United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 23, 2016
Executive Summary: The Tsai government should view the Soong Xi meeting as treading on thin ice. The Tsai government has upped the ante on cross-Strait relations. If it fails to win back its ante, it will lose even more than it has. This will leave Beijing in an even more advantageous situation. Beijing should take advantage of this situation. It should not treat it as a provocation, but rather as goodwill gesture from Tsai. If it does, James Soong's visit to APEC may become a surprise hit. The “meet and greet” may be regarded as James Soong's personal victory. Will it become a victory for Tsai Ying-wen? That depends on the remaining pieces of the jigsaw puzzle.
Full Text Below:
The Soong Xi meeting is a jigsaw puzzle.
James Soong set out on the 15th. On the 16th, Ma Xiaoguang, spokesman for the Mainland State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, said Taiwan's participation at APEC requires conformance with the One China Principle and the related Memorandum of Understanding. He did not say that James Soong conformed to the One China Principle or the Memorandum of Understanding. His wording suggested that Soong did not. Apparently Beijing failed to discourage Soong from attending.
Ma Xiaoguang also said "The Taiwan authorities do not recognize the 1992 Consensus. Therefore the two sides cannot possibly engage in any real and meaningful interaction". The Mainland realized that some form of unavoidable contact would take place. Therefore it immunized itself in advance by stipulating that any interaction “would not be real and meaningful”.
The “meet and greet” took place in the arrival lounge. James Soong sought out Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping did not seek out James Soong. Before the meeting, the green camp revealed its calculations. If Xi Jinping responded to James Soong's overture in an unseemly manner, he would become an international laughing stock. He would also anger the public on Taiwan. Therefore Xi Jinping would probably not ignore Soong outright. Most of the Mainland media dismissed the prospect of a Xi Soong meeting. But naturally Xi Jinping was not about to lose his composure.
The TPP has been badly shaken. The Beijing sponsored RCEP and FTAAP have stolen the spotlight. Xi Jinping suddenly became the star of the Lima conference. For Xi to deal with James Soong by blocking him, rejecting his overtures, or totally ignoring him, was unthinkable. Xi may have concluded that Tsai Ing-wen and James Soong were attempting to take advantage of him. But he knew that under such circumstances he must nevertheless observe the social niceties. Therefore characterizing the Soong Xi “meet and greet” as a “Soong Xi summit” is gross exaggeration.
The Soong Xi “meet and greet” left no photographic record. The two sides met behind the scenes. The bottom line was “No photos”. Beijing insisted on this. It had no desire to publicize the encounter. One can only speculate, but photographs were probably not the only thing that the Mainland rejected behind the scenes.
The size of the lounge resulted in a Soong Xi “meet and greet”. But the Tsai government remains far from Beijing on matters of policy. The political foundation established by the 1992 Consensus, the one China principle, opposition to Taiwan independence, and one China, different interpretations, has collapsed. James Soong said he asked Xi Jinping to "look after Taiwan's small and medium enterprises". This was virtually a case of “lan jiao cheng qing”, i.e., prostrating oneself before the sedan chair of a high official to plead one's case. Also, before the conference, while he was still in Taipei, James Soong proclaimed his support for the one China principle, his opposition to Taiwan independence, and his support for the concept of a “one China roof” covering both Taiwan and the Mainland. After he arrived in Lima however, he told reporters he would only discuss economics and trade, and that they must not be confused with politics.
Was this chess move by Tsai and Soong a one-time event? Or can we expect more of the same? Is Tsai Ying-wen using James Soong as an overt or covert cross-Strait go between? Will Beijing decide to play along and use Soong as a cross-Strait go between? This is a serious matter. James Soong may be Alibaba. But even he must shout “Open sesame” before the door will open. Will the two sides continue to abide by the 1992 Consensus? Or will the Mainland demand recognition of the one China principle and opposition to Taiwan independence as well, as a prerequisite for restored cross-Strait relations?
The APEC scenario showed the Tsai government suing for peace. It also featured Beijing in the role of Jiang Taigong, who dangled his fish hook three feet above the surface of the water, to ensure that any fish that he caught actually wanted to be caught. Tsai Ing-wen used James Soong as her calling card, just as Chen Shui-bian once used James Soong as his stepping stone. In 2005, Beijing played up the Lien Hu summit, while playing down the Soong Hu summit. James Soong's "sincere" alliance with Chen Shui-bian alienated Beijing. James Soong made the red green trial balloon at APEC possible. Beijing may decide to strike while the iron is hot, and play Tsai Ying-wen's game.
If so, Tsai Ing-wen will have to overcome a number of difficulties. Difficulty One. She is using James Soong to pave the way. But whether he can do so, depends on Beijing. Difficulty Two. When James Soong's role in paving the way becomes more apparent, how will the green camp and Taiwan independence elements react? That is something Tsai Ying-wen will have to deal with. As matters stand, Beijing may accept James Soong. The question is whether Taiwan independence elements will find it acceptable.
The Tsai government should view the Soong Xi meeting as treading on thin ice. The Tsai government has upped the ante on cross-Strait relations. If it fails to win back its ante, it will lose even more than it has. This will leave Beijing in an even more advantageous situation. Beijing should take advantage of this situation. It should not treat it as a provocation, but rather as goodwill gesture from Tsai. If it does, James Soong's visit to APEC may become a surprise hit.
The “meet and greet” may be regarded as James Soong's personal victory. Will it become a victory for Tsai Ying-wen? That depends on the remaining pieces of the jigsaw puzzle.
宋楚瑜與習近平的咫尺天涯
2016-11-23 聯合報
欲解讀「宋習寒暄」的過程與意義，仍是一幅尚待拼湊的拼圖。
宋楚瑜十五日啟程赴會。十六日，國台辦發言人馬曉光仍說，台灣方面人士參加ＡＰＥＣ會議，必須符合一中原則和有關諒解備忘錄的規定。不過，他未說明，宋是「符合一中原則」，或不符諒解備忘錄？唯語意透露著否定，可見宋的出席乃是北京阻擋未果。
馬曉光又說：「台灣當局不承認九二共識，兩岸雙方就不可能進行任何有實質意義的良性互動。」這是預期習宋在會中不能避免某種形式的接觸，但已事前定位為「不具實質意義的互動」，打了預防針。
寒暄是在等候進場的休息室發生，由宋「主動出擊」，習是被動。會前，綠營透露沙盤推演，謂若習近平對宋的動作之回應失態，不但貽笑國際，也將激怒台灣人，因此習不致峻拒；大陸多數媒體則唱衰習宋互動的可能性。但習近平的不致失態，應屬必然。
由於ＴＰＰ動搖，北京推倡的ＲＣＥＰ與ＦＴＡＡＰ頓成顯學，習近平儼然成為利馬年會的明星。倘若他在處理宋楚瑜的動作時，竟出以阻攔、拒絕或完全相應不理，是無法想像的事。習的平靜應對，透露著自信；他可能會認為，這是被蔡英文及宋楚瑜吃了豆腐，但在這樣的場合仍須維持儀態。因而，若要將在此種情境中發生的宋習寒暄稱為「宋習會」，恐是逾格的渲染解讀。
宋習寒暄，未見合影。由此可見，雙方應有幕後交涉，不見照片是底線，且此係出自北京的主張，不願見此事過度渲染。由此亦可推測，雙方的幕後交涉，可能不只不見照片。
休息室的咫尺，造成宋習寒暄；但蔡政府與北京的政策距離仍隔如天涯。如今，兩岸連「九二共識／一中原則／反對台獨／一中各表」等共同政治基礎都告崩解，宋楚瑜卻稱，他對習近平說的是「如何照顧台灣中小企業」，這其實是近乎「攔轎陳情」的層次。何況，會前在台北宣示「一中原則／反對台獨／一中屋頂」的宋楚瑜，在利馬記者會上卻稱，只講經貿，不要混為一談。
蔡宋聯手的這一著棋，是一次性或後效可期？蔡英文今後難道就以宋楚瑜為公開或秘密的兩岸管道？或北京今後也將計就計地以宋為兩岸管道？這是茲事體大。因為，宋即使是阿里巴巴，也要喊芝麻開門。只打出宋楚瑜三字恐怕不夠，兩岸是否繼續維繫「九二共識」，或另建包括「一中原則／反對台獨」的其他論述成為兩岸共同政治基礎，必是無可迴避的前提。
ＡＰＥＣ的這一場景暴露了蔡政府求和的殷切，也顯露了北京姜太公釣魚願者上鉤的淡定。蔡英文用宋楚瑜作敲門磚，猶如陳水扁當年用宋楚瑜為探路石。二○○五年，北京抬高了連胡會、壓低了宋胡會，而宋扁的「真誠」結盟亦旋告反目。然而，此番ＡＰＥＣ的紅綠試探，若因宋楚瑜開了頭，北京亦不無打蛇隨棍上的可能性，也許會試著陪蔡英文玩下去。
倘係如此，困難應在蔡英文的肩頭。困難之一，她用宋楚瑜開路，但開不開得成及路向何處開，恐仍操在北京之手。何況，困難之二，當宋楚瑜開路的角色漸形凸顯，綠營及獨派會如何反應，那將是蔡英文必須面對的事。事態發展至此地步，北京接受宋的可能性是有的，問題在獨派吞不吞得下去。
蔡政府應以臨深履薄的心情看宋習寒暄。此事已使蔡政府在兩岸博奕中投下更多的賭注，如果不能回本，就會輸得更多。此事亦使北京站在穩賺不賠的地位，因此似應順勢而為，不必將「被寒暄」視為挑釁，而宜看作蔡英文的善意試探。倘係如此，宋楚瑜出使ＡＰＥＣ，也許就成了歪打正著。
這場寒暄或許可視為宋楚瑜個人的戰役成功，至於是否會形成蔡英文的戰爭勝利，尚待拼圖。
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