Monday, February 29, 2016

Tsai Ing-wen, Listen to Kin Moy

Tsai Ing-wen, Listen to Kin Moy
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2016


Executive Summary: Everyone knows Tsai Ing-wen is reluctant to accept the 1992 Consensus. But no one knows exactly why she is refusing to accept it. The United States acknowledges that today's cross-Strait achievements are based on the 1992 Consensus. Can Tsai Ing-wen truly afford to ignore AIT Director Kin Moy? Can she truly afford to ignore what he was polite enough not to spell out?

Full Text Below:

On Januar 20, Tsai Ing-wen posted an article in the Liberty Times entitled, "The Historical Facts behind 1992: Promoting Cross-Strait Relations". On January 27, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Ma Xiaoguang repeated 13 times that Beijing "remains firm on the 1992 Consensus". More recently, on February 24, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman An Fengshan repeated 16 times that Beijing "remains firm on the 1992 consensus". As Ma and An have made clear, the 1992 Consensus is the “magic talisman” in cross-Strait relations.

This makes it clear that the conflict between Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing over the 1992 Consensus remains unresolved.

On February 4, American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Kin Moy told UDN TV News that everyone's attention is focused on the 1992 Consensus. His message can be summarized as follows.

One. He praised the Ma government's eight year long promotion of cross-Strait exchanges for reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. He affirmed the Tsai government's pledge “to ensure the continuance of current exchanges, and to maintain constructive cross-Strait dialogue".

Two. Moy said the United States has taken note of the important role the 1992 Consensus has played in cross-Strait exchanges over the past eight years under President Ma. He affirmed President Ma's contribution to cross-Strait exchanges, and the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, based on the 1992 Consensus. Kin Moy acknowledged the causal relationship between the 1992 consensus and Ma's cross-Strait policy achievements. He acknowledged that Ma's achievements were the practical result of the 1992 Consensus.

Three. Kin Moy said the US has not taken any position on the 1992 Consensus in the past, but it believes that the 1992 Consensus has been the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. He reaffirmed yet again the role of the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-Strait dialogue.

Four. Kin Moy Mei stressed that the US took no position on the basis for cross-Strait dialogue. He said the basis for cross-Strait exchanges should be determined jointly by the leaders and people from the two sides.

Let us sum up Kin Moy's remarks. One. He  acknowledged the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements. He hoped that the Tsai government would maintain current exchanges. Two. He acknowledged the causal relationship between the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements and the 1992 Consensus. He acknowledged that the 1992 Consensus has been the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. In other words, he affirmed the status quo in cross-Strait relations, and the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-Strait dialogue over the past eight years. Three. He also said that the US took no position on the basis for cross-Strait dialogue. In other words, the 1992 Consensus is the basis for dialogue established by the Ma administration and Beijing. The US does not take a position on that. But it affirms and admires the cross-Strait policy results. The US takes no position on the basis by which the Tsai government and Beijing establish dialogue. It hopes however, that the Tsai government will continue current exchanges.

To sum up Kin Moy's remarks, the United States affirms the Ma government's cross-Strait policy achievements rooted in the 1992 Consensus. It hopes the Tsai government will continue current exchanges. Should Tsai Ing-wen accept the 1992 Consensus as a basis for dialogue? The United States takes no position. As a matter of courtesy, it respects the Tsai government's policy decisions.

Moy put the ball in Tsai Ing-wen's court. Tsai now faces a dilemma. She wants to continue benefiting from Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy achievements, which are based on the 1992 Consensus. As she put it, she wants to “maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations”. But at the same time, she refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus. Alas, Beijing insists on the 1992 Consensus. On this, it is immovable as bedrock. Tsai Ing-wen must ask herself whether Taiwan can withstand the political and economic consequences of her refusal? Kin Moy understands Beijing's position. Is he offering Tsai Ing-wen a word to the wise?

Tsai Ing-wen must pay attention. The United States hopes that the Tsai government will maintain the cross-Strait status quo established by Ma government, based on the 1992 Consensus. Suppose Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus and fails to maintain the status quo? Will the United States apply behind the scenes pressure forcing Tsai Ing-wen to accept the 1992 Consensus? If so, will the courtesy afforded Tsai Ing-wen with these kind words, become a thing of the past?

Everyone knows Tsai Ing-wen is reluctant to accept the 1992 Consensus. But no one knows exactly why she is refusing to accept it. The United States acknowledges that today's cross-Strait achievements are based on the 1992 Consensus. Can Tsai Ing-wen truly afford to ignore Kin Moy? Can she truly afford to ignore what he was polite enough not to spell out?

且聽梅健華說些什麼
2016-03-01 聯合報社論

蔡英文在一月廿日經自由時報發表「九二歷史事實/推動兩岸關係」;一月廿七日,國台辦發言人馬曉光在記者會上十三次提到「堅持九二共識」;最近,二月廿四日,國台辦發言人安峰山在記者會上,又十六次提到「堅持九二共識」。馬安二人皆強調,九二共識是兩岸關係和平發展的定海神針。

由此可見,蔡英文與北京在「九二共識」上的對峙尚未化解。

在這段期間中,二月四日,美國在台協會台北辦事處處長梅健華接受udn TV專訪,論及九二共識,頗受各方注意。他的相關談話,可以歸納並引伸如下:

一、他肯定馬政府八年來在推動兩岸交流、降低台海緊張的貢獻。並支持蔡英文新政府「延續目前交流成果,持續進行兩岸建設性對話」。

二、他說:「美國留意到九二共識在馬總統過去八年任內在推動兩岸交流過程中扮演的重要角色」,並肯定馬總統過去八年「在九二共識的基礎上」推動兩岸交流、降低台海緊張的貢獻。這些論述,應可解釋為:梅健華承認,馬總統八年來在兩岸政策上的成就,與九二共識有因果關係,在一定意義上可視為「在九二共識的基礎上」所實現的成就。

三、梅健華表示,美方長久以來對九二共識沒有抱持觀點,「但我們相信,(過去八年)雙方的(九二)共識是對話基礎」。這段話,似又在表達他對「九二共識是(過去八年)兩岸對話基礎」的觀察與評論。

四、但是,梅健華強調:「兩岸對話基礎為何,美方並無立場。」他說:「兩岸交流的基礎為何,應該由兩岸領導人與人民共同決定。」

試將梅健華的論述略作整理。一、他承認馬政府在兩岸政策上的成就,並希望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」。二、他也承認馬政府在兩岸政策上的成就,與「九二共識」有因果關係,並認知「九二共識是(過去八年)兩岸對話基礎」。也就是說,他肯定兩岸關係的現狀,也對「九二共識為(過去八年)對話基礎」表示接納。三、但是,他說:「兩岸對話基礎為何,美方並無立場。」也就是說,「九二共識」是馬政府與北京共構的「對話基礎」,美國不持立場,但對因此而實現的兩岸成就表達肯定與讚賞。未來,蔡政府與北京將共構何種「對話基礎」,美國亦不持立場,只是寄望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」。

歸結梅健華的看法,可解讀為:美方肯定馬府在九二共識上實現的兩岸關係成就,並希望蔡政府能「延續目前交流成果」;至於對蔡英文是否接受九二共識為「對話基礎」,美方不持立場。這是對蔡政府的政策選擇表達尊重,是梅健華表示的禮貌。

如此一來,球就到了蔡英文的手裡。她的處境是:又要延續馬政府因九二共識而實現的兩岸成果(她說「要維持兩岸關係現狀」),卻似又不願接受「九二共識」。但若北京仍然「堅持九二共識/意志堅如磐石」,蔡英文就必須理智斟酌:台灣的政經情勢能否挺得過去?梅健華的弦外之音,有無可能是在知悉或揣度北京的立場後,給蔡英文的善意示警?

更值得蔡英文注意的是:美國希望蔡政府能「維持馬政府(因九二共識)實現的兩岸現狀」,但若因蔡英文不接受九二共識而致無以維持,美國有無可能回過頭來幕後施壓,要蔡英文接受九二共識?屆時,梅健華如今因維護蔡英文政治尊嚴的這些客氣話,會不會成了明日黃花?

國人只知道蔡英文不願接受「九二共識」,但迄今完全不知她何以拒絕接受。如果美國也承認今日兩岸成就是建立在九二共識的基礎之上,蔡英文難道不該認真聽一聽梅健華究竟說了什麼?及其因禮貌而保留了什麼沒說?

Thursday, February 25, 2016

Help Tsai Ing-wen Overcome Cross-Strait Obstacles

Help Tsai Ing-wen Overcome Cross-Strait Obstacles
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2016


Executive Summary: DPP Legislator Kao Chi-peng's call to purge portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings has provoked a KMT backlash and rallied public opposition. Even the Mainland had harsh words to offer. "What is the agenda? Everyone knows perfectly well.” In response to the controversy, Tsai Ing-wen first tried to go through the motions. She invoked "transitional justice", and spoke of "confronting historical truths". She knows full well that such an action would undermine cross-Strait relations. She is urging the DPP to think more strategically, and calling for a broader discussion of the issue. She appears to applying the brakes on the Sun Yat-sen portrait issue.

Full Text Below:

DPP Legislator Kao Chi-peng's call to purge portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings has provoked a KMT backlash and rallied public opposition. Even the Mainland had harsh words to offer. "What is the agenda? Everyone knows perfectly well.” In response to the controversy, Tsai Ing-wen first tried to go through the motions. She invoked "transitional justice", and spoke of "confronting historical truths". She knows full well that such an action would undermine cross-Strait relations. She is urging the DPP to think more strategically, and calling for a broader discussion of the issue. She appears to applying the brakes on the Sun Yat-sen portrait issue.

As this incident shows, cross-Strait relations present numerous difficulties for Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai has inherited Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait problems. She is now caught in the middle. But her plight is more difficult than Ma Ying-jeou's, for three reasons. Difficulty One. Ma Ying-jeou advocated cross-Strait reconcilation. Opposition to him originated mainly with opponents, not supporters. Tsai Ing-wen's situation is different. She is clearly seeking reconciliation upon taking office. Therefore opposition will come from supporters within her own camp. Opposition will not be limited to DPP supporters, but will also come from deep green NPP elements.

Difficulty Two. Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait stance was largely consistent, from beginning to end. He did not flip-flop endlessly. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, will be making a complete about face upon taking office. She cannot avoid questions about her integrity.

Difficulty Three. Tsai Ing-wen will be making a complete about face. People within her administration may have trouble keeping up. Hence the Sun Yat-sen portrait firestorm. We would like to think that Tsai Ing-wen was not so foolish as to instruct Kao Chi-peng to release a trial balloon. Presumably the DPP acted on its own. To the Mainland, the discrepancy between Tsai Ing-wen before and after is simply too great. This undermines Mainland confidence in her. They see her saying one thing while doing another. They see her talking through both sides of her mouth.

This means that all three camps, green, blue, and red, should help Tsai Ing-wen overcome these three difficulties. Helping her is not for the sake of Tsai Ing-wen personally, but for Taiwan's future, and long-term cross-Strait peace.

First take the green camp. DPP legislators need to appreciate Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait dilemma. They must not make more trouble for her. The Sun Yat-sen portait issue is a farce. It makes Tsai Ing-wen's plight even more awkward. It makes it harder for her to deal with cross-Strait relations.

Now take the blue camp. Tsai Ing-wen will be making a complete about face. She will be reaping the rewards of the cross-Strait policy authored by Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT. Asking the blue camp to swallow this injustice is asking a lot. Tsai Ing-wen is a person of dubious integrity. But the blue camp knows that cross-Strait relations are important. Is Tsai Ing-wen willing to make an about face and acknowledge the KMT's cross-Strait policy achievements? If she is, then the KMT should give her its blessing. Conversely, if Tsai Ing-wen intends to make an about face, she must act with honor. In her 5/20 inaugural address, she must acknowledge the cross-Strait accomplishments of the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou. She must extend an olive branch to the president and  blue camp. This is the way to blue green reconciliation.

Now take the red camp. Despite everything so far, we think the Mainland should allow Tsai Ing-wen more latitude. It should at least "listen to what she says, and watch what she does”. It should not be in too big a hurry to punish Tsai Ing-wen through cross-Strait policy. Take for example, the standoff over the 1992 Consensus. The CCP may wish to consider her pespective. The 1992 Consensus was in fact, a “work in progress”. It was a creative means of creating an ambiguous consensus that simultaneously affirmed the one China principle while qualifying the one China principle. But as Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP see it, they had no role in its creation. They were not party to the consensus. The DPP may find it difficult to swallow the KMT's version of the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen may find it difficult to answer to green camp supporters. Acceptance of the consensus, as is, would amount to political suicide.

The green camp and the red camp, including Tsai Ing-wen and Xi Jinping, should seek a new basis for cross-Strait relations. The Mainland may wish to give the DPP an opportunity to jointly author a new consensus that is nevertheless consistent with the one China principle. The term "old wine in new bottles" comes to mind. The essence of the consensus would remain unchanged, but it would not necessarily bear the name "1992 Consensus". That would provide Tsai Ing-wen with a face-saving measure.

Tsai Ing-wen will need to demonstrate greater sincerity and wisdom. The red and green camps do not trust each other. The two sides must seek some sort of middle ground. A purge of Sun Yat-sen portrais is a de-Sinicization provocation. It must be avoided at all cost. What should the new term for the 1992 Consensus be? Tsai Ing-wen should expand on the foundation established during the Ma Xi summit. Leaders from the two sides can meet. They can establish a newer, even more forward-looking basis for cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen may wish to create a new term for consensus, one able to win approval from the Mainland side.

People on the Mainland consider people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to be members of the same family. President Tsai Ing-wen's difficulties are everyone's to bear. The memory of Chen Shui-bian remains fresh. Tsai Ing-wen would do well to keep the lesson he provided in mind.

幫助蔡英文跨越兩岸關係高牆
20160226 中國時報

民進黨立委高志鵬要求廢國父遺像,引起國民黨反彈、輿論普遍反對,大陸也說了重話:「司馬昭之心,路人皆知。」面對此一議題,原本以「轉型正義」、「面對歷史真相」搪塞的蔡英文,也察覺此一議題將會傷及兩岸關係,要求民進黨團要有戰略思考,要有更多人一起討論,有為廢國父遺像一事踩煞車的味道。

從這一件事可以看出,對蔡英文來說,兩岸議題有著千難萬難的處境。顯然蔡英文將繼馬英九之後,成為兩岸問題的新夾心餅乾,但其處境將比馬英九更艱難,理由有三。其一,馬英九在兩岸是主和派,受到的質疑主要仍來自於反對者,而不是支持者;蔡英文則不然,執政後的她顯然想向主和派轉彎,因此,她的反對者將來自於內部支持者,不只是民進黨的支持者,還包括屬性偏於深綠的時代力量。

其二,馬英九不管在朝在野,其在兩岸問題上的主張「一路走來」,至少「大致如一」,沒有反覆跳躍的問題;蔡英文在野時與在朝後的主張卻有180度的大轉變,「誠信」質疑是她閃躲不了的另一場焦土試煉。

其三,也因為蔡英文的轉向幅度過大,對內民進黨團隊未必跟得上,才會發生廢國父遺像風波。我們願意相信,蔡英文應不至於如此不智地透過高志鵬釋放廢國父遺像的氣球,應屬民進黨的自走炮效應。對外,也由於蔡英文的前後落差太大,深深影響了大陸方面對蔡英文的信任,擔心她言行不一、明暗兩手。

正因為這三個艱難,綠、藍、紅三方都要試著幫蔡英文越過這三個艱難,這不是為了蔡英文個人的政治利益,而是為台灣發展、兩岸和平交流的長遠大計。

先談綠,民進黨立委應了解蔡英文在兩岸的艱難處境,不要再「走鐘」製造蔡英文處理兩岸問題的困擾。類似廢國父遺像的鬧劇多一樁,都只會讓蔡英文更尷尬難堪,更難於處理兩岸關係。

次談藍,雖然要藍營吞下蔡英文透過大轉彎來收割馬英九與國民黨的兩岸成果,從人性上來說並不容易。蔡英文的誠信固可質疑,但藍營仍應有兩岸關係為重的胸襟,如果蔡英文確實願意轉彎,願意接受國民黨兩岸和平發展政策的成果,仍宜祝福期勉。但相對地來說,蔡英文既已確定要轉彎,更應該展現高度,在520就職演說時肯定國民黨與馬英九對兩岸關係的貢獻,遞出橄欖枝,以總統高度還藍營公道,這才是藍綠和解之道。

再談紅,我們仍認為,大陸方面應給蔡英文多一點空間與包容,至少「聽其言、觀其行」,不要急率地在兩岸關係上對蔡英文出手。以「九二共識」的僵持為例,中共不妨換位思考,九二共識其實也是一個「形成的過程」,以一種建設性的模糊方式創造出「九二共識」名詞,來包涵「一個中國原則」並包容兩方對「一中原則」的歧異。但從民進黨或蔡英文的角度來說,共識形成過程中並無民進黨的角色。要民進黨吞下國共建構的「九二共識」,蔡英文將難以向綠營支持者交待,也無異於政治自殺。

換位思考後,綠與紅、蔡英文與習近平才能找到一個新的基礎去延展、維繫兩岸關係。大陸方面,不妨給民進黨一個「新參與」的可能性,共同建構一個不違背「一個中國原則」核心,一種「新瓶裝舊酒」的新名詞共識。亦即共識的本質不變,但共識的名字未必要執著於「九二共識」,給蔡英文一個台階可下。

蔡英文則要展現更大的誠意與智慧,在紅綠缺乏互信下,盡力找出雙方的中間帶,而如廢國父遺像此類的「去中國化」挑釁,應極力避免。至於這個「新名詞」共識,蔡英文可以在馬習會的基礎上向前延伸,兩岸領導人會面,其實已為兩岸創建了一個更為前進的新基礎,這個新基礎,蔡英文不妨以智慧將之化為一個可以獲陸方認同的「新名詞」共識。

對台灣而言、對大陸「兩岸一家親」推動者與支持者而言,當了總統的蔡英文,她的困難,就是大家的困難,應該幫她跨越。對蔡英文而言,陳水扁殷鑑不遠,理應銘記在心。



Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Isolationism will Spell Taiwan's Doom

Isolationism will Spell Taiwan's Doom
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2016


Executive Summary: The Ministry of Labour hopes to relax restrictions on overseas white collar technicians. It has proposed an amendment to the Foreigner Employment Service Law, but has run into stubborn opposition from New Power Party (NPP) legislator Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk. The bill may not get off the ground. The entire world is fighting over talented individuals. Yet politicians on Taiwan are doing their utmost to turn back the clock.

Full Text Below:

The Ministry of Labour hopes to relax restrictions on overseas white collar technicians. It has proposed an amendment to the Foreigner Employment Service Law, but has run into stubborn opposition from New Power Party (NPP) legislator Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk. The bill may not get off the ground. The entire world is fighting over talented individuals. Yet politicians on Taiwan are doing their utmost to turn back the clock. Phison Dongzuo, aka Pan Chien-cheng, is a successful entrepreneur born in Malaysia, and educated on Taiwan. He is the CEO of Phison Electronics Corporation. Pan has issued a heart-felt warning against the DPP's narrow-minded nationalism.

Huang Kuo-chang and others are trotting out elaborate justifications for their opposition. They say loosened restrictions would expose a number of career fields, including shipping, telecommunications, tourism, and finance to increased competition. Low cost workers on the Mainland, who are near by and who speak the same language, would migrate to Taiwan and significantly affect the livelihood of local workers. They would make it harder for young people to find jobs, and reduce their wages. Such outdated arguments might have persuaded people during the 20th century. But any current government that cares about global competitiveness would consider these arguments a joke. If any of Taiwan's competitors learn that this is Taiwan's official position, they will jump for joy.

Why? Simple. Governments the world over are aggressively deregulating. They are loosening policies and laws pertaining to visa issuance for foreign students and workers. They are offering a wide variety of incentives to encourage first-class talent to emigrate and become naturalized citizens. Taiwan, meanwhile, is slamming its door shut. It is erecting daunting barriers to prevent individuals with talent from entering. It is even intent on driving away talented foreigners who are already on Taiwan, who have already contributed to Taiwan. These individuals will surely be snatched up by other countries. So who will be the biggest loser?

Never mind distant regions. Sharp contrasts can be found nearby, right now. The Hong Kong based South China Morning Post recently reported that the Mainland authorities, in order to attract more foreign investment and talent, has officially loosened green card qualification requirements. It has switched from attracting foreign investment to attracting foreign talent. Experts and head-hunters may consider its measures insufficient to attract experienced professionals. But in general they think the effect on foreign talent will be positive.

But here is the really interesting part. Does anyone really imagine policymakers in Beijing haven't thought this through? Do policymakers in Beijing really believe their policies will hurt the livelihood of local workers and make it more difficult for Mainland youth to find jobs? They do not. Their reasoning echoes that of governments the world over. They know that global competitiveness is rooted in brain power, in the ability to innovate. Think about it. Any country would love to attract a talent such as Steve Jobs. How much value can such an individual create? How many jobs? The United States became the world's superpower, because she attracted the first-class talent from the world over. Aren't Mainland China's relaxed requirements for green card eligibility, based on just this sort of strategic thinking?

Taiwan's biggest problem is that its myriad regulations and policies never attract foreign talent. By contrast the Mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao actively create conditions that attract talent from Taiwan. Anyone with even a smattering of knowledge realizes this. How many of Taiwan's top high school graduates are drawn to Hong Kong, Macao, and the Mainland by scholarships? Many talented individuals are poached from the Academia Sinica and top tier universities? In recent years, Taiwan's technology industry has faced increasing bottlenecks. The brain drain of top tier industry professionals is increasingly serious. In 2014, professionals who relocated away from Taiwan accounted for 61.1% of the world's total. Taiwan ranked first in the world.

The opportunities and conditions Taiwan offered to foreign talent lost their attraction long ago. That is why industry is now in a panic. The Ministry of Labor is loosening restrictions on white collar professionals born overseas but who studied on Taiwan. Too bad  they are a day late and a dollar short. How much actual impact is this having? That is hard to say. Huang Kuo-chang and other legislators are even demanding that this tiny door be slammed shut. Is this really “loving Taiwan”, or is this “harming Taiwan”?

Phison Dongzuo, aka Pan Chien-cheng, emigrated to Taiwan from Malaysia. He founded an electronics giant with a market value of nearly 50 billion dollars. He employs 1,000 workers. In  addition to founding Phison, Pan recently recruited 70 to 80 overseas Chinese white-collar workers. If we count workers in the upstream and downstream industry chain, he has created employment opportunities for over 10,000 people. The world is fighting over people like Pan Chien-cheng. Yet Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk would slam the door in the face of such talented individuals. They would even cast out others already on Taiwan. This sort of isolationist xenophobia was in vogue eight years ago. It was overcome only after great difficulty. Yet Huang Kuo-chang and his ilk would resurrect it. If Taiwan actually turns the clock back and reverts to isolationism, it will lose its competitiveness entirely within a few short years. Jobs will be harder to find, and wages will be lower. The ultimate result of such xenophobic isolationism will be national collapse.

招回鎖國幽靈是亂台害台
20160225 中國時報

勞動部為鬆綁僑外生留台從事技術性白領工作,提出《外國人從事就業服務法》修正案,卻遭時代力量立委黃國昌等強力反對,可能因而卡關。當全世界都在使勁爭奪精英人才的此刻,政治人物卻強開歷史倒車。來自馬來西亞,在台灣受教育後創業有成的群聯電子董座潘健成心所謂危,起而批判狹隘的民族主義。

黃國昌等提出此一倡議,振振有詞的論述是,將使得包括運輸、電信、觀光、金融等多項職業領域面臨進一步開放競爭,可能造成距離近、語言相同、成本相對低廉的大陸勞動力來台工作,大幅影響本地勞工的生計,也將使青年就業困難、起薪低迷的問題面臨更嚴峻考驗。這種過時的論述如果放在20世紀,大概還有人聽得進去,如今全球只要還在乎競爭力的政府,早就把這種論述當笑料了,如果台灣的競爭對手知道這將會是台灣的官方論述,他們肯定雀躍不已。

為什麼?理由太簡單,當全球主政者都在積極鬆綁,從簽證、留學、工作等各方面的政策與法令上大幅開放,更創造各種誘因,以便吸引甚至爭取全球第一流的人才前來並入籍之際,台灣卻關上大門,還設下重重不友善的障礙,讓優秀人才不得其門而入,還可能要趕走已經在台灣奉獻的外籍人才,這些全球都在搶的人才肯定都會被其他國家爭取去,這一出一進之間,試問誰才是最大輸家呢?

遠的不談,幾乎就是發生在同時,很值得拿來相對照的一則訊息是,根據香港《南華早報》日前報導,中國大陸為吸引更多外國人才到中國工作和投資,已正式擴大綠卡申請資格涵蓋範圍,將從過去的「吸引外資」轉向「吸引外才」。雖然專家和獵人頭業者認為這項政策對於資深專業人士來說,或許吸引力還不夠,不過一般還是認為此舉對吸引外國人才肯定會起正面作用。

有趣的地方正是在這裡,難道北京決策者不會想到此舉會影響到當地勞工的生計嗎?不會讓大陸青年就業更困難嗎?答案完全不會,因為他們與全球執政者的思維邏輯是一樣的,今天全球競爭力的核心是什麼?就是腦力,就是創新的能力,嘗試想想,今天不論哪一個國家,如果能爭取到一個像賈伯斯這樣的人才,僅他一個人就能創造多少產值?又能開創多少工作機會?美國會成為全球超強,不就是因為她吸引全球第一流人才聚集所締造的嗎?大陸會在政策上擴大綠卡申請資格涵蓋範圍,也不就是基於這種戰略思維嗎?

台灣最大的問題是在各種法規與政策上,從來就沒有締造任何吸引外籍優秀人才的誘因,相對大陸與港澳卻積極創造條件吸引台灣的優秀人才,稍微留心趨勢發展的人當心知肚明,每年不知有多少台灣一流的高中畢業生,被港、澳、大陸高額的獎學金吸引走,中研院乃至頂尖大學也有許多人才被高薪挖走,近年台灣科技產業發展面臨瓶頸,高端產業人才出走現象也日趨嚴重。2014年台灣專業人才外移占總外移人口61.1%,高居全球第一。

台灣的發展機會與提供的條件,對外籍優秀人才早就喪失吸引力了,企業需才孔急,勞動部乃針對僑外生留台從事技術性白領工作進行政策性鬆綁,其實只是亡羊補牢,實際上有多少效果真的還很難說,黃國昌等立委卻是連這個小門都要關上,這哪是在愛台灣?這是在害台灣哪!

來自馬來西亞的群聯電子董座潘健成,在台創立市值近500億元的電子產業,員工約千人,除創辦人潘健成等為僑生,近年聘用了7080名僑外白領人士,但加計上下游產業鏈,開創的就業機會逾萬。正是像潘健成這樣的人才,是全球都在爭奪的,若依黃國昌等人的見解,等於要將這樣的人才全擋在門外,甚至可能還想將已留在台灣的全趕出去。這種排外鎖國的思維,8前也曾流行過,好不容易這幾年打開些許局面了,黃國昌等卻意圖使之大復活,台灣若真因此倒回鎖國年代,不出幾年將喪失所有競爭力,就業困難、起薪低迷的問題只會更嚴重!鎖國的最後,將是亡國!

Tuesday, February 23, 2016

President Lee Teng-hui Violates the Constitution: Can Tsai Ing-wen Remain Silent?

President Lee Teng-hui Violates the Constitution: Can Tsai Ing-wen Remain Silent?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2016


Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen cannot remain silent. Otherwise she will be inexorably painted into a corner, and lose all room for maneuver. Tsai is about to become president. She must abide by the Constitution. She made a commitment to the people. The Constitution explicitly stipulates that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the "Republic of China's Taiwan Area, and the Mainland Area". Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric is unconstitutional. President elect Tsai must nail Lee to the wall using a second nail.

Full Text Below:

Lee Teng-hui's newly published "The Remainder of My Life" has stirred the pot. Strictly speaking, this book is hardly new. It was published in Japan in 2014. The current edition is merely a translation. The book has been widely criticized for alleging that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan", and for advocating Lee's two states theory. It sings a tired tune. But the tired tune has caused an uproar because Lee Teng-hui is demanding that Tsai Ing-wen implement his agenda.

Lee Teng-hui claimed that "The Diaoyutai Islands belong to Japan".  Tsai Ing-wen knew she could not equivocate on this issue. She had no choice but to make herself crystal clear, so she immediately replied "Diaoyutai belongs to Taiwan". She nailed Lee Teng-hui on this historical fact. Other DPP politicians whom Lee named spoke even more plainly and more caustically.

For example, former premier Yu Hsi-kung said that the Diaoyutai Islands were part of Touchen Township, Yilan County. Lee blasted Yu, saying "Nothing is more foolish than this." Yu Hsi-kun clarified his position. He said the Diaoyutai Islands were incorporated into Ilan County in 1973, not during his term as premier. In addition to pointing out Lee's error, Yu sarcastically noted, "I knew long ago that the Diaoyutai Islands were Republic of China territory, because Mr. Lee Teng-hui said so." Yu pointed out Lee's previous, self-contradictory position.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP were not the only ones nailing Lee Teng-hui to the wall. Many fishermen did so as well. Lee Teng-hui seems to have forgotten something. Unless we affirm sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands, we have no legal basis to assert fishing rights within Diaoyutai Island waters. This is why fishermen from Suao denounced Lee Teng-hui as a "lackey of Japan". Lee Teng-hui forfeited sovereignty and humiliated the nation over the Diaoyutai Islands issue. If our fishing rights are not upheld, it directly impacts those who make a hard-scrabble living on the sea. How can they not be outraged?

Lee Teng-hui even nailed himself in his own book, "The Remainder of My Life". Lee praised the Ma government for signing the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement with Japan in 2013. He said, "This, for me as someone who has long looked forward to an early agreement between Taiwan fishermen and Japan, is a truly happy event, a truly historic feat well worth celebrating." But if Ma Ying-jeou had parroted Lee Teng-hui, and argued that the Diaoyutai Islands belong to Japan, what grounds would Taiwan have to negotiate fishing rights with Japan? Japan would never have agreed to this “historic” Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. 

But when the issue is the two states theory, Tsai Ing-wen finds herself in an embarrassing dilemma. During her presidential campaign, she swore to the people, the international community, and the Mainland, that she would abide by the existing constitutional framework. Cross-Strait relations under the existing constitutional framework are explicitly defined as relations between the "Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area", not relations between independent nations. Tsai Ing-wen knows full well that it is one thing to shout “one nation on each side” when one is the opposition party. But if one continues to shout “two states” when one is the ruing party, then “the ground will move and the mountains will shake”. The consequences will be serious indeed. The two states theory approach is infeasible, impossible, and amounts to political and economic suicide. This is why the DPP, which shrilly championed the two states theory during the Sunflower Student Movement, has no choice but to make a complete about face once it assumes power. Political reality and Taiwan's larger interests allow no room for the two states theory. The DPP is pragmatic. Officials on the Mainland do not consider this sufficient to establish mutual trust. But they also consider it a positive sign.

Just as the DPP was preparing to turn the ship around, Lee Teng-hui chose to make waves with his two states theory. In "The Remainder of My Life" Lee claims that "Taiwan has already developed a " Taiwan/Republic of China consciousness". Lee claims that the Republic of China is the Second Republic, and is a separate nation from the People's Republic of China. Lee Teng-hui said he looks forward to a future constitutional amendment, and the full realization of “one nation on each side”.

Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy has long been purposely ambiguous. When faced with this part of “The Rest of My Life” she does not respond the way she did to "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan". When the media demands her response to Lee's characterization of cross-Strait relations as "relations between two nations", she hems and haws.

For one thing, Tsai Ing-wen was the author of Lee Teng-hui's Two States Theory. For another, what she calls the "existing Republic of China constitutional framework" includes future constitutional amendments, and may well be consistent with Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric. This makes it difficult for Tsai Ing-wen to speak plainly.

Political reality requires Tsai Ing-wen to lead the DPP in forsaking the two states version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. Otherwise exchanges between the two sides cannot be maintained. For Tsai Ing-wen, forsaking the two states version involves considerable political risk. From one side she must face the wrath of Taiwan independence elements. From the other side, she must face the blue camp and the Mainland, neither of which trust her. At this point her best strategy is “ambiguity, ambiguity, and more ambiguity”. But Lee Teng-hui is once again hammering home “state to state relations”. He is clearing up the ambiguity, and reducing the room for ambiguity.

Tsai Ing-wen cannot remain silent. Otherwise she will be inexorably painted into a corner, and lose all room for maneuver. Tsai is about to become president. She must abide by the Constitution. She made a commitment to the people. The Constitution explicitly stipulates that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are the "Republic of China's Taiwan Area, and the Mainland Area". Lee Teng-hui's rhetoric is unconstitutional. President elect Tsai must nail Lee to the wall using a second nail.

李登輝違憲 蔡準總統豈可沉默
20160224 中國時報

李登輝新出版的《餘生》一書,攪動了台灣政治一池春水。嚴格來說,這本「新書」一點都不新, 2014年就已經在日本出版,現在只是翻譯後上架,書中被各界廣泛批評的「釣魚台屬於日本」與「兩國論」,更是老調重彈。老調卻引起騷動,因為李登輝擺明要對蔡英文下指導棋。

對李登輝的「釣魚台屬日」說,蔡英文自知不能有模糊空間,必須明確打臉,因而立刻清楚回應「釣魚台是屬於台灣的」,給李登輝釘下一根歷史的鐵釘。幾個被李登輝點名的民進黨政治人物把話得更明、更嗆。

例如李登輝說前行政院長游錫堃把釣魚台列入宜蘭縣頭城鎮管轄,「再也沒有比這更愚蠢的事」。游錫堃澄清,釣魚台隸屬宜蘭頭城,是1973年辦理,而非在他行政院長任內。除指出李登輝所述有誤外,更嘲諷的回應道:「我最早知道『釣魚台是中華民國領土』是聽李登輝先生說的」,挑明反批李登輝的昨是今非。

給李登輝釘釘子的還不只有蔡英文與民進黨,還有許多漁民。李登輝似乎忘了,沒有對釣魚台主權的堅持,就沒有捍衛釣魚台漁權的法理基礎。這是為什麼蘇澳漁民痛批李登輝是「日本走狗」的原因,因為,如果李登輝對於釣魚台「喪權辱國」的主張成立,則漁權也將不保,直接衝擊的就是在海濤上辛苦搏生的討海人,他們能不氣憤嗎?

甚至,連李登輝在《餘生》一書中,都給了自己一根釘子。李登輝盛讚馬政府在2013年與日本簽成的《台日漁業協議》,他說:「這對一心期盼能為台灣漁民早日簽訂協議的我來說,真是可喜可賀之事,真可謂讓人大聲稱快的歷史性壯舉。」但如果馬英九和李登輝一樣主張釣魚台是日本的,台灣還有什麼資格與立場去和日本談判漁權,《台日漁業協議》這項「歷史性壯舉」根本不會有實現之日。

但在「兩國論」的部分,蔡英文就顯得尷尬。競選期間她已經對國人、國際社會及中國大陸做出承諾,要堅持現行憲政體制。憲政體制下的兩岸關係是「台灣地區與大陸地區」,並非國與國關係。何況蔡英文深知,在野時喊喊一邊一國就罷了,如果執政時還繼續搞兩國,必然招來地動山搖的嚴重後果,不僅不可行、不可能,更是政治自毀、經濟自毀的愚行。這也是為什麼,民進黨在太陽花學運時高舉兩國論,喊得如雷震天,贏得政權後就必須轉彎。在政治現實與台灣利益大局考量下,沒有不放棄兩個國家的空間。民進黨的務實,大陸相關人士雖認為仍不足以建立互信,但也認為是一個正面的訊號。

李登輝卻選在民進黨準備大船轉彎的時候,再掀起兩國之浪。依據《餘生》一書說法,「台灣已發展出『台灣中華民國』意識」,中華民國現狀是第二共和,和中華人民共和國應該是兩個國家。李登輝並期盼未來能夠修憲,徹底實現兩岸「一邊一國」目標。

兩岸政策一向模糊的蔡英文,面對《餘生》這一部分的論述,就不像在面對「釣魚台是日本的」說法時一樣強力回擊,媒體緊迫盯人要求她回應李登輝「兩國關係」論述時,一概顧左右而言它。

當然,一方面蔡英文是李登輝時代「兩國論」起草人,少了反駁的正當性,二方面,她所謂「現行中華民國憲政體制」已含有未來可以修憲之意,可能與李登輝的論述若合符節,蔡英文難以回應。

在政治現實上,蔡英文必須主導民進黨放棄《兩岸協議監督條例》兩國版本,才能讓兩岸交流互動關係繼續維繫。放棄兩國版本對蔡英文是極大的政治風險,一方面必須面對獨派的壓力,另一方面藍營,尤其大陸未必信任。此時最佳策略就是模糊、模糊、再模糊,李登輝卻再度提出兩岸「國與國關係」論述,把模糊變清晰,壓縮各自表述的可能空間。

對此,蔡英文不能沉默以對,否則會讓自己慢慢退到牆角,失去迴旋空間。她即將成為總統,遵憲是職務使命與對國人的承諾,《憲法》定位兩岸是「中華民國台灣地區與大陸地區」關係,李登輝的論述已經違憲,蔡準總統就必須給他釘下第二根歷史的鐵釘。


Monday, February 22, 2016

DPP Adopts “Accessorization” Style Taiwan independence

DPP Adopts “Accessorization” Style Taiwan independence
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2016


Executive Summary: Sun Yat-sen used to relate an anecdote called "The Lottery Ticket and the Carrying Pole". A longshoreman kept his lottery ticket hidden in his carrying pole. When he won first prize, he was so ecstatic about no longer needing the carrying pole for work, he flung it into the sea. The story reminds people they must not forget their roots while chasing riches. The DPP has been able to assume power, only by virtue of the Republic of China's century old constitutional government. On the one hand, the DPP is protected by the ROC Constitution. On the other hand, it would undermine the Republic of China's legal foundation. Does this not remind us of the longshoreman who trashed his carrying pole the moment he hit the jackpot?

Full Text Below:

DPP legislator Kao Chi-peng recently proposed removing portraits of Sun Yat-sen from government buildings. He would repeal the Republic of China Flag and Emblem Law, and three other laws that affect the display of Sun Yat-sen's portrait. No one would need to bow before the portrait of Sun Yat-sen ever again. Kao Chi-peng said there is no legal definition of the Father of the Nation. Therefore he said, "We need not continue brainwashing the next generation". DPP legislator Wang Ting-yu, meanwhile, proposed amending the National Holiday and Holiday Implementation Regulations. He would make the day Cheng Nan-jung immolated himself a national holiday. The bill is current in its first reading.

The new government has yet to even take office. Yet DPP legislators have already begun rewriting history. What happened to Tsai Ing-wen's solemn promise to practice "humility, humility, and more humility"? After eight years in the opposition, with power nearly in hand, the only thing on DPP officials' minds is settling past scores, not working on behalf of the nation's citizens.

What do DPP legislators have in mind once they have successfully purged Republic of China founding father Sun Yat-sen? What will remain of the Republic of China? They would define Cheng Nan-jung as a martyr by law. What is their next step? Do they intend to make Cheng Nan-jung Taiwan's "founding father"?

Nor is that all. Green camp legislator Chen Chi-mai has plans for the 2-28 Incident. He would amend the penalty clause in the 2.28 Incident Handling and Compensation Regulations. Anyone who "distorts" or "glosses over the historical truth" about the 2-28 Incident, or who "insults the victims and their families", will be subject to five years imprisonment. This means that anyone who discusses the 2-28 Incident must parrot the DPP version, otherwise they may be convicted in a court of law and imprisoned. This dogmatic mindset not only denies people their right to free speech, it even dictates their understanding of history. This foreshadows a form of fascism more frightening even than that of the authoritarian era.

Furthermore, if hanging portraits of Sun Yat-sen constitutes "brainwashing," why isn't removing portraits of Sun Yat-sen not brainwashing? Isn't the deification of martyr Cheng Nan-jung brainwashing as well? Cheng Nan-jung championed freedom of speech. Isn't miscasting him as an advocate of Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation, falsification of history? Isn't dictating our understanding of history and suppressing our freedom of speech, trampling over democracy and human rights?

The world is watching to see how Tsai Ing-wen, who is unwilling to recognize the 1992 Consensus, plans to "promote cross-Strait relations under the constitutional framework of the Republic of China".  Take the DPP stance on the Cross-Strait Oversight Regulations. DPP members appear to be moving from the "two states" version to a "two regions" version. Observers consider this shift in positions opportunistic but pragmatic. Does Tsai intend to deal with cross-Strait relations pragmatically? If she does, the DPP cannot adopt an aggressive Taiwan independence stance. Kao Chi-peng would purged Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ting-yu would deify Cheng Nan-jung. Chen Chi-mai would dictate how the 2-28 Incident may be depicted. All of the above are nothing more than "acessorization style Taiwan independence". The DPP cannot embark on genuine independence. All it can do is engage in rhetorical sleight of hand, in order to mollify Taiwan independence supporters. All it can do is allow them to daydream about "virtual nation building" and score imaginary Ah Q "moral" victories. .

The green camp does not dare embark on genuine nation building, not when real bullets would fly. All it can do is act coy and play games. This is the dilemma that the soon to resume power DPP must face. These games may bring the DPP momentary comfort. The DPP is about to rule the nation and serve the people. Yet all it can think about is rewriting history? These actions can only lead to the loss of pubic confidence.

Take the purging of Sun Yat-sen for example. Kao Chi-peng says there has never be a legal definition of the "Father of his country". But as everyone knows, the preamble to the Constitution is quite clear. It reads, "The Republic of China National Assembly, commissioned by citizens in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's teachings upon the founding of the Republic of China, authored this Constitution in order to consolidate national authority, protect civil rights, ensure public safety, and promote public welfare... ". Never mind that revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen overthrew the monarchy and established a democratic republic. Not only did he pioneer democracy in Asia, he is also the source of democracy on Taiwan. Besides, isn't purging Sun Yat-sen while deifying Cheng Nan-jung just a wee bit self-contradictory?

Sun Yat-sen used to relate an anecdote called "The Lottery Ticket and the Carrying Pole". A longshoreman kept his lottery ticket hidden in his carrying pole. When he won the grand prize, he was so ecstatic about no longer needing the carrying pole, he flung it into the sea. The story reminds people that they must not forget their roots while chasing riches. The DPP assumed power only by virtue of the Republic of China's century old constitutional government. On the one hand, the DPP is protected by the ROC Constitution. On the other hand, the DPP would do away with the Republic of China's legal foundation. Does this not remind us of the longshoreman who trashed his carrying pole the moment he hit the jackpot?



民進黨改走「裝飾主義」台獨?
2016-02-23 聯合報

民進黨立委高志鵬最近提出「廢國父遺像」的主張,要修法廢除《中華民國國旗國徽法》等三法中有關「國父遺像」的規定,大家今後不必再向國父遺像鞠躬。高志鵬說,因為我國沒有法律定義「國父是誰」,因此「不必繼續洗腦下一代」。與此同時,該黨立委王定宇則提案修改《紀念日與節日實施條例》,要將鄭南榕自焚日列為「法定紀念日」,此案已付一讀。

新政府還沒正式上任,民進黨立委就開始大肆清洗與改寫歷史,這樣的表現,難道就是蔡英文一再叮嚀的「謙卑、謙卑、再謙卑」的出場秀?憋了八年在野,一旦政權到手,民進黨人心中念茲在茲的竟然只是這些歷史陳跡,而不是積極設想如何福國利民。

依民進黨立委的進程,在去除孫中山的國父地位後,中華民國已不知是甚麼「碗糕」;再以法律確認鄭南榕的「烈士」角色;那麼下一步,是否就要把鄭南榕奉為台灣的「新國父」?

不僅如此,綠委陳其邁也動起二二八事件的腦筋,要在《二二八事件處理及賠償條例》中增訂處罰條款,凡是扭曲或粉飾二二八歷史真相,羞辱受難者及其家屬者,將處五年以下有期徒刑。言下之意,任何人談論二二八,必須符合民進黨欽定之版本,否則即可入罪處刑。如此獨斷的思維,不僅剝奪人民的言論自由,更把自己的歷史認知視為一言堂之聖旨,這不僅是法西斯再世,簡直比威權年代還恐怖。

更何況,如果說懸掛國父遺像是「洗腦」,那麼移除國父遺像難道不是洗腦?把鄭南榕神格化為英雄烈士,難道不是洗腦?把鄭南榕追求的「言論自由」編造成追求「獨立建國」,難道不是偽造歷史?用單一的歷史詮釋權來箝制人民的言論自由,難道不是侵犯民主和人權?

外界正在觀察,不願承認九二共識的蔡英文,將如何落實她「在中華民國憲政體制下推動兩岸關係」的承諾。從民進黨在《兩岸協議監督條例》的態度看,似有意由「兩國論」移向「兩區論」;這項轉變,被外界認為是狡猾、但不失務實的作法。如果蔡英文處理兩岸關係選擇務實,即意味民進黨的台獨路線不可能採冒進主義;那麼,高志鵬要求「去孫中山」,王定宇要「尊鄭南榕」,陳其邁要「壟斷二二八論述」,恐怕只能視為一種「裝飾主義」式的台獨路線。亦即,民進黨無法走真正的台獨,卻利用旁門左道來敷衍及滿足獨派支持者,讓他們在「虛擬建國」的幻想中產生阿Q式的精神勝利。

不敢真槍實彈邁向「建國之路」,只好忸忸怩怩改走曲徑幽巷,這正是即將執政的民進黨對其路線矛盾的粉飾之道。這種作法,或可帶來一時精神上的快慰,但聲稱執政要福國利民,卻立刻在這些歷史枝微末節上偷雞摸狗,恐將重挫民眾的信賴。

以「去國父」一案為例,高志鵬說,從無任何法律定義「誰是國父」。殊不知,憲法前言早有清楚說明:「中華民國國民大會受全體國民之付託,依據孫中山先生創立中華民國之遺教,為鞏固國權,保障民權,奠定社會安寧,增進人民福利,制定本憲法……。」更別說孫中山領導革命推翻帝制建立民主共和國,自來是亞洲民主的先驅,也是台灣民主之源。何況,一邊「去國父化」,一邊將鄭南榕神格化,不矛盾嗎?

孫中山說過「彩票與扁擔」的故事:碼頭工人把彩票藏在謀生的扁擔中,中了頭獎後,為不必再挑扁擔欣喜若狂,卻一舉將扁擔丟入大海。故事意在提醒世人,追逐理想不能捨本逐末。民進黨能重返執政,正是植基於中華民國百年憲政的民主歷程;民進黨一方面享受憲政的保護,另方面卻又處心積慮想刨中華民國的根,這不正像中了頭彩卻丟了扁擔的碼頭工人?


There are No Doves and Hawks: There is only the Xi Core

There are No Doves and Hawks: There is only the Xi Core
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 21, 2016


Executive Summary: The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.

Full Text Below:

Talking heads in the media and specialists in academia have long categorized Mainland strategy toward Taiwan as either “hawkish” or “dovish”. They have even labeled specific agencies, officials, and scholars as such. But these so-called hawkish and dovish strategies all fall under category of peaceful reunification. Beijing has different strategies for different groups at different times. It has used both hawkish and dovish strategies simultaneously. Sometimes it tightens its grip with one hand, while relaxing it with the other.

The Taiwan Affairs Office, the Shanghai Taiwan Research Institute, and the Xiamen Taiwan Research Institute, are usually considered dovish. Doves hope to increase cross-Strait trade exchanges, and gradually increase cooperation in culture, media, and education. They hope this will lead the two sides to suspend hostilities, and ultimately lead to peaceful reunification. This approach reached its peak when President Xi Jinping and President Ma Ying-jeou held an historic summit last December.

The military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and hardline official media, are usually considered hawkish. The hawks take national sovereignty very seriously. They hold high the banner of national revival and patriotism. Specific policies include a diplomatic blockade, propaganda war, and military intimidation, including the 1995 and 1996 military exercises held during the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law passed in response to the 2000 “two-states” theory.

Coincidentally, “Sinologists” in Washington are also categorized as reds or blues, and doves or hawks. Doves advocate exchanges to promote the evolution of democracy on Mainland China. Hawks advocate containment, to force Mainland China to collapse from within. The debate has continued for years. More recently, the call has been for both exchanges and containment. The two strategies alternate. Doves and hawks in Washington and Beijing are a fluid phenomenon. They leave visible tracks. When relations between Beijing and Washington warm, doves prevail. When major disputes arise, doves are attacked and  hawks make a rapid comeback.

Many young people have returned to the Mainland. Mainland economic and military might have consequently grown by leaps and bounds. Mainland China has gained unprecedented self-confidence and self-esteem. This has led to a firm foundation of public opinion. No leader can defy the century-long "China Dream", the political objective announced by Xi Jingping at the 18th Central Committee. Mainland China is re-emerging after enduring a century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. It is increasingly powerful, both diplomatically and military. It is no longer maintaining a low profile. In South China Sea and Diaoyutai Island clashes, it often rattles swords.

But the system on the Chinese mainland differs from the system on Taiwan and the United States. One cannot understand Mainland hawks and doves by referring to the US. Michael Pillsbury is a former Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and a longtime US defense policy adviser. Last year Pillsbury published a book entitled "The Hundred Year Marathon". This outspoken American moderate has long believed that hawkish rhetoric on the Mainland is confined to the margins, and that nationalism is not mainstream. That is a serious mistake. Hardliners now command policymaking in Beijing. They represent mainstream geo-strategic thinking. They rarely speak in public, but whenever they do, their remarks represent official policy.

The 2012 DPP election defeat taught the party a lesson about the "final mile”. The DPP began making visits to the Mainland. It began making contact with the Taiwan Affairs Office, Taiwan-related think tanks, and financial research organizations. It probably established links with certain officials. Beijing probably did not allow them close to military and diplomatic circles, or the party's propaganda wing. Green camp members were limited to contacts with United Front agencies, and financial and Taiwan-related sectors. Piecemeal contacts may have provided the DPP with piecemeal information that will lead to misunderstandings and mistaken judgments. DPP policy makers may have listened only to Mainland doves, and come away with false impressions.

The DPP cannot afford to misunderstand Beijing. It cannot afford to think it can refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus after 5/20. It cannot afford to assume that “the horses will continue running, and the party-goers will continue dancing”. It must reach an understanding with the Mainland on the cross-Strait political relationship. Still less can it afford to assume that clashes with the US in the South China Sea will elevate the Taiwan issue to the level of a core US strategic interest, replace the US-China relationship, and make Washington join with Taipei to oppose Beijing. When core interests are at stake, neither Beijing nor Washington distinguishes between doves and hawks. This is especially true for the Mainland. When the issue is sovereignty and opposition to Taiwan independence, neither doves nor hawks are going to compromise. Who the leader happens to be will make no difference.

Only dialogue and cooperation can ensure peaceful relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Only dialogue and cooperation can manage differences and minimize harm. To achieve win-win, all three parties must reduce conflict, seek dialogue, and reach consensus. They must not reverse course and make dispute resolution more difficult. The DPP government will play an important role.

The new government must begin with the cross-Strait status quo. It must discern the Beijing authorities' political mood. It must allow moderates on the two sides to shake hands, instead of allowing hawks and hardliners to disseminate political propaganda and issue military threats.

沒有鴿沒有鷹 對台只有習核心
20160221 中國時報

長期以來,媒體評論或專家解析大陸對台政策,經常以「鴿派」或「鷹派」分類北京對台兩種不同的策略或手段,甚至定位涉台單位或官員、學者。但所謂鴿、鷹,只是北京在推動兩岸和平統一基本方針前提下,針對台灣不同群體、或不同時期所採取的不同策略。北京從來都是鴿、鷹兩手抓,有時一手用力些,另一手放鬆些,有時相反。

一般稱鴿派路線,主要以國台辦及上海、廈門台研智庫為代表。鴿派希望透過擴大兩岸經貿交流與合作,逐步深化成文化、媒體、教育等全方位的交流合作,最終實現兩岸中止敵對,再進展到完成和平統一。這個路線在大陸國家主席習近平和馬英九總統去年12月實現兩岸最高領導人的歷史性會晤後,達到階段性的高峰。

所謂鷹派,通常指的是軍方、外交部門和立論強硬的官媒。鷹派強調嚴肅看待國家主權利益,高舉民族復興和愛國主義傳統。落實在具體對台政策上就是台灣一般稱的外交封鎖和文攻武嚇。這個路線在19951996年台海飛彈軍演危機、2000年兩國論和2005年大陸制訂《反分裂國家法》期間,都曾出現。

無獨有偶,華府研究中國事務圈內也有紅與藍或鴿與鷹之分。主張透過積極交流以促成中國民主演變的鴿派,和主張強勢圍堵、逼中國從內部瓦解的鷹派,長期爭論不休,近年又形成既交流又圍堵、既圍堵又交流的折衷派。而北京和華府間鴿鷹派的浮沉,不但方向高度連動,而且有軌跡可循。當中美關係和緩,鴿派就有出頭的機會;反之,如果雙方關係起了重大爭執,鴿派就會被打擊,鷹派重新抬頭。

中國自大量青壯「海歸派」回國後,經濟發展成就和軍事力量飛躍成長,讓中國的民族自信和自尊不但空前,而且具有厚實的民意基礎,任何一個國家領導人都無法違逆百年來的「中國夢」,也是以習近平在十八大所揭示的政治目標。也因為中國大陸正處於近代中國遭受百年列強侵侮之後的重新崛起,外交、軍事作為轉趨強勢,不再韜光養晦,甚至在釣島爭議和南海問題上,經常選擇性「亮劍」。

不過,中國大陸體制和美國與台灣不同,不能用美國的鷹派與鴿派來理解大陸的鴿與鷹。曾任美國防部助理副部長、長期擔任美國國防政策顧問的白邦瑞去年出版新作《百年馬拉松》中,直言美國溫和派長期以來認為大陸鷹派言論只是邊緣主張、民族主義不是主流,這是嚴重的錯誤。現在不但強硬派在北京政府的決策圈當道,而且是中國地緣戰略思想的主流,他們很少公開說話,一旦公開站出來說話,就代表了決策者真實的聲音。

民進黨2012年敗選,記取「最後一哩路教訓」開始勤跑大陸,與台辦、涉台智庫及財經研究單位多所接觸,可能也與特定官方人士建立某種聯繫管道。不過,我們可以推測,大陸不會容許他們與軍方、外交圈或黨的宣傳單位有任何交往,綠營人士接觸的對象應局限於統戰、財經及涉台領域。其結果是,局部的接觸與訊息得到局部的訊息理解,很容易導致錯誤的判斷。我們非常憂心,民進黨決策人士因偏聽而對大陸產生誤判,甚至對大陸所謂「鴿派」有錯誤的期待。

民進黨不能對北京有錯誤的想像,以為520後就算不承認九二共識,或不與大陸就兩岸政治基礎達成基本共識,兩岸能「馬照跑、舞照跳」;更不能誤以為美、中兩國因南海問題交惡,台灣問題就能成為美國戰略利益的核心而取代美中關係,甚至冀望華府會倒向台北來和北京對抗。事實上,一旦面臨到國家核心利益,無論北京或美國,都沒有鴿鷹之分。尤其大陸,一旦涉及主權和反台獨大前題,無論鴿派或鷹派都寸步不讓,誰當最高領導人都一樣。

只有透過對話和合作,才能讓美、中、台三邊關係中的溫和主張抬頭,讓分歧有效控管,讓爭端危害極小化。要達到三贏,三方都必須採取降低衝突、尋求對話、達成協議,而非反向而行,讓爭端更難化解,民進黨政府是其中重要因素。

新政府應立足於兩岸現狀,看清北京當局目前的政治氣候,創造能讓兩岸溫和派握手的條件,而不是冒險製造讓鷹派抬頭、強硬派文攻武嚇主張當道的機會。


Thursday, February 18, 2016

New Legislature Must Make a Prudent Beginning

New Legislature Must Make a Prudent Beginning
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 19, 2016


Executive Summary: As an old saying has it, the new ruling and opposition parties must show "humility in victory, and grace in defeat”. The ruling DPP must demonstrate humility in victory. On the night of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory, she spoke of humility, and respect for the minority and the political opposition. The defeated KMT is currently a headless fly, mired in internal strife. It must buck itself up. Taiwan needs the KMT to play a part in the legislature. It needs the KMT to offer clear reasoning and provide strong checks and balances. Only then can it provide the necessary leadership for blue camp followers.

Full Text Below:

The new legislature will convene today. This marks the beginning of a new political ecosystem. The DPP will want to implement its “total government”. As the majority party it will have to assume full responsibility. The KMT must learn what it is to be the underdog. It must become an effective opposition party, able to oversee the government and the ruling party. It must prevent DPP abuse of power and corruption. It must prevent the DPP from leading the nation down the wrong path. The blue and green parties have switched roles. The above criteria will reveal whether they are qualified for their new positions. 

A prudent beginning is essential. The key will be the two parties' approach to priority legislation. Two pending bills are the key. They are the “Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations”, and the “Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority”. These bills will reveal whether the two parties have the proper attitudes and postures for their new roles. The DPP has characterized these two bills as priority legislation. The KMT has not.

First take the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. The DPP initially proposed a "two-states theory” version, entitled the "Draft Bill for Agreements between Taiwan and China". It explicitly referred to agreements between the two sides as "agreements between two nations". Passage of this bill into law, would amount to the passage of the "two-states theory” into law. It would become the first shot fired in the battle for de jure Taiwan independence. It would bring unspeakable catastrophe upon Taiwan. Leave aside the reaction from the Mainland for the moment. Chaos would prevail, on Taiwan, in the US, and among other foreign allies. Not one of them would support us or recognize us.

Tsai Ing-wen knows full well the lethal blowback that would result from such a move. In the wake of her election victory, she began altering the two-states theory version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. DPP legislative caucus leader Ko Chien-min was more explicit. He said "The content will be modified. At the very least, the name of the regulations will be different".

Considering Taiwan's larger interests, the DPP's move is correct and necessary. We would remind the DPP however, that merely changing the name of the bill, or deleting the words, "agreement between two nations", will not enable the DPP government to squeak by. If the draft bill contains other "two-states theory” content, then any DPP efforts to stabilize cross-Strait relations will be severely jeopardized.

The best way to deal with the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations is for Tsai to follow in Ma's footsteps. Following in Ma's footsteps may provoke discontent among Taiwan independence supporters, and invite opposition ridicule. But that is a price the DPP must pay. After all, the DPP knew full well that its two-states theory version of the regulations was infeasible. But it proposed it anyway, merely to win votes. Its credibility must of course now take a hit.

Turning away from the two-states theory is precisely what we are urging the DPP to do. Anyone with eyes can see how many DPP proposals that guaranteed success during the election, also guaranteed failure during governance. The DPP is now in power. Presumably Tsai wants her administration to succeed. A 180 degree “bootleg turn” is unavoidable. That being the case, the DPP may as well bite the bullet. Whatever it does, it must not flinch. It must not hedge its bets, in a futile attempt to please both sides. It must not attempt to simultaneously eat crow and save face. Otherwise it will wind up with nothing to show on either side.

Now take the “Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority”. The KMT demands to know why the DPP considers this such an urgent matter. Its attitude suggests pettiness. It is barking up the wrong tree. It suggests that the KMT has yet to accept its new role as an opposition party.

The clash over the articles is both substantive and procedural. In terms of procedure, the Articles on the Transfer of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Authority are important. The DPP has won a legislative majority. It now wants to make the articles a priority. The KMT also wanted this legislation. So why not respect the wishes of the ruling party? What the KMT should do, is closely monitor the substantive aspect of the articles.

For example, the DPP version of the articles expand presidential authority, and may well be unconstitutional. After all, presidential authority is limited by the Constitution. Article 171 of the Constitution stipulates that "Any legislation that contravenes the Constitution is null and void". In other words, the KMT can safely defer to the DPP on the matter of priority, while noting obstacles to its passage, or voicing doubts as to its constitutionality. It can leave behind a record that enables the public to judge its merits.

This is why we recommend that the Kuomintang adjust to its new role as an opposition party. The DPP enjoys a stable majority in the legislature. Or does the KMT intend to take the same path as the DPP once did, the same path the KMT criticized the DPP for? Does it intend to forcibly occupy the podium? If not, then the KMT will not be able to block passage of the bill. That does not mean it cannot play a powerful role on the matter of substance. During debates over substance, the KMT must put up a fight. It must present clear reasons for its opposition that enable the public to see why the bill is wrong.

As an old saying has it, the new ruling and opposition parties must show "humility in victory, and grace in defeat”. The ruling DPP must demonstrate humility in victory. On the night of Tsai Ing-wen's election victory, she spoke of humility, and respect for the minority and the political opposition. The defeated KMT is currently a headless fly, mired in internal strife. It must buck itself up. Taiwan needs the KMT to play a part in the legislature. It needs the KMT to offer clear reasoning and provide strong checks and balances. Only then can it provide the necessary leadership for blue camp followers.

新立法院開議日要慎始
20160219 中國時報

立法院新會期今天開議,將是國會新生態的開始,民進黨要學著如何當全面執政、全面承擔、全面負責的多數黨;國民黨也要學著如何當一個處於劣勢卻有戰力的少數黨,能有效監督政府與執政黨,防止濫權與貪腐,並避免國家走上錯誤道路。這是藍綠在國會互換角色後,是否稱職的試金石。

慎始非常重要,開議後最關鍵的表現,就是兩個政黨對優先法案的態度。我們不妨從二個指標法案──「兩岸協議監督條例」以及「總統副總統職務交接條例」來觀察新朝野該有的新態度與新角色。而這兩個法案,是民進黨想在新會期處理的「優先法案」,卻都未被國民黨納入「優先法案」。

先來看「兩岸協議監督條例」,民進黨原來提出的是被稱為「兩國論版」的「台灣與中國締結協議處理條例草案」,草案第一條明文把兩岸間協議稱為「兩國協議」。此一條文若通過,就是「兩國論入法」,開了法理台獨的第一槍。這將是台灣難以承受的大災難,不要說中國大陸會有強烈動作、台灣內部會有極大動盪,美國等國際上友我國家,也不可能支持認同。

蔡英文深知此一「致命後座力」,勝選後即開始陸續釋放「兩國論版」的「兩岸協議監督條例」將轉彎的訊息。民進黨立院黨團總召柯建銘更把話挑明:「內容一定會修改、至少條例名稱會不一樣」。

為台灣大局利益計,我們認為民進黨轉彎是正確的,更是必要的。但仍要提醒民進黨,不是只把法案名稱改一改,或者刪除草案第一條的「兩國協議」文字就能安渡關山,在該草案中,如果有其他擦邊球式的「兩國論內容」,仍然會對民進黨接下來努力想要和緩、穩住的兩岸關係帶來重創。

處理「兩岸協議監督條例」最好的方式,就是「馬規蔡隨」,雖然拿香跟拜可能惹來獨派支持者的不滿、對手陣營的訕笑。但這是民進黨必須付出的代價。畢竟,民進黨在提出兩國論版的監督條例時,也清楚知道絕無可行,但為了爭取選票還是提出,誠信受責,也是當然之理。

從兩國論轉彎,這也是我們對民進黨新角色要做出的勸告,明眼人皆知,民進黨在過去為了「選舉成功」,提出了許多將導致其「執政失敗」的政策與主張。現在執政了,除非蔡英文不想執政成功,否則「狂轉彎」幾乎已是不可避免的宿命,既然如此,民進黨要「狂轉彎」,就乾脆一次轉到底,千萬不要「欲轉還留」,留下不清不楚、想兩面討好、裡子面子都要拿的擦邊球,這將變成兩頭空的另一場災難。

接著來看「總統副總統職務交接條例」,國民黨質疑民進黨將之列為優先法案的「必要性跟急迫性在哪裡?」態度上顯得不夠大方,在議題切入上也顯得失了準度。這也顯示,國民黨還沒有調整好「新在野」的角色。

如果把交接條例分為程序議題與實質議題,從「程序面」言,總統副總統交接法制化有其重要性,民進黨既已贏得國會多數,既然在意此事,要將之置為優先法案,國民黨過去也曾有意推動立法,現在何妨尊重執政黨?國民黨該做的是在「實質面」嚴格把關。

例如,民進黨版交接條例,其對總統職權的限縮,不無違憲的疑慮,畢竟總統職權仍為憲法所明訂,《憲法》第171條亦規定:「法律與憲法牴觸者無效。」換言之,在該交接條例上,國民黨就算程序上尊重民進黨列之為優先,仍可以在實質內容上指出其滯礙難行,或有違憲疑慮之處,留下據理力爭的紀錄,讓民眾公評。

這也是我們給國民黨「新在野」的角色建議,未來在民進黨居於穩定多數的國會生態裡,除非國民黨要走過去他們所批評的民進黨霸占主席台的老路,否則國民黨恐怕很難在程序上去阻擋民進黨欲通過的法案,但程序上的無力,不代表不能在實質面發揮強大的戰力,只是在實質議題的辯論攻防中,國民黨要下更足的功夫,用犀利的道理,讓民眾公評法案的是非。

用一句古諺:「勝不驕,敗不餒」送給「新朝野」。「勝不驕」要送給新會期的民進黨,要記得蔡英文勝選夜說的謙卑,要尊重少數與在野。「敗不餒」,送給目前仍持續處在無頭蒼蠅狀態、沉陷在敗選內鬨的國民黨,好好打起精神,台灣還是需要國民黨在國會擔當犀利說理、強而有力的制衡者,如此也才能領導支持藍營路線的群眾徐圖再起。



Wednesday, February 17, 2016

New Government Should Leverage the MTA

New Government Should Leverage the MTA
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 18, 2016


Executive Summary: Premier Chang San-cheng recently told this newspaper that after more than a year of negotiations, the Merchandise Trade Agreement (MTA) has reached near perfect agreement. The negotiating team must not simply leave. It must continue negotiating. He invited the new government's transition team to review the results, and decide for itself whether anyone “sold out Taiwan”, whether Taiwan's best interests were considered, before deciding what to do next.

Full Text Below:

Premier Chang San-cheng recently told this newspaper that after more than a year of negotiations, the Merchandise Trade Agreement (MTA) has reached near perfect agreement. The negotiating team must not simply leave. It must continue negotiating. He invited the new government's transition team to review the results, and decide for itself whether anyone “sold out Taiwan”, whether Taiwan's best interests were considered, before deciding what to do next.

Consider what Chang San-cheng said, and compare it to the latest Executive Yuan priority legislation list.  The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" draft bill is nowhere to be seen. The Ma government has probably given up on the oversight regulations, the MTA, and the STA, and left their fate to the incoming government's "total rule".

Over the past two years, the importance of the STA and the currently negotiated MTA to Taiwan have been obscured by bickering between the ruling and opposition parties. In the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, the public expected greater social justice and distributive justice. The Ma government failed to effectively communicate with the public. As a result, the STA and MTA were stigmatized as "black box operations", as "pandering to [Mainland] China", and as "enriching the corporations".

Fortunately, after the mid-January presidential and legislative elections, Taiwan will not hold any new elections for the next two years. Public opinion may revert to rationality and moderation. People may be able to consider just what sort of political, economic, and trade relations Taiwan needs to have with the Mainland? Will the new government reject the STA and MTA negotiated by the Ma government outright? Or will it retain it and allow it to go in force? Will it at least continue negotiations?

The DPP legislative caucus has hurriedly drafted an “Articles for Presidential Authority Handover”. The new version prevents the president from signing any international or cross-Strait treaties during the transition period. That was astonishing, considering that the election is already over. The Democratic Progressive Party is about to enjoy “total rule”. But its "Everybody cheats!” mindset remains strong. The DPP has apparently forgotten that its most urgent duty at the moment is neither oversight nor the formation of a transitional cabinet, but fulfilling its campaign promises and rebuilding the nation.

Beginning today, President-elect Tsai Ing-wen will pay visits to seven major industries. The public has pinned its hopes on the new leader. She would do well to listen to what industrialists have to say about the STA, MTA, and cross-Strait relations. She will meet tomorrow with members of the DPP transition team. She may wish to accept Premier Chang San-cheng invitation to jump in and evaluate the results of past talks, and decide whether they really are utterly worthless?

Enemies during an election are not necessarily enemies in perpetuity. Tsai Ing-wen says she wants to “unite everyone on Taiwan". If so, she should think hard about maximizing “residual value” during the transition period leading up to 5/20. After that, Beijing will inevitably "listen to what she says, and watch what she does”. The STA and MTA are ready to go. Why wait for the final mile, for Beijing to raise the political asking price? Why wait for unforeseen bumps in the road? Why not allow the transition team to scrutinize the STA and MTA and see if it contains anything that “sells out Taiwan”? If the Tsai government agrees with Chang San-cheng that the time is right, why not take advantage of the Ma government's cross-Strait framework?  Washington and Beijing think it maintains the status quo. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to "backdoor list" the STA and MTA?

The Ma government was routed during the previous two elections. The main reason was that while pursuing economic growth, it failed to ensure social justice. It failed to reduce the gap between rich and poor, between capital and labor, between big business and small. Once the new government comes to power and demands changes, it too must make the pie bigger. Otherwise what will there be to divide?

During the election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen's economic policy platform called for innovation in five major industries. It did not look only at GDP figures. It also valued full employment and equitable distribution. Tsai is attempting to address the blind spots in Ma's political and economic policy. But she cannot turn a blind eye to the necessity of Taiwan-Mainland cooperation for economic survival. This is what the new government will face in the future. Tsai may wish to use the STA and MTA as touchstones, to find the optimal solution, and avoid a nightmare scenario. She must not procrastinate and hope for the best.



簽貨貿協議 新政府可借力使力
2016-02-18 聯合報

行政院長張善政近日接受本報專訪時提及,歷經一年多來的談判,我方在兩岸貨貿協議討價還價上,已達「最適點」,談判團隊要不要見好就收,還是繼續談下去,他歡迎新政府的交接團隊先檢視目前結果,有無賣台,是否為台灣爭取最大利益,之後再決定貨貿的下一步。

張善政此說,再對照行政院最新提列的優先法案清單,已不見《兩岸協議監督條例》草案,幾乎已可斷定,馬政府已將監督條例、兩岸服貿協議與貨貿協議的去留選擇權,交由即將「完全執政」的新政府來決定。

過去兩年多來,服貿與在談判中的貨貿,先是在高度的朝野對立中,難以清楚凸顯對台灣的重要性;接著又歷經太陽花學運後,民間對社會公平與分配正義有高度期待。在政府說不清,一時間也沒找到有效的社會溝通方法下,服貿、貨貿就已被貼上「黑箱」、「傾中」與「圖利財團」等汙名化標籤。

所幸,1月中的總統大選、立委選舉結束後,在未來兩年內,台灣都不會再有新的選舉。新民意大可回歸理性、中道,在盈滿的正當性加持下,好好想想,台灣到底需要和大陸發展什麼樣的政治與經貿關係?馬政府主政下的服貿、貨貿,到底是要直接捨棄,還是留下來通過生效或者繼續談?

從民進黨立院黨團最近急急如律令般地推動《總統職務交接條例》草案,新版本還增訂了「看守期間不得簽定國際條約和兩岸協議」等條款,頗讓人詫異,大選已經結束了,民進黨即將完全執政了,但是「防範宵小」的心態還是很濃厚。民進黨似乎忘記了,此刻最重要的使命,不是「監督」或「看守」過渡內閣,而是根據選前的許諾與藍圖,動手重建家園。

今天起,總統當選人蔡英文將展開七大產業之旅,這位民意寄與厚望的國家新領導人,不妨好好聽聽產業界對服貿、貨貿與對兩岸關係的想法;而約定明天起開始接觸的政權交接小組在碰面後,民進黨的交接小組成員,不妨接受閣揆張善政先發出的「邀請函」,直接「入內」好好深度評鑑一下,過往談出的成果,是不是這麼一文不值。

選舉時的敵人,不會是百無一好永遠的敵人,在新領導人蔡英文不時主張要「團結整個台灣」的思維下,更應好好盤算,在520之前,怎麼善用過渡內閣來日不多的「剩餘價值」。試想,北京對於520之後的新政府,免不了要一段「聽其言、觀其行」的觀察期,服貿、貨貿此刻若能見好就收,何必要等到北京墊高對台的政治要價後,讓已浮現最後一哩路的服貿、貨貿,還要一路顛簸呢?如果交接小組詳加檢視服貿、貨貿清單後,發現的確無賣台,也的確在張善政所稱的「最適點」後,何妨利用馬政府所搭建且一路獲得美、中認可的兩岸架構,在「維持現狀」下,「借殼」洽簽貨貿,通過服貿?

馬政府在前兩次大選挫敗的主因,是未能體察在追求經濟成長的同時,也要兼顧社會公平分配,盡力減輕貧富、勞資、與大小企業間的相對剝奪感。新政府上台後,費力矯正的同時,也要規劃如何把經濟的餅做大,否則不夠豐腴的小餅,哪裡夠分呢?

在大選期間,蔡英文描繪的經濟政策,提到了要發展五大創新產業,也提到了不能只看GDP數字,還要重視充分就業與公平分配。偏偏這些旨在修正馬政府經濟政策盲點的看法,都少了未來要如何與大陸經濟共生的論述。這也是新政府在日後必然要面對的挑戰,不妨即刻以服貿、貨貿做為試金石,嘗試找出最佳解方,以免夜長夢多、以拖待不了變。


Tuesday, February 16, 2016

May the Two Mainland Sessions Lead to Good Cross-Strait Relations

May the Two Mainland Sessions Lead to Good Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 17, 2016


Executive Summary: The Mainland's National Peoples Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) will hold important meetings on cross-Strait relations beginning on March 3. These are the first such meetings held since the Democratic Progressive Party return to power was confirmed. Mainland President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang will deliver important speeches. The two meetings will introduce a "Ten Three Five Planning Outline", an important indicator of the Mainland's new Taiwan policy. We hope these two meetings will reaffirm the roadmap for cross-Strait peace, and ensure a bright future for cross-Strait relations.

Full Text Below:

The Mainland's National Peoples Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) will hold important meetings on cross-Strait relations beginning on March 3. These are the first such meetings held since the Democratic Progressive Party return to power was confirmed. Mainland President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang will deliver important speeches. The two meetings will introduce a "Ten Three Five Planning Outline", an important indicator of the Mainland's new Taiwan policy. We hope these two meetings will reaffirm the roadmap for cross-Strait peace, and ensure a bright future for cross-Strait relations.

Not long ago, the results of the January 16 general election were announced. The DPP scored a major victory. It won not only the presidency, but a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. It has become the largest party on Taiwan, and will be implementing “total rule”. But president-elect Tsai Ing-wen has yet to recognize the 1992 Consensus, nor affirmed that "both sides of the strait belong to one China".  As a result cross-Strait relations have been thrown into limbo.

On February 2 of this year, the Mainland held a working conference on Taiwan. They resolved to continue cross-strait economic integration, to expand cross-strait exchanges and cooperation in all areas.  But they made no mention of continued “cross-Strait consultations and negotiations". Clearly the Mainland still has doubts about the DPP government's political posture. It is waiting for Tsai Ing-wen to clearly recognize the 1992 consensus before it negotiates with the new government on Taiwan and the DPP.

Where will the Mainland announce the conclusions of its meeting on Taiwan policy? In three ways. One. President Xi Jinping will meet with missions dedicated to Taiwan-issues, and make public their conclusions. Two. Premier Li Keqiang will make public the "Government Work Report". Three. The Mainland authorities will make public the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" chapters on cross-Strait relations.

Everyone remembers what Xi Jinping said about cross-Strait relations in March last year, on two occasions. He said "Without a solid foundation, the earth will move and the mountains will shake". His wording was harsh. His purpose was to ensure that the DPP respect and recognize the basis for cross-Strait political relations, namely, recognition of the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. In Li Keqiang's NPC and CPPCC government work reports last year, the Taiwan-related part of the presentation focused on efforts to promote cross-Strait dialogue, win/win, economic integration, grass-roots and youth exchanges. They were convinced that peaceful cross-Strait relations were irreversible and irresistible.

The two meetings will introduce the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline". Contrast this with the “Ten Two Five Planning Outline” introduced during two meetings in 2011. A special chapter devoted to cross-Strait relations planning was entitled “Promote Peaceful Cross-Strait Relations and Reunification of the Motherland”. The first sentence began with "insist on peaceful reunification, and the one country, two systems policy". The main body of the chapter however, called for three means by which to promote cross-Strait economic development. They were: establish and improve the cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanism, expand cross-Strait economic cooperation, and support the West Coast Economic of the Taiwan Strait Economic Zone.

In any event, when the two meetings convene this year, the change in ruling parties on Taiwan will be a fait accompli. The new government will take office on May 20. Cross-Strait relations will have entered a new era. Under the circumstances, the policy declaration issued during the two meetings is bound to affect cross-Strait relations. Mainland party and government leaders must craft an appropriately  worded declaration in advance of the two meetings. Only then can the two sides reach the greatest agreement.

The highest priority of these two Taiwan-related policy meetings should be the vital interests of the public on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan
wants cross-Strait peace. It wants close cross-Strait exchanges, win/win, and greater common interests that move the two sides towards integration.

This and the election results on Taiwan are two different things. The DPP victory was mainly due to poor performance by the ruling Kuomintang.  The DPP victory was the result of internal factors. Cross-Strait relations was not a major factor.

Therefore the two Mainland meetings should not hesitate to reaffirm the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and set the minds of the public on Taiwan at ease. The "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" will be reviewed and finalized by the two meetings this year. Mainland party and government leaders should declare a "cross-Strait peace dividend", and let the public on Taiwan experience more substantive benefits. This will rein in the DPP, and prevent its cross-Strait policy from straying too far from the path.

This being the case, the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" chapter devoted to cross-Strait policy should expand cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. For example, the Ten Two Five Planning Outline mentioned support for the Taiwan Strait West Coast Economic Zone. The Ten Three Five Planning Outline should call for "free trade zone and One Belt, One Road exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan". This would increase its appeal to Taiwan. The Ten Two Five Planning Outline referred to "one country, two systems". Does the Ten Three Five Planning Outline need to make the same reference? That is something worth the Mainland's further consideration.

If the DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, the two meeting have no choice but to respond. We hope Mainland party and government leaders distinguish between the DPP and the general public. Do not undermine the feelings the general public has toward the Mainland. It can encourage the DPP to move closer to the 1992 Consensus, instead of confronting it.  This will prevent shocks to cross-Strait relations. After all, the DPP government will not take office for three months. It still has room to adjust its cross-Strait policy path.

盼陸「兩會」為兩岸關係開出好局
20160217 中國時報

大陸全國人大及政協「兩會」定33日起舉行,這次會議對兩岸關係極為重要。這次會議是台灣確定民進黨再執政後,大陸首次舉行的重要會議,大陸國家主席習近平及國務院總理李克強都將發表重要演說,會中並將端出《十三五規畫綱要》,都將成為新階段大陸對台政策的重要指針。我們期盼,這次兩會能再度確認兩岸和平發展路線,為未來兩岸關係開出好局。

不久前的116日台灣大選投票結果揭曉,民進黨大勝,不但贏得總統寶座,亦成為立法院過半數席位的最大黨,將要全面執政。但總統當選人蔡英文迄今未承認「九二共識」,亦不認同「兩岸同屬一中」,致使兩岸關係陷入不確定情境中。

大陸已於22日舉行今年對台工作會議,會中結論雖明示要促進兩岸經濟融合發展,及擴大深化兩岸社會各領域的交流合作,但未提出近年常講的「繼續推進兩岸協商談判」;顯示陸方對民進黨政府的政治立場仍抱持疑慮態度,必須等到蔡英文正面肯定九二共識後,才會和民進黨及台灣新政府協商談判。

大陸這項對台政策考量,在3月的「兩會」場合將如何呈現呢?這個問題,有三大觀察指標,一是大陸國家主席習近平會見台灣相關代表團,所發表的談話;二是國務院總理李克強「政府工作報告」的涉台部分;三是《十三五規畫綱要》的兩岸關係篇章。

各界都記得,習近平在去年3月的兩會場合,針對兩岸關係發表了「基礎不牢,地動山搖」的談話,其語意頗為嚴厲,目的顯在促使民進黨,尊重及認同兩岸關係發展的政治基礎,即九二共識和反對台獨。而李克強去年兩會政府工作報告,涉台部分則著重表述,努力推動兩岸協商對話、推動經濟互利融合、加強基層和青少年交流、堅信兩岸關係和平發展潮流不可阻擋及不可逆轉等。

至於即將在今年兩會端出的《十三五規畫綱要》,對照依據是2011年兩會呈現的《十二五規畫綱要》,後者用了一個專章,來表述兩岸關係發展規畫,其標題為〈推進兩岸關係和平發展和祖國統一大業〉,開頭第一句話是「堅持和平統一、一國兩制方針」。不過該專章主體內容,是促進兩岸經貿發展的三大取向,即建立健全兩岸經濟合作機制、全面深化兩岸經濟合作、支持海峽西岸經濟區建設。

無論如何,今年兩會登場時,台灣執政黨再輪替已成定局,新政府即將在520日上任,兩岸關係也要進入新階段。在這種形勢下,今年兩會對兩岸關係所作的政策宣示,必然會深刻影響下一步的兩岸關係走勢。就此,大陸黨政領導層有必要事先拿捏好分寸,俾於兩會場合,作出最適切的宣示,以求取兩岸雙方的最大公約數。

台灣民眾的願望和切身利益,理當是本次兩會涉台政策優先關切的對象。台灣民眾普遍熱愛兩岸和平,也殷切期盼兩岸密切交流、互補互利,擴大共同利益走向融一。

這和年初台灣大選結果是兩回事;民進黨大勝,主要是國民黨執政績效不佳所致,是台灣內政因素,兩岸關係不是主要因素。

因此,本次大陸兩會,應義無反顧再次確認兩岸和平發展路線,以安定台灣民心。恰好,《十三五規畫綱要》,將由今年兩會進行審查及定案,大陸黨政領導層理應通過該綱要,來釋放新的「兩岸和平紅利」,讓台灣民眾感受到更多實惠;這樣也可牽制民進黨,使該黨的兩岸路線不致太偏差。

既然如此,則《十三五規畫綱要》的兩岸專章,應該擴大及深化兩岸經貿合作內容。譬如,十二五規畫提到支持海峽西岸經濟區建設,十三五規畫則應擴大及深化表述為「支持各自由貿易區及一帶一路的對台交流合作項目」,這樣對台更有吸引力。至於十二五規畫所講的「一國兩制」,十三五規畫是否需再提,也值得大陸方面深入考量。

本次兩會勢必要對仍拒絕接受九二共識的民進黨「有所表示」,我們期盼大陸黨政領導層,應區隔民進黨與社會大眾,勿傷害一般民眾對中國大陸的感情,對民進黨可以「鼓勵」替代「對抗」,使民進黨心甘情願向九二共識靠攏,這樣也可避免兩岸關係發生震盪。畢竟,民進黨政府3個月後才上台,其兩岸政策路線還有很大的調整餘地。