Thursday, December 22, 2016

Diplomatic Setbacks: The Tsai Government Must Consider the National Interest

Diplomatic Setbacks: The Tsai Government Must Consider the National Interest
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 23, 2016

Executive Summary: After eight years of diplomatic truce, Sao Tome and Principe have suddenly broken off relations with Taipei. Many are angry and uneasy. Beijing persuaded a diplomatic ally to switch sides because the Tsai government refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. That was entirely predictable. The Trump Tsai phone call resulted in Trump opening fire on the Mainland, and accelerated the process.

Full Text Below:

After eight years of diplomatic truce, Sao Tome and Principe have suddenly broken off relations with Taipei. Many are angry and uneasy. Beijing persuaded a diplomatic ally to switch sides because the Tsai government refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. That was entirely predictable. The Trump Tsai phone call resulted in Trump opening fire on the Mainland, and accelerated the process.

The first domino has fallen. if we do not want to see a second or even third and fourth domino fall, what countermeasures must the Tsai government take? Unfortunately, public statements by President Tsai personally and others following high-level national security meetings, indicate that no new strategies are in sight. All we see are replays of the "Pity poor Taiwan” card from the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian eras. This is more regrettable than any severing of diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

Sao Tome and Principe broke off relations with Taipei. President Tsai called on government agencies charged with national security and foreign affairs to consider countermeasures. She made three points. One. The government will help allies via “pragmatic diplomacy”. But it need not compete with Beijing over checkbook diplomacy. Two. Cross-Strait relations do not conflict with participation in international affairs. The government considers Beijing's handling of the one China principle regrettable. Three. Government agencies charged with fiscal and economic affairs should continue to focus on foreign exchange matters and their impact on the stock market. These three points are tired cliches. Not one of them has any relevance to events over the past 20 years. The government is merely consoling itself. The presidential office even resorted to indignation and sensationalism to fan public sentiment. It retreated instead of advanced in its thinking.

Sao Tome and Principle broke off relations with Taipei. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored Sao Tome and Principe's demand for 200 million USD in financial aid. It created the impression among the Taiwan public that Sao Tome and Principle was "greedy", and "unscrupulous". But this is the reality of international politics. This tiny island took advantage of the contradiction between the Mainland and Taiwan. It used it as leverage. This is the way small nations pursue their national interests. The Tsai government can only blame the diplomatic quarrel between the two sides of the Strait. This presented other nations with opportunities to exploit. Besides, how is this any different from the Tsai government's pandering to the United States and Japan?

Furthermore, so-called "checkbook diplomacy" is ugly beyond compare. But suppose we use it in a positive manner, for humanitarian assistance? Suppose we use it to help our allies grow their economies, or establish medical or educational facilities? This would increase our participation in international activities and our international visibility. Unfortunately, when Taiwan was knee deep in money, we merely bought other nations off with money. We failed to establish a reputation as an international benefactor. Taiwan is no longer so flush. We can no longer compete with the Mainland in checkbook diplomacy. We now blame our allies for demanding too much money. If we fail to resolve these contradictions as Taiwan's economic competitiveness declines and our diplomatic arrogance increases, how can we possibly address our diplomatic plight?

The loss of diplomatic relations with Sao Tome and Principe is not that frightening. After all, it is only a tiny island off the coast of Africa with 150,000 people and 1,000 hectares of land area. The question is, who do we have to lose before we really begin to worry? Who do we have to maintain diplomatic relations with before we really feel we have dignity? Political debate on Taiwan has long been a mile wide and an inch deep. The government's reaction to severed diplomatic relations has been to blame Beijing, denounce those nations that broke off relations, or issue panicky and empty declarations. Seldom if ever has the government reflected upon or changed its strategy and tactics. This time was no exception. Even more surprising, David Lee insisted that the severed relations had no relationship with the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said the move was directed against everyone in the nation. How can people this evasive honestly confront reality?

Severed diplomatic relations are not that frightening. What is frightening is the government's aimlessness and blindness, and its ability to lead people around by the nose. Take cross-Strait relations. The ROC must strive for equality, dignity, and visibility. That goes without saying. But the international reality means that equality, dignity, and visibility cannot be achieved through confrontation or impassioned propaganda. It can only be achieved by quietly working behind the scenes on critical issues. The DPP, sad to say, is not good at this. The DPP demands instant results. The DPP is good at springing short-term surprises and launching surprise attacks. These tactics, unfortunately, do not work well on the diplomatic front. Even if they win battles, they cannot win wars. This is clear from the defeats at the WHO annual meeting, the ICAO Assembly, and Interpol.

Tsai Ing-wen needs to be less DPP-centric, and more concerned with the national interest. Only then will she be able to see what her diplomatic strategy ought to be.

外交受挫 政府要務實思考國家利益
2016-12-23 聯合報

歷經八年外交休兵的平靜,台灣突然面對聖多美普林西比宣布斷交,許多民眾難免感到憤怒與不安。事實上,在蔡政府拒絕承認九二共識後,中共藉機奪取我邦交國以為威嚇,已在預料之中;只不過,「川蔡通電」觸發川普對中國大陸開砲,加速了台聖斷交的過程。

在第一張骨牌倒下後,如果我們不願意再看到第二張、甚至第三、第四張骨牌繼續被推倒;那麼,蔡政府可有什麼對策?遺憾的是,從蔡總統的談話及隨後召開的國安高層會議,民眾看不到新思維或新戰略,只看到李、扁時代的「悲情牌」借屍還魂。這點,其實是比台灣「被斷交」還可悲的事。

在台聖宣告斷交後,蔡總統召集國安、外交部門研商對策,並作出三點裁示。第一,要本著平等互惠的「踏實外交」原則協助友邦發展,但不必與中共作金錢競逐;第二,兩岸的國際參與彼此並無衝突,中共操作「一中原則」令人遺憾;第三,財經部門應持續關注外交事件對股匯市的影響。這三項裁示皆是萬古老調,沒有一點超越近廿年的思維,而比較像是政府的自我寬慰;甚至,總統府用了義憤填膺的煽情手法來訴諸選民,心態上反顯得倒退。

這次聖多美普林西比與我斷交,外交部刻意強調聖國索求兩億美元之金援未遂,意圖製造民眾對該國「貪得無饜」、「見利忘義」之惡感。事實上,回到國際政治的現實,這個蕞爾小島利用一中一台的矛盾居間槓桿取利,這是小國追逐國家利益之道;要怪只能怪兩岸畸形的外交競逐,提供了該國鑽營的機會。何況,蔡政府親美媚日以抗中的身段,與此有多少差別?

進一步看,所謂「金錢外交」,今天看來固然醜陋無比,但如果善用其光明面進行海外人道援助,協助友邦發展經濟、醫療或教育等建設,其實可以為台灣創造可觀的國際參與成績,也是提升國家能見度的好機會。遺憾的是,在台灣錢「淹腳目」的時代,我們只想用暴發戶手段花錢買外交,卻未能積極經營海外援助的形象;而如今台灣手頭不再寬裕,在經援資金上競爭不過對岸,遂反過來責怪友邦需索無度。這樣的矛盾情結若不設法解開,台灣物質上的競爭條件變弱,外交上的自大心態卻日甚一日,我們的外交困境如何可能有解?

失去聖多美普林西比的邦交,其實並沒有那麼可怕;畢竟,這只是個人口才十五萬、面積僅一千公頃的非洲外海小島。問題是,我們要失去誰,才會真正感到憂心?我們要維持與誰的邦交,才讓台灣感到尊嚴?多年來,在台灣的淺碟政治下,政府對斷交的反應,除了指責中共、謾罵斷交對象作情緒發洩,或者說些處變不驚的空話,很少從基本國家戰略面來反省及調整政府的目標和手段;這次的反應,幾不例外。更令人吃驚的是,李大維說斷交「無關九二共識」,蔡英文說打壓是針對全體國人;這樣東遮西掩的邏輯,又怎麼可能有誠懇面對現實的心?

斷交並不可怕,可怕的是政府漫無目標的盲動,又胡亂號召人民跟隨它走向不知何方。以兩岸關係為例,台灣當然必須極力爭取對等與尊嚴,爭取國家的能見度。但在國際現實環境中,所謂對等尊嚴與能見度,並非僅靠著對抗或激情喊話即能達成,而必須隱微地在關鍵處下工夫,必須靠長期的經營耕耘成果。但是,這些正好是急功近利、貪功躁進的民進黨最不擅長的事。民進黨喜歡的是短線驚奇,擅長的是發動奇襲;然而,這些招術在外交陣線往往卻不管用,就算儌倖贏得一役,也贏不了戰爭。這些,從世衛組織年會、國際民航組織大會,國際刑警組織大會的交鋒落敗,其實已一目了然。

蔡英文只要少一點民進黨自我中心、多一點國家利益考量,外交戰略自然能更清晰。

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