United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
July 29, 2015
Executive Summary: Lee Teng-hui's Tokyo visit is likely to increase Beijing's awareness and understanding of the Taiwan independence movement. Beijing may not be able to respond to Lee Teng-hui, but it can take aim at Tsai Ing-wen. Lee Teng-hui has just handed Tsai Ing-wen a ticking time bomb. On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, Lee Teng-hui went on stage and hugged Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to break free from his embrace. And Lee Lee Teng-hui is not about to let her do so.
Full Text Below:
Lee Teng-hui's visit to Tokyo might well be characterized as the Tokyo Edition of his Cornell visit. The backlash will smack Tsai Ing-wen squarely in the face.
In June 1995, Lee Teng-hui visited the United States and delivered a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. The visit hogged the spotlight. But the Cornell visit was instigated by lobbying firms, and led to major frictions with the White House, the State Department, and Congress. It swiftly worsened cross-Strait relations to the breaking point.
At the time Lee Teng-hui and Beijing still maintained contact through secret emissaries. Lee wanted Beijing to support his visit to Cornell and boost voter support for him in next year's presidential election. Lee pledged to significantly improve cross-Strait relations. But Lee Teng-hui's behind the scenes double-dealing raised Beijing's suspicions. The visit was seen as a move toward Taiwan independence. Beijing concluded that Lee was "already wallowing in the mud of Taiwan independence", and even vowed to "use force to defend Taiwan". This ended Lee Teng-hui's secret channel to Beijing.
Over the following months acrimony between Beijing and Lee persisted. The following year, the 1996 ROC presidential election was marred by the Straits missile crisis and a US carrier group in the Taiwan Strait. Lee Teng-hui won the election because Beijing threatened military intervention. But cross-Strait relations deteriorated. In 2000, Lee trotted out his two states theory, and James Soong deserted the KMT. As a result, the KMT lost the presidential election and revoked Lee Teng-hui's party membership. Lee turned around and became the standard-bearer of the Taiwan independence movement. The key to this sequence of events was Lee's Cornell visit.
Actually, Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric during his Cornell visit was relatively measured and cautious. He spoke of the "Republic of China", and averred that "sovereignty belongs to the people". The United States initially announced that is would disallow the visit, but later reversed itself. This, plus the earlier Shiba Ryotaro incident, plus the presence of Taiwan independence forces on the reception committee, intensified the confrontation over the Cornell visit, which eventually spun completely out of control.
Twenty years later, Lee Teng-hui visited Tokyo. His political status may not be what it was when he visited Cornell. But his stature within the Taiwan independence movement has increased. Did Beijing read too much into Lee's visit to Cornell back then? Possibly. But this year's visit to Tokyo left no room for misunderstanding whatsoever.
Lee Teng-hui's address to the Japanese Diet on the 22nd includes three main points. One. Orthodox Taiwan independence rhetoric. He called for "discarding the old and adopting the new", for "thorough clarification of the half century long relationship between Taiwan and China", for the discarding of "one China", and "the constraints of the Chinese legal system". Two. He acknowledged that cross-Strait policy is rooted in deception and fraud. For example, the so-called "National Unification Guidelines" are nothing more than a "means to an end". They were merely a means of deceiving Beijing and "allaying the suspicions of the ruling Kuomintang." Three. The Taiwan independence movement uses "backdoor listing" as its main strategy. It retains the name "Republic of China", but empties it of all ROC historical, constitutional and spiritual substance.
Lee Teng-hui's own testimony reveals the character of Taiwan independence advocates. One. They may change their outward appearance, but they remain completely unchanged in their bones. Two. Deception and fraud count for everything. Political integrity counts for nothing. Three. Backdoor listing and deception. Lee Teng-hui is no longer in charge of state affairs. Therefore Beijing has no leverage over him. But what if Beijing sees Lee Teng-hui as representative of Taiwan independence? What if Beijing sees the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen as alter egos of Lee Teng-hui? Cross-Strait interaction is certain to be impacted by Lee Teng-hui's Tokyo visit. Lee Teng-hui used his Tokyo visit to give himself a political makeover. But the backlash is likely to impact Tsai Ing-wen, who is taking part in the presidential election, and undermine her election prospects.
Lee Teng-hui gazes into the mirror and feels sorry for himself. But Tsai Ing-wen bears the brunt of his self-pity. As far as the impact on Tsai Ing-wen is concerned, the Cornell trip and the Tokyo trip differ in certain respects. One. When Lee confronted Beijing in 1999, Lee Teng-hui issued his "two states theory". That same year, Chen Shui-bian issued his "Resolution on Taiwan's Future". Chen Shui-bian was not held hostage by Lee Teng-hui. The two were on an equal footing. Tsai Ing-wen's situation is different. She has yet to emerge from Lee Teng-hui's shadow. Two. Lee is old Taiwan independence. The Sunflower Student Movement and the Anti-curriculum movement are young Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen finds herself trapped between old and young Taiwan independence forces. Chen Shui-bian's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" is not as explicitly linked to Taiwan independence. Three. Lee proudly admitted that the Taiwan independence movement relied on deception and fraud. This is certain to undermine confidence in Taiwan independence inside and outside Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen initially denounced ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan". She later changed her tune and vowed that she would "accept ECFA unconditionally", proving she could not be trusted. Three. Tsai Ing-wen has pledged to abide by the "existing constitutional framework". But Lee Teng-hui has publicly confessed that this is nothing more than "backdoor listing". How much credibility, if any, do he and Tsai still have after this? Four. When the Cornell visit took place, the two sides were relatively isolated from each other. Beijing foolishly launched missiles. Now however the two sides are joined at the hip. Missiles may not fly, but the earth will surely move.
Lee Teng-hui's Tokyo visit is likely to increase Beijing's awareness and understanding of the Taiwan independence movement. Beijing may not be able to respond to Lee Teng-hui, but it can take aim at Tsai Ing-wen. Lee Teng-hui has just handed Tsai Ing-wen a ticking time bomb.
On the eve of the 2012 presidential election, Lee Teng-hui went on stage and hugged Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen has yet to break free from his embrace. And Lee Lee Teng-hui is not about to let her do so.
八面風光。但康乃爾之行是透過遊說公司勉強促成， 造成了美國白宮、國務院及國會的重大摩擦， 並成為當時兩岸關係急遽惡化以致斷裂的拐點。
希北京支持其康乃爾之旅，藉此衝高他次年總統直選的得票率， 並保證他將大幅改善兩岸關係。 但北京卻因李登輝對康乃爾之旅幕前幕後的兩手操作， 對李失去信任，當時即以台獨定性此事，謂李登輝「 已經在台獨深淵裡滾得連泥帶水」，甚至發出「武力保台」之論。 北京與李登輝建立在密使上的私密關係，就此反目破裂。
次年一九九六年總統大選， 發生飛彈危機及美國航空母艦通過台灣海峽， 而李登輝亦因北京以武嚇介入選舉而贏得大選， 但兩岸關係已急轉直下。至二○○○年，因李鋌而走險倡兩國論， 又發生宋楚瑜出走，使國民黨輸掉總統選舉， 卒致李登輝被國民黨逐出，轉身變為台獨旗手。這一連串變化， 關鍵皆在康乃爾之旅。
論述尺度亦僅及「中華民國」及「主權在民」而已。 北京是因美國原表示不允此行到後來放行， 及稍早的司馬遼太郎事件，與發現有台獨人士參與接待工作等， 而升高了與康乃爾之行的對抗，以致一發不可收拾。
李登輝個人的政治角色雖已不如當年康乃爾之旅時的總統地位， 但他在台獨陣營的政治象徵地位卻已大幅提升。 若謂當年北京對李的康乃爾之行，容有過度解讀或誤解之處， 此次東京之旅已無誤會可言。
是正宗的台獨論述。主張「脫古改新」，「 應當徹底釐清台灣與中國延續半世紀以上的曖昧關係」，「（要） 擺脫『一個中國』、『中國法統』的約束」。二、 承認其兩岸操作皆出自權謀變詐。例如，謂《國家統一綱領》 是出自「於是我心生一計」，只是用在欺騙北京及「 對我心懷疑懼的國民黨當權派」。三、其台獨主張以「借殼上市」 為主體，保留中華民國之名，但掏空中華民國的歷史、 憲政及精神內涵。
台獨思維雖有變貌，但深入骨髓。二、以權謀變詐為操作， 無政治誠信可言。三、借殼上市，自欺欺人。如今， 李登輝已不操持實際國政，北京對其無施力之處； 但北京若視李登輝為台獨之代表， 而認為民進黨及蔡英文是另一群李登輝，則雙方互動之發展， 必然會受李登輝東京行的衝擊。也就是說， 李登輝以東京行在自己臉上塗政治胭脂， 但其後座力會彈射到正在參與總統選舉及有可能當選的蔡英文身上。
與蔡英文在李登輝東京行陰影下的處境，有幾點差異：一、 李與北京交惡時，在一九九九年，李登輝發表「兩國論」， 陳水扁則同年公布了《台灣前途決議文》。亦即， 陳水扁非但未被李所挾持，且有分庭抗禮的態勢， 但蔡英文卻迄今跳不出李的陰影。二、李是老台獨， 太陽花及反課綱是小台獨。蔡英文今日處在老小台獨包夾的情勢中， 此與當年陳水扁以《台灣前途決議文》區隔台獨大異其趣。三、 李沾沾自得地將台獨標榜為權謀變詐的操作， 使台獨人物更加喪失內外信任；而蔡英文在「ＥＣＦＡ傾中賣台」 至「ＥＣＦＡ概括承受」的諸種變異，亦無可信任。三、蔡英文的「 現行憲政體制推動論」，在李登輝公然揭示的「借殼上市」論述下， 尤難建立可信性。四、康乃爾之旅的時代，兩岸關係比較隔絕， 北京愚至發動飛彈事件；但此時此際，兩岸已至肌理血肉相連， 雖不動飛彈亦可能「地動山搖」。