Monday, September 12, 2016

Now Is the Time for the KMT to Speak Out on Cross-Strait Relations

Now Is the Time for the KMT to Speak Out on Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
September 13, 2016

Executive Summary: One hundred days after taking office, President Tsai's popularity has plummeted. All manner of polls have her on the critical list. All manner of protests have broken out, one after another. Cross-Strait relations remain deadlocked, creating a serious drag on Taiwan's economic development. The public can take to the streets. But otherwise it is helpless. At this stage of the game, it can still find no substitute for the DPP. The KMT is still licking its wounds following its rout at the polls. It has yet to reposition itself and find its future direction. The KMT will naturally find it difficult to regain the voters' trust. DPP governance may be riddled with problems. But persuading voters to switch back to the KMT is going to be difficult.

Full Text Below:

One hundred days after taking office, President Tsai's popularity has plummeted. All manner of polls have her on the critical list. All manner of protests have broken out, one after another. Cross-Strait relations remain deadlocked, creating a serious drag on Taiwan's economic development. The public can take to the streets. But otherwise it is helpless. At this stage of the game, it can still find no substitute for the DPP. The KMT is still licking its wounds following its rout at the polls. It has yet to reposition itself and find its future direction. The KMT will naturally find it difficult to regain the voters' trust. DPP governance may be riddled with problems. But persuading voters to switch back to the KMT is going to be difficult.

This is especially true with cross-Strait issues. Cross-Strait issues were once the KMT's strength. This was especially true in 2005, when Lien Chan visited the Mainland. The KMT was virtually a symbol of peaceful cross-Strait interaction. It was the ballast that ensured stable cross-Strait relations. But the dividends from cross-Strait interaction failed to reach the lower rungs of society. They failed to result in salary increases. Instead, the facilitation of cross-Strait capital flows led to rising housing prices that priced young people out of the housing market. Public resentment against the Kuomintang exploded. Cross-Strait relations became a liability instead of an asset.

Following the election, KMT members demanded a review of cross-Strait policy. Many even want the KMT to take the “nativist” path. But that is surely gross overcompensation.

To be fair, peaceful cross-Strait relations and cross-Strait civilian exchanges are the historical trend. The KMT must be commended for having the courage to stand on the cutting edge. The monopolization and uneven distribution of the benefits of cross-Strait exchanges must of course be addressed. But the basic direction was absolutely correct. When the KMT reviews its cross-Strait policy path, it must distinguish between strategic direction and specific policies. It must not “give up eating for fear of choking”. It must not sit on its hands and do nothing.

Consider the current cross-Strait situation. The Mainland insists on the 1992 Consensus. But the DPP government refuses to recognize it. This means the 1992 Consensus no longer provides room for negotiation. In order to get cross-Strait relations back on track, toward healthy development, a new basis for cross-Strait political relations must be found. The Mainland is flexible on this issue. The Mainland has long focused on the implications of the 1992 Consensus, rather than the term itself. In other words, if the new government can find some sort of loophole, the cross-Strait deadlock can be broken. But given the Tsai government's policy tone, one cannot expect the Tsai government to offer up any sound policies. The Tsai government's cross-Strait strategy is to avoid making any mistakes, rather than getting anything done. But managing Cold Confrontation is difficult. The harm inflicted upon Taiwan's economy is all too real. This provides the KMT with a golden opportunity.

On September 4, the KMT Party Congress incorporated a Peace Agreement into its new party platform. But controversy erupted over “one China, different interpretations”. This newspaper has long urged the KMT to convene a policy debate on this very issue in order to establish a strategic direction. Since the Five Goals of the Lien Hu summit were announced, the Kuomintang has benefited from large scale cross-Strait exchanges. It has become lax in its defense of its policy path. This has weakened its ability to explain what it is doing. During public debates, it has found itself pummeled relentlessly, helpless to fend off DPP red-baiting and accusations of “pandering to China [sic] and selling out Taiwan”. This remains true even today.

This problem increases the need for debate and clarification. Preparation for debate is precisely what the KMT needs in order to regain the initiative when debating cross-Strait relations. We earnestly hope the Kuomintang will take advantage of this opportunity.

Trust between the KMT and the Mainland runs deep. As long as the two sides adhere to the one China principle and oppose Taiwan independence, there will be no conflict between the KMT and the CCP. The KMT can then throw open its doors and seek better solutions to cross-Strait problems.

The KMT's premise of "one China, different interpretations" stresses its commitment to the Republic of China. The "one China, same interpretation” premise represents an ambitious step forward in cross-Strait relations. Both formulations enable the Taiwan side to advance or retreat. Neither premise involves opposition with the Mainland. Both recognize one China. Both are consistent with the Mainland's own position. Both are likely to become the mainstream view on Taiwan in the future. The KMT has absolutely no need to fret about voter appeal or political correctness. As long as the matter is debated, supporters of the Kuomintang will rally to the cause, and help Taiwan establish a new basis for cross-Strait relations. This is the key by which the Kuomintang can renew itself and achieve electoral victory.

KMT cross-Strait policy should be also consider the perception of 1.3 billion compatriots on the Mainland. The Tsai government's words and deeds have provoked anti-Taiwan sentiment on the Mainland. The KMT must distance itself from the DPP. Its policy must express goodwill toward the Mainland. It must restore friendship between private individuals on both sides of the Strait. It must act as a stabilizing force in cross-Strait relations, and increase the scope of cross-Strait exchanges. Cross-Strait civilian exchanges will inform people on Taiwan about the role of the KMT, and enable them to realize its importance. This will gradually transform perceptions about the KMT, and help it return to power.

奪回兩岸話語權 國民黨趁現在
2016/9/13 中國時報

蔡總統上任百日之後,聲望直墜,各類民調都進入死亡交叉,各種抗議此起彼落,而兩岸關係僵局難解,更將嚴重拖累台灣的發展。對此,社會各界除了批評抗議以外似乎也是束手無策,因為現階段還找不到可以代替民進黨政府的政治力量。特別是國民黨,至今仍走不出大敗過後的陣痛期,找不到黨的自我定位和未來發展方向。在這種情況下,國民黨自然很難重新贏得選民的信任,即便民進黨施政問題重重,也難以讓選票重新流回國民黨。

兩岸問題尤其如此。兩岸議題曾經是國民黨的強項,特別是從2005年連戰訪問大陸以來,國民黨幾乎就是兩岸和平互動的象徵,也是維繫兩岸關係健康發展的壓艙石。但兩岸紅利並未滲透到社會底層,企業利益增加未能帶動薪資提高,兩岸資金流通便捷反而造成房價高漲,年輕人買不起房,人民對國民黨的不滿情緒爆發,兩岸關係反而成了國民黨負資產。

選後檢討,國民黨內要求檢討兩岸政策路線的聲音不絕於耳,也有不少國民黨人甚至認為應該走本土路線,但這無疑又是矯枉過正。

持平而論,兩岸關係和平發展以及兩岸民間的大交流當然是歷史趨勢,國民黨勇於站上這一歷史潮流的風口浪尖也值得讚許。兩岸交流過程中存在資源壟斷和利益分配不均問題,應該採取切中要害的措施加以解決,但基本方向並沒有錯誤,國民黨要檢討兩岸政策路線,應該分清戰略方向和具體策略的分際,不能因噎廢食,也不能無所作為。

當前的兩岸形勢是,大陸堅持九二共識,民進黨政府卻堅持拒絕,這意味九二共識問題已經失去轉圜空間,為了讓兩岸關係重回健康發展的軌道,就必須尋找新的兩岸政治基礎。大陸在此問題上並非沒有靈活性,大陸的重點始終是九二共識所蘊涵的一中內涵,而不是名詞。換句話說,新政府若能在一中問題上找到解套之法,兩岸僵局就有解。但從蔡政府的政策基調來看,很難寄望蔡政府找到解套良策,「不求有功、但求無過」是蔡政府當下的兩岸基本戰略,但冷對抗的管理極度複雜,對台灣經濟的傷害卻非常具體,這正是國民黨再起的機會。

9月4日舉行的國民黨黨代會已經將和平協議納入新政綱,但在一中各表問題上產生爭論,我們曾多次呼籲國民黨能就此問題進行政策辯論,以確立國民黨的戰略方向。自從連胡五項共同願景發表之後,國民黨受惠於兩岸大交流的成果,放鬆了在政策論述上的努力,導致自己在兩岸問題上缺乏論述能力,在輿論場上也處於被動挨打的局面,面對民進黨的長期抹紅毫無招架之力,親中賣台形象即便到現在還是難以擺脫。

面對這一問題,就更需要藉辯論之機予以澄清,而辯論的準備過程恰恰也是國民黨重建論述、重奪兩岸關係話語主導權的過程,我們真誠建議國民黨能夠珍惜這一機會。

國民黨與大陸的互信基礎深厚,只要守住兩岸一中和反台獨的路線,就不會有國共對立的問題,國民黨完全可以大開大闔,在政策辯論中找到更好的兩岸問題解套之法。

「一中各表」強調對中華民國立場的堅守,「一中同表」則代表了進一步推進兩岸關係的企圖心,對台灣來說,二者是進可攻、退可守的策略,絕非截然對立。兩種說法都承認兩岸一中,也都和大陸的原則相契合,二者未來都可能成為引領台灣的主流路線,國民黨大可不必以選舉心態,動輒以政治正確來否定其中一種主張,只要通過辯論,就可以產生國民黨支持者的最大公約數,建立為台灣找到出路的兩岸新論述,這才是國民黨能夠再起和獲勝的關鍵。

國民黨在思考兩岸政策時還應該考量大陸13億人的觀感,蔡政府的言行已引爆大陸民間反台情緒,對此,國民黨必須予以區隔,在政策論述上要向大陸釋放善意,重建兩岸民間互動的友好氛圍,如此也能讓自己扮演兩岸關係健康發展的穩定力量,讓兩岸交往之路愈走愈寬。通過兩岸民間交流,國民黨的這一角色也可以從大陸傳回台灣,讓台灣民眾意識到國民黨的重要性,從而逐漸轉變對國民黨的觀感,幫助其重回執政之路。

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