Recognize Taiwan's Strategic Advantages: Pander Not to Japan

Recognize Taiwan's Strategic Advantages: Pander Not to Japan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 3, 2016

Executive Summary: The Tsai government must think long and hard about its behavior when confronted with Japan. It must not reflexively cave in every time. Instead it must understand its strategic advantages. It must negotiate with the Japanese to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. Only that counts as responsible government.

Full Text Below:

To deal with the problem of Taiwan fishing vessels fishing in the waters off "Okinotori", Japan convened a "Taiwan-Japan Conference on Ocean Affairs and Cooperation" in Tokyo. But a day of wrangling proved fruitless. Shortly after the DPP government took office, it withdrew from the waters off “Okinotori” on its own, without prompting. The Ma government insisted that “Okinotori” was merely a reef and not an island. During recent talks however, the Tsai government repudiated the Ma government position. Alas, it received nothing in return. It received neither a compromise nor a commitment on fishing rights. The Tsai government may also have undermined our bargaining position in negotiations over the sovereignty of Taiping Island. Tsai government diplomatic ineptitude has left the public frustrated. The ability of Taiwan fishermen to make a living has been severely compromised. No wonder fishermen's groups are up in arms.

Let us examine the issues discussed by the two sides. They include cooperation on fisheries, maritime search and rescue, and science and technology. The scope is broad. Maritime search and rescue cooperation is a matter of national security involving sensitive issues. Participants on our side included the Agriculture Commission Fisheries Agency, the Coast Guard, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security Council. This shows that our concerns are not limited to fishing rights. The Japanese side however, downplayed the matter. It tried to minimize political sensitivity in everything from meeting procedures to seating arrangements. During the talks, the Tsai government renounced the Ma government's insistence that “Okinotoro” was a reef, not an island. The Tsai government merely asked that fishing vessels from Taiwan be permitted to operate outside the 12 nautical mile limit, and protested the seizing of fishing vessels such as the Tung Sheng Chi Number 16. Its demand that fishing vessels be returned was rejected. Instead Japan reaffirmed sovereignty over “Okinotoro” and claimed a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone.

The DPP took the initiative and made concessions on the island vs. reef issue. Japan accepted the concessions as their rightful due, then turned a deaf ear to our demands on fishing rights. Japan held its ground. It ignored our compromises and concessions. The Tsai government surrendered without a fight. Was this a strategic blunder? Did the Japanese have our number? Or does the DPP government have ulterior motives for allowing Japan to eat its lunch?

After taking office, President Tsai has not explicitly declared that the government was “cozying up to the US and Japan, and distancing itself from the Mainland”. But through her public statements and actual moves, President Tsai hopes to improve her government's relationship with the United States and Japan. She even hopes to become part of the US Pivot to Asia strategy. Therefore, when negotiating with Japan, she repudiated the Ma government strategy of fighting for every last square inch of land. She made strategic concessions to Japan in exchange for its support. But the real world consequences were clearly not what she expected.

Strategically speaking, Taipei and Tokyo do in fact need each other. But during negotiations, Japan puts its national interests first. It never sacrifices its substantive interests for strategic cooperation. Japan is aware of Taiwan's strategic needs. But it is not about to make concessions with regards its substantive interests. Japan has also demanded that Taiwan lift its ban on the import of foodstuffs from disaster-stricken areas. When given an inch, it takes a mile.

From this perspective, the Tsai government committed a strategic blunder. Look back at the Ma government's policy of "close to the US, friendly to Japan, and at peace with the Mainland”. The DPP airily dismissed it as "pandering to China [sic], and selling out Taiwan". In fact Ma's policy involved a shrewd strategic balance. The Ma government used improved cross-Strait relations to force the United States and Japan to fulfill Taiwan's strategic needs, often by making substantive concessions to Taiwan.

In particular, during Taiwan-Japan fisheries negotiations, the Japanese were subject to relentless pressure from the Mainland regarding Diaoyutai. They were forced to cooperate with Taiwan, and make major concessions in order to dissuade Taiwan from cooperating with the Mainland in the defense of Diaoyutai. The Mainland, the US and Japan are engaged in a strategic struggle. Within the cracks Taiwan gained hard won breathing room. It also won major concessions for Taiwan fishermen.

Unfortunately the Tsai government is ideologically committed to opposing the Mainland. It does everything in its power to distance itself in order to reduce pressure from the Mainland. It must rely on outside forces to resist the Mainland. This has led to a loss of strategic footing. Worse, it has enabled the US and Japan to see through its game. Ever since President Tsai's election victory, Japan has sent one delegation after another to Taiwan to demand the lifting of the ban on food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster area. The United States has relentlessly demanded the lifting of the ban on US pork imports. These are practical examples of Taiwan's substantive interests being sacrificed as a consequence of strategic compromises.

Chiu Yi-jen is purportedly a master strategist within the DPP. He is charged with negotiations between Taipei and Tokyo. This makes one wonder just what is Tsai's strategic intent? Why does she cave in whenever she confronts Japan? Why can't she solve this problem? In fact, Taiwan has plenty of chips it can play when dealing with Japan. Since taking office, Abe has been mired in a global strategic battle with the Mainland in the Asia-Pacific region. Every square inch of land is being fought over. Japan clearly does not want the Mainland to control the East Asian region. It is determined to check it with every ounce of strength it can muster.

In other words, Japan's strategic intentions mean that Taiwan and Japan need each other. It is not simply a case of Taiwan needing Japan. As long as Taiwan is able to remain flexible and maintain a balance between the Mainland and Japan, it hold its own and force Japan to choose.

The Tsai government must think long and hard about its behavior when confronted with Japan. It must not reflexively cave in every time. Instead it must understand its strategic advantages. It must negotiate with the Japanese to maximize the interests of the public on Taiwan. Only that counts as responsible government.

社論》認清台灣戰略優勢 不必逢日必軟
2016/11/3 下午 07:38:22  主筆室

為處理我漁船在「沖之鳥」水域捕魚問題，東京舉行的「台日海洋事務合作對話會議」，經過一天折衝，未能達成任何具體成果。民進黨政府就任不久，隨即主動撤出沖之鳥水域海巡艦艇，這次對話又放棄馬政府「沖之鳥」是礁非島主張，卻未能換得日方對捕魚權的妥協或承諾，甚至埋下伏筆，將對我方太平島主權談判造成不利影響。蔡政府外交折衝能力不但讓民眾失望，漁民生計更深受損害，難怪漁民團體紛紛表態抗議。

攤開雙方討論議題，包括漁業合作、海上搜救合作、海洋科學合作等，議題範圍甚廣，尤其海上搜救合作屬於國安層級，事涉敏感。我方除農委會漁業署、海巡署、科技部外，外交部及國安會也加入對話，顯示我方志不僅在漁權，實另有所圖。不過，日方非常低調，由會議程序及座位安排觀察，試圖盡量降低政治敏感性。會談中，我方放棄馬政府時代「沖之鳥」為礁非島的主張，僅要求在「沖之鳥」12浬範圍外海域漁船作業，並對日方扣捕我東聖吉16號等漁船表示抗議，要求索回該漁船遭日方沒收之保釋金。日方沒有正面回應，反而重申其擁有「沖之鳥」的主權和200浬專屬經濟海域立場。

民進黨政府在島礁問題上主動讓步，日本卻將我方讓步視為理所應當，對我方要求的捕漁權則置若罔聞。日本堅持立場，不因我方妥協而讓步，蔡政府未戰先讓。這究竟是我方戰略誤判，日方鴨霸吃定台灣，還是民進黨政府另有所圖，放任日本吃定？

蔡總統上任以來，雖未明言「親美日、遠大陸」，但透過其公開發言和實際行動都可以看出，希望透過加強與美日等國的準聯盟關係，消解來自大陸的影響力，甚至希望配合美國重返亞洲戰略。因此，在與日本談判時，一改馬政府寸土必爭的作法，而以戰略上的讓步來換取日本的支持，但實際效果顯然未如預期。

從戰略上看，台日雙方確實彼此需要，但日本在談判中，仍以本國利益優先，不會因為戰略合作的需要而輕言放棄現實利益。甚至可以說，日本也意識到台灣對自己的戰略需要，反而更不願意在實際利益上作出讓步。不僅如此，日本對台灣其實是予取予求，除了漁權問題以外，日本還要求台灣解禁核災區食品進口，可謂步步進逼。

從這個角度看，蔡政府犯了戰略錯誤。回顧馬政府時代「親美友日和中」政策，民進黨簡單斥之為「親中賣台」，殊不知這是非常巧妙的戰略平衡。馬政府藉改善兩岸關係，讓美日產生對台灣的戰略需要，常能換得美日對台政策的實質利益。

特別是台日漁權談判上，日本受制於大陸在釣魚台問題上步步進逼，不得不選擇與台灣合作，終於在漁權上對台灣大幅讓步，讓台灣不與大陸合作保釣，免除腹背受敵厄運。台灣在中美日戰略博弈夾縫中，爭取到難得的生存空間，也為台灣漁民爭得實際利益。

但蔡政府出於「疑中抗中」意識形態，集中精力疏遠大陸，為了減輕來自大陸的壓力，就必須引入外力加以抗衡，這就平白無故讓自己失去了戰略縱深，更讓美日看破手腳。從蔡總統勝選以來，日方就接二連三派遣代表團推動核災區食品解禁，美國也不斷要求開放美豬進口，都是戰略妥協之下台灣實際利益遭到損害的實際事例。

號稱民進黨戰略高手的邱義仁，是台日談判主導，這不能不讓人產生疑問，蔡政府的戰略意圖到底是什麼？為何逢日必軟而找不到解套之法？事實上，台灣面對日本絕非毫無討價還價能力，安倍上任以來在全球與大陸展開戰略競逐，在亞太區域更是寸土必爭，顯然，日本不希望大陸完全掌控東亞區域主導權，希望拉攏一切可能力量加以制衡。

換句話說，日本的戰略意圖意味台日之間是相互需要，絕非單純台灣有求於日本。只要台灣在中國大陸與日本間，能保持靈活的平衡關係，就有空間提出並堅持自己的主張，日本也會識時務作出選擇。

蔡政府應該深刻反省自己面對日本時的種種表現，不要逢日必軟，反而應該在清晰認知自己戰略優勢的基礎上，對日本據理力爭，最大限度的為台灣人民爭取利益，這才是負責任的政府。