leader elected in 2016 opposes the 1992 consensus and supports Taiwan independence, the basis for peace will evaporate. Political trust, Taiwan's membership in the AIIB, RCEP, TPP and other regional economic organizations may be threatened. During the recent Hsia Zhang meeting, Taiwan's request to join the AIIB was not promptly approved, This reveals the Mainland's wariness toward Taiwan.

Two. Cross-Strait industrial cooperation fails to take into account the One Belt, One Road strategy. Taiwan screams that it wants to profit from the business opportunities provided by the Mainland's One Belt, One Road strategy. But is Taiwan industry prepared?

We all know that the Mainland supply chain has risen. Industrial development on the Mainland has gradually caught up to Taiwan. The Mainland's high-speed rail, nuclear power, and other infrastructure projects have made it highly competitive. Taiwan wants to profit from the Mainland's One Belt, One Road project. But Taiwan cannot join the AIIB. Infrastructure projects require considerable capital. This is not among Taiwan's strengths.

There is only one hope. The One Belt, One Road promotes economic development, regional consumption, and investment in the nations along its path. Taiwan is adept at trade. It might find a foothold there. But such opportunities are long term. They are unlikely to show returns that will help Taiwan's economy in the short term. If Taiwan wants to benefit from the One Belt, One Road, it must understand the Mainland's One Belt, One Road strategy. It must allow Taiwan's industrial advantages to enjoy a synergistic effect. It must seize the initiative. This is especially important in the absence of stable cross-Strait relations. We must regain the initiative. That is even more important. We cannot merely scream about profiting from the economic opportunities provided by the One Belt, One Road. We must offer a strategic blueprint for industrial cooperation. We must be clear on what we want. Passively waiting for the Mainland to make concessions is wishful thinking.

Mainland industries are large in scale. But in certain respects, they lack Taiwan's finesse. They also lack experience in marketization. By contrast, up to 98% of Taiwan's industries are small and medium enterprises. Many of them are stealthy "small is beautiful" champions in their own fields. They include companies such as TXC in the Taoyuan Pingtan Industrial Zone, which manufactures quartz components. Apple, Samsung, Huawei, and other non-Apple mobile phone manufacturers all use their parts. Of the 700 million smart phones the world over, one in five uses TXC's quartz components.

Taiwan has many stealth champions like this, enough to play an important role in the Mainland's One Belt, One Road strategy. It can punch beyond its weight. But it must work as a group, combining the advantages of Taiwan's various industries, then negotiate with Mainland.

The old model for cross-Strait industrial cooperation . involved the government setting up a platform on which companies would then fight for business opportunities on their own. That is no longer viable. Instead, they must work as a team. Former Vice President Vincent Siew said that to profit from the Mainland's One Belt, One Road business opportunities, all walks of life, big and small, must form groups. Only then will they have a strong enough team to seize these opportunities.

抱團主動發掘一帶一路商機
2015-5-28 旺報(中時集團)

亞投行年底即將成立,大陸力推的「一帶一路」正大步邁進,台灣亟盼參與大陸「一帶一路」商機,必須要因應兩岸新情勢、新局勢,積極主動出擊,針對台灣產業優勢,提出具戰略的兩岸產合模式,否則,隨著大陸紅色供應鏈崛起,台灣將陷入邊陲化危機。

大陸提出一帶一路願景,是致力於亞歐非大陸及附近海洋的互聯互通建設,透過鐵公路等互聯互通基礎建設項目的推動,與沿線各國發展戰略對接,發掘區域內市場的潛力,促進投資和消費,創造需求和就業,說白一點就是更深層次的區域合作。

一帶一路貫穿亞歐非大陸,「一路」(21世紀海上絲綢之路),是活躍的東亞經濟圈,與台灣地緣關係密切;「一帶」(絲綢之路經濟帶)則是發達的歐洲經濟圈,是台灣主要外貿市場。

再就數據來看,「一帶一路」沿線涵蓋的人口約44億人,經濟規模達21兆美元,占全球經濟比重近30%,總投資規模估達1.6兆美元,貿易總額高達2.5兆美元;前述的任何一個數字都在世界經濟發展的版圖中,占有非常大的比重。

有不少台灣智庫擔心,如果台灣不能參與「一帶一路」建設,隨著大陸這項貫穿歐亞非大陸的更深層次區域合作成型,已陷入經濟邊陲化危機的台灣,將更無立錐之地,特別是「一帶一路」也將促進中國產業的全球鏈結。

近幾年大陸扶植自主產業,紅色供應鏈崛起,已讓台灣原仗著靠中間零組件銷往大陸再加工出口的模式,面臨壓力。最近台灣海關公布的外貿出口數據及經濟部發布的外銷訂單統計,都出現對大陸出口及接單成長力道減弱的趨勢,特別是今年4月對大陸出口表現及接單成長均出現近6年來的最大衰退,都是警訊。

台灣如果在大陸傾全力推動的「一帶一路」重要戰略下再被排擠或缺席,可以想見這個經濟規模占全球經濟比重近30%、堪稱21世紀最大區域整合,台灣如果被動,或是做壁上觀,台灣經濟命脈,將嚴重受創,在可以預見的未來恐永無翻身之地。

而這種情形,不是不會發生,而是惡夢即可能成真。首先,兩岸關係已進入關鍵節點,如果2016年台灣選出領導人對陸方提出的「九二共識、反台獨」和平基礎上無法正面回應,給予政治互信,則台灣在加入亞投行、乃至參與RCEP或TPP等區域經濟組織,都可能面臨變數。這次夏張會台灣堅定表達參與亞投行未獲立即回應,即可看出大陸對台讓利的審慎。

其次,兩岸產業合作,缺乏因應一帶一路需求的大戰略布局。迄今,台灣喊著要參與大陸一帶一路商機,但要問的是,台灣產業做好準備了嗎?

大家都清楚,大陸在地供應鏈崛起,大陸產業發展水平已逐漸追上台灣,大陸高鐵、核電等基建也具備走出去的競爭格局,台灣想要分食大陸一帶一路商機,但在台灣還無法參與亞投行下,基建工程涉及許多融資,這並不是台灣的強項。

唯一可以期待的是一帶一路發掘沿線國家發展,帶動區域消費及促進投資後,「貿易互通」或許是外貿導向的台灣可以著力的地方,但這樣商機,要假以多時,短期內很難爆發,帶動台灣經濟。台灣想要分食一帶一路商機,必須要針對大陸一帶一路規畫,構思台灣產業優勢能發揮加乘效果部分,主動出擊。特別是未來在缺乏穩定的兩岸關係加持下,化被動為主動,更顯重要,否則口口聲聲說要分食一帶一路商機,但卻又沒有產業合作的大戰略藍圖,或說不出個所以然,想分食商機,被動等待對岸釋善意,恐只是望穿秋水。

大陸產業規模雖然很大,但在許多細緻技術工藝上,沒有台灣精緻,更無市場化的經驗,反觀台灣高達98%中小型企業,不乏是在某些專業領域「小而美」的隱型冠軍。像位於桃園平潭工業區的台灣晶技,製造的石英元件,不管蘋果或是三星、華為等非蘋手機大廠,都使用他的零件,全球7億支智慧手機,每五支就有一支使用台灣晶技的石英元件。

台灣類似這樣的隱型冠軍企業相當多,足擔當在大陸「一帶一路」重要戰略中,發揮「小兵立大功」之效。問題是,需要打群體戰,結合台灣各領域產業優勢,整個去和大陸談判。

兩岸產業合作不能再依循過去政府只搭平台,由企業單打獨鬥談合作的模式,而是必須以團隊的方式,就如同前副總統蕭萬長所強調,要搶食大陸「一帶一路」龐大商機,台灣各界應以大帶小、成群結隊,才能建構堅強團隊來掌握這個商機。

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

Constitutional Amendments Must Not Be Rooted in Short-Term Partisan Interests

Constitutional Amendments Must Not Be Rooted in Short-Term Partisan Interests
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2015


Executive Summary: The Legislative Yuan is once again debating constitutional amendments. The ruling and opposition parties are close to agreement on one issue -- lowering the voting age from 20 to 18. The KMT also wants an absentee voting system written into the constitution, but has met with DPP opposition. The KMT has proposed a constitutional amendment to restore the legislature's power of consent on prime ministerial appointments. The DPP also opposes this.

Full Text Below:

The Legislative Yuan is once again debating constitutional amendments. The ruling and opposition parties are close to agreement on one issue -- lowering the voting age from 20 to 18. The KMT also wants an absentee voting system written into the constitution, but has met with DPP opposition. The KMT has proposed a constitutional amendment to restore the legislature's power of consent on prime ministerial appointments. The DPP also opposes this.

DPP chairperson and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen said the purpose of constitutional amendments is to solve problems, not fulfill the political needs of any one political party. She said that political parties must not attempt to hijack the constitutional amendments by means of package deals. Tsai advocated current stage amendments, saying the most important task is increasing political participation. She said the current constitutional amendment proposal lowering the voting age from 20 to 18, allows more people to participate. Lowering the threshold for non-constituency legislators increases public representation in the legislature. Lowering the threshold for constitutional amendments enhances the people's right to amend the constitution. She said the proposed amendments highlight the fact that the people are the heart of democracy. Increased political participation will make Taiwan's democracy more robust and sound.

Chairperson Tsai's words sound pretty. Constitutional amendments do require comprehensive, rational consideration. In any democracy, constitutional amendments are national events. They require wide-ranging public discussion to arrive at the greatest social consensus. They must not benefit only one party or faction. They must not involve quid pro quo deals between special interests. Chairperson Tsai has rightly accused the KMT of improper political quid pro quo exchanges. But her harsh criticisms suggest another possibility. Are they the beginning of a constitutional debate? Or are they merely one political party's election season political calculations?

Constitutional amendments require social consensus. The amendments must not benefit one particular party or faction. We need more political persuasion, and fewer political accusations. Political parties invariably villify each other the most harshly during major elections for maximum political advantage. Constitutional debate requires a high degree of political consensus for good results. Anyone with even a modicum of political sense knows that debating constitutional amendments during election season is futile. It is likely nothing will come of it. Nevertheless political parties and politicians on Taiwan invariably demand constitutional amendments during election season.

Constitutional debate seldom involves sincerity and mutual concessions. The slightest disagreement usually degenerates into political recriminations. Once such recriminations are made public, constitutional amendments inevitably become more difficult to pass. Political parties insist on debating constitutional issues during election season. Their motive is seldom getting the amendment passed. It is usually to bolster their election campaign and get a leg up on their opponent. When political parties openly clash on constitutional issues, are they really engaged in the constitutional amendment process? Or are they merely out to paint their opponent as inferior specimens of democracy?

Lowering the voting age is said to increase political participation. If that is good, then why oppose absentee voting, which also increases political participation? The two parties have taken stands on constitutional issues. Which did so out of anything but political calculation? They accuse their opponents of insincerity. But isn't that the pot calling the kettle black? 

Is lowering the voting age to 18 really a social consensus, or merely a unilateral proposal by a particular political party or political faction? Polls have already shown that opponents outnumber proponents. Taiwan has many polling organizations. Perhaps they should conduct polls on this issue to see if it has a high degree of public support.

Constitutional amendments are national events. Legislative Yuan constitutional amendments require comprehensive thought, not the random application of patches. On Taiwan, 20-year-olds are considered adults. Adult citizens have the right to vote. The reasoning is clear. If the voting age is lowered to 18, shouldn't the civil law age for majority be amended as well? Can the legislature completely ignore this problem and not discuss it? An 18-year-old is a minor. According to civil law he is limited in his capacity. To sign a contract he requires legal representation. Yet he is now going to vote? Does this not call for some explanation?

Are these issues unrelated? If they are, why not lower the voting age to 17, 16, or even 15? Does the legislature intend to amend the constitution first then the civil law? If so, shouldn't this be debated? Shouldn't reasons be given for doing so? Should the age of majority be lowered in order to increase political participation? Should the civil law be amended first and the last?  If the amendment fails to pass, should the civil law be amended? These questions have never even been mentioned. How can this be considered a comprehensive amendment process?

This is even more true for phase two constitutional amendments. The assertion is that the threshold for constitutional amendments is too high. But the last time the constitution was amended, the political parties agreed to set the threshold high in order to prevent any one particular political party from amending the constitution unilaterally, and to avoid overly hasty constitutional amendments. Were they wrong then? Are they right now? Is half the voters as the threshold for constitutional amendments really high enough? Is such a constitutional amendment merely being promoted for its own sake? Are constitutional amendments for their own sake the real purpose?

修憲不能跟著政黨短線利益走
20150527 中國時報

立法院中又在討論修憲問題。朝野政黨看法較為接近的一項修憲議題,是將行使投票權的年齡自20歲調降為18歲。國民黨同時主張,應將不在籍投票的制度一併寫入《憲法》,則是遭到民進黨的反對。國民黨提議修憲恢復立法院的閣揆同意權,民進黨也不贊成。

民進黨主席、也是總統參選人蔡英文表示,修憲是要解決國家運作的問題,不是滿足政黨利益,任何政黨都不該以包裹處理的方式,相互綁架個別修憲主張。蔡也主張本階段修憲,最重要的意義在於擴大人民政治參與;在這次修憲提案中,18歲公民權與20歲被選舉權是要賦予更多人民參政權,降低政黨不分區門檻是要擴大國會的民意代表性,降低修憲門檻則是要賦予人民修憲提案權,這都是要彰顯人民才是民主政治的核心;以更多的政治參與,使得台灣的民主更為健全茁壯。

蔡主席一席話相當漂亮,就修憲應有的周延理性思考,確實有討論商量的必要。對任何民主國家而言,修憲都是國家大事,應該盡量從事社會多元觀點的廣泛討論,求取最大的社會共識,既不能只是一黨一派的主張,也不該從事利益交換。蔡主席指責國民黨從事政治交換的方法不當,義正詞嚴,很有道理。但是嚴厲指責的背後,也透露出另外一種訊息供人思考,此中究竟是修憲討論的開誠布公,還是政黨選舉的政治利益算計更多一些?

正因為修憲是要求取社會共識而不能只是一黨一派的政治利益,討論修憲的過程中,尤其需要更大的耐性從事政治說服,不需要的則是政治指責。其實,大型政治選舉期間,向來都是政黨相互指責最烈以求取選舉政治利益的時刻,最不利於從事需要高度政黨共識才能成就善果的修憲討論。稍有政治常識者都會知道,在大選期間討論修憲是緣木求魚,一事無成的可能性極高;偏偏台灣的政黨或政治人物,總是偏好在選舉期間提出修憲主張。

在修憲討論之中,誠心相互讓步的情形少,一言不合就從事政治指責的機會多,一旦公開嚴詞批判譴責,恐怕只會增加修憲的困難。政黨在選舉期間提出修憲議題,其實此中獲致修憲圓滿成功的理性祈願少,政治造勢以攫取選舉競爭利益的企圖多。政黨在修憲議題上公然相互傾軋,哪裡是真的想修憲?不外就是要在選舉中,取得更多證明對手是民主政治劣等生的相罵本罷了。

調降投票年齡說是有擴大政治參與的效益,固然不錯,那何以成就不在籍投票就不是擴大政治參與呢?兩個政黨在修憲議題的選擇上,誰沒有爭取選票利益的算計呢?指責對手修憲誠意不足,大哥就不必取笑二哥了吧!

其實調降投票年齡成18歲,真的是社會共識而不只是政治黨派的片面主張嗎?已有民意調查顯示,社會上不贊成調降的民意比率高於贊成者,台灣從事民調的單位相當多,不妨各家都做一做民調,公布看看這個主張是不是屬於已有高度社會共識的議題。

修憲是國家大事,立法院提出修憲提案,應該周延思考,不宜只從一點切入,修到哪算到哪。在台灣,20歲是成年年齡,成年的公民取得投票權,道理很清楚。若要調降投票年齡到18歲,成年年齡是否也要一併修改《民法》加以調整,立法院可以完全不加思考、不予討論嗎?18歲是未成年人,《民法》上稱為限制行為能力人,簽訂契約尚且需要法定代理人同意,成為可以投票的公民,不需要一些解釋嗎?

如果此事兩不相干,那投票年齡為何不調降到17歲、16歲或是15歲?如果立法院是要先修憲再修《民法》,應不應該一併討論並提出如此行事的理由?包括為什麼應該為了擴大政治參與而下修成年年齡,或是為什麼不能先修《民法》再修憲,或是修憲不成時《民法》上的成年年齡還修不修等等道理在內。這些道理連提都不提,算是周延的修憲思考嗎?恐怕聽聽就好吧!

至於二階段修憲的主張,那就更是聽聽就好了。說是修憲門檻過高,門檻設得高,不是上次修憲時,各政黨同意為了防止一黨修憲,避免修憲過於草率頻繁的共識產物嗎?怎麼又昨非而今是了呢?以選民的半數做為修憲的門檻,真的過高嗎?如此主張是為了修憲而修憲嗎?為了修憲而修憲,真正的目的又何在呢?

Monday, May 25, 2015

Tsai Ing-wen's Job Interview with Washington: Everyone Wants In on the Act

Tsai Ing-wen's Job Interview with Washington: Everyone Wants In on the Act
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 26, 2015


Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen departed for the United States on Friday for her "job interview" with Washington. Recently everyone has been vying for the position of job interviewer. During questioning Tsai Ing-wen found herself stretched to the limit. Let us hope that this time her job interview with Washington was successful.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen departed for the United States on Friday for her "job interview" with Washington. Recently everyone has been vying for the position of job interviewer. During questioning Tsai Ing-wen found herself stretched to the limit. Let us hope that this time her job interview with Washington was successful.

The job interview questions Washington asked Tsai Ing-wen were the same questions others have been asking as well. No prizes for guessing the questions asked on cross-Strait relations. Those can be found in any reference book. Some of Tsai Ing-wen's answers have already been made public. One. Maintain the cross-Strait status quo. Two. Reject the 1992 consensus. Yet during her interview Tsai Ing-wen all of a sudden said her position on maintaining the status quo was the same as that of the United States. She said that maintaining the status quo was consistent with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. She rambled aimlessly while stretching the truth. Is the US position really consistent with the Resolution on Taiwan's Future?

When Tsai Ing-wen answered Washington's interview questions, she simultaneously answered other peoples' questions. On cross-Strait relations, everyone is a job interviewer. Every job interviewer has his own preferred answer. But every job interviewer is also concerned about the opinions of other job interviewers. For example, the US and the PRC need each other. But they are also fearful of each other. They co-govern the Taiwan Strait. Therefore the US position will be influenced by the Mainland position. In some respects, it may even coincide with the Mainland position. By contrast, radical Taiwan independence forces have nothing to lose. They do not care about other job interviewers' concerns. Therefore they are the most vehemently opposed to any compromise on Tsai Ing-wen's part. Tsai Ing-wen is finding it difficult to please everyone. That is why so far she has responded feebly, saying she will "maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations". This response is witless. It is a response that will not pass muster with any of her job interviewers.

Lin Yi-hsiung and Shih Ming-teh represent two ends of the Green Camp spectrum. Lin Yi-hsiung is competing against Tsai Ing-wen for "third force" legislative seats. He is differentiating his Taiwan independence stance from the DPP's. He asked Tsai: What is the status quo? We are electing a president. Can we really afford to blur our plans for the future of the nation? If not, then proclaim that "Taiwan and China are different countries", that "Taiwan is sovereign and independent". Dig out the Resolution on Taiwan's Future and repeat it. That is how one runs for president. "How can one run for president without making one's position clear?"

Lin Yi-hsiung drafted the Basic Law of the Republic of Taiwan. He was also the DPP Chairman who promoted the Resolution on Taiwan's Future.  He may demand that Tsai Ing-wen endorse his positions. But can Tsai Ing-wen respond to Wahington, Beijing, and ROC voters this way? Never mind the rest. Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly attempted backdoor listing of the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. Beijing dismissed these attempts as "one country on each side". As a result, she ceases mentioning it for some time. Who knew Lin Yi-hsiung would pressure her to reaffirm it? Tsai Ying-wen invoked the Resolution on Taiwan's Future in defense. This revealed that she was utterly stumped, both rhetorically and technically.

Shih Ming-teh has affirmed the 1992 consensus. He advocates the Broad One China Framework. Therefore he cannot reject the 1992 consensus. Unless one begins with one China, different interpretations, one cannot possibly advocate the Broad One China Framework. Some DPP leaders want to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform and author a Resolution on the Republic of China. They are positioned at the same end of the spectrum. Chen Ming-tong, Hung Chi-chang, et al, endorse the Broad One China Framework. Clearly some DPP leaders seek policy reform. Can Tsai Ing-wen satisfy both the DPP reformists and the Sunflower Student Movement?

Susan A. Thornton is U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. She said the key was that no one on either side of the Strait should unilaterally change the status quo. At this point, people suddenly realized why Tsai Ing-wen insisted that her position on maintaining the status quo was the same as that of the United States. But the United States supports the "one China policy". Is Tsai Ing-wen's position really the same? Thornton told Tsai Ing-wen to her face that cross-Strait interaction and dialogue already has a solid foundation. The United States hopes to continue these interactions because they are beneficial not only to Taiwan, but also to the United States and Mainland China. One reporter asked Thornton whether the "foundation" she referred to was the 1992 consensus. Thornton said the name given to the "foundation" was up to Taiwan and the Mainland to decide. Clearly the US job interviewer was looking to the Mainland job interviewer for agreement. She said she hoped all parties would continue to maintain close communication, and a no-surprises, low-key approach.

Thornton did not say "1992 consensus". She said "solid foundation". Was her "foundation" the same as Xi Jinping's "foundation"? Did she say whether the Taiwan and the Mainland should agree that the 1992 consensus was that "foundation"? Tsai Ing-wen may deny it. But Beijing likes the term. So who will blink first? Finally, if Tsai Ing-wen insists on repudiating the 1992 consensus, will the United States consider this a close communication, and a no-surprises, low-key approach? 

Tsai Ing-wen must also respond to job interview questions from the blue camp and swing voters. President Ma said that the status quo Tsai Ing-wen wants to maintain, is the same status quo that she previously denounced as "pandering to the Mainland and selling out Taiwan". This status quo took seven years to establish. If she finds it so intolerable, why does she want to maintain it? Ma said, "On the one hand, it makes me very happy. On the other hand, it leaves me deeply puzzled." Tsai Ing-wen called Ma a "leader out of touch with public opinion". But this was clearly no answer. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to make herself clear. She now advocates "maintaining the status quo". Before she denounced the status quo as "pandering to the Mainland and selling out Taiwan". One wonders, is this the same status quo that made Ma Ying-jeou "very happy and deeply puzzled"?

Finally, Xi Jinping said "If the foundation is not solid, the earth will move and the mountains will shake". Tsai Ing-wen still has no idea how to respond.

蔡英文赴美面試 各方爭相做考官
2015-05-26聯合報

蔡英文周五啟程赴美面試。但這段期間已見各方爭做考官,蔡英文在回應各方考題時頗見捉襟見肘之態。此番赴美趕考,盼她考運順利。

美國給蔡英文的考題,也是各方給她的考題。兩岸關係不用猜題,且可翻書作答,蔡英文的部分答案也已透露:一、維持兩岸現狀。二、否定九二共識。但是,蔡英文在回答考卷時,一下子說「維持現狀與美國立場相同」,一下子又說「維持現狀與《台灣前途決議文》沒有不一致的地方」,東拉西扯卻是捉襟見肘,難道「美國立場」也與《台灣前途決議文》相同?

蔡英文在回答美國考題時,也在回答各方的考題。兩岸關係,各方皆是考官,每一位考官都有自己傾向的答案;但各個考官在兩岸關係中的角色地位不同,因而每一位考官也會在意其他考官對答案的見解。例如,美中兩大的關係是互有需求也互有警戒,且共同治理台灣海峽,因此「美國立場」會受「中國立場」的影響,甚至在某些方面與中國同一立場。相對而言,台獨激進勢力作的是無本生意,對其他考官最不在乎,因此也最反對蔡英文作出示弱的答案。眾口難調是蔡英文之所以迄今只作出「維持兩岸關係現狀」這個沒頭沒腦的答案之原因,但這樣的答案卻在每一位考官前都不能通過。

林義雄與施明德,可以視為綠營光譜兩端的代表。林義雄向蔡英文爭「第三勢力」的立委席次,也同時欲以傾獨路線與民進黨作出區隔。他問蔡英文:現狀是什麼?要選總統的人,國家前途可以模糊嗎?不然要說台灣與中國是不同的國家、台灣主權獨立,把台灣前途決議文拿出來複述一遍,要不怎麼選總統,「這個事情模糊還能選總統嗎?」

林義雄是《台灣共和國基本法草案》的起草人,也是促成《台灣前途決議文》的民進黨主席;他出題可以要求蔡英文這樣作答,但蔡英文能把這個答案交給華府、北京及台灣選民等別的考官嗎?莫說其他,蔡英文過去幾次欲以借殼上市的《台灣前途決議文》敷衍情勢,皆被北京指為「一邊一國」,以致許久未見她再提。不料,如今被林義雄一逼,蔡又拿「決議文」來抵擋,足見詞窮亦是技窮了。

施明德曾肯定九二共識。他既主張「大一中架構」,應不會否定「九二共識」,因為不從「一中各表」談起,即不可能有「大一中架構」。民進黨內主張「凍結《台獨黨綱》」「提出《中華民國決議文》」者,均可視為光譜的同一端;而陳明通、洪奇昌等曾為「大一中架構」背書,更可見民進黨內亦有轉型因子。在兩岸考題上,蔡英文如何作出讓民進黨內轉型派與太陽花同感滿意的答案?

總結美國國務院官員董雲裳的最近談話,其關鍵詞在「兩岸任何一方都不應片面改變現狀」。至此,使人恍然大悟為何蔡英文會說「維持現狀與美國立場相同」。但美國主張「一個中國政策」,蔡英文與之立場相同嗎?董雲裳為蔡英文留了顏面說:兩岸互動與對話已經確立堅實的基礎,美國希望這些互動繼續下去,因為「這不僅對台灣有利,也對美國及區域內的中國等國有利」。記者明知故問:所謂「堅實的基礎」是否指九二共識?董雲裳說,把這個「基礎」叫做什麼名稱,「要由台灣和中國大陸商定」。可見美國考官把眼光投向了中國考官。她又說:希望各方在兩岸事務上繼續「維持密切溝通、低調、零意外」。

董雲裳未說「九二共識」,卻稱「堅實的基礎」,她說的「基礎」是否與習近平所稱的「基礎」相同?至於她說是否稱為「九二共識」,「要由台灣和中國大陸商定」,係指蔡英文可以否定,但北京亦可堅持此一名稱,看誰挺得住?最後,倘若蔡英文堅持「否定九二共識」,美國會認為這是「密切溝通、低調、零意外」的答案嗎?

當然,蔡英文也必須回答藍營及中間選民的考題。馬英九總統說:蔡英文主張維持現狀,就是她曾指的「傾中賣台」的現狀,也是我們七年來建造的現狀;現狀若是那麼不堪,她為何還要維持?「這使我一方面感到很欣慰,二方面也感到很納悶」。對此,蔡英文顧左右而言他諉稱「領導人與民意脫節」,這卻是文不對題的答案。蔡英文仍未說清楚:她現在所說的「維持現狀」,與她以前說的「傾中賣台的現狀」,及馬英九此刻說的「欣慰與納悶的現狀」是否同一現狀?

最後,面對習近平所出「基礎不牢/地動山搖」的考題,蔡英文好像也仍攤著白卷不知如何作答。

Sunday, May 24, 2015

War and Peace: Hsia Zhang Meeting and the Choice of Paths

War and Peace: Hsia Zhang Meeting and the Choice of Paths
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 25, 2015


Executive Summary: The Hsia Zhang meeting is a high profile display of the 1992 consensus in action. It is not a trap, but a rather a chance for ministers and officials from the two sides to treat each other with courtesy and respect. Conversely, Taiwan independence pipe dreams motivated by anti-Mainland bigotry will inevitably provoke hatred and precipitate war. Tsai Ing-wen is about to visit the United States. She must think hard about this. Will her presidential dream be dashed during her final mile? That will depend on the decisions she makes.

Full Text Below:

The Hsia Zhang meeting being held in Kinmen is a story of peace. It provides historical contrast. Half a century ago artillery shells fell on the island like rain, leaving behind scars and hatred. Back then, the two sides were irreconcilable. A half century later, the two sides' ministers and officials are meeting to discuss policy, and their laughter is wiping away old enmities.

This peace was not born out of thin air. It is rooted in the 1992 consensus. Why does this simple formula have so much impact? Because it represents the evolution of historical reality. The two sides have long been separated, beginning with a brutal civil war. Even today, the shell marks and fortifications can be seen on Kinmen, and provide a living record of the war. As we can see, an effective policy must encompass, process, and transcend that history.

In other words, the 1992 consensus may be interpreted in two ways, depending upon their own terminology. But rejection of the consensus means war, whereas acceptance of the consensus means peace. To prevent the resurgence of war, the 1992 consensus is indispensable. Rejecting this historical basis means going to war, inciting hatred, forsaking peace, and returning to the martial law that erected these fortifications and strung this barbed wire.

The 1992 consensus provides us with a comprehensive historical narrative. The long-term cease-fire following the civil war has not changed the facts. The two sides remain part of one China. This historical reality cannot be wished away by heads filled with pipe dreams of Taiwan independence. Nor can it be wished away by ambiguous use of terms such as "maintaining the status quo". Such attempts to evade historical reality and substitute a fabricated narrative cannot ensure peace. Only the 1992 consensus can do so.

The two sides finalized plans for the Wang Zhang meeting in February. This newspaper concluded that Beijing intended to refrain from interfering with ruling party changes within Taiwan. This would establish a "new normal" for the two sides. This "new normal" is aimed at peace. Its intent is to ensure that regardless of which political party is in power, communications and interactions will remain peaceful. If Beijing feels this is under control, peace can be preserved. Conversely, if this "new normal" cannot be maintained, the norm will be a new "cold war" or the "threat of war".

The Hsia Zhang meeting shows that Beijing's goals remain unchanged. Zhang Zhijun invited Hsia Li-yan to visit the Mainland. He urged a fourth meeting between officials charged with cross-Strait affairs. Last year he proposed a Wang Zhang meeting. He reiterated that "cross-Strait relations must not be stalled, still less set back." Beijing hopes the two sides can continue their official dialogue, and that peace will not suffer.

But the "new normal" is after all merely a hope. It requires that the DPP make an historic decision to accept the 1992 consensus. Only then will it be real. It cannot be wished into existence. The DPP must embrace and accept the 1992 consensus. The Hsia Zhang meeting is taking place one week before Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the US. Naturally the hope is that Tsai Ing-wen will take note and realize that the Hsia Zhang meeting constitutes a wonderful "peaceful status quo". To maintain this "peaceful status quo," Tsai Ing-wen must free herself from the shackles of the DPP and respond to this call for peace.

Tsai Ing-wen has perhaps taken one small step. She now says she hopes to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo." But the status quo and the "new normal" remain far apart. In other words, it is a long way from peace. Needless to say, the missing ingredient is the 1992 consensus. Tsai Ing-wen may find it difficult to recognize the 1992 consensus. If so, she can begin by adhering to the ROC Constitution, and forswearing Taiwan independence. She can gradually come around to the 1992 consensus. Or, she can emulate Ko Wen-che and say that she "respects the existing cross-Strait political framework." These are all ways that Tsai Ing-wen can respond to questions during her visit to Washington.

Tsai Ing-wen must realize that these steps are not difficult. In 2000, when Chen Shui-bian came to power, he took them all. He announced his "five noes". When meeting foreign guests, he said he could accept the 1992 consensus. Chen lacked international understanding. Yet even he could do that much. Is Tsai Ing-wen less capable than Chen Shui-bian? Or is Tsai Ing-wen's head too swollen from Sunflower Student Movement flattery? Has she been so seduced by anti-Mainland hatred that she can no longer see the importance of a peace that can only ensured by the 1992 consensus?

The Hsia Zhang meeting is a high profile display of the 1992 consensus in action. It is not a trap, but a rather a chance for ministers and officials from the two sides to treat each other with courtesy and respect. Conversely, Taiwan independence pipe dreams motivated by anti-Mainland bigotry will inevitably provoke hatred and precipitate war. Tsai Ing-wen is about to visit the United States. She must think hard about this. Will her presidential dream be dashed during her final mile? That will depend on the decisions she makes.


戰爭與和平:夏張會演繹的路徑選擇
2015-05-25 聯合報 聯合報            

「夏張會」選在金門,敘說一個和平的故事。它展示了一個歷史對照:半世紀前彈如雨落的創痕與仇恨,註解兩岸冰炭不容;而半世紀後兩位部長官員在此處縱論政策,笑泯恩仇。

這個和平不是憑空而生,它是由「九二共識」這根支柱所支撐。一個簡單的語詞,竟有此功效,因為它是根據真實的歷史演進磨礪而來。兩岸長期割裂的處境,是由一場殘酷的內戰而起;直至今日,金門仍以坦露地表的彈痕與工事,記載著那段戰爭歷史。於此可見,一個有能力的政治論述,必須能夠包納、處理並跨越這段歷史。

亦即,「九二共識」的兩端,連接著不同的歷史語彙,那一端是戰爭,這一頭是和平。防止戰爭回潮的,正是「九二共識」這個接點。意圖將這個歷史的承軸抽走,就意味著再去溯尋戰爭、挑動仇恨、放棄和平,返回那個用碉堡與鐵絲築成的精神戒嚴。

「九二共識」是一整套的歷史敘事,內戰之後雖已長期停火的兩岸關係,其實並未改變兩岸俱在一個中國之內的本質,這個歷史內核不能被某些人頭殼裡憑空編撰的台獨想像所瓜代,更不能以含混其詞的「維持現狀」所模糊,一切企圖否定、遮蔽這段歷史的所有另行建造的論述,都無法獲致「九二共識」所能獲致的和平。

兩岸在二月敲定「王張會」時,我們即推論,北京試圖超越台灣內部政黨輪替執政的干擾,開拓出一個兩岸的「新常態」。這個「新常態」的真正思維,就著眼於「和平」,它意欲在不同政黨執政時,仍能維持足夠的和平交往與互動,在北京可以管控的前提下,讓和平得以延續下去。相反地,若是此一「新常態」無法建立,就意味著「準戰爭」或「戰爭邊緣」將成為另一種常態。

這次「夏張會」證明北京的願望依然未改,張志軍藉著邀請夏立言訪陸,推動第四次的兩岸事務首長會見,而又對著夏立言搬出去年「王張會」時的談話,重申「絕不能讓兩岸關係再遭折騰,更不能走回頭路」。這意味,北京希望兩岸官方對話能夠持續不輟,和平不會橫遭破壞。

然而,「新常態」畢竟只能表達一種主觀意志 ,它必須透過民進黨與「九二共識」完成歷史性的接軌,才可能真正鞏固。亦即,它不能憑空而存,仍然需要民進黨最終擁抱與接納「九二共識」。因此,「夏張會」選在蔡英文訪美前一周舉行,當然是希望對蔡英文作出政治召喚,讓蔡英文再看一眼:「夏張會」豈不是一個美好的「和平現狀」?若要繼續保有這一美好的「和平現狀」,蔡英文必須能夠掙脫民進黨的舊有窠臼,回應這個和平的號召。

蔡英文或許已走出一小步,她聲稱要「維持兩岸現狀」。但「維持現狀」與「新常態」仍有巨大差距,也就是說,它跟「和平」仍有很大差距。不消多說,它就是缺少了「九二共識」這根支柱。但承認「九二共識」,蔡英文若是一時難以做到,或可以嘗試從服膺中華民國憲法出發,並以宣示不追尋獨立為底線,再逐步尋求向「九二共識」靠近。或者,亦可仿效柯文哲說法:「尊重兩岸既有的政治基礎」。這些皆是蔡英文訪美時,可以回應華府考題的說法。

蔡英文若不健忘,這些步驟,都非難事。兩千年忽焉上台的陳水扁,已一一做到,他不僅宣示了「四不一沒有」,甚至在接見外賓時,一度表達可以接受「九二共識」。缺少國際視野的陳水扁,尚且能做到這一點,蔡英文難道還比不上陳水扁的識時務?或者,蔡英文被太陽花學運那些浮誇、躁動的仇中主張所誘惑或引導,因而不能看清「九二共識」所能承托的和平盛景?

「夏張會」是「九二共識」擴張性與延展性的高度展示,「九二共識」不僅不是讓人掉入陷阱,反而是讓兩岸部長級官員以禮相待,實事求是。相反地,仇中的台獨異夢卻必然呼喚仇恨和戰爭,蔡英文赴美前應有所深思。她的總統夢,會不會又潰敗於最後一哩,在於她的抉擇。

Thursday, May 21, 2015

DPP Writing Checks That Cannot Be Cashed

DPP Writing Checks That Cannot Be Cashed
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 22, 2015


Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has long been known as "kong xin Cai" or "content-free Tsai" because she has refused to clearly state her political views. Meanwhile, her speeches, discussions, or articles are filled with pretty words such as "equal justice", "progressive values", "citizen participation", "Taiwan First!", "The People", and "democracy". More recently, she has held forth on "regional governance", "generational justice", "the new economy", "the new agriculture", "creativity", and "innovation". Her rhetoric has remained theoretical. Little if any of it can be translated into concrete policy. Her rhetoric has remained at the "communications platform" level.  It has yet to coalesce into a real program with cost-benefit analysis.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen has long been known as "kong xin Cai" or "content-free Tsai" because she has refused to clearly state her political views. Meanwhile, her speeches, discussions, or articles are filled with pretty words such as "equal justice", "progressive values", "citizen participation", "Taiwan First!", "The People", and "democracy". More recently, she has held forth on "regional governance", "generational justice", "the new economy", "the new agriculture", "creativity", and "innovation". Her rhetoric has remained theoretical. Little if any of it can be translated into concrete policy. Her rhetoric has remained at the "communications platform" level.  It has yet to coalesce into a real program with cost-benefit analysis.

"Content-free Tsai" did not acquire her nickname overnight. When Tsai Ing-wen first became party chairperson, progressive scholars flocked to her. They had high hopes for this old style bureaucrat who hailed from academia and the civil service system. They saw in her qualities atypical of politicians. They imagined her transformed into a new era progressive politician. Many pinned their hopes of transforming old politics into new politics on her.

Content-free Tsai's story has a second chapter. When the aura around the DPP's four party princes began to fade, Tsai Ing-wen became the DPP savior. She began her ascent to the summit of power. Avoidance of conflict and pandering to voters became Tsai Ing-wen's guiding light. This, needless to say, merely reinforced her "Content-free Tsai" image.

Content-free Tsai's story is now in its third chapter, namely, her "final mile". In contrast to 2012, Tsai Ing-wen is almost certain to win the campaign ahead of us. The DPP already sees itself as the "ruling party elect" at the central government level, in addition to being the ruling party in most local jurisdictions. It sees the Kuomintang and voters through these glasses. As a "ruling party elect " presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen now finds it difficult to maintain her conflict avoidance motivated policy ambiguity. She finds herself compelled to respond to voter questions and voter expectations. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen has gradually issued a series of policy checks. The first pertains to cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen says the DPP's basis for cross-Strait relations is "maintaining the cross-Strait status quo", in other words, maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait and the continued development of cross-Strait relations. According to Tsai Ing-wen this is the key to cross-Strait relations, and the DPP goal upon returning to power. She assures us that "The DPP is confident in its ability to handle cross-Strait relations and avoid accidents. It will not stir up opposition, conflicts, and confrontation."

The moment she uttered "maintaining the status quo", everyone was baffled. They wanted to know Tsai Ing-wen's definition of the "cross-Strait status quo". They wanted to know why she wanted it maintained. Over the past month people have learned what Tsai Ing-wen means by the status quo. It means "follow and uphold the United States' definition of the status quo". From the DPP's anti-Mainland standpoint, such a position is relatively stable. On the surface it avoids the mistakes that earned Chen Shui-bian the moniker of "trouble maker".

But this is clearly an unbalanced and dangerous policy. DPP cross-Strait policy would fall victim to short-term fluctuations in Sino-US relations. It would greatly increase friction, disagreement, and conflict between Taipei and Beijing. In the long run, it may not even be in the best interests of the United States. In sum, Tsai's has proposed a cross-Strait policy riddled with uncertainty.

Tsai Ing-wen's social and economic policies are rife with contradictions and dangers as well. Recently, when Tsai Ing-wen visited the Changhua Coastal Industrial Park, she declared that "Taiwan has too many holidays", and touched off a wave of controversy. According to reports Tsai Ing-wen was addressing a business group. Therefore she first assured them that she was not anti-business, that she was concerned no only with industrial workers and farmers, that she had no objection to FTAs, that she did not support the luxury homes tax, capital gains tax, and sin taxes. She assured them that her commitment to equal justice would not undermine her commitment to efficiency and competitiveness. When Tsai Ing-wen addresses entrepreneurs she boasts about suppressing labor welfare to maintain industrial competitiveness. Meanwhile, she also trumpets her commitment to "progress" and "justice".

Tsai Ing-wen has recently talked up a "new model for economic growth". She advocates a "from small to big" industrial strategy. She says the primary force behind next generation economic growth is SMEs, not Big Business. She says it is people with smarts, not traditional capitalists. She says knowledge and innovation are more important than capital. Therefore "Taiwan's economic development can no longer rely exclusively on traditional capitalists and the wealthy." Frankly, Tsai Ing-wen's "new economic growth model" is a hodge-podge of anti-Big Business sentiment, "small is beautiful" philosophy, green economics, and new economics. It has no connection to the reality of the global economy. It runs counter to the development strategies of the world's major nations. It reveals total incomprehension regarding the relationship between Big Business and SMEs. Such an economic policy is utterly divorced from reality. It promises false equality and false progress.

When Tsai Ing-wen addresses middle class, lower class, and underprivileged voters, she invariably talks about national responsibility and distributive justice. When she addresses environmental groups she invariably promises a nuclear-free homeland by 2025, 50 billion Kilowatt hours of green electricity in 10 years, the establishment of a smart grid, and measures to save 30 billion Kilowatt hours of energy in 10 years. Alas, she never tells us the source of the revenue. She never says anything about overall fiscal reform. These are her "irresponsible leftist policies". When Tsai addresses business groups, she objects to tax increases, questions shorter working hours, stresses market economics, market efficiency, and market competition. These are her "dishonest rightist policies."

Uncertain cross-Strait policies, irresponsible leftist policies, and dishonest rightist policies. These are the rubber checks Tsai Ing-wen has issued. Can the people and the international community really trust such a person?

開了太多浮誇支票的民進黨
20150522 中國時報

很長一段時間以來,蔡英文被稱為「空心蔡」,原因是她始終說不清楚她的政治主張。同時,她的演講、談話或是文章論述,始終堆砌著漂亮的詞藻,如:公平正義、進步價值、公民參與、台灣主體、人民、民主等等,最近一段時間,又多了區域治理、世代正義、新經濟、新農業、創意、創新等美麗語彙,但是說了半天,仍然停留在理念的層次,極少化為可以實踐操作的具體政策,或者就是停留在要打造「溝通平台」的層次,未能形塑出實際的綱領、路徑圖,也沒有成本效益分析。

「空心蔡」不是一朝一夕形成的。蔡英文擔任黨主席之初,一批批「進步學者」包圍了蔡英文,希望將這位學界與公務體系出身的舊官僚,憑藉著其非典型政治人物的某些特質,改造成新時代的進步政治家,成為許多人翻轉舊政治、打造新政治的寄託所在。

「空心蔡」的故事還有第二階段。當民進黨的所謂四大天王年華逐漸老去、政治魅力逐漸消退時,蔡英文越來越成為民進黨的救世主,越來越接近權力的頂端。於是,迴避矛盾、討好選民就成了蔡英文論述的主軸,當然也就更加鞏固、深化了她「空心蔡」的形象。

「空心蔡」故事演化的第三階段,就是此刻這「最後一哩路」。比起2012年,擺在眼前的這場選戰,蔡英文幾乎是十拿九穩,民進黨也早就以中央準執政黨、地方最多數執政黨的姿態面對國民黨和選民。作為「準執政黨」總統候選人,蔡英文已經很難維持過往那種「迴避矛盾」的政策模糊,必須回應選民的提問與期待,於是,蔡英文陸陸續續推出了一系列政策支票,其中第一大部分是兩岸政策。

蔡英文說,民進黨處理兩岸關係的基本原則,就是「維持兩岸現狀」,也就是維繫台海和平及持續兩岸關係穩定發展的現狀,據蔡英文表示,這是兩岸關係的核心,也是民進黨重返執政後致力目標,她還信心滿滿的保證「民進黨有信心可以處理好兩岸關係,避免意外,更不會挑起矛盾、衝突和對立。」

「維持現狀論」一出,各方反應多是不瞭解蔡英文定義的兩岸現狀為何,也不知道她要如何維持現狀。一個多月過去,人們發現,蔡英文所謂的維持現狀,其實大約就是「追隨並維持美國定義的台海現狀」。從民進黨的反中立場來看,這樣的立場是理所當然也是相對穩健的,表面上似乎可以避免重蹈陳水扁時代的「麻煩製造者」覆轍。

然而,這卻清清楚楚是一種「失衡」的危險政策,不但將使民進黨的兩岸政策隨著中美關係的短期波動而擺盪,也將大大提高兩岸之間發生摩擦、齟齬甚至衝突的機率,長期來看,其實也未必符合美國的根本利益。總而言之,蔡所提出的是「不確定的兩岸政策」。

至於蔡英文的社會經濟政策,更是充滿矛盾與危險。日前,蔡英文在參訪彰濱工業區時,提到台灣勞工「放假太多」,引發一波爭議。據了解,蔡英文在面對工商團體時,先後提出了不仇富反商、不獨尊勞工農民、不反對簽訂自貿協定、不支持豪宅稅、證所稅、奢侈稅,更不以「公平正義」損害「效率」、「競爭力」等承諾。矛盾的是,當蔡英文面對企業主大談抑制勞工福利,以維持產業競爭力的同時,卻又擺出了「進步」、「公平正義」的姿態。

這段時間以來,蔡英文喜歡談「新經濟成長模式」,說要確認一個「以小搏大」的產業戰略主軸,她認為下一個世代引領經濟成長的主力,是中小企業,不是大企業;是有腦袋的人,不是傳統資本家;知識與創新比資本重要,因此「台灣經濟發展不能再獨厚傳統資本家與有錢人」。坦白說,蔡英文的所謂新經濟成長模式,是揉雜反財團情結、某類型「小就是美」的生態經濟理念和知識新經濟概念的集合體,實際上完全脫離了全球經濟發展的現實,背離了世界主要國家發展戰略性產業,也完全不瞭解巨型企業與中小企業之間的產業鏈關係,這樣的經濟政策,只能是脫離現實的假平等、假進步政策。

蔡英文面對中下階層與弱勢群體時,總是把國家責任與分配正義掛在嘴邊,面對環保團體,更提出畫大餅的「以2025非核家園的達成為總目標」、「10開發綠色能源500億度」、和透過建立智慧電網等措施來「10節電300億度」的新能源政策,但是卻從來說不清楚穩定財源何在,更避談整體性的財稅改革,這完全是「不負責的左派政策」。而當蔡英文轉身面對工商團體時,又反對加稅、質疑工時縮短,強調市場經濟、效率與競爭,可稱得上是「不誠實的右派政策」。

「不確定的兩岸政策」、「不負責的左派政策」和「不誠實的右派政策」,這就是蔡英文眾多支票的實質,這樣的蔡英文,真能獲得人民和國際社會的信賴嗎?

Wednesday, May 20, 2015

Constitutional Amendment Requires Public Debate

Constitutional Amendment Requires Public Debate
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2015


Executive Summary: The Legislative Yuan "constitutional amendment committee" is conducting a substantive review of constitutional amendment proposals. The committee will convene 10 times over three weeks to discuss nine proposed constitutional amendments. Tsai Ing-wen hurriedly declared that the constitutional amendments must be passed. She said the legislature must not allow itself to be "condemned by history." The blue camp immediately countered. Tsai Ing-wen now opposes the restoration of prime ministerial consent, it said. She has flip-flopped on this matter repeatedly. If the constitutional amendments fail to pass, she bears the greatest responsibility.

Full Text Below:

The Legislative Yuan "constitutional amendment committee" is conducting a substantive review of constitutional amendment proposals. The committee will convene 10 times over three weeks to discuss nine proposed constitutional amendments. Tsai Ing-wen hurriedly declared that the constitutional amendments must be passed. She said the legislature must not allow itself to be "condemned by history." The blue camp immediately countered. Tsai Ing-wen now opposes the restoration of prime ministerial consent, it said. She has flip-flopped on this matter repeatedly. If the constitutional amendments fail to pass, she bears the greatest responsibility.

The constitutional issues are still unclear. Yet the ruling and opposition parties have already begun passing the buck to each other. It hard to be optimistic about the current constitutional amendment process for three reasons. One. The time alloted is insufficient. According to provisions, ruling and opposition legislators must reach an accord by June 16. Only then can a public referendum be held on January 16 concurrent with the presidential election. The legislature must resolve differences between the ruling and opposition parties in 20 short days. That is an impossible task. Constitutional amendments are major undertakings. How can we allow so little public debate?

Two. The constitutional amendment process has been reduced to a political tool. For both the ruling and opposition parties, the constitutional amendment process is all about 2016 campaign strategy. It reeks of political calculation. For example, the two major parties' positions overlap on some issues. These include lowering the voting age to 18 and lowering the threshold for non-constituency legislators. Both parties are determined to convey an image of openness and to avoid offending young voters. But the DPP advocates lowering the threshold for constitutional amendments, the abolition of the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan. It hopes to undermine the foundations of the Republic of China and challenge the legitimacy of its five-power constitution. Naturally the KMT is not going to agree.

By contrast, the ruling and opposition parties and the general public support the restoration of prime ministerial consent. Just last year, Tsai Ing-wen demanded the restoration of of prime ministerial consent. But this year the DPP has performed a complete about face and is suddenly firmly opposed. The reason is obvious. Tsai Ing-wen thinks a change in ruling parties will take place in 2016. She will hold the reins of power. So why give the legislature the power to appoint the prime minister? As for the KMT, including this as part of a "constitutional package" gives it confidence. Ruling and opposition party constitutional amendment proposals may be prettified with high-minded rhetoric. But the selfish motivations are glaringly obvious.

Three. Limits to constitutional debate and debate venues. The constitutional amendment process was originally supposed to begin with public debate. That way constitutional amendments would have a broader base of popular support. The debate process would help the public reach a consensus. It would enable the public to understand the ins and outs of the constitutional amendment process and to establish their priorities. Earlier this year, Tsai Ing-wen proposed a "national affairs conference". This would have been a good venue. Unfortunately ruling and opposition party differences rendered it stillborn. As a result, the Legislative Yuan established a "Constitutional Amendment Committee" to continue the investigation of constitutional amendment issues.

Alas, the constitutional amendment process has hit a wall in the legislature. The legislature is reenacting ruling vs. opposition party political wrangling and under the table deal-making. The process is rushed. Open and full discussion is impossible. Even participation by experts, social groups, and activists is impossible. The most obvious example of this took place in 2004. Under pressure from Lin Yi-hsiung a ruling and opposition party "constitutional reform committee" in the Legislative Yuan unanimously adopted a resolution to reduce legislative seats by half, and to raise the threshold for constitutional amendments. Eleven years later, reducing the legislative seats by half is considered an irrational amendment passed under pressure from populism. It constituted a fatal decline in legislative professionalism. Back then the DPP demanded a higher threshold for constitutional amendments. Now it is demanding that a lower one. So whose fault is it? Current legislators will remain in office until January next year. They have achieved little over the past three years. During that time the legislature was even occupied by force. Now they are engaged in a bidding war to amendment the nation's basic laws. How can we not be concerned?

Consider previous constitutional amendments. To say that if a constitutional amendment fails to pass, then so and so will be "condemned by history" is nonsense. In fact, history tells us that constitutional amendments must be well thought out. They must not be ill-conceived or motivated by momentary whim. Those who view the constitutional amendment process as a chess game, are the real culprits who will be condemned by history. The current constitutional amendment proposals, with the exception of lowering the voting age to 18, all require careful thought.

This includes lowering the threshold for political parties non-constituency legislators to 3%. The blue and green camps may have reached a bipartisan consensus on the matter. But it should be evaluated from a long-term perspective. This might help the disenfranchised. But it could also result in increasingly fragmented political parties. Once small parties proliferate, political consensus will be more difficult. National governance will be more difficult. Take the Taiwan Solidarity Union for example. By virtue of its party vote it has three non-constituency seats. But when their legislators speak, they often utter nonsense. Some even suggested "recruiting black people as mercenaries" and raised alarms about the "People's Liberation Army occupying Kinmen with kitchen knives". Is this sort of small party diversification really what Taiwan needs?

That the legislative process is haphazard is bad enough. But to take a hatchet to such an important matter as the constitution is infinitely worse. We cannot afford to be this reckless.

修憲欠缺的不是協商,而是公共討論
2015-05-21聯合報

立法院「修憲委員會」進入修憲提案的實質審查,將在三週內召開十場委員會,討論九大修憲議題。蔡英文率先喊話,說修憲必須成功、不能失敗,要求立法院不要做「歷史的罪人」。藍營立即反擊,蔡英文堅決反對恢復「閣揆同意權」,言行反覆,若修憲破局她要負最大責任。

修憲八字尚無一撇,朝野即開始互推責任,可想而知,這次修憲結果難以樂觀。從客觀環境看,這次修憲不可能有太大成果,主要原因有三:第一,時程太過緊迫。依規定,立法院必須在六月十六日前將朝野修憲議案送出,才能趕得上明年一月十六日大選同步進行公民複決;但是,立法院要在短短廿多天中處理完朝野歧見,幾乎是不可能的任務。修憲的重大工程,豈容如此草草討論?

第二,修憲議題被工具化。朝野兩黨的修憲主張,幾乎都與二○一六選戰策略掛勾,因此充滿算計與心機。例如,兩黨目前有交集的主張,包括降低投票門檻到十八歲,以及降低不分區立委得票門檻,都是為了塑造開放形象,避免得罪年輕選民。但是,民進黨主張降低修憲門檻,以及廢除考、監兩院等,目的則在挑戰及動搖「中華民國」及「五權憲法」的基礎及正當性,自然不易取得國民黨的認同。

相對的,對於朝野及民間皆有廣泛共識的「閣揆同意權」,蔡英文去年才喊了要爭取恢復,今年民進黨卻變臉堅決反對;其原因可想而知,主要是蔡英文自認二○一六政黨輪替在望,屆時自己大權在握,何必將閣揆任命權讓給立法院。至於國民黨,抓住這個環節要求「包裹修憲」,似乎也就喊得理直氣壯。從這個角度看,朝野修憲無論說得多動聽,其私心也就昭然若揭了。

第三,修憲討論與參與場域的局限。本來,比較理想的修憲議案,應該是開放更多的社會討論與公民參與;那樣,修憲議題將具有更廣泛的民意基礎,同時也能藉討論的過程凝聚共識,並讓社會大眾了解修憲工程的來龍去脈及應該選擇的優先順序。蔡英文今年初稍早曾有召開「國是會議」之議,這原是一個不錯的場域,遺憾的是,此一提議在朝野歧見下流產;也因此,才轉而由立法院成立「修憲委員會」,以接續研擬修憲議題。

問題在,修憲議題一進入立法院的圍牆,即無異是在複製朝野的政治角力和密室協商,倉促而密集的會議,不僅難以達到開放、完整的討論,同時也隔絕了專家菁英、社會團體、乃至積極公民的參與機會。最明顯的例子是,二○○四年立法院在林義雄的靜坐施壓下,朝野在立法院「修憲委員會」一致通過「立委席次減半」的決議,同時提高了修憲的門檻。十一年後,立委席次減半被認為是一次民粹威脅下的非理性修憲,也是國會專業職能下降的致命傷;不僅如此,當時墊高的修憲門檻,民進黨今天又喊著要降低,請問:這是誰之過?更何況,本屆立委的任期至明年一月就要結束,他們過去三年多並無多少作為,其間還發生國會遭到占領的憾事,此刻若讓他們用「喊價」的方式來執行國家基本大法的修改,豈不可憂?

檢視歷次的修憲,若要說某個修憲提案不過,誰就是「歷史的罪人」云云,這種說法完全是毫無根據的指控。事實上,歷史經驗告訴我們,必須完整配套的憲政架構,若因思慮不周或一時突發奇想而胡亂更動,這種視憲法如棋局和草芥的玩弄者,才是真正的歷史罪人。以目前攤在桌上的修憲主張看,除了放寬投票年齡至十八歲一案,其餘皆有待審慎思考。

包括放寛政黨不分區席次門檻到三%一案,儘管藍綠兩黨在此議意見一致,其實仍有待從長計議。理由是,此舉固然照顧了零星選票的綜合代表性,卻可能造成政黨政治的愈發破碎化,一旦小黨林立,政治共識將更難凝聚,國家治理也將愈發困難。就以台聯為例,它憑藉政黨票分配到三個不分區席次,但審視其立委的發言,有時不僅言不及義,甚至常出現「找黑人當傭兵」、「解放軍拿菜刀占領金門」等荒誕質詢,這是台灣需要的多元化小黨嗎?

國會的立法工作離離落落也就罷了,要向憲法動刀這等大事,還是小心為上!